Local NGOs in national development : the case of East Timor by Hunt, J
  
 
 
Local NGOs in national development: 
The case of East Timor 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Janet E. Hunt 
B. Ed., M. Ed., ACAM 
 
 
 
School of Global Studies, Social Science and Planning 
RMIT University 
 April 2008 
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Except where I have acknowledged assistance with interpreting and translating, this 
thesis is entirely my own original work, conducted since the commencement date of 
the approved research program. It has not been submitted in whole or in part to qualify 
for any other academic award and has complied with the relevant ethics procedures and 
guidelines of the RMIT University. 
 
 
 
Janet E Hunt 
 iii
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
My thanks are due primarily to the many individuals whose vision, passion and 
courage led them to form local non-government organisations (NGOs) in East Timor to 
pursue their dreams of a better life for their people. I am particularly indebted to the 
boards, staff and volunteers of the NGOs which I studied in depth, Caritas Dili, 
ETADEP, HAK, FOKUPERS, SAHE and Timor Aid, and particularly Sister Idalia 
Taveres, Gilman dos Santos, Jose Luis d’Oliviera, Manuela Pereira, Nuno Rodrigues 
and  Maria do Ceu Lopes da Silva Federer who facilitated this research in their 
respective organisations. 
 
I am also grateful to many other individuals from the local Timorese NGO community, 
far too numerous to mention, who shared insights with me. Thanks also to colleagues 
from international NGOs, members of the Timor-Leste Government and international 
donor agencies and others who so generously gave their time to provide me with 
information.  
 
Particular thanks are due to Arsenio Bano, who first invited me to work with the East 
Timor NGO Forum which led to my interest in this issue, and who himself retained an 
interest in this research; to Keryn Clark from Oxfam Australia who generously 
provided office facilities in Dili and shared her vast knowledge of East Timor 
generously;  to Elsa Ximenes for her interpreting skills and her interest in this research, 
and to others who assisted  me occasionally in this area; Palmira Pires and the East 
Timor Development Agency and Fernando da Costa who assisted with translation of 
chapters, and in Fernando’s case, checked and resolved translation problems with 
NGOs; to Inge Lempp and Constantino Pinto, Annie Keogh and Patrick Walsh, Maree 
Keating and Kerry Brogan, all of whom provided me with accommodation during 
fieldwork and much other intellectual and practical support. Aderito de Jesus Soares, 
Mena Dos Reis and Ann Wiggleworth also encouraged me; they openly discussed 
 iv
ideas and provided friendship and encouragement. Merrindahl Andrews, Kristina Beck 
and Ann Wigglesworth also kindly proofread parts of the text to assist me with post-
examination final editing. Of course, the usual disclaimers apply. 
 
Thanks also to my supervisors, Dr Peter Marden for his steady feedback on draft 
chapters, and Dr Helen Hill for her special knowledge of East Timor; Professor Jon 
Altman of the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at The 
Australian National University for enabling me to take four weeks’ leave from my 
position there to complete the writing; and my CAEPR colleague Diane Smith for 
encouraging me to finish it. 
 
Lastly, my special thanks to my partner Allan Carriage who endured my endless hours 
at the computer when there was so much else to do, and to many other friends and 
colleagues who provided encouragement, and tolerated my unsociable behaviour. 
 
 
 v
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................... v 
Glossary of Acronyms............................................................................................ xi 
Words in languages other than English............................................................... xvii 
Summary ................................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction .......................................................................................  5 
1.1  Approaches to studying NGOs..............................................................  10 
1.2   Selecting the NGOs for study ............................................................... 16 
1.3  Conducting the case studies ..................................................................  23 
Chapter 2 Post-conflict and transitional societies and local NGOs ................ 30 
2.1  Civil society in development in the 1990s: diverse  
   theoretical perspectives ........................................................................ 31  
2.2  Issues relating to NGOs in development ............................................... 34 
2.3  Local civil society and NGOs in complex humanitarian  
emergencies and emergency relief responses ......................................... 39 
2.4  NGOs and democracy ...........................................................................  44 
2.5  NGOs and peacebuilding ...................................................................... 51 
2.6  Civil society and donors ........................................................................ 56 
2.7  The emerging issues .............................................................................. 60 
 vi
Chapter 3  History of governance, development and civil society ................. 64 
3.1  Gvernance before Portuguese colonialism ............................................64 
3.2  Portuguese colonialism ..........................................................................65 
3.3  Civil society in the Portuguese period ................................................... 70 
3.4  ‘Development’ in East Timor under Indonesian occupation ................. 73 
3.5  The Resistance: hidden governance systems .........................................75 
3.6  Indonesian development strategy and the role of NGOs  
   and civil society .....................................................................................77 
3.7  Civil society and NGOs in East Timor during the Indonesian period ...81 
3.8  NGO development in East Timor ..........................................................84 
Chapter 4  The stormy transition to nationhood: civil society in  
                   the period 1999-2004........................................................................ 88 
4.1  Grasping an opportunity: civil society’s role before the ballot .............88 
4.2  The crisis after the ballot .......................................................................93 
4.3  Conditions for LNGOs after the vote ....................................................98 
4.4  Shaping the new state ..........................................................................101 
4.5  NGOs and the new government ...........................................................110 
4.6  Conclusion ...........................................................................................113 
Chapter 5  The case study NGOs: Caritas Dili and ETADEP ..................... 114 
5.1  Caritas Dili .......................................................................................... 114 
     5.1.1  Caritas East Timor 1997-1999 .....................................................115 
     5.1.2  The emergency period before the ballot ......................................117 
    5.1.3  Response to the September crisis ..................................................118 
 vii
    5.1.4  Return to development programs ................................................. 121 
    5.1.5  Changed approach in 2003 ........................................................... 130 
    5.1.6  Structure and relationships ........................................................... 133 
5.2  ETADEP (East Timor Agricultural Development Program) .............. 137 
    5.2.1  ETADEP’s early years ................................................................. 137 
    5.2.2  Expansion and new roles .............................................................. 138 
    5.2.3  1990s: the environment worsens .................................................. 140 
    5.2.4  After the violence: beyond an emergency response  
              in the UNTAET period ................................................................. 142 
    5.2.5  Changes since independence ........................................................ 145 
    5.2.6  ETADEP in 2004/5 ...................................................................... 147 
5.3  Conclusion: the capacities of Caritas Dili and ETADEP .................... 150 
Chapter 6  HAK Association (Perkumpulan HAK) .....................................  154 
6.1  HAK in the late 1990s: its early roles ................................................. 156 
6.2   HAK in 1999 ...................................................................................... 158 
6.3  Reestablishing HAK ............................................................................ 160 
6.4  Beyond the emergency: HAK’s new roles in the UNTAET period .... 162 
6.5  HAK in 2002-2004 .............................................................................. 168 
6.6  Organisational development to meet the challenges HAK faces ........ 179 
6.7  Conclusion ........................................................................................... 185 
 
 viii
Chapter 7  FOKUPERS—Forum Kommunikasi Untuk Perempuan  
                   Timor Loro Sae ............................................................................. 187 
7.1  The late 1990s and the UNAMET period ............................................190 
7.2  The aftermath of September 1999 .......................................................192 
7.3  Women in the new nation ....................................................................195 
7.4  Keeping the focus on violence .............................................................200 
7.5  Education and awareness raising on women’s rights ..........................203 
7.6  Strengthening FOKUPERS’ own capacity ..........................................204 
7.7  Challenges ............................................................................................207 
7.8  Conclusion ...........................................................................................208 
Chapter 8  Timor Aid and SAHE .................................................................... 210 
8.1  Timor Aid ............................................................................................210 
    8.1.1  After the Ballot .............................................................................212 
    8.1.2  Changes in the organisation ..........................................................217 
    8.1.3  From emergency to development projects ....................................218 
    8.1.4  Poverty reduction ..........................................................................223 
    8.1.5  Restructure and redirection ...........................................................228 
    8.1.6  Relationships with government and others ...................................230 
8.2  SAHE Institute for Liberation (SAHE) ...............................................233 
    8.2.1  SAHE’s role in the lead up to the 1999 Ballot .............................234 
    8.2.2.  The September 1999 emergency ..................................................235 
    8.2.3  Developing a focus .......................................................................236 
     
 ix
    8.2.4  The School for Activists (Escola Ukan Rasik A’an)  
              and an educational role ................................................................. 237 
     8.2.5  SAHE and nation-building .......................................................... 240 
    8.2.6  Relations with other NGOs .......................................................... 241 
    8.2.7  Organisational structure and sustainability .................................. 242 
8.3  Conclusion ........................................................................................... 242 
Chapter 9  Changing NGO roles and capacities in a complex environment 246 
9.1  Local NGOs through the transitions: the challenges  
       of context.......... ………………………………………………………246 
9.2  Overview of LNGO roles .................................................................... 256 
9.3  How the changing context affected NGO capacities .......................... 259 
9.4  NGOs developing their capacities ....................................................... 261 
9.5  Conclusions ......................................................................................... 267 
Chapter 10  NGO contributions in post-conflict transition: the case of  
                     Timor-Leste..................................................................................  269 
10.1  Local NGOs and the transition to and consolidation of democracy . 269 
10.2  Local NGOs in development ............................................................. 280 
10.3  Local NGOs in post-conflict peacebuilding ...................................... 284 
10.4  The impact of donors on civil society ............................................... 286 
10.5  Concluding comments ....................................................................... 291 
References ..........................................................................................................  336 
 x
List of Tables  
Table 1  NGOs selected for case study research .................................................. 22 
Table 2  Phases in the study period and NGO responses.................................... 248 
Table 3  Summary of NGO roles throughout the study period...........................  257 
Appendices  
Appendix A  Preliminary lists of NGOs  ............................................................296 
Appendix B  Examples of NGOs in Timor-Leste beyond the six case studies ...301 
Appendix C  Questions which guided the case study research........................... 313 
Appendix D  Persons interviewed for this research............................................  317 
Appendix E  Additional documents and other sources used in  
                     compiling NGO case studies.......................................................... 325 
Appendix F  Some examples of official donor support to civil society  
                     in East Timor 1999-2004/05. ......................................................... 328 
 xi
 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
ACFOA  Australian Council for Overseas Aid 
AETA Australia-East Timor Association 
AFAP Australian Foundation for the People of the South Pacific 
AI  Amnesty International 
APHEDA Australian People for Health Education and Development Abroad  
APODETI Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (Popular Democratic 
Association of Timor) 
ASDT Associacao Social Democratica Timorense (Timorese Social  
 Democratic Association) 
ASIAT Australian Society for Inter-Country Aid-Timor 
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development 
BEC  Basic Ecclesiastical Communities (Philippines) 
CA  Constituent Assembly 
CAA Community Aid Abroad (Australia), now known as Oxfam Australia 
CAFOD Catholics for Overseas Development (UK) 
CAP  Consolidated Appeal Process (UN) 
CARE Full name of an International NGO 
CAVR Comissao de Acolhimento Verdade e Reconciliacao (Commission for 
Truth, Reception and Reconciliation) 
CBO Community Based Organisation 
CEDAW Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
CEP  Community Empowerment Program (World Bank) 
CeTTiL East Timor Training Centre (Timor Aid) 
CNRM Conselho Nacional da Resistancia Maubere (National Council of 
Maubere Resistance) 
CNRT Conselho Revolucionario de Resistencia Timorense (National Council 
for East Timorese Resistance) 
 xii
CRRN Conselho Revolucionario de Resistencia Nacional (Revolutionary 
Council of National Resistance)  
CRS Catholic Relief Services (USA) 
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
CSRNET Commissao Secrete de Resistencia Nacionaldos Estudantes Timorense  
(Secret Commission of the Timorese Students Resistance) 
CUCO  Credit Union Cooperative Organisation (Indonesia) 
CWSSP  Community Water Supply and Sanitation Project (AusAID) 
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency  
DELSOS Delgado Social (precursor to Caritas East Timor) 
DFID Department for International Development (UK) 
DKA Dreikoenigsaktion (Austrian Catholic NGO) 
DOTS Direct Observation Treatment System 
ECSP Engaging Civil Society Project (CRS) 
ELSAM  Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (The Institute for Policy 
Research and Advocacy, Indonesia)  
ETADEP Yayasan Ema Mata Dalan Ba Progressu (Road to Progress Association) 
ETAN East Timor Action Network (US) 
ETCAS  East Timor Community Assistance Scheme (AusAID) 
ETSSC East Timor Students Solidarity Council 
ETTA East Timor Transitional Authority 
ETWAVE East Timor Women Against Violence 
FALINTIL Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor 
FECLETIL Frente Estudantil Clandestina de Timor-Leste (Clandestine Front of 
East Timorese Students) 
FMLN Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador) 
FOKUPERS Forum Kommunikasi Untuk Perempuan Timor Loro Sae (East Timorese 
Women’s Communication Forum) 
FORTILOS Forum Solidaritas untak Rakyat Timor Lorosae (Solidarity Forum for 
the People of East Timor) Indonesian NGO. 
FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
 xiii
FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 
GFFTL Grupo Feto Foinsa’e Timor-Lorosa’e (East Timor Young Women’s 
Group) 
GOI Government of Indonesia 
Golkar  Governing Party in Indonesia during occupation of East Timor 
HABURAS Environmental NGO 
HAER Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (UNTAET) 
HAK Hukum, Hak Asasi, dan Keadilan (The Foundation for Law, Human 
Rights and Justice) 
Halarae Agriculture NGO (Halarae means Landcare in Kemak dialect) 
HASATIL Hametin Agrikultura Sustentavel Timor-Leste (Sustainable Agriculture
 Network East Timor) 
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (World Bank) 
HPPMAI Humpunan Pemuda Pelaja dan Mahasiswa Anti-Integrasi (Association 
of Anti-integration Youth and Students) 
ICA  Institute of Cultural Affairs 
ICRC International Committee of Red Cross 
IDP  Internally Displaced Person 
IMPETTU Ikatan Mahasiswa Permuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur (Organisation of  
East Timorese Students) 
IMVF  Instituto Marques Vale Flor (Portugal) 
INFID International Forum on Indonesian Development  
INFIGHT Indonesian human rights NGO  
INGO International non-government organisation 
INL National Institute of Linguistics 
INTERFET  International Force East Timor 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
IPM Integrated Pest Management 
IUATLD International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease 
JAM Joint Assessment Mission 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
 xiv
JKPIT  Jaringan Kesehatan Perempuan Indonesia Timor (Network for East 
Indonesian Women’s Health).  
JPC Justice and Peace Commission 
KACTL  Klibut Alizados Cartilosa Timor-Leste (NGO) 
KAS    Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Foundation (Germany) 
KBH  Knua Buka Hatene (NGO Training Centre) 
KFB Austrian Catholic Women’s Group (Austria) 
KOTA Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain (Association of Sons of Timorese Warriors) 
KSI Kadalak Sulimutuk Institute (a Student Research Institute) 
LAIFET  Labour Advocacy Institute for East Timor 
LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute, Indonesia) 
LNGO  Local non-government organisation 
LNWDA  Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency (Bougainville) 
LSM  Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Community Self-reliance Organisation) 
MAFF   Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries 
MKITL  Indonesian Humanitarian Mission for Timor Lorosae (Indonesia). 
MNKV  Movimentu Nasional Kontra Violencia (National Movement Against 
Violence) 
MRC Member’s Representative Council (HAK) 
NASSA National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice and Peace (Caritas 
Philippines) 
NDI National Democratic Institute (USA) 
NDP  National Development Plan 
NDPEAC National Directorate of Planning and External Assistance Coordination 
NGO Non-government organisation 
NOVIB Dutch NGO, member of the Oxfam family. 
NTP National Tuberculosis Program 
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OJECTIL Organisacão da Juventude Catolica de Timor-Leste (East Timor 
Catholic Youth Organisation) 
 xv
OMT  Organizacao  Mulheres Timor  (Organisation of Timorese Women)  
OPMT Organizacao Popular (da) Mulheres Timor (Popular Organisation of 
Timorese Women)1 
OPE Office for the Promotion of Equality 
OPJT Organizacao Popular Juvente (or dos Jovens) Timorense (Popular 
Organisation of Timorese Youth) 
OSOS Organisasi Siswa Intra-Sekolah (Intra-School Students Association) 
PAS Pronto Atu Serbis (Ready to Serve) 
PD Democratic Party 
PKI  Communist Party of Indonesia 
POSKO Post for the Coordination of Emergency Aid 
PRA  Participatory Rural Appraisal 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (World Bank) 
PSD Social Democratic Party 
RDP Rural Development Programme (Caritas Dili) 
RDTL Republica Democratica De Timor-Leste ( Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste) 
REDE (Feto) Women’s NGO Network  
RENETIL Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste (National 
Resistance of Timorese Students) 
SACOP  Social Action Centre of Pampanga (Philippines) 
SAHE  Sahe Institute for Liberation 
SIP Sector Investment Program 
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
TAF The Asia Foundation (USA) 
TB Tuberculosis 
TNI  Indonesian National Military (after April 1999; previously known as 
ABRI) 
UDT Uniao Democratica Timorense (Democratic Union of East Timor) 
                                            
1 The Portuguese and Tetum forms for OPMT and OPJT vary and are used interchangeably by different 
    authors 
 xvi
UN United Nations 
UNAMET United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor 
UNETIM Uniao Nacional de Estudantes de Timor (National Union of Timorese 
Students) 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNIFEM United Nations Fund for Women 
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
UNTIM Universitas Timor Timur (University of East Timor) 
UNTL  University of Timor-Leste  
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USC Unitarian Service Committee of Canada 
WB World Bank 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WFP World Food Programme 
YASONA NGO of the Protestant Church 
 
 
 
 
 xvii
 
WORDS IN LANGUAGES OTHER THAN ENGLISH 
 
 
Accao National Popular   name of single political party in 
Portuguese Period 
Adlita Democratic Association for the 
Integration of East Timor with Australia  
aliran political grouping or ideology 
assimilado Timorese person accepted as Portuguese 
in colonial period 
Bahasa Indonesia  Indonesian language 
bases de apoio resistance support bases 
Bia Hula Bubbling Spring (name of a water and  
sanitation NGO) 
chefe de suco  head of a suco (small administrative unit  
below posto) 
conselho   large administrative unit (region) 
Escola Ukun Rasik A’an Activists School (SAHE)  
Escuteiros Catholic Scouts 
indigenes  population defined as indigenous 
(non-Portuguese) 
Komite Defeza  ba Demokrasia    Committee in Defence of Democracy 
Komnas Ham Human Rights Commission (Indonesia) 
La’o Hamutuk walking together (name of an NGO) 
liurai head of a kingdom 
lulik sacred object 
malai foreigner 
mestico  mixed race person 
Orgao Oito Organ Eight:  name of a resistance cell 
07                               name of a resistance cell 
 xviii
pancasila Indonesian state ideology 
Partido Trabalhista Workers Party 
plat merah LSM  red plate NGO (NGO close to Indonesian  
 Government) 
posto administrative unit below conselho  
Rumah Rakat People’s House (HAK) 
Seara  name of a Catholic newspaper 
Solidamor name of an Indonesian NGO 
Solidaritas Jepang  Solidarity Japan (Japanese NGO) 
suco administrative unit below posto  
simpan pinjam small savings clubs 
Solidaritas Jepang  Solidarity Japan 
tais Traditional woven cloth 
Timor Timur (Indon) East Timor 
Ukun Rasik A’an Tetum term encompassing sovereignty,  
self-determination, self-sufficiency and  
independence 
usaha bersama  credit unions and informally structured  
cooperative enterprises 
yayasan foundation 
Yayasan Hanai Malu   savings and credit NGO 
zonas libertadas  liberated zones 
 
 
 1
SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis explores the roles and experiences of local East Timorese non-government 
organisations through the multiple transitions which accompanied East Timor’s process 
of independence. During the 1990s, development theory and practice gave a central 
place to civil society in development and democratisation. Non-government 
organisations were seen as key players in civil society which donors tended to support. 
This study set out to understand how the rapidly changing circumstances of the period 
1999–2004 affected the roles which key local NGOs played in East Timor’s turbulent 
transition from occupied province to independent nation. It explores how they 
attempted to influence the changing environment in which they were operating, 
particularly in the development of the new nation. In doing so, it examines how the 
actual experience of these local NGOs relates to theories of civil society and NGOs in 
the various phases of transition to democracy, state and nation building and post-
conflict peacebuilding. 
 
After reviewing literature relating to the role of civil society and NGOs in 
democratisation, development and peacebuilding from many parts of the world, and 
identifying some key issues to explore, the study turns to the particular context of East 
Timor. It summarizes the colonial history, with a particular focus on governance, 
development and the emergence of civil society and NGOs in that territory, 
demonstrating that a complex, multi-layered governance system was in place prior to 
the 1999 emergency. It then turns to the major phases of the transition, from the 
January 1999 announcement that the Indonesian Government might consider 
independence for East Timor, through the popular consultation, the subsequent militia 
rampage, the emergency response and establishment of a UN administration and the 
eventual declaration of independence on 20 May 2002, followed by the first two years 
of the new state, with particular attention to what happened to civil society broadly 
during these phases.  
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It then focuses closely on six leading East Timorese NGOs, which between them 
reflect different organisational origins and sectoral interests and which were perceived 
to be playing significant roles within the NGO community. Caritas Dili is the NGO of 
the Catholic Diocese of Dili; given the central role which the Catholic Church played 
in protecting the people during their resistance struggle, and the vital humanitarian 
assistance which Caritas Dili was providing during the early period of this study, it was 
selected. ETADEP is a well respected agriculture NGO which also had a long history 
of activity. HAK and FOKUPERS formed during the mid-late 1990s, with a human 
rights and women’s rights agenda respectively. Both began by trying to support victims 
of human rights violations as Indonesian repression gripped East Timor. SAHE was 
formed even later by East Timorese students in Jakarta as a study club to debate and 
consider issues critical to development of a nation, while Timor Aid was initiated by 
Timorese exiles in Australia and Jakarta to support their compatriots inside Timor. It 
grew rapidly to play a major role in the response to the 1999 emergency. 
 
The case study chapters each describe briefly the history of the NGO, then trace its 
story over an approximately five year period through the various transitions. They 
explore how the visions, strategies, programs and organisational systems of these 
NGOs changed as the context changed. The case studies show how adaptive these 
NGOs were to the context in which they operated, how excluded some of them were by 
the huge influx of international players after the ballot, but how, in the absence of a 
legitimate government, they were included in various processes in a number of 
important ways during the UNTAET period. These studies also reveal some of the 
challenges the NGOs faced as the new government took over in May 2002, and their 
relationships to the government became less clear. 
 
The study concludes by summarising the changing roles and capacities of the NGOs, 
highlighting the many roles which local NGOs played throughout the study period, and 
the way in which they had to change to meet new demands placed upon them. It 
identifies capacities in the areas of relationships and resources as critical for these 
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NGOs’ survival and development, and identifies some strategies which the NGOs 
themselves identified as useful in helping them attain these. It also identifies some 
areas, notably relating to community development and organisational management, 
which they found challenging and where more capacity development may have been 
valuable. 
 
Finally the study reflects on the actual experiences of Timorese NGOs compared to 
theory and experiences elsewhere relating to democracy, development and 
peacebuilding. It finds that NGOs played a supportive role in the transition to 
democracy, contributed to democratic consolidation by strengthening the state in a 
number of ways, but had little leverage to hold the government to account. Their 
efforts to make democracy more responsive to the development needs of the people 
were thwarted to some degree by the centralist nature of decision making and the very 
limited resources and capacities of the government itself. Government-NGO 
collaboration occurred primarily in areas where pre-existing relationships provided a 
basis of trust. NGOs were active in many areas of development, largely with 
international NGO and donor funding, but official donor support was declining rapidly 
towards the end of the study and the sustainability of even well established NGOs was 
an open question. NGOs also made a contribution to managing local conflicts and 
building a culture of human rights, but the violence which erupted in 2006, after the 
study concluded, was beyond their scope. The findings, which emphasise the changing 
relationship of the new state to its citizens, suggest that the civil society and 
development practice, which has been strongly based on de Tocqueville’s approach to 
civil society, is not particularly helpful in a post-conflict setting. Instead, an adapted 
Gramscian approach, viewing civil and political society as interrelated sites in which a 
struggle to embed non-violent means of apportioning power is being waged could be of 
greater analytic and practical value. 
 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
East Timor2 was the first new nation created in the twenty-first century. It has only 
recently emerged from some 450 years of Portuguese and Indonesian colonisation. Its 
extraordinary struggle for self-determination over more than 24 years of Indonesian 
occupation, and the human rights violations its people endured, have been widely 
documented, most recently and fully by the Truth, Reception and Reconciliation 
Commission (Comissao de Acolhimento Verdade e Reconciliacao), established 
following its liberation (CAVR 2006). Creating a new nation is an enormous 
endeavour; it involves reconfiguring and building new institutions and organisations of 
all types; forming a government is of course a critical element, but it is certainly not the 
only one, as this research illustrates. 
 
This study about non-government organisations (NGOs) in this new nation sits within a 
broad framework of interdisciplinary social science research known as development 
studies. Much of the focus of development studies historically has been on the 
processes of national development pursued by newly decolonised states in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. Most of these states emerged before 
the extraordinary expansion of non-governmental organisations across the developing 
world, which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (Salamon 1994). East Timor is emerging 
as a nation in a totally different context from the earlier wave of newly independent 
states. Today globalisation of the world economy, market-led development, new 
information technology and the rapid dissemination of ideas are distinctive features of 
the environment.  
 
                                            
2 The territory which is called in English, East Timor, is officially named ‘Timor-Leste’. It has also been  
    known by some as Timor Lorosa’e and is referred to through this thesis by all three names depending  
    on the context and the sources used. 
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Earlier development theory has also been subject to criticism by those who believe that 
‘development’, as exemplified by major development institutions, has failed to deliver 
on its promises to the poor; rather, ‘development’ has entrenched elites and 
marginalised others, favoured the adoption of western models and systems 
inappropriate to developing country contexts, and disregarded the diversity of cultural, 
social and economic possibilities (Crush 1995, Escobar 2000, Sachs 1992). Such 
writers have suggested greater attention to local actors and locally developed ideas for 
improving people’s lives. These authors have themselves been subject to criticism, 
their detractors arguing that development has already adopted concepts of 
empowerment and participation, and that local communities actively engage with 
development, and make of it what they will (McGregor 2007, Robins 2003). Thus the 
very nature of ‘development’ is now contested and there is room for a diversity of 
players. Among those players, the world of development now widely accepts a place 
for civil society, including NGOs, in a more democratic development.  
 
Development studies researchers have also recently sought to better understand the 
specific challenges presented by post-conflict societies, as a great deal of development 
work is now undertaken in such environments. The study of peacebuilding has become 
important to development agencies (Junne and Verkoren 2005). Attention to NGOs and 
civil society in governance and development has become a specific area of study, but 
research specifically about local NGOs has only rarely been linked to post-conflict 
development (Smillie 2001). This study attempts to bring these issues together in the 
context of East Timor.  
 
Most of the focus of international players during East Timor’s transition to 
independence was on the humanitarian response and the initial physical reconstruction 
after the massive destruction by the militia rampage in September 1999. This followed 
the historic popular vote for separation from Indonesia in a United Nations (UN) 
supervised ballot. Attention has also focused on the establishment of the institutions of 
state and the first government of the new nation of Timor-Leste, which formally took 
the reins of power on 20 May 2002. This is understandable. Much of what has been 
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written about what followed the rampage has also been from the perspective, or about 
the operations of, the international community in East Timor in undertaking these 
tasks, rather than about or from the perspective of the local players, especially those 
outside the government (see for example, Martin 2001, Smith and Dee 2003, Taudevin 
and Lee 2000). Yet building a new nation involves more than building a government, 
particularly where the nationals of that country have been brutally suppressed for 
decades. Forming a state and forging a nation are two different yet related tasks. Nation 
building implies developing a sense of community as a polity; it is about creating a 
sense of common political identity among the citizens (Simonsen 2006:576); state 
building refers to creating or strengthening the organs of the state, such as the 
constitution, the parliament, judiciary, and public service, and includes building the 
civil society organisations as well. Both therefore require the involvement of the 
citizenry of the new nation. Nation building in East Timor requires a process of forging 
a national identity beyond the unifying struggle for independence. And beyond state 
building, East Timor must urgently engage in a whole new struggle against poverty. 
East Timor, like many other developing countries before it, starts its journey of 
nationhood from a situation of deep material poverty (Joint Assessment Mission 1999a, 
UNDP 2002b). It is the poorest country in Asia. Thus the challenge of development is a 
central one for the new nation.  
 
Within almost any developing country today, important roles are played by various 
traditional and modern citizen associations which bring together people with common 
needs, interests or concerns, who work together to achieve their goals. Such 
associations may reflect concerns relating to social, economic, or environmental issues, 
or may focus on the promotion of cultural or sporting interests. In the socio-economic 
area, there are two types of organisation—those which might be considered ‘self-help’ 
groups, such as associations of farmers, or trade unions, which exist to improve the 
lives of the members. Others comprise groups of people who come together to assist 
others, or improve the society in some way. All these sorts of organisations have been 
formed or re-formed in East Timor since 1999, and many are now playing an important 
role in the development of the new nation (Holloway 2004a). This study is most 
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interested in those organisations working in the socio-economic area, broadly defined, 
and those which see themselves playing a policy advocacy role in the shaping of the 
new nation. It is these organisations which are most involved in the development of 
East Timor’s emerging democracy and the nation’s socio-economic progress. Some 
international support has gone to these non-government organisations and to the wider 
civil society of East Timor as part of the humanitarian reconstruction and establishment 
of the new democracy, but little has been written about them. 
 
I was actively involved in the international civil society movement for the right of East 
Timorese people to self-determination, and was leading the Australian NGO peak body 
which initially coordinated international NGOs during the emergency response in 
1999. In late 2000 I was invited to work with the East Timor NGO Forum, the 
umbrella organisation established to coordinate local and international NGOs in East 
Timor. I continued this work during much of 2001 as a consultant to AusAID and 
UNDP, and then continued working with local and international NGOs in East Timor 
through a series of consultancies with international NGOs during 2002-2003. In 
September 2003 I began to interview local NGOs about their experiences over the 
period, and in  early 2004 selected six for in-depth attention during a series of field 
visits begun during that year and finishing in June 2005. It was my experience of the 
exclusion of many local NGOs from the early period of the emergency which inspired 
me to follow the progress of these organisations over the ensuing five years, to trace 
what happened to them in the longer term. 
 
The literature suggests that ‘civil society’ is central to the development of democracy, 
and that it plays an important role in socio-economic development, yet definitions 
remain confused and contested (Kaldor 2003, Van Rooy 1998). Civil society includes a 
wide range of organisations and traditional, relatively informal, social forms and 
networks which are not motivated by profit. These may include cooperatives, trade 
unions, media, human rights groups, womens’ and youth groups, church and student 
organisations, and self-help groups. They are assumed to be independent of the state. 
NGOs are part of civil society, but far from the only players within it (Mitlin 1998).  
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The Cardoso Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-civil society relations set up by UN 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in 2003 defined civil society as: 
 
‘…the associations of citizens (outside their families, friends and businesses)  entered 
into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and ideologies. The term does not 
include profit making activity (the private sector) or governing (the public sector)’ 
(Cardoso 2004:13). 
 
Kaldor suggests that the term has always been associated with ‘a rule-governed society 
based largely on the consent of individual citizens rather than coercion’ (Kaldor 
2003:1), noting that different definitions reflect ‘different ways in which consent was 
generated, manufactured, nurtured or purchased, the different rights and obligations 
that formed the basis of consent, and the different interpretations of this 
process’(Kaldor 2003:1). Van Rooy notes its diverse political and philosophical 
origins, but defines it for practical purposes as ‘an observable reality’ (organisationally) 
and ‘a good thing’, in that even an imperfect one is better than no civil society at all 
(Van Rooy 1998:30). Essentially, it seems at its core to be about the relationship 
between citizens and their state, and it may take organisational form. Whilst the term 
‘civil society’ is often used in the development literature in a normative way as 
something worthwhile, it is clear that civil society organisations may work towards 
internationally agreed standards embodied in human rights agreements, or may actively 
engage in violence (Keane 1998, 2003). This study acknowledges this broad 
understanding of civil society but deliberately seeks out organisations which are 
working for development and the attainment of human rights, broadly defined (i.e. for 
social, economic and cultural rights as well as civil and political ones) in a context in 
which the end of violence is sought. 
 
Whilst ‘civil society’ is a term which embraces much more than NGOs, this research 
focuses particularly on local NGOs, because they are generally a key aspect of civil 
society which other development players emphasise as important (UNDP 2001, World 
Bank Civil Society Team 2003). Officially recognised definitions, such as that 
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provided by the Commonwealth Foundation, tend to point to four key NGO 
characteristics. These include: 
•independence;  
•voluntarism;  
•not for profit; and  
•‘not for the immediate benefit’ of members (Ball and Dunn 1996). 
 
NGOs are independent of government and are supposed to be controlled by their 
boards, rather than by anyone else; they are formed voluntarily rather than by statute, 
and there is an element of voluntarism in their operations. They may generate revenue 
but must apply the profits towards their goals, rather than distribute them. Finally, their 
efforts are intended primarily to benefit others, usually disadvantaged members of 
society (Ball and Dunn 1996). This focus on NGOs is not to downplay the valuable 
contributions played by the media, the church and religious organisations, or trade 
unions, to name a few other elements of civil society, but it is to limit this study to 
manageable proportions.  
 
Despite the interest in NGOs in the wider development literature (see for example 
Edwards and Hulme 1992b, Fowler 1997, Van Rooy 1998), there is very limited 
literature about the roles of local, in contrast to international, NGOs in post-conflict 
reconstruction and development (Smillie 2001). Whilst it is recognised that 
international NGOs have a role to play, especially in the immediate emergency which 
follows violent conflict (Smillie and Minnear 2004), little attention has been given to 
the experiences, roles and contributions of the local NGOs in such contexts. This thesis 
aims to do this in relation to the case of East Timor. 
1.1 Approaches to studying NGOs 
 
There are several approaches to or frameworks for studying NGOs (see for example 
Davies 1998, Fisher 1997, Hilhorst 2003, and Salamon and Anheier 1999). Salamon 
and Anheier emphasise that NGOs are ‘deeply embedded in the social, economic and 
political dynamic of different societies’ (Salamon and Anheier 1999: 87) and that 
 11
explanations for their emergence based on responses to market failure, the available 
supply of nonprofit entrepreneurs (often through religious institutions), or the state’s 
need for complementary organisations to enable it to respond to citizen needs, are all 
insufficient. The emergence of NGOs will reflect the particular socio-political histories 
of individual countries. Their research illustrates how authoritarian regimes, the 
colonial experience, limited economic growth, legal and religious factors, and 
development policies favouring state development all seem likely to have constrained 
the development of a nonprofit sector in certain developing countries. This research is 
less focussed on the reasons for the emergence of NGOs in East Timor as on their roles 
and organisational challenges in a rapidly shifting environment. Studies of a single 
NGO or of particular qualities of NGOs, such as those by Hilhorst (2003) or Davies 
(1998) respectively, could not offer an insight into the broader trends in the NGO 
sector through the transitions taking place in East Timor. The most relevant approach 
for this study is therefore one which examines NGOs as organisations in their wider 
context, and which could be applied to several NGOs (Fowler 1997). NGOs may be 
viewed as dynamic organisations which change in direct response to external pressures 
and challenges or as organisations which try to act upon a changing external 
environment. These two approaches to understanding NGOs—that of studying the 
organisations themselves or of examining their response to the external context and 
pressures is at the heart of this study. It seeks, as far as possible, to do both. It looks 
closely at the rapidly changing context, as the way the NGOs were affected by and 
responded to it was seen as the central issue. 
  
The most common organisational framework for analysing NGOs is Korten’s, which 
has at its heart the notion of NGOs as organisations of change and adaptation. Korten 
(1990) suggested that NGOs could be understood by their changing nature. He 
described four distinct phases or generations of NGO evolution over the past 40 years, 
largely with international, rather than local NGOs in mind: 
Phase 1:  Relief and welfare:  in which NGOs delivered social services 
during periods of acute shortages. 
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Phase 2:  Community development:  in which NGOs functioned as 
mobilisers ofpopular and governmental support in responding to 
locally based / community projects. 
Phase 3:  Sustainable systems development:  in which the focus of NGOs 
shifted to sub-regional and national concerns (especially in the 
environmental areas). 
Phase 4:  People’s Movements:  in which NGOs functioning as activists 
and educators seek to coalesce and energise self-managing 
networks towards both national and global social development 
goals (Korten 1990: Table 10-1, p. 117).  
 
While Korten’s original writing implied that these were stages which NGOs moved 
through as they matured, the reality is that many NGOs reflect some or all of these 
stages through different activities they undertake at any one time. Certain activities 
may dominate at different times, but the development of higher level stages may 
indeed come at later stages in the organisation’s growth. Korten also speaks of the 
strength of the voluntary sector in its distinctive capacity for diversity and 
independence. He seeks to understand the distinctive difference of NGOs according to 
their values and ethos and according to how they function and respond in a changing 
development environment (Korten 1990).  
 
More recent analyses have tried to further refine and develop Korten’s framework, 
while retaining a notion of NGOs as adaptive and improving organisations. For 
example, Smillie (1995) points to a study by John Hopkins University that concludes 
that the most rational basis for defining an organisation is its structure and operation. 
Using this definition, he suggests a different set of evolutionary stages for NGOs: 
? Community based voluntarism: requiring a high degree of personal 
involvement and responsibility for the delivery of humanistic service; 
? Institutionalisation: responsibility remains with people but is expressed through 
the formation of associations that may complement services provided by 
governments; 
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? Professionalisation: demands for services and other issues lead to federation 
and professionalisation of associations and often, reluctantly, to government 
funding or even to a replacement by government services; 
? Welfare state: one in which society provides for all people’s needs and charities 
then become redundant. 
 
Most of this organisational theorising about NGOs draws heavily on literature about 
international NGOs rather than national NGOs in developing countries, and while 
similar stages may apply, this cannot be assumed. It appears that Smillie’s last phase is 
highly questionable in any case, as even in developed societies of very high income per 
capita and well developed welfare systems, NGOs retain an important role in both 
service delivery and advocacy. Certainly, the last stage of Smillie’s categorisation was 
out of the question in East Timor. However, these frameworks can provide a prism for 
both selecting and studying NGOs in East Timor, whilst being treated with some 
scepticism in such a different environment. 
 
Fowler’s (1997) work provides, however, the overarching NGO framework for this 
study, because it brings together the internal organisational capacities of an 
organisation with the external conditions in which it operates. It is this nexus which is 
of interest in this study.   Fowler makes the point that NGOs must have capacity in five 
areas:  
1. Designing development strategies, programs and projects, based on a clear 
vision    
2. Having people and the management systems to implement them  
3. The ability to mobilise resources  
4. The skills to maintain external relationships, and  
5. The ability to achieve outcomes (Fowler 1997: 43-68). 
This framework recognises that as the context changes, NGOs have to assess the 
changes and adjust their strategies. For this reason, this framework was chosen as the 
most suitable for exploring what was happening to NGOs in the changing context of 
East Timor. This study used this framework as a broad structure for designing 
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interviews to identify what had happened to NGOs over the five-year period of the 
study. Further insights were gained by drawing on Fisher (1997) who suggests that, in 
general, writers about NGOs can be divided into two categories. The first group are 
those who believe that NGO action can improve an approach to development which, 
while flawed, is generally in the right direction. The second are those who see NGOs as 
offering a challenge to orthodox development discourses and approaches. Since NGOs 
themselves are very heterogeneous it is also clear that NGOs which themselves reflect 
both perspectives exist. For those reflecting the first perspective, development agencies 
‘support local NGOs  for their effectiveness in pursuing the goals of what some have 
called a ‘new policy agenda’, a heterogeneous set of policies based on a faith in two 
basic values—neoliberal economics and liberal democratic theory’ (Fisher 1997:444). 
Thus, NGOs are seen as more flexible, innovative, and effective at achieving 
development and overcoming the constraints facing bureaucratic government agencies, 
and they are assumed to contribute to democratisation. 
 
For the second grouping, Fisher argues, NGOs are ‘vehicles for challenges and 
transformations of relationships of power…part of a process that is capable of 
transforming the state and society’ (Fisher 1997: 445). Their challenge is to make 
political issues which were either not politicised or were ‘depoliticised’ through the 
discourse of ‘development’. These writers recognise that the development industry has 
an enormous capacity to take in new ideas and transform their radical potential into a 
technical formula. Thus the risk for NGOs is one of being co-opted into a process of 
depoliticisation, whereby questions of political power are turned into technical 
questions of development, through the mechanism of NGOs. 
 
Fisher suggests that what is important to the study of NGOs is the ‘fluid web of 
relationships’ and the flows of funding, knowledge, ideas and people that move 
through them, and how these intersect with the external context and its ‘multiple 
connections’ (Fisher 1997:450). Thus, how NGOs relate to social movements, the 
complexities of the state and the donor environment are very important. The literature 
suggests that donor funding has a major influence on NGOs, shifting their focus from 
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social mobilisation to service delivery (Edwards and Hulme 1996). At the same time, 
Fisher suggests that there is a strong tendency for such organisations to ‘drift from 
participatory to oligarchic political structures’ (Fisher 1997:456). Thus the question 
arises of whether NGOs can be transformative, or whether they actually reproduce 
existing social patterns and structures.  
 
The idea of NGOs existing within a fluid web of internal and external relationships, 
relating to funding, knowledge, people and ideas, seems to be a useful one to think 
about in this study, as is Fisher’s observation that, recognising that to ‘govern is to 
structure the field of possible actions of others’, NGOs may ‘emerge from, contribute 
to, or challenge the moral regulation inherent in governing’ (Fisher 1997: 458). In a 
new nation like East Timor, the governing institutions during the transition process, as 
well as the new government itself, will structure the possibilities for others’ actions in a 
significant way. Thus my approach to the study of the local NGOs in East Timor draws 
particularly on Fowler’s and Fisher’s insights.  
 
Most recently, Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006) urge those researching NGOs to focus 
their analysis not only on organisational characteristics of NGOs but on the 
environments in which they operate, and the institutional systems and policy contexts 
in which they are embedded. This thesis attempts to do this. While concerned with the 
broad developments relating to local NGOs in East Timor, this study focuses on the 
experiences of six selected East Timorese local non-government organisations which 
existed before September 1999, and which regrouped and began to respond to the very 
changed conditions confronting them after the almost complete destruction of the 
country. However, these are set within a wider NGO, civil society and governance 
context. Five of these NGOs were operating in East Timor before the 1999 emergency; 
the sixth comprised East Timorese students living in Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital, and 
was relocated into Dili, East Timor, in late 1999.  
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The key questions this thesis addresses are: 
1. How did the rapidly changing circumstances of the period 1999-2004 affect the roles 
which key local Timorese NGOs played in East Timor’s turbulent transition from 
occupied province to independent nation? 
 
2. How, in turn, did Timorese NGOs attempt to have influence on the changing 
environment in which they were operating, particularly the nation building process and 
the development of the new nation? 
 
3. How does the actual experience of these local NGOs relate to theories about the 
roles of civil society and NGOs in the various phases of transition to democracy, state 
and nation building and post-conflict peacebuilding? 
1.2 Selecting the NGOs for study 
 
 A necessary first step in selecting NGOs for study is some means of classifying them. 
Vakil (1997) summarizes numerous classifications of NGOs and argues that there are 
two essential descriptors which classify NGOs: orientation and level of operation. In 
addition, she argues for two further contingent descriptors: evaluative attributes and 
sectoral focus. Together, the four provide a focus for research and development of 
NGOs and their practice.  
 
By orientation, is meant the kinds of activities in which the organisation engages, (e.g. 
welfare, development, research, advocacy); and by level of operation is meant the 
distinction between community based, national, international and regional NGOs.3 In 
terms of evaluative attributes, Vakil refers to two specific classificatory approaches 
based on evaluative criteria, those by Fowler (1985) and Korten (1990) which  relate to 
                                            
3 Vakil suggests international NGOs are those usually based in the industrialised world—although there    
   now exist NGOs which operate internationally, not simply regionally, which are based in the  
   developing world, such as the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) in  
   Indonesia or Isis International-Manila, making this distinction inadequate. National NGOs are based  
   in the third world, while community based organisations are more local within developing countries,  
   often involved in rural development at the community level.  
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control over resources, accountability and, in the case of Korten, values (whether 
values-driven or market-driven). She also refers to other criteria such as efficiency, 
participation and congruence with the aims of feminism identified by other writers. In 
addition Vakil refers to ‘sectoral’ focus as a classification tool but does not discuss this 
at all.  
 
The most useful aspect of this classification system for this study is its distinction 
between international, national and community based NGOs. This study was able to 
distinguish clearly NGOs which fit into the national NGO category in East Timor. The 
sectoral criterion was more difficult to use, as many national NGOs in East Timor are 
active in several sectors at once, however, this was taken into consideration in the 
selection process, to try to achieve a spread of different sectors overall. The orientation 
of the NGOs was another consideration, as I was keen to identify NGOs which might 
try to have influence over development directions in the new state, thus I looked for 
those which had advocacy roles or potential, as well as other activities. Again, few 
NGOs in East Timor worked within only one orientation. All those selected had existed 
prior to 1999 and were formed with a values-driven rather than market-driven agenda. 
There was little or no opportunity to be ‘public sector contractors’ for East Timorese 
NGOs within Indonesian occupied East Timor, although that situation changed after 
1999. One had a clearly feminist orientation.  
 
Vakil notes that there has been little research about how NGOs manage more than one 
orientation at a time or change ‘from one to another orientation over time’ and that the 
literature ‘hints either directly or indirectly at the importance of taking into account the 
external environment’ (Vakil 1997:2067). This study will shed light on both these 
issues, and indeed their interrelationship. 
 
The challenge facing this researcher was to determine a basis on which to select a 
relatively small number of NGOs for detailed study, amongst the large number of local 
non-government organisations which existed in 2000 and 2001 in the UN-administered 
transition period to nationhood, and still existed in 2003. The organisations had to be 
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Timorese, and to this end, the definition of a Timorese NGO adopted by the East Timor 
NGO Forum, in its Constitution, was used:   
 
An East Timor NGO is defined as an organisation which: 
? was established in East Timor,  
? is governed and run by East Timorese people, 
? was formed voluntarily and operates partly or wholly through the work of 
volunteers, 
? is independent i.e. is controlled by the NGO board only, based on the internal 
rules of the NGO,  
? is not affiliated with any political party, is not being used for party-political 
work or propaganda, and is not led by a leader of a political party, or a 
government leader, 
? does not operate for profit: i.e. although the NGO may pay staff and  may raise 
money through profitable activities, any  profits gained are used for the NGO’s 
programs and do not go to any individual or to the members of the board (East 
Timor NGO Forum 2000a:3). 
 
This definition was adopted to deal with a number of issues at the time: the extent to 
which purportedly Timorese organisations were genuinely controlled by Timorese, 
rather than international people; the extent to which they were genuinely independent 
of political parties, and the extent to which they were really nonprofit.4 The criterion of 
‘Established in East Timor’ in the English translation was subsequently interpreted to 
mean existed in East Timor rather than began in East Timor, with NGOs which had 
been initiated outside East Timor itself, but by Timorese people, being accepted as 
Timorese NGOs in the NGO Forum membership.  
 
In order to understand the impact of the range of changes through the full period 1999-
2004, I decided that the first criterion was to be that the organisation pre-existed the 
September 1999 crisis. That is, it was operating in some form at that time, and was still 
                                            
4 Personal observation of debate at the East Timor NGO’s first AGM at which this Constitution was 
   adopted. I was involved in helping to draft this document and worked closely with the East  
   Timor NGO Forum for over a year afterwards.  
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operating through the relief and reconstruction into the period of nationhood. The 
second criterion, to identify organisations which were operating in more than one 
district, preferably at least three districts, was to filter out the smaller organisations and 
find those which might be more significant players. 
 
Thus the first task was to identify, from the best possible information, the Timorese 
NGOs which existed in early-mid 1999, had survived the crisis and reestablished 
themselves, and operated in at least two or three districts, based on best available 
information. This was not an easy task. Several sources were used5 and careful 
comparison and cross-checking enabled me to identify 18 NGOs fulfilling those 
criteria which existed inside East Timor before September 1999 which were still 
operating in late 2003. This is from a total of 34 Timorese NGOs (local NGOs or 
LNGOs) which were operating in East Timor during the Indonesian period (Ribeiro 
and Magno 2004:16) if the data from this period is accurate, which is hard to know 
(Pedersen and Arneberg 1999). I also identified three which were founded by Timorese 
people outside East Timor but were operating inside in 2003 (see Appendix A).  
 
Further selection then involved discussion with key NGO leaders, both Timorese and 
international, in East Timor. A range of people who knew the local NGO scene well 
were asked to identify the NGOs which they thought were among the most important 
local NGOs which had existed in 1999, and would provide a good range of NGOs to 
study—NGOs which might be considered as ‘leaders’ in the NGO movement that 
might have views about development approaches in the new nation. This proved to be a 
method which drew a lot of common responses, especially in relation to NGOs such as 
                                            
5 The sources used were: The East Timor NGO Forum 2003 list of National NGOs, and more updated  
   contact lists for the Districts of Bobanaro, Suau, Baucau, Manututo, Oecusse and Lautem (East Timor  
   NGO Forum 2003); A list of NGOs attending a Government-initiated meeting for NGOs in August  
   2003 to discuss proposals for a High Level Mechanism (East Timor Ministry of National Planning and  
   External Affairs 2003); this was an important meeting for NGOs with a wide range of attendees; The 
   Columbia University data base 21 October 2003 version; this data base was of all NGO projects and    
   had  hundreds of entries by project; Early documentation about the formation of the East Timor NGO  
   Forum in 1998; A list of  East Timorese and International NGOs involved in Development Assistance 
   in East Timor in  early 1999  from a document titled ‘Socio Economic Conditions In East Timor’  
   (Pederson and  Arneberg 1999); A Directory of East Timorese NGOs, published by the Australian   
   Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) in 2000. This included dates when they claimed to have been  
   formed (ACFOA 2000). 
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HAK, FOKUPERS, ETADEP, and Caritas Dili. These were frequently mentioned as 
NGOs which had played, and continued to play, important roles and which merited 
study. HAK was a well-known human rights organisation, FOKUPERS worked on 
women’s rights, ETADEP was one of the earliest NGOs, with an agriculture focus, and 
Caritas Dili6 was significant because it was a part of the Catholic Church which had for 
many years sheltered and protected the people in their liberation struggle. It had 
provided emergency assistance through church networks to people over many years.  
 
Newer NGOs, such as La’o Hamutuk or Haburas, were often cited as significant, but 
were excluded since they had been formed or become operational after September 
1999. However, a number of them were also interviewed, both to ascertain their ideas 
on which of the older NGOs were seen as offering leadership, and also to understand 
some additional NGO roles which the newer organisations were undertaking, such as 
monitoring the international assistance, drawing attention to environmental questions, 
or developing ecotourism etc., and to help understand the factors impinging on the 
broader NGO community (Appendix B provides brief information about these NGOs). 
 
It then remained to select a final two for study, and this selection was in some ways 
slightly arbitrary, as several NGOs could have been included. At this point I 
approached several of the NGOs which might have been included, and conducted 
preliminary interviews with their director or key person to learn more about them, in an 
effort to decide which to include or exclude. This data forms part of the wider picture 
of what happened to NGOs. A total of thirteen were interviewed. Four of these turned 
out to have either been formed after 1999 or were operating in less than three districts. 
Information from these NGOs is included in those sections of this thesis which deal 
with broad NGO developments.7 Factors considered in determining the final few to 
study in depth included the sectoral focus, and the links between the NGOs and the 
range of increasingly important NGO networks which were developing in East Timor, 
                                            
6 Caritas Dili was previously known as Caritas East Timor and its mandate covered the entire province,  
   but when a second Diocese was formed in East Timor it was renamed Caritas Dili (see Chapter Five). 
7 These NGOs were: Haburas, Halarae, CDEP, GFFTL, ETWAVE, SAHE, Timor Aid, Yasona, Bia  
   Hula, PAS, ETDA, Roman Luan, JSMP. 
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in which certain NGOs were playing important roles. The intent was to select NGOs 
which came from a diversity of sectoral interests and which others saw as leaders. 
SAHE played a leading role in the Popular Education Network, whereas Timor Aid 
was less involved in networks, but its Director had been selected from a large meeting 
to chair a significant Working Group embracing government and civil society players.8 
This indicated that she was seen by others as a leader in civil society.  
 
In the end, issues such as the availability of key people who had been central to the 
organisation through key periods was a consideration, as was trying to get a diversity 
of NGOs in terms of the organisational approaches to development outlined above. 
Some were excluded because their experience was rather similar to one already 
selected.9 Timor Aid was chosen because of the very significant role it played during 
the immediate post-emergency period and because it had a very high international 
profile as a Timorese NGO, and SAHE was selected for a very different reason. SAHE 
was a research, education, media and activist NGO which drew in part on the early 
philosophical approaches of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 
(FRETILIN), a liberation movement in the mid-1970s, which by 2003 had become the 
dominant political party in the first Timorese Government. SAHE grew out of a 
combination of the traditions of Portuguese liberation theology and the Indonesian 
student movement strategy to form ‘study clubs’, and began as one such club of 
Timorese students in Jakarta. While Timor Aid began from the initiative of Timorese 
in exile in Australia, SAHE began through Timorese in Indonesia itself. It might have 
been expected that these NGOs would have different analyses and approaches to the 
development of the new nation which would be interesting to explore. Thus the 
breakdown of those finally selected was as indicated in Table 1.  
 
                                            
8 This was the High Level Mechanism relating to the implementation of the National Development Plan  
    (see Chapter  Four). 
9  For example Halarae was somewhat similar in its program focus to ETADEP, and Bia Hula was a  
    similar single sector NGO, very close to an official aid donor, but with water and sanitation, rather  
    than  agriculture, as its expertise. 
 22
 
Table 1 NGOs selected for case study research  
 
NGO 
 
Sector 
 
Link to network  
 
Comments 
HAK Human Rights  Several, especially 
International 
Tribunal 
Very well known NGO 
 
 
FOKUPERS Women’s rights REDE women’s 
network 
Most significant women’s 
NGO 
 
 ETADEP Agriculture  Member of 
HASATIL 
Old, well established 
NGO 
 
Caritas Dili  Health, Agriculture and 
others 
Member of 
HASATIL 
Significant humanitarian 
role  before emergency; 
oldest NGO. 
Timor Aid  Various (eg. Health, civic 
education, micro-credit, 
capacity development, 
language) 
No leadership role 
in a network  
Significant role after 
emergency. 
Director selected to chair 
Working Group from 
HLM meeting with Govt. 
SAHE  Education, media Popular Education 
network 
Small NGO, but ideas  
appeared influential 
 
Each of the selected NGOs was then invited to participate in the research. This 
involved meeting with the Director or Coordinator of each NGO to explain the research 
idea to them, provide them with an outline of the proposal translated into Tetum, and to 
discuss what might be involved from their side before seeking their agreement to 
participate. In most cases they agreed at the initial meeting, though in a couple of cases 
they wished to discuss with other staff first and subsequently advised me of their 
agreement. 
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1.3 Conducting the case studies 
 
The approach to the study of the six selected NGOs was to write case studies of their 
changing roles and relationships, and their strategies over the five year period of the 
study, through interviews with current and former staff members and volunteers. A 
decision about who would be important to interview in each case was made in 
consultation with the NGO, to ensure that key personnel responsible for different 
aspects of its work over the five years were interviewed.10 Often interviewees would 
indicate that another person would be able to give me more detail about a certain 
period or aspect of the NGO’s work and such ‘snowballing’ would lead to further 
interviews. The number of people interviewed varied significantly among the NGOs, 
according to their size and complexity, the staff and volunteer turnover they had 
experienced, and the extent to which the individuals available had a broad overview or 
only a limited picture of the NGO’s work. 
 
A schedule of key questions was prepared to guide my interviews (see Appendix C), 
but in practice respondents talked freely, often providing me with a richness of data 
and stories about their experiences which rigid adherence to a list of questions would 
not have encouraged. A number of my respondents already knew me quite well, and 
knew that I had a level of knowledge of some of the events and experiences they talked 
about. My questions simply helped me to check as the interview progressed whether all 
the key issues I needed to know about had been covered. They were rarely used in a 
formulaic way.  
 
In addition to the interviews with the case study NGOs I also interviewed people from 
key institutions with which they interacted, among them personnel from international 
NGOs, official donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral), local NGO networks, some 
government officials, including the Ministry of Planning and External Affairs and its 
NGO Unit, a member of Parliament, and people from the Truth, Reception and 
Reconciliation Commission. These interviews were intended to obtain stakeholders’ 
                                            
10 A small number of people it would have been desirable to interview were not available in East Timor  
     or Australia; they were studying overseas and could not be contacted. 
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accounts of the roles of the relevant NGOs, and their relationships with them. As 
mentioned above I was also able to draw on the interviews I conducted with other 
NGOs to understand the broader developments affecting NGOs in general and to gain 
their perspectives on the way NGOs had responded to the changing environment and 
influenced the development of the new nation (Appendix D provides a complete list of 
all interviewees and other informants who provided information about the case study 
NGOs).  
 
Most of the interviews with Timorese respondents were conducted in Tetum 
(sometimes with words, phrases or sections in Indonesian) with the assistance of an 
interpreter. Only a few interviews with Timorese people were conducted in English, 
while those with international players from a variety of nations were all in English. 
Finding a capable and appropriate interpreter was a difficult task. Considerations 
included whether the person would be trusted by all the NGOs, so that they could be 
open and frank about some of the issues they would want to talk about given the 
political complexity of East Timor; whether the interpreter would have enough 
knowledge of NGOs and the broad contextual vocabulary about development to be 
able to make sense of what the respondents were saying; as well as cost and 
availability. The demand for interpreters was strong at the time this research was 
conducted and many of the best were already contracted to development organisations.  
 
In the end, I was fortunate to find a final year English student keen to gain interpreting 
experience in the development field, who was suitable. She fairly quickly grasped the 
particular vocabulary relating to NGOs, and my own grasp of Tetum and Indonesian 
coupled with my knowledge of the NGOs, was sufficient to be able to check if I 
thought she had misunderstood or missed important points the speaker made, and to 
ensure that we had properly understood. Almost all of the interviews were conducted 
with her help.11 On my final visit to East Timor in 2005 when I was simply checking 
the release of the case studies with the NGOs, this interpreter was not available, so I 
                                            
11 On the few occasions when she was sick or otherwise unavailable I was able to find a person close to  
    the respondent who could assist. 
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worked with the assistance of another English student whom she had recommended. In 
fact on this occasion, most of the key NGO leaders whose agreement I needed were by 
then relatively more fluent in English and happy to converse in it. Accessing the 
interviewees was easy in theory, but more difficult in practice. The key NGO leaders 
were extremely overloaded people, balancing many demands on their time; other NGO 
workers were equally busy and often out in the districts or the villages; even when they 
were in town, sickness is common, as are other family emergencies. Thus while all the 
NGOs were quite happy to be involved in the research, some patience and persistence 
was required to find appropriate times to talk to the people essential to the study. 
 
In addition to interviews I also gathered as much written material about the NGOs as 
was available, including newsletters, pamphlets, CD-Roms, evaluation reports, project 
documents, their own accounts of aspects of their histories in journals or newspapers, 
presentations they made, in one case a public ‘Open Day’ etc.—the amount of material 
available varied greatly among the NGOs. Where possible I attended meetings they 
held or at which their representatives spoke, visited some project sites, and generally 
immersed myself in their activities as far as time and resources (especially the limited 
transport) allowed (Appendix E provides a list of mainly internal documents and other 
sources of information  which provided background about the case study NGOs).  
 
The case studies were written drawing largely on the material provided by the NGOs 
themselves, and those who worked closely with them in government, donor agencies 
and international NGOs. Once sufficient interviews had been conducted relating to 
each NGO to satisfy me that I was able to identify the features and major transition 
points in the NGO’s role, and had identified the key issues emerging, the case studies 
were written in draft form. This confidence arose when interviews generally provided 
no significant new data but consistently repeated information I already knew. To my 
surprise, given the rapid change the NGOs had been through, there was a high level of 
consistency in accounts given by different people of what had taken place in the NGOs, 
making the task of writing the case studies relatively straightforward. Where 
inconsistencies were identified, I was able to clarify them during a subsequent visit. I 
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have not identified individuals in the case studies as some information provided was 
still sensitive at the time this research was conducted, and I decided that anonymity for 
my respondents was the best option. This was the basis on which interviews were 
conducted. I have however, given each interviewee a number, and provided references 
throughout using this numbering system. I have also referenced documents which 
provided complementary evidence. 
 
Once written, each case study was provided in English and Tetum to the NGOs and 
they were asked (a) to correct any errors of fact, and (b) to indicate if they were happy 
with the case study, or material based on it, being made publicly available. This phase 
of the process was slow, and it seemed that the NGOs did not really understand that I 
was seeking their permission to use the information. It seemed that they simply 
expected me to use it and were also reluctant to correct anything I had wrong.12 
However, over time, some corrections were forwarded to me and permission granted to 
use the material. Some problems had emerged as the translations (mostly undertaken 
confidentially by the NGO East Timor Development Agency (ETDA) on a commercial 
basis) had not all been correct as written Tetum was still being standardised and 
differences of interpretation emerged. These had to be resolved.13  
 
The case studies are set within a far wider context and it is to that which I first turn. 
Chapter Two explores more specifically what is already known about the role of local, 
as opposed to international, NGOs in emergencies and transitional and post-conflict 
societies. It also canvasses some of the issues which are reflected in the literature about 
local NGOs in development more generally. It notes a very limited range of studies 
which focus specifically on local non-government players through such a major 
transition period in the emergence and establishment of a new state in such a poor 
country.  
                                            
12 There may have been a number of reasons for this among them: their own time and the priority they  
    could give this; the fact that no-one had ever asked for such consent before; my status as an  older  
    foreigner who had assisted the NGO Forum; and their wish not to offend. 
13 In the case of ETADEP, one of the experienced senior staff used the case study to make a presentation  
    about the NGO at an international conference, thereby affirming for me that he was completely happy  
    with what I had written.  
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Chapter Three traces the history of governance, development and civil society in East 
Timor itself. It describes earlier governance arrangements and sets the scene for the 
emergence of civil society and NGOs. It describes the roles local NGOs were playing 
during Indonesian time, and situates their experiences within a wider context, that is 
the nature of Indonesian development and military occupation of East Timor.  
 
Chapter Four covers the various phases of relief and rehabilitation, reconstruction, 
peacebuilding, nation building and development which the small country experienced 
in the five year period from late September 1999 until the end of 2004. It explores what 
these changes were, how the local NGO community broadly experienced them, and 
how these organisations tried to contribute to the rebuilding of the country and towards 
shaping the new nation. This chapter highlights various steps or incidents along the 
way that the NGO community identify as significant to either shaping the role and 
nature of NGOs in the new state or to NGOs’ role and input to shaping the nation. 
NGOs interacted with the many other players operating in East Timor throughout this 
period, among them the United Nations administration and peacekeeping operation, 
numerous UN  development agencies, international financial institutions (e.g. the 
World Bank), bilateral development organisations, many international non-government 
organisations, the  transitional administrations of the emerging East Timor 
Government, Timorese political parties, many newly formed local NGOs and 
community groups, and the predominantly rural communities of East Timor 
themselves. Everyone was struggling to come to grips with the new reality and to 
construct the new nation. It was no easy task.  
 
This study explores, then, how selected NGOs made their contributions during a very 
critical period for the emerging nation. It examines some of the challenges they faced 
in doing that, and how they dealt with those. Subsequent chapters discuss in some 
detail how each of  the six selected case study NGOs dealt with the changing 
environment, what roles they tried to fulfil, how they managed their relations with the 
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many stakeholders, and how they developed their own capacity to respond to the 
changed and changing conditions.  
 
Chapter Five describes the experiences of the two oldest Timorese NGOs, Caritas Dili 
and ETADEP, both of which were involved in agriculture and rural development, 
although Caritas Dili also had other significant programs, particularly in health.  
 
Chapter Six focuses on the NGO which was initially known as Yayasan HAK, a human 
rights NGO established by students in the mid-1990s in response to the human rights 
situation; it became one of the best known and largest NGOs in the country, and had 
excellent links with international human rights NGOs.  
 
Chapter Seven similarly describes the work of FOKUPERS, a women’s NGO which 
grew from a Forum within HAK to concentrate on women’s human rights. 
FOKUPERS particularly focussed on violence against women, initially related to 
military repression, but later broadened its mandate to embrace family violence and 
other priorities for women.  
 
Chapter Eight explores the experiences of two NGOs which were initially established 
outside East Timor, SAHE by East Timorese students in Indonesia, and Timor Aid by 
exiles in Australia. Both established themselves inside East Timor before the violence 
of September 1999 and responded to the crisis along with others. 
 
Chapter Nine draws out some of the main issues and trends identified in the previous 
chapters highlighting the way NGOs’ roles have shifted during the various phases of 
the transition, how they tried to engage with and influence events, and the 
organisational transitions they experienced as they did so. This chapter also discusses 
the capacities the Timorese NGOs needed to survive in the rapidly changing 
environment and how they developed them.  
 
 29
Chapter Ten tries to draw some conclusions about the role that local NGOs played in 
post-conflict East Timor. It tries to assess the extent to which local NGOs contributed 
to the development of democracy, development and peacebuilding. It discusses their 
relationship to the newly emerging state, and the long term sustainability of their 
contributions to the new nation. Finally, some reflections on how civil society and 
NGOs may be conceptualised in post-conflict nation and state building conclude the 
thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
POST-CONFLICT AND TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 
AND LOCAL NGOS 
 
 
This study focuses on a period in East Timor which was characterised by a series of 
transitions:  from a highly repressive colonial state perpetrating significant human 
rights violations; through a UN sponsored self-determination process; significant 
destruction and terror following the ballot leading to a complex humanitarian crisis; 
UN intervention for emergency relief and subsequent reconstruction; a transition to 
independence and the building of a democracy; and the start of a longer-term process 
of peacebuilding and nation building. This chapter tries to establish what is already 
known from theory and research elsewhere about the roles of civil society, particularly 
local NGOs, in these different transitional and post-conflict contexts. It cannot canvass 
the vast range of literature on democracy, post-conflict and peacebuilding in general, 
although it begins by situating the specific context of civil society in post-conflict 
societies within a broader context of civil society and NGOs in development during the 
1990s. It then examines the literature about civil society, especially NGOs, in different 
phases and roles in democratic transitions as well as in post-conflict societies. Studies 
from Latin America, Africa, Asia (especially South East Asia), Afghanistan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovena are discussed. However, discussion about civil society, NGOs 
and democratisation in Indonesia itself is covered in Chapter Five, on the history of 
governance, civil society and NGOs in East Timor, since the latter’s history has been 
highly influenced by its former colonial power.  
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2.1 Civil society in development in the 1990s: diverse theoretical 
perspectives 
 
Development practice during the 1990s was dominated by a so-called ‘New Policy 
Agenda’ promulgated by the World Bank, other financial institutions and donor 
agencies (Gore 2000). While there were certain variations, there were two key elements 
of this policy approach: firstly, there was a faith in the efficiency of an untrammelled 
market to drive development through economic growth; hence the emphasis on 
reducing the size and role of the state, deregulation, privatisation, and economic 
liberalisation; secondly, there was emphasis on the need for good governance, 
variously interpreted to mean democracy, reduced corruption and greater transparency, 
adherence to market-friendly economic policies, reform of the public sector and 
promotion of civil and political rights. Those donors who emphasised the first strand, 
who saw the market as the key to development, tended to view NGOs as low cost 
service providers, either providing services in areas where markets had failed or were 
not appropriate (e.g. primary health care in rural isolated areas) or bringing markets to 
the poor (e.g. through the provision of micro-credit). This perspective is what Glasius, 
Kaldor and Anheier (2006:21) refer to as the ‘new public management and welfare 
reform’ approach in which NGOs are seen as among the new providers of welfare. 
Those concerned with the second strand tended to see NGOs as part of civil society 
which was seen as having a democratising role in relation to the state. In this case, 
NGOs were seen as a counterweight to repressive states, and a means of making states 
accountable to their citizens. NGOs could demand transparency and accountability of 
states and promote human rights. Glasius, Kaldor and Anheier (2006:21) also 
recognised a third approach which has been popular, one which emphasises civil 
society as contributing social capital through the participation of people in voluntary 
associations. Similarly, Ottaway and Carothers (2000) and Grugel (2000) noted the 
social capital and democratic rationales for civil society involvement in development, 
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but added a different third rationale—contributing to peace, conflict resolution and 
human rights (Grugel 2000, Ottaway and Carothers 2000).  
 
Thus, for a variety of reasons, civil society had come to feature strongly in 
development policy and practice (Pearce 2000, Salamon and Anheier 1999) so that, 
writing in the mid-1990s, White commented, ‘Together with the market and 
democracy, “civil society” is one of the magic trio of development panaceas which 
emerged in the 1980s and now dominate conventional prescriptions for the global ills 
of the 1990s’ (White, G. 1996:178). Furthermore, towards the end of the 20th century 
it was becoming clear that civil society, including NGOs, had an inherently global 
dimension (Florini 2000, Glasius, Kaldor and Anheier 2006), thus exploring civil 
society within a nation would necessitate understanding its global linkages. 
 
While much of the theory has been about civil society, donors became particularly 
enamoured of NGOs in the 1990s and they became officially-recognised players in the 
development endeavour. The World Bank saw them as efficient non-state channels in 
an era of anti-statism; progressive international donors, on the other hand, saw them as 
a means of helping the poor and powerless or as promoting democracy (Brinkerhoff 
1999, Edwards and Hulme 1996, Pearce 1993). Within this context, NGOs became 
organisations everybody could love, but which meant very different things to different 
people.  
 
Some of this diversity and ambiguity of expectation probably arises because civil 
society theory draws from several different political and philosophical traditions, which 
tend to become confused in development approaches. Ferguson’s idea of civil society 
(Ferguson 1767), developed from Hobbes’ earlier ideas (Hobbes 1660), contrasted it to 
a ‘state of nature’, the rampant individualism which emerging capitalism was expected 
to produce. Thus ‘civil society’ would temper social behaviour and maintain social 
cohesion. Hegel however, saw ‘civil society’ as potentially dangerous, and argued that 
it needed to be controlled to protect the public interest and ensure citizens acted 
morally. De Tocqueville, on the other hand, viewed a dense web of associations as a 
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means to deepen democracy, and enable citizens to check the power of the state (de 
Tocqueville 1988). While from a Marxist perspective, Gramsci saw civil society as an 
arena of ideological struggle for and against capitalist domination of the state and the 
society (Alagappa 2004, Van Rooy 1998). It seems that development practice has 
tended to be most influenced by the de Tocqueville view, with civil society linked 
strongly to the deepening of democracy and more participative policy development 
(Fukuyama 2001, Glasius, Kaldor and Anheier 2006, Kaldor 2003, Van Rooy 1998). 
However, almost all of these civil society theorists wrote from their analysis of the 
development of western forms of civil society in a particular European or USA 
historical period; as I will discuss later, the context in which civil society emerges, and 
the forms it takes, may differ substantially in quite different settings, such as Asia in 
the 21st century, casting doubt on some of the assumptions about civil society, 
democracy and development which development theorists and practitioners have 
adopted. 
 
Kaldor, who sees NGOs as tamed versions of earlier social movements, questions 
NGOs’ claimed separation from the state, suggesting that they may in fact reflect a 
more ‘flexible state or the market becoming more embedded throughout society’ 
(Kaldor 2003: 94-95). Various authors have argued that NGOs cannot continue to fulfil 
the functions of global welfare as well as representing themselves as alternatives to the 
dominant economic and social values. They argue that NGOs must take a more active 
role in shaping the global context rather than simply being determined by it (Commins 
1999, de Senillosa 1992, Jennings 1995). The same could be said within national 
boundaries. Bebbington captures some of this dynamic: 
 
NGOs have always been in part a response to state failure, in part a response to market 
failure, and in part a response to weaknesses in popular organisations. On some 
occasions, they have acted more like a state, other times more like an ally of the 
popular organisation, and on other, though fewer occasions, more like a (socially-
orientated) market activator. This mixing of roles has never been easy, and has 
contributed to the crises that NGOs now face (Bebbington 1997:1764). 
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As Fowler (1997:30-33) recognises, the changing aid and development context in the 
early to mid-1990s generated a great deal of organisational reassessment and 
restructuring for both northern and southern NGOs. NGOs in the developing world 
were repositioning themselves in part in response to major societal and political 
changes occurring, for example in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the former 
communist countries, and in part in relation to the way northern NGOs were struggling 
to reconcile their values base and voluntary principles in the new era of public sector 
contracting and market competition. Southern NGO responses, he claims, were shaped 
by ‘ideology, donor pressure and local opportunities’ (Fowler 1997:33). Fowler also 
recognises that an important factor in the history of many southern NGOs is their 
relationship to their colonial history. Citing Adam (1990) he refers to three responses: 
‘return to the past’, ‘seize the future’ or ‘transmission belt’. The first group seek to 
build their identity on pre-colonial values, religions or cultures which were suppressed 
during the colonial period;  the second group find their identity through an analysis of 
both past and present oppression and the denial of basic human rights among the 
people; the third grouping  simply help transfer aid (Fowler 1997:36). It would be 
expected that NGOs of each type might be evident in East Timor and that ‘ideology, 
donor pressure and local opportunities’ might indeed shape the work of Timorese 
NGOs.  
 
2.2 Issues relating to NGOs in development 
 
Since this growing engagement of NGOs in official development work, there has been 
a proliferation of literature about them. Much of this literature has focussed primarily 
on the role and work of international, rather than local NGOs, although some of it 
embraces both.14 In a wide-ranging review of NGO-related literature, from an 
                                            
14 This literature, which grew rapidly in the 1990s, covers the role, structure and functions of these 
     organisations and the impact that their activities have (Makoba 2002, Malhotra 2000, Pearce 1993,  
     Reymeni 1997), their relationships to states and donors (Bebbington 1997, Brinkerhoff 1999,   
     Edwards  and Hulme 1996, Hateley 1997; Nelson 1995, Pfeiffer 2003, Stiles 2002), their  
     accountability, effectiveness and impact on the ground including through their advocacy (Ebrahim 
     2003, Kelly and Chapman n.d., Najam 1996, Suzuki 1998), in particular whether their claims to  
     reach and represent poor people and foster participation are borne out (Cleary 1995, Rumansara    
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anthropological perspective, Fisher recognised that ‘there are relatively few detailed 
studies of what is happening in particular places or within specific organisations…’ 
(Fisher 1997:441). He drew attention to the need to examine the way discourses about 
NGOs affect their practice; how interrelationships between them and other players, 
including the state and communities, operate; and how they evolve and develop in 
context (Fisher 1997:441- 442). 
 
Indeed, whilst NGOs are generally recognised as distinctive types of development 
actors because they are values-based, there is some debate about the gap between the 
theory and practice of NGOs’ values, with suggestions that they often struggle to 
operationalise them (Mukasa 1999, Wallace 2000). In particular, some NGOs have 
been criticised for the apparent contradiction between their promotion of ideals of 
inclusive democracy and their hierarchical internal structures, although Smillie and 
Hailey’s study of Asian NGOs refutes these perceptions (Smillie and Hailey 2001). 
How NGO values are articulated through the range of roles which they play is another 
issue already referred to (Korten 1990). What is interesting is how NGOs manage 
diverse roles and combine them in an effort to meet their goals.  
 
Through the nineties, a predominant thread in the literature on NGOs reflected a 
concern about the extent to which their relations with states and donors impeded their 
ability to retain their close relationships with, and primary accountability to, very poor 
and excluded people (see for example Bebbington 1997, Edwards and Hulme 1996 and 
1997, Hadenius and Uggla 1996, Khus 2000, Nyamugasira 1998, Stiles 2002, White 
1999) although it is generally recognised that by their nature NGOs are more able and 
likely, compared to other development organisations, to be flexible, innovative and 
responsive to changing circumstances (Khus 2000). How NGOs gain and maintain 
their legitimacy is a further issue—it may come from their membership or from the 
quality of the service they provide to those with whom they work, and their expertise 
                                                                                                                              
    1998, S.White 1996, 1999) , the nature  and quality of their partnerships with local NGOs or CBOs  
     (Brehm 2001; Fowler, 1998, Lewis and Sobhan 1999, Lister  1999, 2001, Jordan and van Tuijl 2000,  
    Postma 1998, Malhotra 1997), their relationships to wider civil society (Kaldor 2003, Van Rooy 
    1998) and their work in  conflict and emergency relief (Duffield  1997, Hulme and Goodhand 2000,  
    Smillie 2001). 
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(Clark 2003). Najam (1996) lays out various ways in which NGOs’ diverse 
accountability requirements can be met, including through codes of conduct, standard 
setting, and evaluation of programs as well as through transparency and reporting about 
financial and other matters.  
 
A related thread in the literature relates to NGO partnerships. Originally ‘partnership’ 
was understood by NGOs as ‘a code word to reflect humanitarian, moral, political, 
ideological or spiritual solidarity between NGOs in the North and South that joined 
together to pursue a common cause of social change’ (Fowler 1999). Today partnership 
can mean almost anything—donors have partnerships with NGOs (Yonekura 2000) 
and NGOs have partnerships with the private sector (Murphy and Bedell 1999). The 
concept has been stretched almost to the point of meaninglessness. Hateley (1997) 
presents an analysis of partnership as either one-way and vertical in nature or two-way, 
more equal and mutual. Fowler (1998) believes that ‘authentic partnerships’ in which 
each partner plays an equal, if different, role and in which accountabilities are mutual, 
are rare, and Ahmad (2006) concurs. However, Hilhorst’s anthropological study of a 
Philippines NGO illustrates how local NGOs, which are generally seen as ‘at the 
mercy’ of funding agencies, may be more powerful in relation to the donor than is 
usually imagined. These relationships are not simply contracts—they are negotiated 
processes, often of ‘multiple realities’ and multiple meanings. Even when donors and 
NGOs share the same language, their meanings or interpretations of it may vary 
(Hilhorst 2003). 
 
There has also been a lively debate about the effectiveness and impact of NGO 
programs. Most official evaluations and reviews of donor-supported programs have 
found international NGOs (who frequently work in partnership with local NGOs) to be 
quite effective (AusAID 1995, DANIDA 1999, Riddell et al. 1997) but because of the 
diversity of NGOs and the range of work they undertake, it would be naïve to assume 
that problems do not exist. The literature often focusses on many of the problems, 
rather than the successes, and these may include ineffective programs with undesirable 
side effects, undermining of state programs, patchy services, jealousies and 
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competition between NGOs, and poor coordination (Fisher 1997, Pfeiffer 2003, Stiles 
2002). NGOs have been criticised for failing to evaluate their work, and the question of 
whether and how NGOs learn and adapt has also been raised (Fowler 1997). Whilst 
some of this literature implicates local as well as international NGOs it is often 
focussed more on the latter than the former. However, even where NGO work is 
undoubtedly effective, development agencies are often critical of the small scale of 
NGO impacts. In response, some studies have investigated strategies for ‘scaling up’ 
NGO efforts generally (Chambers 1992, Edwards and Hulme 1992a and 1992b, Uvin 
and Miller 1999). However, when Uvin, Jain and Brown (2000) examined five Indian 
NGOs, they found that there were two major approaches to scaling up actually adopted 
by them: the first involved expansion, while the second involved increasing impact 
without getting larger. For example, they created other organisations, or persuaded 
others to adopt their strategies in a variety of ways. They become ‘catalysts of policy 
innovations and social capital’, creators of new knowledge, and of new organisations 
(Uvin, Jain and Brown 2000:1418). 
 
The question of the capacity of international NGOs to develop the capacities of their 
local partners is another key issue emerging in the literature (Kaplan 1999, 2000, Low 
and Davenport 2002). Fowler’s (1997) ‘capacities framework’ provides a useful 
analytic tool for examining NGO capacities, which, combined with his model about 
how NGOs take development action, provides a useful framework for the investigation 
of NGOs in this study, without constraining it. There is clearly a tendency for capacity 
building to focus on donor system requirements, rather than on analysing the NGOs’ 
context and reviewing appropriate roles and strategies (Hudock 1997). There is thus a 
risk that local NGOs lose sight of their own mission and values and are not reflective 
enough of changing circumstances. A study of large South Asian NGOs suggests that 
the capacity to survive and become sustainable in the longer term is critical, and this 
requires NGO leaders to become ‘donor savvy’, having a vision of their organisation’s 
future, but being flexible about how to reach it, gain the trust of donors and legitimacy 
in the eyes of constituents, remain politically neutral, innovate, meet complex state and 
donor requirements, and develop social cohesion (Banerjee 2003). Pacific NGOs urge 
 38
more than skills training for individuals; they need organisational and network capacity 
development, management and leadership development and financial sustainability 
(Low and Davenport 2002). 
 
Managing changing circumstances however seems critical to NGO survival and 
achievement. Smillie and Hailey studied nine Asian NGOs which they considered to 
have sustained success to explore how they had done this. Successful management of 
NGOs, they concluded, is about change management. Success was about how NGOs 
‘understood and adapted or invented new ways of working towards the economic and 
social empowerment of the disempowered…It is about the management of change 
within organisations as well as management for change in the lives of people’ (Smillie 
and Hailey 2001: 2). They found four key themes arising from their research, which 
were ‘the importance and influence of context… time, timing, and the length of time it 
takes for change to happen’ as well as the need to balance formality and strategy with 
informality and flexibility, and the value of participative management (Smillie and 
Hailey 2001:160-161). These NGOs had survived through intensely difficult periods in 
the political environment in which they operated, had generally experienced a crisis at 
some time in their development, but had grown and could point to major achievements. 
Smillie and Hailey concluded that ‘the key learning competencies needed by growing 
NGOs are the ability to filter data and information, the analytic capacity to reflect on 
past experience, a hunger to learn and the insight actually to remember lessons’ 
(Smillie and Hailey 2001:72).  
 
A final but somewhat different area of relevant literature is concerned with legal 
frameworks for NGO activity and standards and codes of conduct. Mayhew (2005) 
demonstrated the way in which national legislative frameworks reflect diverse 
responses to the NGO sector in four different Asian countries, ‘ranging from 
ideological control to state apathy’ (Mayhew 2005:729). However, laws are often very 
limited in scope and many developing country NGO consortia have developed peer-
managed codes of conduct which govern their activities and set voluntary standards. 
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Their generally greater attention to donor and government accountabilities than those 
to their beneficiaries is, however, a weakness (Lloyd 2005).  
 
2.3 Local civil society and NGOs in complex humanitarian            
emergencies and emergency relief responses. 
 
 As a subset of the development literature there is a significant amount of material on 
complex humanitarian emergencies and emergency humanitarian relief, although 
relatively little of it relates to local NGOs. Some, however, discusses the role of civil 
society and its relationship to the collapsed or newly emerging state.15 Emphasizing the 
political dimension of these events, Cliffe and Luckham (1999) refer to complex 
political emergencies (CPEs), identifying among them ‘reform or liberation wars’ 
(Cliffe and Luckham 1999:37), the type which East Timor represents. They recognise 
that when states collapse and humanitarian emergencies occur, even in the case of 
liberation movements, the regimes which emerge, though formally liberal democracies, 
are often severely affected by the years of conflict, the heavy presence of security 
instrumentalities and the weakness of ‘democratic conflict management’ (Cliffe and 
Luckham 1999: 39). They find that even when new states are established, old patterns 
of power are likely to continue (such as human rights violations, suppression of dissent 
and corruption). CPEs also leave their own legacies of state failure to compound the 
legacies of conflict, and these combine to affect state and local institutions, including 
the civil society, in many complex ways. Among the many challenges such societies 
face, are those relating to how a new state will relate to non-state players, and how trust 
and cooperation will be rebuilt.  
 
                                            
15 There are three common elements in the diverse situations which the UN has termed ‘Complex  
    Humanitarian Emergencies’(CHEs). These are that: 
    ‘The crisis is multidimensional, with profound human suffering; the roots of the upheaval are in part  
     political, even if complicated by drought and other disasters; one dimension of the emergency is that  
     the state is contested or collapses.’ (Pearce 1999:51). Although the scale and complexity of some  
     CHEs, such as Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzogovina, is greater than in East Timor, as will be shown  
     later, these three features were all evident there following the 1999 UN sponsored ballot. 
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Pearce suggests that CPEs of the 1990s are quite different from the conflicts of the 
Cold war era in Central America which arose in a context of strong and repressive 
states and an era of state led development. More recent CPEs emerged in contexts of 
weak states unable to maintain territorial control, in an era of globalisation and a 
reduced role for the state (Pearce 1999:54). The East Timor conflict, emerging at the 
end of 1999, was certainly an eventual outcome of the impact of global processes in 
Indonesia (the ‘Asian crisis’) (Nyman 2006), but in other ways it emerged from a 
repressive state context and was about the universal principle of self-determination. 
The state, initially very strong, collapsed in September 1999, and the UN took over its 
role. 
 
However, Pearce argues that peacebuilding in Central America has nevertheless been 
negatively affected by the same processes which have led to the 1990s CPEs. In 
particular she highlights the failure of national elites to take responsibility for a more 
inclusive form of national development, and the persistence of now weak states which 
reflect elite interests. The welfare of poorer people has been left to NGOs and 
international actors, but remains aid dependent and hence, unsustainable. Thus donor 
support for civil society and local peacebuilding initiatives is having limited impact in 
the absence of strong national development goals and strategies. Donors also found it 
difficult to work with the popular civil society organisations who had mobilised and 
empowered people, were sceptical about donor motives, and lacked technical project 
management skills. Donors transferred support to new, less politicised NGOs who 
developed those skills. Divisions between NGOs and grassroots groups also emerged 
due to the latter’s resentment about the funding flowing to the former.  
 
Debates in the literature about the humanitarian emergency responses to these CPEs 
have frequently related to the politics of humanitarian intervention, the right to 
intervene and the issue of sovereignty. They have also focussed on the relationship of 
largely international humanitarian actors with military actors, issues of coordination, 
effectiveness and accountability for the quality of the response to a humanitarian crisis, 
and issues of protection and human rights in the response (Minear 2002, Quinn 2002, 
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Smillie and Minear 2004). Particular themes which are of special relevance to this 
study are those relating to the role of civil society in emergency and rehabilitation, 
local capacity building, and the relationship of international to national players (Smillie 
2001).  
 
While White (2000) saw four potential NGO roles in relation to intra-state conflicts, 
namely, relief and rehabilitation, human rights monitoring, early warning and 
mediation and reconciliation, Harvey (1998) was sceptical about what he called a ‘civil 
society rebuilding approach to rehabilitation’ which was popular among donors in 
CPEs in the 1990s (Harvey 1998:201). He, like Pearce (1999), believed this led to 
efforts to build civil society capacity without adequate attention to building state 
capacity. Noting that despite war and conflict, traditional and religious institutions may 
persist, he recognised that civil society was not entirely independent of the state, or of 
entities fulfilling some state functions, such as warlords. Thus simplistic ideas about 
building civil society failed to grasp the complex interactions and political dynamics in 
conflict and post-conflict environments, in which civil society space itself may be 
contested. Goodhand and Lewer (1999) were also sceptical about NGOs’ capacities in 
such settings, beyond providing relief. Further, Harvey (1998) recorded the suspicion 
about NGOs generated in Somalia when, in response to availability of short-term aid 
funds, thousands of ‘NGOs’ formed to implement projects, with inadequate capacity 
building and accountability in place. Most disappeared as the aid funds dried up. 
 
Minear (2002) noted the international humanitarian community’s rhetoric on the 
importance of local participation in the response to a humanitarian emergency, yet 
commented that over a decade little had improved in practice. He suggested this 
indicates ‘deeply rooted dysfunctional power relationships that underpin the 
humanitarian apparatus’ (Minear 2002:56). He was concerned about the preponderance 
of international actors in emergency settings, and how unequal relationships 
established early on may constrain possibilities in later phases of recovery and 
development. He found that attitudes of foreign (and some local) actors were the key 
factor in determining whether existing local capacity was utilised and strengthened or 
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undermined. Further he found that generally, enhancing local capacity was seen simply 
as a means to an end (more effective delivery of relief) rather than an end in itself, for 
the longer-term. 
 
The unequal power relations between donor agencies and local organisations are at the 
heart of the problems, but Zetter indicated that it was possible for local NGOs to 
successfully challenge the dominance of international organisations, citing examples of 
local NGO work in refugee assistance in Malawi and Zimbabwe (Zetter 1996). Studies 
in Afghanistan (Hulme and Goodhand 2000, Monshipouri 2003) also emphasised the 
important roles local and international NGOs played during and after the protracted 
conflict there, notably in providing relief, supporting projects in areas such as health, 
education, job creation, child survival, assisting women, restoring agriculture, 
landmine removal and water supply in rural areas. By helping restore social justice and 
economic development, and simply by operating freely, Monshipouri (2003) believed 
NGOs could contribute to peacebuilding there, so long as they maintained political 
neutrality.  
 
Smillie offers a rare collection of case studies of efforts towards local capacity building 
in humanitarian emergencies, with a strong emphasis on gaining local perspectives 
(Smillie 2001). His research illustrated the difficulties of capacity building in contexts 
fraught with conflict. It also reinforced Harvey’s (1998) view that in an emergency 
civil society may contract or expand, and illustrated the range of relationships civil 
society may have with the state from almost complete disengagement (Mozambique) to 
significant overlap and dubious independence (Sri Lanka). The question Smillie raised 
is whether international humanitarian agencies would see the value of developing local 
civil society to play a potentially significant role in their country’s transition from 
emergency to some sort of normality, and to prevent it returning to conflict. He 
recognised many operational problems, among them the capacity of the capacity 
builders, issues to do with timing and funding, corruption, pressure for immediate 
outcomes, and the restrictive nature of contracting arrangements. He also discussed 
political issues, such as the partisan nature of some local civil society actors and the 
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reality that some donor support is short term and purely instrumental, with no concern 
for long term organisational sustainability. Finally he commented on motivational 
issues—whether the will was actually there to make the necessary changes to give local 
civil society a more prominent role in post-conflict emergency and recovery work. The 
Haiti case study in his volume demonstrates that this may only come about when 
circumstances force it, and through changes in donor procedures (Mangones 2001). 
 
The Bosnian case study (Smillie and Todorovic 2001) raises some issues especially 
relevant to East Timor’s circumstances. Few Bosnian government officials understood 
what an NGO was, and some were somewhat hostile. After the emergency there was a 
huge expansion of NGOs, and no legal framework for their operations. Donor priorities 
changed rapidly, so NGOs tried to keep pace with the shifting agendas and short term 
funding timeframes. Although donors proclaimed support for civil society, in practice 
they saw local NGOs as simply a cheap approach to residual social welfare (Smillie 
and Todorovic 2001:33). Donors failed to work closely with Bosnian NGOs, to support 
them in strengthening their own capacities for the long haul, and to help them develop 
a positive interaction with their government, including on the matter of NGO laws. 
Also relevant, because of the influence of the Timorese diaspora in Mozambique, is 
that country case study in Smillie’s collection (Lubkemann 2001). It showed how the 
experience of Portuguese colonialism had prevented the emergence of a genuinely 
independent civil society until after 1975, when at independence, government was 
transferred to FRELIMO who then sought to control any local initiatives. These 
experiences encouraged local communities and associations to adopt strategies of ‘exit’ 
or non-engagement with the state, rather than ‘voice’, meaning advocacy and 
participation.  
 
On a more positive note there is evidence of local NGO work in response to disasters 
being better recognised by developing country governments, in Bangladesh and India, 
where local NGOs have demonstrated capacity for disaster mitigation and response 
work (Matin and Taher 2001, Palakudiyil and Todd 2003). 
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The above studies illustrate the significance of the position adopted by the state on the 
nature and roles which civil society and NGOs may adopt after a crisis.  
 
2.4 NGOs and democracy  
 
A second theme in the literature relates to civil society, NGOs and democracy. Much of 
the global interest in civil society grew out of the apparent success of the democracy 
and human rights movements which challenged communism in the eastern bloc and 
dictatorial regimes in Latin America, and played a major role in the anti-apartheid 
struggle in South Africa. Civil society—in the form of strong movements variously led 
by students, trade union members, churches, professionals, women’s groups and many 
citizens—was seen as essential to the transition to democracy. Hence civil society 
attracted a normative meaning and soon became strongly associated with the idea of 
building democracy (Blair 1998). 
 
However, specific literature on the roles of NGOs in processes of self-determination or 
decolonisation is almost non-existent, probably because most of these decolonisation 
processes in Asia and Africa occurred between the end of the Second World War and 
the 1960s, prior to the emergence of interest in civil society and before the ‘association 
revolution’ referred to by Salamon (1994) which led to the expansion of NGOs in the 
developing world. East Timor is a rare example of a decolonisation process conducted 
in the last decade, although far from unique in terms of UN election processes in other 
types of post-conflict environments (such as Cambodia, Guatemala, former Yugoslavia 
etc.). What literature there is refers to the growth of NGOs or the constraints on them 
after earlier processes of decolonisation and independence, such as in Nigeria, 
Malaysia and the Philippines (Bradley 2005, Case 2003, Silliman and Noble 1998, 
Wah and Teik 2002). In the latter case a weak government and  poor economic 
conditions contributed to the rapid growth of civil society (Silliman and Noble 1998), 
whereas in Malaysia the strong authoritarian state and developmentalist approach with 
restricted liberties made the emergence of civil society more difficult (Wah and Teik 
2002).  
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The literature in the area of civil society and democracy is highly normative and 
focuses less specifically on NGOs and more on the role of broad movements (Clark 
2003, Keck and Seckink 1998, Kaldor 2003) in relation to democratic transitions 
and/or democratic consolidation (Diamond 1994). Clarke (1998) refers briefly to 
NGOs’ involvement in both phases in Thailand, Philippines and Chile, but is a rare 
example. Yet Alagappa observes: 
 
…the democratic-transition literature assigns civil society an important role in the 
prelude to the transition, although not in the transition itself… and the democratic 
consolidation literature posits the institutionalisation of civil society as a key condition 
for the consolidation of democracy, making it the only game in town (Alagappa 
2004:31). 
 
Haynes (1997) notes that broadly there are two types of ‘action group’ which have 
mobilised in the third world, those concerned with development and those concerned 
with a wider range of socio-political goals; he raises the question of whether the civil 
society which struggled against military dictators has the capacity to weaken deeply 
embedded authoritarianism in the society. White (G. White 1996) more optimistically 
suggests that civil society can foster democracy and good governance by altering the 
balance of power between the state and society in favour of the latter; playing a 
disciplinary and accountability role in relation to public governance standards; 
mediating the community’s demands of and interactions with the state; and playing a 
‘constitutive’ role, to redefine social norms and push for rules based on democratic 
values. Indeed, if, as Keane suggests, democracy is a set of institutions whereby power 
can be non-violently apportioned and monitored, the democratisation of the use of 
violence itself is vital (Keane 2004). However, the way power is exercised within civil 
society has a lot to do with the success or failure of a transition to democracy (G. 
White 1996). In the case of East Timor, non-state actors (militias) were terrorising the 
population, even as the civil society human rights movement tried to press their claims. 
Similarly, Alagappa argues that civil society is an area of governance in its own right: 
he cautions not to overlook the heterogeneity within civil society, and recognises that, 
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‘the control of violence is a major problem for civil society and the state’ (Alagappa 
2004: 35). Alagappa recognises many functions which civil society may play in the 
arenas of political society, the state, broad socialisation and its own governance.16  
However the influence of civil society in any context will depend on the strength of 
other political forces in the state and the international environment (G.White 1996).17 
 
Other studies of democratic transitions and civil society, particularly in Asia, challenge 
some of the western assumptions behind approaches to civil society and democratic 
transitions in the development literature (Lyons and Hasan 2002, Schak and Hudson 
2003, Wah and Teik 2002). Civil society in Asia has diverse origins and histories, in 
societies in which the separation of the state from the civil society is not always as 
marked as in the west (Ma 2002, Morton 2005). Rather, civil society may be a zone of 
interaction, cooperation or compromise; even though it may help overthrow despotic 
regimes it may not necessarily create the conditions for democratisation. A history of 
corporatist states and authoritarian cultures with embedded patron-client relationships, 
the valorising of material development over democracy, the strength of family and kin 
networks, and the role of religion, may mitigate against a transition to liberal 
democracy, despite very active civil societies emerging (Hyuk-Rae, 2003, Lyons and 
Hasan 2002, Rowley 2005, Vichit-Vadakan 2003, Wah and Teik 2002, Weller and 
Hsiao 2003). Civil society may emerge from traditional forms  into a ‘grey zone of 
organisations that mediate between the state and the citizenry but are not fully 
independent of the state as found in liberal democracies’(Lux and Straussman 
2004:178), so that donor support for civil society may not necessarily help combat 
corruption— it may fuel it. Or civil society may be highly fractured along ideological 
lines and distinctly illiberal (Constantino-David 1997, Kostovicova 2006). Thus what 
kind of civil society may emerge in East Timor in relation to what type of state has to 
remain an open question. 
                                            
16 See for example Table 1.1 Functions and roles of civil society, page 53-54, Alagappa (2004). 
17 The other major forces affecting East Timor’s transition to independence were the transitions towards  
    democracy going on in Jakarta and international pressures on the Indonesian state following the Asian   
    crisis of 1997-98 (Nyman 2006).This thesis is more concerned with what roles local Timorese NGOs  
    played in this period and how those roles changed as events unfolded, rather than the impact of the  
    wider Indonesian civil society on the democratisation process unfolding in the colonial power. 
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There are nevertheless examples in Asia, such as the Philippines and South Korea, 
where very active civil societies within a more liberal democratic political model have 
emerged. In Taiwan, social movements contributed to the democratic transition, which 
in turn helped the NGO sector to grow, with both service-providing and advocacy 
NGOs active (Hsiao 2003, Weller and Tsiao 2003). In Korea, movements of labour and 
the middle class broke through authoritarianism, but civil society groups themselves do 
not reflect participatory approaches and their effectiveness has been limited as they 
have not acted collaboratively towards common social goals (Hyuk-Rae 2003). 
Although NGOs have made the Philippines more democratic, in particular by shaping 
the agenda with new issues, there remain many areas where they have failed in their 
goals. For example, the elite political families still retain enormous power and control 
and there is oligarchic rule; for NGOs and civil society in contrast, ‘democracy means 
people empowerment’ (Silliman and Noble 1998:293). This may be related to what 
Hedman (2006) calls ‘transformism’, a process whereby radical pressures which 
crystallise into major civil society expressions (such as the non-violent overthrow of 
the Marcos regime in 1986) are ‘absorbed’ by conservative forces. ‘People power’ 
ultimately supports a form of liberal democracy that leaves undisturbed these gross 
power inequalities. Despite earlier ideological schisms in civil society (Constantino-
David 1997), Ferrer (1997) notes that shared values are emerging and NGOs are 
maturing so that they can agree to disagree and yet work together. As they moved in 
the 1990s into closer partnership with a more NGO-friendly government, NGOs were 
also challenged to better organise the citizenry to have the capacity to push the state to 
meet their demands, to professionalise and develop technical skills for project work, to 
develop effective partnerships, and to address issues of sustainability (Aldaba 2002, 
Constantino-David 1997, George 1998). The Local Government Act of 1991, which 
gave NGOs roles on local development councils, contributed to the greater 
legitimisation of NGOs; those who built alliances with development-oriented officials, 
Manila-based networks, and scholars who could assist them were able to loosen the 
grip of local power elites and strengthen the people’s influence (Brillantes 1994, 
George 1998). 
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As Mercer (2002) points out, civil society efforts to promote a ‘democratic culture’ can 
help consolidate democracy, but a fragmented or conflictual civil society can threaten 
the prospect of a stable democracy emerging (Mercer 2002:8). Mercer’s review of the 
literature reveals that there have been three main arguments put forward as to how 
NGOs strengthen democracy: first, they are said to contribute to pluralism, through 
establishing networks and alliances that play a watchdog role—their sheer numbers are 
assumed to broaden out opportunities for advocacy and ‘voice’. Secondly, they are said 
to contribute to a more inclusive democracy by engaging more marginalised people and 
enhancing their capacity to engage with policy; thirdly, they are believed to check state 
power and autonomy, and contribute to both democratic transitions and consolidation 
as a result. However, as Mercer points out, and some examples from Asia noted above 
illustrate, NGOs may well encapsulate contested views about the nature of the state or 
society; and they may indeed be vehicles in a wider project of transformation of 
traditional societies towards a more ‘democratic’ vision, thus strengthening the state. 
So NGOs can weaken civil society and either strengthen or weaken the state (Mercer 
2002:12). They may not achieve broad coalitions, they may be captured in service-
delivery roles, and they may lose their grassroots linkages in the process of transition 
itself. They may, in fact, find themselves entrenching an undemocratic status quo rather 
than transforming it (Wiktorowicz 2002). However, where regimes are newly 
democratising, NGOs may play valuable roles. They may  ‘strengthen the state through 
their participation in improving the efficiency in government services, acting as 
strategic partners for reform-oriented ministries, filling in gaps in service-provision and 
helping the government forge ties with the grassroots’ (Mercer 2002:18). Yet others 
argue that donor support to NGOs in such contexts can undermine states (Fowler 1991, 
Marcussen 1996, Pfeiffer 2003, Tvedt 1998), for example by capturing precious donor 
resources or competing with states to provide services and command community 
loyalty. 
 
NGOs may be seen not only as part of civil society but as facilitators or strengtheners 
of it (Mitlin 1998). Local NGOs have thus been assumed to be important players in 
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building a vibrant civil society, which is regarded as a prerequisite for effective 
democratic processes. This role for local NGOs has been the centre of extensive study 
(Clayton 1996, Hearn 2000, Howes 1997, Marcussen 1996, McIlwaine 1998, Ottaway 
and Carothers 2000). Jorgensen (1996) describes some of the trends, and in particular, 
the potential difficulties for domestic NGOs as they embrace this work. These include 
the danger of losing touch with their constituencies, the risks involved in adopting 
political perspectives in some situations and the difficulty of maintaining funding for 
such roles. Furthermore, Choup suggests that civil society organisations (CSOs) would 
only deepen democratic culture if their strategies contributed to legitimising and 
strengthening democratic structures and processes (Choup 2003). She notes that grass 
roots organisations in the Dominican Republic often by-passed these and went straight 
to the President, because it was most effective in terms of outcomes. Thus as she 
concluded, ‘Democratic tendencies within civil society are limited by the effectiveness 
of democratic methods in obtaining government services’ (Choup 2003:40).  
 
Brinkerhoff also recognised that the extent to which civil society can play a role in 
policy development at the regional or national level depends to a great degree on the 
inclination of the state (Brinkerhoff 1999). He concluded that a number of factors were 
significant, among them the level of trust between the players, the existence of a clear 
legal or regulatory framework, the technical complexity of the policy being considered, 
and the mechanisms established for the partnership. He identified a number of 
measures which states need to take for effective partnerships, among them: creating the 
structures and mechanisms, especially decentralisation; building the capacity of the 
public sector to work with civil society; developing the legal frameworks and 
mechanisms; and having communication strategies for information flow to civil society 
(Brinkerhoff 1999:82). 
  
Bebbington (Bebbington 1997) illustrated how changes in state roles in line with New 
Policy Agenda thinking have challenged NGOs in the Andes and Chile. During the 
period of repressive state-dominated development, NGOs played a resistance role, 
supporting the popular movement. After the change, while NGOs initially had some 
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influence on state policies, they soon became excluded from these opportunities and 
became program implementers, at risk of losing their original visions. At the same 
time, their relationships with popular organisations were also being challenged, with 
critiques of their effectiveness, transparency, and legitimacy, and greater reliance on 
the state and outsiders for their funds. In response, NGOs were developing a variety of 
sustainability strategies, among them, development consulting through subcontracting 
with the state and/or donors, becoming a social enterprise or assisting the poor with 
market access, including through credit and financial services, and returning to the 
campesino economy. But financing such work was not easy, and the alternative visions 
needed an economic base (Bebbington 1997). Similar challenges are likely to be 
emerging in East Timor, where the nature of the NGOs’ relationship with the state has 
changed and the identities and strategies of NGOs will have to alter.  
 
Research on local NGO policy and advocacy efforts is limited except where the focus 
has been on international campaigns and the dynamics of local-international 
partnerships in these contexts (Chapman and Fisher 2000, Clark 2003, Collins, Gariyo 
and Burdon 2001, Edwards 1993, Gaventa 2001, Keet 2001). The experience of the 
Uganda Debt Network, a ‘southern’ partner within the international ‘Jubilee’ debt 
campaign network, describes efforts of northern NGOs to build the local campaign’s 
capacity and linkages between the local and global campaigns. It shows how capacity 
building of the Uganda Debt Network by international NGOs enhanced the 
effectiveness of the local campaign but also broadened the perspective of international 
NGOs’ work. Thus a process of mutual capacity building occurred (Collins, Gariyo 
and Burdon 2001). A related area in which NGOs, as part of civil society, have been 
involved in trying to expand their impact has been through influencing development 
policy in the preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) as part of the 
World Bank’s approach to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 
Mercer (2003) however, showed that civil society participation was extremely limited 
in developing Tanzania’s PRSP.  
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2.5 NGOs and peacebuilding 
 
The third relevant strand of literature comes from peacebuilding studies. The 
peacebuilding literature indicates differing definitions (Cutter 2005), but peacebuilding 
is often viewed as a process which occurs after violent conflict has subsided—a 
‘process of socio-political engineering’ (Labonte 2003:261). The UN views it as ‘a 
wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation and societal 
transformation… the phase of the peace process that takes place after peacemaking and 
peacekeeping’ (Maiese 2003:1). Yet NGOs may view it as a rather more all-
encompassing term, which begins with early warning and conflict prevention, through 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and including humanitarian intervention, and the 
establishment of peace zones. Essentially, peacebuilding is ‘a process that facilitates 
the establishment of durable peace’ (Maiese 2003:1) to prevent the recurrence of 
violence. It involves changing the socio-economic conditions that lead to violence, 
rebuilding fractured social relationships, and healing the trauma. Peacebuilding and 
post-conflict literature recognises that all levels and parts of society need to be 
involved, especially women, that the process needs to be long term, requires care in 
economic development approaches, and that civil society, among others, has a role to 
play (Castillo 2001, Maiese 2003, Menocal and Eade 2005). Peacebuilding is 
distinguished from state building which refers to ‘developing the institutions of 
government’ (Chesterman 2002:47), a task which in East Timor was also the 
responsibility of the UN. Unfortunately, peacebuilding success is elusive as around half 
of all peacebuilding efforts fail within ten years (Collier et al. 2003); and there remain 
debates about the capacities, impacts and legitimacy of civil society in post-conflict 
settings (Fischer 2006).  
 
Orjuela (2003) found during violent conflict in Sri Lanka, that although local civil 
society actors played a number of valuable peacebuilding roles, in particular public 
awareness, trust building and ethnic dialogue across the divide, advocacy and 
generating political pressure for negotiation, and contributing to reconstruction and 
development, the impact of many small, disconnected activities is hard to assess. The 
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rather top-down approach of NGOs and others, and the authoritarian tendencies within 
civil society organisations must also be recognised. Like others (e.g. Fischer 2006) she 
asserts that while a civil society contribution to peacebuilding is necessary it is 
insufficient. 
 
Hulme and Goodhand’s study of local and international NGOs’ role in peacebuilding, 
encompassed case studies in Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka (Hulme and 
Goodhand 2000). Their research suggested that NGOs played only a minor role in 
peacebuilding, yet some specific interventions where they play to their strengths can be 
valuable. East Timor after September 1999 represents what they term a ‘low risk/high 
opportunity environment’ in that open conflict was declining and there were 
opportunities for peacebuilding. Their case studies identified eleven discrete roles 
which NGOs played in conflict, although they failed to distinguish clearly between 
local and international NGOs in their work. Nevertheless the roles they identified were: 
mediation/conflict resolution; building peace constituencies; demobilisation; human 
rights monitoring and protection; constitutional reform; local capacity 
building/institutional strengthening; socio-economic development; reconciliation; 
judicial reform; supporting local leadership; and advocacy/education. Importantly they 
commented that NGOs could be a source of peace leaders—individuals who could play 
extremely important stabilising roles in the reconstruction phase. Successful 
organisations which managed to get issues on the public and policy agenda had 
indigenous leadership, strong contextual analysis, were bold and creative, had strong 
networks, took a long term approach and were carefully supported. However, there 
were constraints, often related to donor environments. Short timeframes, frequent 
policy shifts, a tendency to foster risk avoidance and conformity, and time demands of 
rational planning, reporting, and accountability mechanisms all worked against good 
practice in civil society capacity building (Hulme and Goodhand 2000).  
 
Civil society organisations also ‘played an important role in peacebuilding processes at 
the local and national levels’ (Leonhardt et al. 2002: 2) in both Guatemala and Kenya. 
In Guatemala, NGOs had been involved in the processes in a number of ways, among 
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them: providing input to the peace negotiations, addressing past violations, promoting 
specific issues relating to the justice system and impunity, promoting community 
dialogue and debate on violence and political issues, promoting women’s rights and 
roles, assisting peasants to have a voice, and supporting returning refugees. The peace 
process had led many NGOs to ‘fundamentally review their mandate, policy and 
programmes’ (Leonhardt et al. 2002:14); some had influenced government policy 
making, but the NGOs faced major constraints due to limited and unreliable funding 
from donors. In Kenya, development organisations (the authors again did not 
distinguish between local and international, but it appears that these were mostly 
international NGOs) had recognised that conflict was impeding their work, and these 
organisations had tended to draw on specialist conflict resolution NGOs to assist them. 
NGOs were seen to have made a positive impact at local level through working with 
other civil society groups to create local peace forums. At national level, the National 
Council of Churches of Kenya had led the community dialogue around a constitutional 
review. Arising from both contexts Leonhardt et al. (2002) identified a number of key 
issues: the lack of clarity and agreement within government and civil society about the 
nature of the desired post-conflict society and strategies to achieve it, and the need for 
wide community dialogue about this; the need to enhance the effectiveness of NGO 
peacebuilding programs so as to enhance their legitimacy, through building 
organisational and human resource capacity as well as the ability to analyse and plan 
interventions in conflict settings; the need to build NGO advocacy capacity and 
coordination to achieve greater impact at a number of levels; and the problem of short 
term, project-oriented funding mechanisms which do not facilitate capacity building for 
the longer term, and NGO efforts to overcome this (Leonhardt et al. 2002).  
 
In post-conflict Cambodia, Hourn (1999a) described the emerging opportunities 
provided by the democratic space as well as the challenges local NGOs faced in 
responding. Notably there were external challenges related to the state and society and 
internal challenges relating to their own capabilities. The problems ranged from lack of 
funding and lack of cooperation to lack of capability and professionalism. While he 
noted that civil society made tremendous progress, he suggested that learning to build 
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‘consent’ (meaning learning tolerance, cooperation, compromise, and roles of 
opposition and civil society) was the most important challenge for the whole nation. 
This is a similar point to Leonhardt et al.’s about the need for broad community 
dialogue about the desired post-conflict society. Curtis (1998) recognised that NGOs 
had played a major part in various phases of Cambodia’s rehabilitation, reconstruction, 
and transition towards peace but that their roles changed over time and lack of trust 
made cohesive NGO development difficult. Yet they were channels for significant 
donor funds and some had become mature, capable organisations having development 
impact. Civil society was playing a number of roles, among them fostering people’s 
participation, reducing local poverty, promoting human rights and peace, safeguarding 
democracy, election observing, and fostering local dispute resolution mechanisms. But 
Yonekura (1999) disagreed that Cambodian civil associations had successfully 
persuaded the state to respect democracy, largely because of their weak autonomy from 
the state and donors, their limited capacities for participation and advocacy, and 
because of the lack of state will and neutral law enforcement post-UNTAC. Hourn 
(1999b) argued that Cambodia needed stronger grass roots democracy, which was a 
responsibility of government as well as NGOs, but the latter needed long term visions 
and strategies to achieve it. Curley also found that ten years after UNTAC issues of 
NGO sustainability and funding diversification were to the fore (Curley 2004). 
Heinrich found that, in the case of South Africa, NGOs had a valuable role to play in 
consolidating democracy, mitigating racial conflict, and advocating for the poor, but 
changing external conditions which required them to either charge user fees or become 
subcontractors to government, were limiting their space and capacity for pro-poor 
advocacy (Heinrich 2001). Thus research seems to indicate that funding imperatives 
may distract NGOs from what might be their most important contribution in post-
conflict peacebuilding. 
 
If local NGOs are often overlooked, local women’s NGOs can be even more excluded 
than others. Abdela (2003) noted that women’s NGOs in Kosovo had been excluded 
from any input to the internationally led reconstruction process. The women 
complained, ‘We have never felt so pushed aside as we feel now’ (Abdela 2003: 212). 
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Helms (2003) also found that women’s NGOs led efforts at reconciliation and played 
many other humanitarian and social welfare roles in the post war reconstruction of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, often with the support of international donors, yet had been 
marginalised from formal, male-dominated political power. Donors had supported civil 
society there to advance the idea of a unified, multi-ethnic state, but while women’s 
NGOs had successfully cut across ethnic lines, Helms believes they were able to do 
that precisely because they were excluded from political power, and drew on their 
moral power. Similarly McGrew, Frieson and Chan (2004) found that although women 
were excluded from the peace negotiations, women’s NGOs in Cambodia since the 
UNTAC period used UNTAC’s emphasis on democracy and human rights to challenge 
violence and human rights abuses, strongly promote non-violence, and build 
partnerships with government on these and related issues; they demonstrated the 
positive role women can play in governance. 
 
Women’s NGOs can clearly play valuable roles in post-conflict settings, as the Leitana 
Nehan Women’s Development Agency (LNWDA) in Bougainville illustrates (Hakena, 
Ninnes and Jenkins 2006). This organisation developed teams of community peace 
workers who tackled issues such as ‘homebrew’ and violence through awareness 
workshops, offered counselling, used radio and bush theatre activities, and had 
frequent interaction with community leaders, government officials and others in 
authority to promote non-violent conflict resolution and peace transformation. 
LNWDA was seen as successful in its peacebuilding work because it brought to it a 
wide range of relationships and networks across the society, was able to work with a 
range of different players, including men and the Catholic Church; by rejecting 
‘binaries’ and accepting those who shared some if not all of their values, it was creative 
and risk taking in the approaches it used. LNWDA’s national and international 
networks were also a major source of strength and support, and these expanded 
outwards and changed in nature over a twelve year period. 
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2.6 Civil society and donors 
 
A significant number of studies, as well as examining civil society, explore the impact 
of donor assistance on it. Van Rooy (1998) noted  a wide range of reasons donors 
supported civil society, including to promote development, build social capital, 
contribute to equity, take over provision of key services, contribute to democratisation 
(through building institutions and a culture of democracy), and counterbalance the 
power of the state. She also identified some political agendas in donor support of 
certain civil society groups.  
 
The literature indicates that some donors and writers have a stronger focus on the 
democratic role of civil society (Blair 1998) while others see civil society as a key to 
achieving poverty reduction. In particular USAID has focussed especially on the 
democratic role (Ottoway and Carothers 2001). UNDP has offered a broad rationale for 
working with civil society groups, noting that governments alone cannot do all that is 
required for sustainable human development and has attempted to build relationships 
between governments and civil society in transitional countries (Lillehammer 2003). 
UNDP sees citizens as ‘participants, legitimizers and endorsers of government policy 
and action, as watchdogs on the behaviour of regimes and public agencies, and as 
collaborators in the national development effort’ (UNDP 2001:2). An evaluation of 
UNDP support to six conflict-afflicted countries, completed since this study concluded, 
stated, ‘serious attention to civil society concerns is critical if political legitimacy is to 
be established’ (UNDP 2006:43).  
 
In terms of civil society’s contribution to poverty reduction specifically, the World 
Bank argues that civil society organisations contribute to poverty reduction in six 
specific ways: promoting public consensus and local ownership of policies and poverty 
reduction strategies; giving voice to the concerns of the poor and marginalised; 
strengthening and leveraging impact of development programs; bringing innovative 
ideas and solutions to development challenges; providing professional expertise and 
increasing capacity for effective service delivery, especially in post-conflict 
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environments; and improving public transparency and accountability (World Bank 
Civil Society Team 2003: 4-5). These are some of the official reasons donors support 
civil society, but evaluations and research indicate that the consequences of donor 
support do not all match the rhetoric. Indeed UNDP found that its offices failed to 
engage with civil society and its concerns in the post-conflict countries studied. The 
evaluation attributes the failure to do this as cultural—the lack of local knowledge and 
language skills among international staff and their rapid turnover—as well as the lack 
of time to build solid relationships with communities. It also criticises the tendency of 
international organisations to delay development to the post-recovery period, and to 
‘focus on humanitarian relief and macro-economic stabilization’ (UNDP 2006a:26-27). 
 
Solis and Martin (1992) traced El Salvadoran NGOs’ experience before and after the 
signing of the 1992 Peace Agreement, following the decade-long civil war through the 
1980s. During this period, NGO numbers trebled, and became the organisational 
expression of popular movements of poor, marginalised people and providers of 
humanitarian aid to displaced and affected people. Thus they emerged in response to an 
emergency, and were faced with a new situation when the peace agreement was signed. 
The Peace Agreement included a commitment by the government to develop a National 
Reconstruction Plan, and donors established a fund to support its implementation. 
Donors, especially USAID, sought roles for NGOs in areas such as democracy 
programs, social programs, environment and agricultural development, but as 
McIlwaine found, the Salvadoran Government preferred to confine itself to work with 
NGOs linked to businesses, rather than the social sector or ‘popular NGOs’ which had 
been closer to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and played such 
key roles during the civil war (McIlwaine 1998). Experience from Nicaragua also 
indicates that post-war NGOs may find themselves competing among themselves and 
with popular organisations for funds and influence, and promoting projects which 
reflect donor priorities more than a long term development strategy; furthermore, in a 
period of change, roles of international and local NGOs may not be clearly delineated, 
methodologies may need to change, and independence from the political players must 
be maintained (Solis and Martin 1992:110). Similarly, Sabatini found the groups 
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donors supported in Latin America to be well-established elite groups, some working 
exclusively on democracy-related issues, others combining democracy work with a 
range of other objectives of a socio-economic nature. None had a mass membership 
base, and many were heavily dependent on donor support. He questioned whether 
international financing contributed to the distancing of these groups from the local 
political context (Sabatini 2002). Henderson (2002) also found that aid had led Russian 
NGOs to become preoccupied with their funders to the neglect of building 
constituencies; similarly short term funding  approaches in Bosnia had ‘failed to 
strengthen the NGO sector’ and fostered an elite focus, distancing NGOs from the 
society and social campaigns (Fagan 2005:415-417). 
 
Hearn  (2000) was highly sceptical of donor support for civil society in South Africa 
during the transition from apartheid, arguing that the weight of international support to 
organisations willing to promote procedural democracy, regardless of the wider socio-
economic benefits it may or may not deliver, was overshadowing earlier civil society 
goals of social democracy. She believed that that this implied no transformation of the 
highly unequal socio-economic order in South Africa. Landsberg (2000) added that as 
apartheid ended, civil society groups were able to attract far less support from donors 
than beforehand, as the latter had switched their support to the new state. This 
increased competition among civil society groups, and drew many away from grass 
roots work in an effort to nurture donors. Many NGOs were ill prepared for the rapid 
reduction of aid to the civil society sector, and had not developed strategies for 
sustainability. He argued that there was an urgent need for donor support for NGOs to 
help strengthen democracy at the grass roots. 
 
Ottaway and Carothers’ study of US democracy assistance suggested that donors 
should not make the simplistic assumption that NGOs were the key to civil society. 
Many other types of organisation play crucial roles. They also suggested that the 
attempt to appear politically neutral through civil society support was flawed, since 
civil society engages in a political process, a point also made by Santiso (2001). 
However, in trying to assess the impact of civil society aid they examined three levels. 
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At the micro-level they noted the huge impact in terms of numbers of NGOs supported 
through civil society programs and acceptance of the idea of NGOs as the form of civil 
society in many countries. At the ‘meso’-level, the impact advocacy NGOs have had 
on government policies is more mixed, in part because NGOs cannot always mobilise a 
broad constituency, although women’s NGOs tend to be the exception. This was also 
true in the case of the Philippines where the focus of NGOs was on the participation of 
grass roots people in social and economic development issues, rather than on 
democracy for its own sake (Racelis 2000). Finally, they concluded that the influence 
civil society assistance had on consolidating the broader political transition to 
democracy was minimal compared to other factors (Ottaway and Carothers 2000). 
They also noted that transitions do not always follow a straightforward trajectory, and 
whereas NGOs may influence policies where transitions are successful, where civil 
space shrinks NGOs may be very important in simply keeping democratic ideas alive 
(Ottaway and Carothers, 2000: 309-11).  
 
Donors can be naïve, believing that simply increasing the quantity of NGOs means that 
civil society is functioning well or that supporting service NGOs will contribute to 
democratisation (Fagan 2005, Hawthorne 2004, Jeffrey 2007); the international 
community failed to recognise that to build peace in Bosnia, NGOs had to engage with 
the complex ethno-nationalist politics, which was not a simple technical task but an 
intensely difficult and political one. Failure of civil society to engage with this, because 
of donor influence, perpetuated the politics of fear and hatred along with social 
fragmentation (Belloni 2001). However, over time, Bosnian NGO-government 
collaboration had been developed, although NGOs risked ending up distanced from the 
communities which they served (Jeffrey 2007) and looking more like ‘para-state’ 
organisations (Fagan 2005:413). 
 
Other writers (Hadenius and Uggla 1996, Stiles 2002) highlighted the risks of donor 
support for civil society creating donor dependence and reducing organisational 
accountability to members or clients or distracting NGOs from social mobilisation and 
empowerment of the poor, and alienating them from other parts of civil society. 
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Goodhand and Chamberlain (1996) also found that donor support for NGO relief 
activities into Afghanistan was often based on a limited strategic and political analysis 
of the conflict, and short-term donor support for NGOs had undermined longer-term 
NGO capacity building. Thus, in examining the role local NGOs have played in East 
Timor’s transitions it appears important to examine the influence of civil society aid on 
this.  
 
2.7 The emerging issues 
 
The literature reveals that while there is a great deal of discussion and theory about the 
role of ‘civil society’ and NGOs in development, including in post-conflict societies 
and peacebuilding, there is very limited research about what actually happens within 
and among local civil society organisations which experience a major humanitarian 
emergency (in which they are as much victims as anyone else), a dramatic collapse of 
the state, and an internationally supervised  process of post-conflict transition to a new 
democratic government. Smillie’s (2001) work comes closest to this, but it is a rare 
exception and its focus is particularly on capacity building. Yet, as Smillie and Minear 
comment, ‘indigenous NGOs and civil society institutions based in conflict zones, (are) 
simultaneously the most important and least appreciated player’(Smillie and Minear 
2004:16). International NGOs receive more attention than local ones, and often there 
are only ‘snapshots’ of NGO work in particular phases.  
 
It is interesting that the three major strands of literature, to do with development, 
democracy and peacebuilding, rarely interact or speak to each other. One exception to 
this is some emerging work on post-conflict development (Junne and Verkoren 2005) 
which attempts to highlight what is different about development in post-conflict 
environments compared to so-called ‘normal’ development. Junne and Verkoren argue 
that development needs to take the conflict setting into account in its approach, and that 
conflict studies need to include development considerations in their work. They also 
recognise that a shift to democratisation ‘implies nothing less than a cultural revolution 
in many societies’ (Junne and Verkoren 2005:315) but they make no conclusions about 
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the role of NGOs or civil society. However, they recognise that because conflicts are 
embedded from local communities through all their national and international  
interlinkages, conflict transformation ‘has to be embedded in an overall development 
strategy supported by many different groups’(Junne and Verkoren 2005:325). The way 
in which NGOs conceive of the intersection of peace, development and democracy will 
therefore be an interesting consideration. Other specific (although sometimes related) 
issues emerge from the different literatures. 
 
The development and humanitarian literature suggests a number of key issues to 
explore in this particular case study. Firstly, what roles local NGOs actually undertook 
through the various transitions is of interest; in particular, how they saw their tasks in 
relation to the broad themes identified in the literature, such as service provision, 
contributing to good governance and accountability, building social capital and 
encouraging participation, poverty reduction, promoting peace and conflict resolution 
and upholding human rights. It will also be useful to explore how their origins shaped 
their responses to the new environment after 1999. Did they ‘return to the past’, ‘seize 
the future’ or simply act as ‘transmission belts’ for the aid? What were the sources of 
NGO legitimacy, the scale of their activities, and the ways in which they attempted to 
expand their influence and their impact in the rapidly changing environment? 
 
A second broad theme is how local NGOs related to the colonial and subsequent 
emerging state (and UN bodies exercising state functions) as well as the communities 
of East Timor, and the changing dynamics among them. To what extent did NGOs find 
that old patterns of power reasserted themselves and how did they address this?  How 
local NGOs were engaged with the governance of the state or the governance of a 
diverse civil society itself will be of interest. The legal status of NGOs in the different 
periods and the changing administrative frameworks within which they operated will 
be examined, as well as how these changing political environments affected their 
community relationships.  
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Thirdly, the role of the international community and donors as significant players 
within this state-community-NGO dynamic is an issue. What influence did donors have 
on NGOs—and how was their support perceived?  It will be important to understand 
how the partnerships with different international donors, both official and non-
government developed, and how the local NGOs experienced them, as well as the 
extent to which the capacities of local NGOs were enhanced or excluded over the study 
period. To what extent were donors willing to work with NGOs and civil society 
engaging in an empowerment approach? 
 
The democracy literature provokes other questions. How did civil society, and NGOs 
in particular, contribute to the transition to democracy and then its consolidation?  In 
what ways did they attempt to do this—in terms of White’s, Mercer’s and Alagappa’s 
views about possible approaches? What kind of civil society was emerging and what 
was its relationship to the new state? How did NGOs relate to other expressions of civil 
society? Did NGOs strengthen or weaken the new state and how did they position 
themselves in the transition from a traditional society towards a democratic vision? 
How did state actions frame the scope of their possible contributions? What 
possibilities were there for partnerships with the new state? What was the scope for 
local NGO advocacy? Finally, what role did NGOs play in relation to wider civil 
society? Did they contribute to strengthening it? How did they interact between local 
community members and local state organs? 
 
The peacebuilding literature suggests paying attention to the likely dominant role of 
international players in the early humanitarian conflict phase; the  roles local NGOs 
play, particularly the roles of women’s NGOs, based on other studies of both 
international and local NGOs’ roles in peacebuilding; the constraints which donor 
behaviour placed on civil society and NGO capacity to act effectively; the mechanisms 
within the society for building consent or engaging in dialogue about the broad shape 
of the post-conflict society; and the capacities of the local NGOs to respond to the 
demands placed upon them. 
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Finally, the literature on civil society and donors indicates a need to observe donor 
interactions with NGOs and in particular to understand the influence and focus of the 
donors; the way donors and the state perceived the role of NGOs  and influenced the 
‘political economy’ of the civil society; how donors supported and shaped civil society, 
or withdrew from it in favour of support for the state; how donor relationships  may 
have helped isolate NGOs from other parts of civil society or distorted their goals and 
their accountability to the community; how donors viewed ‘enhancing local 
capacity’(as an end in itself or a means to an end?) and the political nature of civil 
society itself. 
 
These were some of the questions and issues relevant to the experience of East Timor 
which other studies had highlighted. Whilst they would not limit my enquiries, they 
clearly indicated features which might be important to understand, although I would be 
unable to consider all of them. The next chapter provides some historical background 
to the period under study, as it is essential to understand this history to make sense of 
the developments between 1999 and 2004. Civil society and NGOs emerged in East 
Timor from particular experiences, connections and contexts—from a variety of 
responses to the shared experience and pain of years of colonisation and eventual 
liberation.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HISTORY OF GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND  
CIVIL SOCIETY IN EAST TIMOR 
 
This chapter traces the early history of non-government organisations in East Timor 
and situates them in the wider governance, civil society and development contexts of 
the territory that is now the nation of Timor-Leste. Much detail about the history of the 
resistance inside East Timor has only become available through the work of the CAVR 
since independence, though a lot written prior to that focussed on the terrible human 
rights violations and suffering which the Timorese people endured. This chapter does 
not attempt to repeat the existing accounts of the pain and oppression the Timorese 
people experienced or the political and military strategies they undertook to win self-
determination (Dunn 1983, CAVR 2006). Rather, it traces the governance of East 
Timor through the periods of Portuguese and Indonesian occupation, with a focus on 
the development of civil society organisations. It shows that, with the exception of the 
church, and from the mid-1970s, the different civilian elements of the independence 
movement, development of civil society and NGOs has been relatively recent in 
Timor-Leste. Governance has otherwise been dominated by traditional systems and 
colonial states until the late 1990s: prior to that the conditions for the free development 
of a significant modern civil society simply did not exist.  
 
3.1 Governance before Portuguese colonialism 
 
East Timor has a history of 400 years of Portuguese colonialism followed by 
Indonesian occupation from December 1975. Prior to Portuguese colonialism the island 
of Timor comprised two kingdoms, both largely located in what is now West Timor. 
What is now East Timor comprised several small kingdoms, each governed by a king 
or liurai, with sub-units known as princedoms (Ospina and Hohe 2002).  
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Ospina and Hohe (2002) describe the structure of a kingdom, based on the liurai, 
whose position of political authority derived from his membership of a sacred house. 
Relations between kingdoms were often war-like, but peace arrangements could be 
sworn with a blood oath. Family relationships were complex and developed through 
marriages between houses. Wife-giving houses were seen as giving fertility and life, a 
great value, and marriage negotiations involved exchange of goods between the wife-
taking family and wife-giving family. In this traditional cosmology, outsiders are 
always associated with political authority and wife-taking, whereas indigenous houses 
(‘Lords of the Land’) are associated with ritual power, wife-giving and fertility. Ritual 
power is far greater than outside powers have realised, and traditionally it was always 
ritual power holders who appointed political authorities. Thus in this period, 
governance was clearly embedded within a coherent social and cultural system and a 
holistic cosmology (Hohe 2002a, 2002b).  
 
3.2 Portuguese colonialism 
 
Portuguese first arrived in the region and formed a base at Malacca in 1511, landing in 
Timor itself in 1515. Portugal established its presence as a colonial government in 
Timor, initially in Lifau (Oecusse), moving its base to Dili in 1769, after protracted 
conflict with the Dutch over control of the islands of the region (Dunn 1983, Taylor 
1999). When Portugal developed a political administration over what is now Timor-
Leste18 its colonists had already begun to plunder the area’s sandalwood timber wealth, 
and colonial missionaries had actively promulgated the Christian faith (Dunn 1983, 
Ospina and Hohe 2002, Soesastro 1988, Taylor 1999). Portugal’s administration had 
little effect on the traditional governance system of East Timor, which was divided into 
62 small kingdoms, each under a ‘liurai’ chief, and further sub-divided into a number 
of clans. The Portuguese used this system to retain indirect control over much of its 
territory for most of its colonial rule, and political authority remained with the liurai 
system until late in their administration (Sherlock 1983). From a Timorese 
                                            
18 The political boundaries between what is now East and West Timor were only settled between  
     Holland  and Portugal in 1914 (Durand 2006: 281-298). 
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cosmological perspective, Portuguese were perceived as the ‘younger brothers’ who 
had travelled overseas and returned to ‘introduce political values’ (Ospina and Hohe 
2002: 47).  
 
With the vast majority of the population living in rural areas and engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, social life was largely restricted to the village, and religious life 
was shaped by animism, with great reverence given to the ‘luliks’, or sacred objects. 
People lived in their traditional kinship groups, small hamlets and loosely organised 
villages. Visitors in the mid-1800s described East Timor as miserably poor, with the 
colonisers having an oppressive, exploitative relationship with the local Timorese 
(Dunn 1983, Ospina and Hohe 2002). Subsistence and smallholder agriculture were the 
main economic activities, although Dunn notes that by the mid-1850s small amounts of 
wheat, sugarcane, coffee and potatoes were being exported. Chinese dominated the 
retail and trading sectors, especially in the major towns, and were viewed as 
exploitative by local Timorese, as they paid low prices for agricultural produce but 
charged exorbitantly for essential goods (Dunn 1983). 
 
From the mid-1850s the Portuguese organised East Timor into eleven districts, each 
under the control of a military commander, whose main responsibility was the 
collection of taxes, but this again had little impact on the traditional structures. The 
Portuguese used the local ‘chefe de suco’ to collect the taxes and manage their limited 
administration (Ospina and Hohe 2002). Towards the end of the nineteenth century 
Portugal sought to generate more wealth from its colonies, so it introduced coffee to 
East Timor as a cash crop, later adding copra as well. The colonial power also 
introduced a head tax and a system of forced labour to make people produce over and 
above their subsistence needs, which caused significant resentment. This resentment 
built up and towards the end of the nineteenth century a series of bloody rebellions and 
uprisings against the Portuguese administration occurred, which were violently 
crushed. These reduced the population and shattered the limited economy. Food output, 
coffee production and livestock numbers were dramatically reduced (Dunn 1983, 
Soesastro 1988). Best known of these uprisings is the 16 years of rebellion by many 
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liurais under the leadership of the liurai of Manufahi (Same) which culminated in 
violent clashes between 1910 and 1912. During this period some 3,000 East Timorese 
were killed and another 4,000 captured (Ospina and Hohe 2002, Taylor 1999). In 
response, the Portuguese set about abolishing the liurais’ kingdoms. They re-divided 
them into ‘sucos’ (princedoms) and introduced the new smaller administrative units, 
‘posto’ and ‘conselho’, in an attempt to destroy the traditional power system (Ospina 
and Hohe 2002, Taylor 1999).  
 
The post World War One period of colonial rule was relatively calm, and people’s 
subsistence and barter economy thrived (Dunn 1983) but the Second World War 
brought further disruption and devastation to East Timor, with major conflict between 
the Japanese and the Allies fought out in East Timor’s mountainous terrain. An 
intelligence report  in 1943 indicated that prior to the Japanese invasion there were now 
seven major administrative units (which it termed provinces), each administering eight 
to ten postos, and below each of them up to 12 sucos, each comprising up to 15 
villages, in a complex settlement and administrative hierarchy (Allied Geographical 
Section 1943: 68-70). How accurate this was is hard to assess. The majority of 
Timorese fought courageously with the Allies, who acknowledged their invaluable 
support. However, the Timorese people’s suffering under the Japanese occupation was 
immense, as the intense fighting again wreaked havoc on their agricultural livelihoods, 
and bombing campaigns destroyed much essential infrastructure. At least 40,000, 
perhaps as many as 60,000, Timorese died (Dunn 1983, Taylor 1999). 
 
The Portuguese administration, which had fled, returned once the Japanese had left, 
again using a system of forced labour to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed in the war 
(Taylor 1999). However, there was little significant post-war development during the 
late 1940s and 1950s, although agricultural production and livestock numbers began to 
recover by the early 1960s (Dunn 1983). Dunn also notes an expansion of primary 
schooling by the 1970s. Returning to Dili in 1974 after a lengthy absence, he describes 
the dramatic increase in students and primary schools from only 8,000 students in 39 
primary schools in 1953 to 60,000 students in 456 primary schools (Dunn 1983:7-8). 
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Catholic schools educated 60 per cent of primary school age children, while colonial 
schools were reserved for ‘assimilados’ (assimilated as Portuguese) and ‘mesticos’ 
(mixed race people) (Taylor 1999). There was still very limited access to secondary 
education, with just one government high school founded in 1965 (Hill 2002), no 
tertiary education locally available, and by 1974 only 39 students were attending 
university in Lisbon (Taylor 1999).19 
 
People’s health was poor; tuberculosis was common and malaria prevalent in the 
coastal lowlands. Health infrastructure was limited, but at least on a par with that in the 
region at the time, and better than some. Two hospitals, eight district clinics and 48 
health posts existed (Dunn 1983:45). Dunn also noted big changes in the towns, with 
the emergence of a significant Timorese elite, and growing numbers of Timorese in the 
administration, the church and the military. Much of Dili’s essential infrastructure was 
not developed until the 1960s (Nicol 2002, Soesastro 1988) and Dunn comments that 
in the dry season ‘it was possible to travel by four-wheel-drive vehicle to any part of 
the province’, although this was impossible in the wet (Dunn 1983:30).  
 
In 1964 an 11-member local Legislative Council was set up, later broadened to a 
Legislative Assembly of 21 members, 10 elected from a small electorate of the 
propertied and literate elite, a further 11 appointed to represent different interests. This 
body was officially to ‘advise and assist’ the governor (Dunn 1983:38), and as Dunn 
notes, its composition always assured him of support. Its few Timorese members were 
mostly certain liurais whose interests were served by perpetuation of Portuguese 
colonial power. Only assimilados could vote for this body and the Portuguese National 
Assembly. To be an assimilado a person had to speak Portuguese, earn enough income 
to support his family, and be ‘of good character’. Nicol estimates that only two percent 
of the population was eligible to vote (Nicol 2002). The rest of the population were 
                                            
19 Hill (2002: 34-39) describes the role of the missions and religious orders, the army and the Chinese  
    community in Dili in running schools in this period; the Catholic orders (Canossians and Jesuits  
    respectively) ran a school for girls at Ainaro and for boys at Soibada as well as the Jesuit seminary at  
    Dare which provided the only avenue to secondary education for most Timorese. The  liceu, or  
    government secondary school, was only established in 1965. There was also an agricultural and  
    vocational school near Baucau, a technical college, and a teacher training college for primary school 
    teachers. 
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designated ‘indigenes’, a designation which Taylor believes had an important effect on 
the emergence of indigenous elites in the independence movement itself (Taylor 1999). 
 
As Portuguese colonialism came to an end, following the ‘Carnation revolution’ in 
Portugal in April 1974, Dunn records that the economy had changed little. Most people 
were still surviving through subsistence, with maize as the main crop. The Chinese 
controlled the trading,20 and a growing part of the coffee business, manufacturing was 
small scale artisanal, with wood crafts, textiles, alcohol and baking as the main 
examples. There was some foreign mineral exploration and a little interest in the 
potential of tourism, but political instability soon discouraged both (Dunn 1983). 
Soesastro describes Portuguese colonialism as exhibiting ‘all the symptoms of colonial 
neglect and indifference’ (Soesastro 1988: 209)—a colonial attitude which was to 
change radically in the subsequent Indonesian occupation.  
 
Taylor argues that despite the colonial power’s efforts to undermine traditional 
systems, these had largely failed. Post World War Two the liurais and the sucos were 
the bases of socio-political power, with the Chinese holding the commercial power. At 
the middle of the twentieth century,  
 
‘All the basic elements ensuring the reproduction of indigenous society were still 
firmly in place—kinship systems, ideologies legitimising traditional rule, a self-
regulating political system, a self-sustaining subsistence economy and a culture based 
on notions of reciprocity and exchange’ (Taylor 1999:15).  
 
Ospina and Hohe illustrate how this occurred through the incorporation of colonial 
powers into the traditional cosmology and power structures of East Timor (Ospina and 
Hohe 2002). 
 
                                            
20 Taylor notes that at the end of the 1960s, 397 of the 400 retail outlets were run by Chinese families  
    (Taylor 1999:16). 
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3.3 Civil society in the Portuguese period 
 
The Church was the most significant example of what is now known as a ‘civil society’ 
organisation during this period of Portuguese colonisation, although at that time it 
officially represented the colonial power in its education role (Hill 2002).21  In the early 
colonial years missionaries were active (initially from a mission station established in 
Solor as part of the Malacca diocese) and the liurais were early converts (Dunn 
1983:15-16). The Church was favoured by the colonial state as a unifying presence and 
it appears to have had a cosy relationship with the Portuguese authorities, whilst 
assisting its Timorese parishioners resolve some of their grievances with the colonisers. 
Its outreach was often more extensive than the colonial administration and it played a 
valuable educational role, particularly running primary schools. The Jesuit seminary in 
Dare played an especially important role in raising awareness among its seminarians 
about the colonial plight of the Timorese, and about the development of nationalist 
movements elsewhere in the world. Its graduates were to play significant roles in the 
independence movement (Dunn 1983). 
 
Other ‘civil society’ organisations served the colonial power exclusively. In fact, the 
Portuguese colonists tolerated little freedom of association and only limited freedom of 
expression. One newspaper and a radio station were Portuguese controlled, and a single 
political party, Accao National Popular, functioned to promote the colonial regime 
(Dunn 1983, Taylor 1999, Nicol 2002). However, two Catholic newspapers, despite 
limited circulation, took a more independent line and provided an early opportunity for 
voices of pro-independence Timorese to be heard, albeit usually anonymously. Seara, 
for example began publishing in the 1960s (Hill 2002, Taudevin 1999, Taylor 1999) 
and was widely read for over 30 years (Crowe 1995). Unions and professional 
associations existed and had representation among the appointees on the Legislative 
Assembly (Dunn 1983).  
 
                                            
21 As a result of the Concordata signed between the Portuguese State and the Vatican in 1940, followed  
    by the Missionary Statute in 1941, the Missions took reponsibility for education of the indigenous  
    people in the colonies (Hill 2002:36). 
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Immediately after Portugal’s abrupt change of policy on East Timor in 1974 local 
political parties formed and decolonisation talks began. The Uniao Democratica 
Timorense (UDT), which supported self-determination in federation with Portugal, 
drew its support from Dili’s administrative leadership, plantation owners, and a number 
of liurais, especially from Ermera, Maubara and Maubisse. Associacao Social 
Democratica Timorense (ASDT), which in September 1974 became Frente 
Revolucionaria do Timor-Leste Independent (FRETILIN), also derived support from 
the urban elite and some liurais, but drew especially on a young constituency. ASDT 
called initially for gradual independence, and had a strong participative social program 
approach, with stress on literacy, agriculture, health, and Timorese culture. However, 
the name change signalled a shift in favour of speedier independence. Associacao 
Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI), a pro-integrationist party, only had a few 
hundred supporters, while three other parties (Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain [KOTA], 
Partido Trabalhista and Adlita) never gained significant membership. By late 1974 
FRETILIN had eclipsed UDT as the largest party; it had an extensive network across 
the rural areas, and gave special focus to agriculture and the Tetum language (Hill 
1980, Joliffe 1975). Its mass organisations for youth (Organizacao Popular dos Jovens 
de Timor) and women (Organizacao Popular da Mulher de Timor) played important 
roles in this work. OPMT, for example, was established in 1975 to engage women in 
the anti-colonial struggle and to challenge the discrimination women experienced. 
These mass organisations played important roles in childcare, education, health and 
local administration. Early in 1975, in the face of potential Indonesian invasion, UDT 
and FRETILIN formed a pro-independence coalition. During this period, in March 
1975, an Australian civil society delegation visited East Timor, hosted jointly by 
FRETILIN and UDT. Among those the delegation met was a large crowd from the 
Timorese Workers Union which encompassed all employees in the Province. This 
union was organised by FRETILIN which itself grew from the Committee for the 
Defence of Labour. They also met the national student union, Uniao Nacional de 
Estudantes de Timor (UNETIM), which had delegates across the Province; both the 
union and the student organisation were assessed as strong and active (Joliffe 1975). 
This coalition between FRETILIN and UDT did not last however. While 
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decolonisation talks had begun, a brief civil conflict ensued between these two political 
parties. In August 1975 UDT staged a coup, and started rounding up and killing 
FRETILIN members, but by the end of the month, FRETILIN’s far greater strength 
had crushed them, and FRETILIN moved to form a government.22 The impotent 
Portuguese authorities had meanwhile fled to the island of Atauro. 
 
It was during this period that international non-government organisations first became 
involved in East Timor. Initial humanitarian assistance to East Timor following the 
civil war came from a new Australian NGO, Australian Society for Inter-Country Aid-
Timor (ASIAT), which provided medical assistance, followed quickly by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (Hill 1980). In October 1975, a delegation 
from the Australian non-government aid agencies’ peak body, the Australian Council 
for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), also toured the country, and met with FRETILIN cadres, 
the head of the Economics Commission, the Timorese Women’s Organisation (OPMT) 
and the Catholic Bishop, among others. They recommended immediate help as well as 
a long term strategy for assistance to health, agriculture and education (Hill 1980, 
2002). That help was provided by ACFOA in the form of an initial shipment of food 
and the presence of David Scott on the ground until the Indonesian invasion (Scott 
2005).23 
 
On 28 November 1975, expecting an Indonesian invasion at any moment, FRETILIN 
declared independence, in order to make an appeal to the UN. Immediately afterwards, 
UDT joined APODETI to declare integration with Indonesia (Dunn 1983, Taylor 
1999). Fear of FRETILIN’s communist tendencies, seemingly exaggerated Indonesian 
accounts of the flow of refugees crossing the border into West Timor, and Indonesia’s 
territorial ambitions opened the way for western powers to turn a blind eye to the 
Indonesian invasion. The invasion in December 1975 was swift and exceptionally 
bloody (Dunn 1983). 
                                            
22 More detail about the history of East Timor’s political parties is contained in Walsh (2001). 
23 David Scott was at the time the Chair of Community Aid Abroad, later to become Oxfam Australia.  
    He had planned to assist with further shipments of rice, corn and other necessities via the Australian 
    Red Cross and Taiwanese authorities, but was forced to leave in fear of his life as the invasion took  
    place. 
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3.4 ‘Development’ in East Timor under Indonesian occupation 
 
The very short-lived civil conflict and the subsequent Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor had a devastating effect on East Timor’s economy and people. Tens of 
thousands of people lost their lives.24 In the 12-18 month period following the invasion 
Indonesian troops used an ‘encirclement’ strategy to relocate people and totally 
restructure Timorese society (Taylor 1999). Many found themselves in shocking 
conditions in resettlement camps. Food production and livestock numbers plummeted, 
and a large scale famine ensued, as a result of which many more lives were lost 
(CAVR 2006 Section 7.3).  
 
Aid was initially channelled through the Indonesian Red Cross, an army-controlled 
organisation. Outsiders had little confidence in its distribution, fearing that much was 
being diverted and sold (Dunn 1983). It was not until four years later, in 1979, that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the US NGO, Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS), were allowed into East Timor but strictly on the Indonesian 
Government’s terms. The ICRC was still constrained to work through the military-
controlled Indonesian Red Cross, while CRS, which had a far larger program, 
collaborated directly with Indonesian authorities. It assisted with food and medical care 
for some 300,000 people in 150 resettlement camps described by Taudevin as 
‘concentration camps’, rather similar to the strategic hamlets used in other war settings 
(Taudevin 1999). Thus CRS, funded largely by USAID, assisted the Indonesian 
Government to move people to areas of its choosing and confine them there. So while 
ICRC and CRS programs alleviated the worst of the suffering, and the famine was 
considered over by 1981, the CRS in particular had, with USAID support, played into 
the hands of the Indonesians by assisting them to establish people in strategic 
settlements where they could best control them (CAVR 2006: Section 7: 223-248, 
Dunn 1983, Hill 1980) 
 
                                            
24 Dunn says aid workers estimated one tenth to one third of the population perished (Dunn 1983:329). 
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Overall recovery of the economy from this devastating period was slow, hampered by 
security considerations, and characterised by rampant exploitation of Timor’s natural 
resources by the Indonesian military and a monopoly company, PT Denok, under the 
control of some of its generals. In 1981 the Timorese local Assembly complained about 
this exploitation, the level of corruption and human rights atrocities, as well as the lack 
of employment opportunities for Timorese people and their generally poor socio-
economic conditions since the Indonesian invasion (Dunn 1983, Soesastro 1988). By 
the mid-1980s East Timor’s economy was growing at around six per cent per year, 
driven particularly by government expenditure on infrastructure, especially transport, 
in part to stimulate trade, but no doubt with security considerations to the fore. As 
Schwartz notes, the ‘security approach’ formed the core of the policy, and Indonesia 
saw the problem in East Timor as poor implementation of integration. They did not (or 
chose not to) recognise that the Timorese rejected integration altogether (Schwartz 
1999). The extensive road network gave the Indonesian military greatly improved 
access to the population. There was also considerable spending on health and education 
but there remained much to be done to strengthen the coffee industry and agriculture 
more broadly (Soesastro 1988). Higher levels of growth continued in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, but this did not translate into better social indicators in East Timor, 
whose population remained extremely poor, was poorly nourished, and had high levels 
of illiteracy (Azis 1996).  
 
In the early 1980s, Indonesia held the first elections for village chiefs which had the 
appearance of modern democracy, but in practice reflected traditional power. 
Candidates were often selected by traditional power-holders and elected officials were 
frequently from the correct political house, as Timorese endeavoured to retain their 
traditional social systems despite the turmoil the society had endured (Ospina and 
Hohe 2002). During this period, following the Indonesian takeover, the now 
clandestine independence movement within East Timor reorganised into small cells 
with direct links to FRETILIN and FALINTIL, the armed wing (CAVR 2006 Part 5, 
Pinto 2001).  
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3.5 The Resistance: hidden governance systems 
 
The brief period prior to the Indonesian invasion, during which FRETILIN had been 
able to organise people through a socio-political program, had been important. 
FRETILIN renewed its efforts in its ‘zonas libertadas’ (liberated zones) in the 
mountains and forests as soon as it was able to after the occupation. For example, 
initial efforts by  the Popular Organisation of Timorese Women (OPMT) and Popular 
Organisation of Timorese Students (OPJT) to organise food for people in Covalima 
District displaced by the invasion are recorded by CAVR (2006 Section 7.3 Paragraph 
96). At this time, FRETILIN developed a civilian administrative structure from the 
sub-village to the district level for the areas it controlled. Its civilian political structure 
oversaw its military command. In this first period between the 1975 invasion and mid-
1976 FRETILIN organised civilians in ‘bases de apoio’ (resistance support bases) 
which the armed movement FALINTIL protected. However, by mid-1976 the 
Indonesian military had carried out their extensive ‘encirclement and annihilation’ 
strategy, which destroyed the liberated zones; the FALINTIL guerrillas who had 
escaped attack were surviving on the run in the forests, and had to be supported 
primarily by clandestinely organised civilians now living in the Indonesian occupied 
area.  
 
Following this shattering defeat, reorganisation was necessary so in 1981 the 
Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Conselho Revolucionario de 
Resistencia Nacional, CRRN) was created to lead the resistance. In practice 
FALINTIL, as the only effective resistance player at that time, took a strong leadership 
role. By 1987, in an attempt to be more inclusive of all pro-independence political 
parties and movements, the CRRN was replaced by a new formation, the National 
Council of Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional da Resistancia Maubere, CNRM), 
which gave high priority to developing the diplomatic struggle and garnering 
international support. By now, the resistance was clearly organised into three streams: 
the armed wing through FALINTIL, the cells of civilians working clandestinely inside 
East Timor (and through students in Indonesia), and the international diplomatic 
efforts. FALINTIL cut its specific ties with FRETILIN to fight for the CNRM 
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movement as a whole, and this arrangement continued through the transformation and 
development of the CNRM to become the broad and inclusive National Council of 
Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense, CNRT) in April 
1998 at a meeting in Portugal at which the Timorese ‘Magna Carta’25 was adopted 
(CAVR 2006 Section 5:2-6, CNRT 1998). It was this umbrella political body that led 
the Timorese resistance through the process of independence (de Araujo 2000).  
 
The civilian activities in this period were entirely underground, and were organised in 
small separate cells. Each small cell networked outwards cautiously to spawn new 
cells, so that an extensive, diverse, and highly decentralised network was formed. 
Women and young people were very active in this underground network which 
comprised many different groupings of cells organised together under one name (such 
as 07 or Orgao Oito).  
 
It was not easy to get involved in the underground because the networks and groups 
were small, and people were very secretive about their organizations. Such caution was 
necessary. Even if you were already part of one organization, you didn’t know other 
organizations because each had its own channels to the armed resistance. Students, 
civil servants, merchants, church people, and women’s groups all worked discretely 
and separately (Pinto and Jardine 1997:95). 
 
The underground resistance provided essential support for the guerrilla fighters in the 
jungle. They acted as communication channels between the fighters and the outside 
world, including the diplomatic front and the student organisations in Indonesia, such 
as the Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste, RENETIL (National 
Resistance of Timorese Students). They advised them of Indonesian military activities 
and movements, provided them with food and other supplies, and raised money for 
them (Pinto and Jardine 1997). 
 
                                            
25 This document sets out the principles (freedoms, rights, duties and guarantees) which the movement  
     supported. 
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While these developments were occurring within the political resistance movement, the 
more overt elements of civil society and the few NGOs were experiencing and 
reflecting the shifting trends within Indonesia state-civil society relations more broadly. 
 
3.6 Indonesian development strategy and the role of NGOs and civil 
society 
 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor occurred just a decade after the installation of the 
New Order Regime led by President Suharto, following civil turmoil in Indonesia 
associated with ‘aliran politics’ and the brutal purging of the Communist Party of 
Indonesia (PKI) (Aspinall 2004). Indonesian development strategy under this 
authoritarian regime was state-centric and coercive. The ideology and practice of 
‘developmentalism’ was strongly embedded in Indonesia during the late 1960s and 
1970s. Developmentalism implied state-led modernisation in the Third World, through 
tightly controlled industrialisation. This ideology was part of the repressive state 
apparatus which prevailed in East Timor. For many commentators, Indonesia’s 
transition from low income country at independence to middle income industrialised 
economy by the mid-1990s through rapid industrialisation and export-orientation was 
remarkable (Arndt 1996, Barlow 1996, Soesastro 1996). However, East Timor and the 
neighbouring Nusa Tenggara provinces were the poorest provinces of Eastern 
Indonesia, a region which did not benefit significantly from this wider economic 
transformation.  
 
The New Order State ‘strongly dominated the civil society’ (Billah 1996:168). Billah 
describes a process of ‘state corporatism’ across Indonesia, which required that while 
citizens’ organisations could play a part in democracy, they could do so only on the 
state’s terms and within the bounds of the state’s goals and agenda (Pancasila). 
Aspinall recognised three types of civil society organisation during this period:  ‘sole 
organisations’ which drew together major sectors such as peasants and trade unions 
and affiliated them with Golkar (the ruling party) to keep them under close control; 
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others he described as ‘semi-corporatist’, such as the large Muslim groups, which 
though independent, compromised with the state in order to survive; the third group 
were the ‘proto oppositional groups’, which included NGOs (Aspinall 2004). As Billah 
notes, ‘state domination over civil society was expanded and deeply rooted so that 
social groups had very little opportunity to organize freely and systematically’ (Billah 
1996:168). Hadiwinata (2003) describes the Indonesian state as ‘bureaucratic 
authoritarian’ (after King 1982) and notes that although in the late 1960s and 1970s 
community development organisations were allowed to operate, by the late 1970s the 
Government began cracking down on students, a move which over time stimulated 
campus activism and student ‘study groups’. This activism shifted to the arena of 
NGOs in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
 
National development in Indonesia was closely associated with military security, and a 
repressive climate ensued across the country, particularly in the then province of Timor 
Timur (East Timor). As Nyman points out, the separation between civil society and the 
state assumed in Western literature could not be assumed in Indonesia; there was some 
ambiguity, with some ‘civil society’ groups working from within the state—the so-
called ‘plat merah LSM’26 (Nyman 2006:42). In the mid-1980s state control over 
NGOs also tightened considerably. Laws were introduced in 1986 forcing NGOs to 
register with the Ministry of Home Affairs and report to it on their activities, funding 
sources, organisational structures and rules.27 They also had to allow themselves to be 
politically supervised by that Ministry and technically supervised by the relevant 
sectoral department. To avoid such legal constraints, some NGOs registered 
themselves as yayasans (foundations) under commercial law, rather than operate as 
LSMs (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat, or ‘Community Self-reliance Organisation’) 
with these restrictions. They also developed networks to support each other and strong 
leadership which would protect them and negotiate for their space to operate 
(Hadiwinata 2003: 93-96).  
                                            
26 ‘plat merah LSM’—or red plate NGOs—referred to the red number plates on government cars. 
27 Law No 8/1985 initially applied to ‘Social Organisations’ and NGOs were initially unsure whether it  
    applied to them or only to ‘mass organisations’. To clarify that it did apply to NGOs, Law no 18/1986  
    was subsequently introduced (Bourchier  and Hadiz 2003, Hadiwinata 2003). 
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Following a drop in national income due to declining oil prices in the late 1980s, 
Indonesia became more engaged with the World Bank, which at the time was 
beginning to be more open to NGO involvement in development programs. This was a 
period in which Indonesia was pressed into economic liberalisation, and it was thought 
likely that this would be accompanied by greater political liberalisation. It was in this 
context, with the World Bank’s influence, that some Indonesian NGOs began to 
become more closely tied into official development strategies. Many Indonesian NGOs 
became more enmeshed in state corporatism, and worked within the modernisation 
paradigm (Billah 1996, Budiman 1998). But as Budiman records, the process of 
democratisation was complex, with various elements of the state and civil society 
positioned differently in relation to it, ‘civil society is divided; part of it supports the 
authoritarian state, the other supports democracy’ (Budiman 1990:9). 
 
Aspinall records that by the 1990s, ‘the NGO sector had become a prominent player on 
the Indonesian political scene’ (Aspinall 2004:72). Tensions between the state and 
NGOs grew in the 1990s with greater NGO emphasis on empowerment and mass 
mobilisation activities, particularly among human rights, environmental and women’s 
NGOs, who posed growing challenges to the state in an increasingly difficult political 
environment. As late as 1995, Gaffar described Indonesian politics as ‘tightly 
controlled’ with very limited space for political opposition. He noted the way in which 
the permit system for NGO, student and even political party meetings of more than five 
people acted as a control mechanism, and commented on how frequently such meetings 
in major cities were broken up by the police. Media control and trials conducted 
against dissidents were other strategies used to keep civil society in check (Gaffar 
1996: 44-49). 
 
NGOs had by now become divided into two (Hadiniwata 2003) or three (Eldridge 
1990, 1995) main types according to their willingness to co-operate with the state or 
confront it. Eldridge (1995) characterised Indonesian NGOs as falling into three 
categories in terms of their relations with the state: 
(1) High level partnership-grassroots development; 
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(2) High level politics-grassroots mobilization; or 
(3) Empowerment of the grassroots. 
The first group worked in a cooperative relationship with the state, trying to encourage 
a more participatory approach, but not trying to change the broad directions. This 
included Bina Swadaya which was active in East Timor. Bina Swadaya promoted  
‘small savings clubs (simpan pinjam), credit unions and informally structured 
cooperative enterprises (usaha bersama)’ (Eldridge 1990: 515) and controversially saw 
value in trying to influence Golkar’s (the governing party’s) groups of farmers and 
fishers, among others (Eldridge 1990,1995). The second group, influenced by radical 
social theory, sought to conscientise people at the grass roots, but protected themselves 
through high level political relations. They acted in an advocacy role, and had links to 
military and bureaucratic networks in Jakarta. One example is the Legal Aid 
Foundation, which  worked with a network of groups on a wide variety of legal and 
human rights issues facing the rural and urban poor, as well as supporting women and 
labour organisations (Eldridge 1990, 1995). It made occasional visits to East Timor. 
The East Timorese human rights NGO, Yayasan HAK, also adopted such a strategy in 
the late 1990s. The third group simply worked at local level, creating awareness and 
building local groups, but had minimal contact with state institutions (Eldridge 1990). 
These were mainly smaller groupings emphasising the development of self-
management. Yasona, which began in 1983 under the auspices of the Indonesian 
Protestant church, represents this type of NGO in East Timor. 
 
Thus while the environment in East Timor was particularly repressive, NGOs and civil 
society there were embedded in, and influenced by, the wider context of Indonesian 
law and politics. Yet for Indonesian NGOs generally, even those in the second 
category, East Timor’s situation was not a significant issue. They had major problems 
of their own trying to operate within the limited democratic space, only had officially 
sanctioned information about the province, and generally accepted official accounts of 
the situation there. It was not until the mid to late 1990s that this situation began to 
change, as the flow of alternative information increased, and democratic space opened 
up within Indonesia itself. Some support for East Timor came from a couple of 
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Indonesian human rights NGOs, as well as from a range of international NGOs, 
especially through Catholic networks. The International Forum on Indonesian 
Development (INFID) network, through their international NGO connections, as well 
as informal student groups in contact with students from East Timor studying in Jakarta 
and Yogyakarta, were among those who became aware of alternative accounts of the 
situation. Two small NGOs, Fortilos and Solidamor, formed in Indonesia to offer 
solidarity to East Timor. 
 
As democratic space began to open in Indonesia after the May 1998 fall of Suharto, 
civil society flourished, unconstrained by the repressive laws of past years, and in 
response to the harsh economic situation which the Asian financial crisis had inflicted 
on Indonesia. However its impact remained constrained by the power of the IMF and 
international capital, the strength of the bureaucracy, and the weak organisational 
capacity of poor sectors of the society. To achieve pro-poor policy would require 
considerably more than democratisation and decentralisation, as entrenched power 
structures remained (Rosser, Roesad and Edwin 2005). This Indonesian experience 
signalled similar challenges ahead for East Timor, where at least two of those 
conditions remained (if not the strength of bureaucracy). 
 
3.7 Civil society and NGOs in East Timor during the Indonesian 
period 
 
Within East Timor, the Catholic Church, led first by the Bishop of Dili Diocese, 
Martinho Costa Lopes, and later by his successor, Bishop Belo, emerged as a protector 
of and voice for the people throughout the repression (Kohen 1999, Lennox 2000). 
Priests had witnessed the brutalities of the Indonesian military and the famine caused 
by the ‘fence of legs’ operation, and by 1977 the Catholic Church began what became a 
vital role in providing information to the outside world about human rights violations 
and acting as a protective umbrella for the people (Taylor 1991). The Catholic Church 
played a critically important role especially through the provision of education and 
health services to the community, and in 1998 Timor Kmanek, a Catholic Church 
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sponsored radio, began broadcasting in Tetum, a significant move since all other media 
used the official language, Bahasa Indonesia (Taudevin 1999). Radio Kmanek was 
widely listened to and church publications were widely read. Indeed, Crowe reported 
claims that ‘the pastoral letters of the Bishop are read more than any newspaper in East 
Timor’ (Crowe 1995:4). As Kohen says, ‘the church…was an institution that 
demonstrated a closer connection with the people than any other from the colonial 
period on’ (Kohen 2001:44). Taylor argues that the Catholic Church’s strong 
opposition to the occupation reflected a widespread rejection of Indonesia’s annexation 
of the territory by almost all social classes and groupings, unifying a society previously 
riven with ‘religious, cultural, educational and economic cleavages’ (Taylor 1991:157)  
between colonial, rural and nationalist groups. 
 
The student movement started in 1974-75, with groups of high school students 
involved with political parties, particularly UNETIM (Uniao Nacional de Estudantes 
Timorense) which was linked with FRETILIN. Students undertook political education 
work in rural areas. By the early 1980s, with more education available, including 
tertiary education in Jakarta, a new form of student movement developed, with small 
cells of three to five people, linked to FRETILIN. As CAVR records: 
 
These cells successfully infiltrated and controlled legal organisations such as the 
Catholic Scouts (Escuteiros) and the Intra-School Students Association (Organisasi 
Siswa Intra-Sekolah, OSOS) the student bodies in each high school created by the 
Indonesian government (CAVR 2006: Section 5:43). 
 
Students attending the Catholic schools could also organise themselves as they had a 
freedom to discuss political issues which was not possible in government schools. As 
time went on, there were a number of student organisations active, as well as the 
Catholic Boy and Girl Scouts, which were aligned with FRETILIN and/or the wider 
underground movement of the CNRM, which later transformed into the CNRT. After 
1986, students at the newly-opened University of East Timor (Universitas Timor 
Timur, UNTIM) also began to form clandestine cells and by 1991 activists from 
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several cells had formed the Association of Anti-integration Youth and Students 
(Humpunan Pemuda, Pelaja, dan Mahasiswa Anti-Integrasi, HPPMAI) (CAVR 2006 
Section 5: 43). By 1996-97 the UNETIM movement had widened to welcome 
participation of all youth, and was renamed OPJT (Organizacao Popular Juvente 
Timorense). Women were very actively involved in the resistance movement, 
particularly through Organizacao Mulheres Timor (Organisation of Timorese Women, 
OMT) and Organizacao Popular Mulheres Timor (Popular Organisation of Timorese 
Women, OPMT), as well as through the Scouts and other student groups. Nuns had a 
special role as they were less likely to be the targets of Indonesian violence than other 
non-violent resisters (Mason 2005).  
 
Timorese civil society also began to develop in other parts of Indonesia. From the early 
1980s East Timorese students were able to study in Java, Bali and elsewhere in 
Indonesia with Indonesian Government support. They subverted the Indonesian 
Government established Organisation of East Timorese Students, (Ikatan Mahasiswa 
Permuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur, IMPETTU) to support the resistance. A further 
student organisation, RENETIL, initiated by activist Timorese university students in 
Bali, soon spread through Indonesia playing an important role in educating Indonesians 
about East Timor. Other groups of Timorese students, including some who had been in 
the Catholic Youth Organisation (OJECTIL), also emerged where Timorese students 
were based, including the Secret Commission of the Timorese Students Resistance 
(Commissao Secrete  de Resistencia Nacionaldos Estudantes Timorense, CSRNET) 
and  the Clandestine Front of East Timorese Students (Frente Estudantil Clandestina 
de Timor-Leste, FECLETIL) (CAVR 2006 Section 5:43). 
 
Inside East Timor, the youth movement staged their first public protest in 1989 on the 
occasion of the Pope’s visit to Dili, and held a larger protest the following year when 
the US Ambassador visited. Such protests continued for a decade. Students also played 
a courageous role in the diplomatic struggle, passing information out of the country via 
student networks, and, as some had language skills, acting as intermediaries between   
international activists posing as ‘tourists’ and the resistance leadership (Pinto 2001). 
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However, a major turning point in the East Timorese campaign for independence came 
in 1991, when a student funeral march to the Santa Cruz cemetery turned to tragedy 
after Indonesian troops opened fire on the mourners. While several hundred students 
lost their lives that day, the presence of international media captured the horror, and the 
world suddenly paid greater attention to East Timor’s plight (Nevins 2005, Schwartz 
1999).  
 
3.8 NGO development in East Timor 
 
International NGOs had operated in East Timor from the early days of the Indonesian 
occupation and some supported the development of local NGOs. The Catholic Church 
had its own humanitarian organisation, Delgado Social (DELSOS), which later became 
Caritas East Timor. DELSOS was probably the earliest local NGO which grew from 
support provided by the Catholic Church in Indonesia across the border from Atambua, 
West Timor. It began in 1976, supported by international Catholic NGOs in Germany 
and the USA (Bano, Hunt and Patrick 2001). The Protestant Church NGO Yasona also 
began quite early, in 1983, but was at that time seen as an Indonesian institution, only 
later becoming Timorese-controlled (Social Naroman Foundation 2004). Though the 
ICRC remained in East Timor after the famine of the late 1970s, CRS withdrew in the 
mid-1980s, having helped to establish a local agricultural NGO, Yayasan Ema Mata 
Dalan Ba Progresso (Road to Progress Association) better known as ETADEP, in 
1987. CRS continued its support for ETADEP from its Jakarta office. After the 1989 
‘opening’ of East Timor a wider range of Catholic agencies, among them the Catholic 
Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) from the UK, Misereor from Germany, 
and Caritas Norway, Caritas Sweden and Caritas Australia,28 lent support to Catholic 
and other local organisations there (Bano, Hunt and Patrick 2001, Nest 1999). New 
international NGOs also started working in the area, notably CARE Canada (1995), 
Christian Children’s Fund (1990) and World Vision (1995), the last two as part of their 
Indonesian programs from their Jakarta offices (Bano, Hunt and Patrick 2001). There 
                                            
28 At that time Caritas Australia was known as Australian Catholic Relief. 
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was also some presence by branches of Indonesian NGOs such as Bina Swadaya (Nest 
1999), and Satunama, the latter supported by the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) 
of Canada (USC 2007).  
 
A small number of other local NGOs were formed and operating by the early 1990s 
although it was hard to ascertain their number or capacity (Pedersen and Arneberg 
1999). Yasona (1983), Hadia lale Ita Rain (Halarae) (1992) and Yayasan Hanai Malu 
(1990) for example, all offered credit and agricultural support to farmers. Local charity 
and welfare groups affiliated with religious orders and faith groups also assisted people 
in need, while Christian Children’s Fund operated in partnership with some eleven 
local foundations and was working with Perdhaki, a local NGO, on an acute respiratory 
infection prevention project (Pedersen and Arneberg 1999, Nest 1999). Around 1996-
97 more local NGOs started to form, among them Yayasan HAK focussing on human 
rights, FOKUPERS and ETWAVE (initially formed as  Gerakan Wanita Anti 
Kekerasaan, or GERTAK) addressing women’s rights and violence against women, 
Pronto Atu Serbi (PAS) a health NGO, and in 1998 Yayasan Bia Hula, a water and 
sanitation NGO formed within an AusAID bilateral aid project. Catholic Justice and 
Peace Commissions in Dili and, later, Baucau, were also significant especially in 
documenting the many human rights violations that were occurring. POSKO (Post for 
the Coordination of Emergency Aid), initially intended as a network of emergency 
relief under the auspices of Yayasan HAK, but in practice an operational organisation, 
formed to respond to the 1997-98 drought,29 and in 1999 did its best to reach and assist 
the militia-controlled Internally Displaced People (IDPs). Local NGOs also began to 
establish a coordinating body, the East Timor NGO Forum, in 1998 but it had difficulty 
meeting from April 1999 onwards because of the worsening security situation (Bano, 
Hunt and Patrick 2001). Some 14 local NGOs who founded the Forum released a 
Mission Statement on 23 June 1999 (East Timor NGO Forum 1999b)30 but the Forum 
                                            
29 POSKO’s members included Yayasan HAK, Caritas East Timor, FOKUPERS and ETADEP among 
     others. 
30 The NGOs who founded the Forum were: Yayasan Timor Aid, Yayasan Hope, Yayasan Kasimo,  
     Puskopit Hanai Malu, Puslawita, Yayasan Ledavo, Yayasan Halarae, Yayasan Bia Hula, Yayasan  
     ETADEP, Yayasan HAK, Bina Swadaya TimTim, Yayasan Bina Sejahtera Lestari, FOKUPERS and 
     Unitarian Service Committee (USC). 
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was barely able to function before the September 1999 emergency. In a broad 
assessment of development assistance to Timor conducted in May 1999, Nest (1999) 
notes that Timorese NGOs had been involved in project implementation, but ‘while it 
is difficult to ascertain the number and capacities of local NGOs, the consensus is that 
overall indigenous institutional capacity is very weak’ (Nest 1999:2). Neverthless, he 
recognised that, ‘there is however a small and competent core of local NGOs, and there 
are continuing plans by some aid agencies to help develop local human resources’ 
(Nest 1999:10).  
 
Local NGOs, especially those concerned with human rights, were viewed with deep 
suspicion by the Indonesian authorities, so had to manage their relations and activities 
with great care; they often took considerable risks assisting people, and passing 
information into the country and to the outside world. They were operating under 
constant surveillance and in a climate of intimidation and fear. The small number of 
international NGOs whose presence was known also had to operate cautiously, or risk 
expulsion from the province. Although the Indonesian state was extraordinarily strong 
and repressive, civil society was growing in courage. The church and students were 
particularly significant and the small local NGO presence was playing some extremely 
important roles such as documenting and protecting human rights, providing 
humanitarian assistance, undertaking development work in areas such as agriculture, 
savings and credit cooperatives (at least until the security circumstances prevented the 
continuation of normal development work), and assisting with health care (Australian 
Council For Overseas Aid 1999, Bano, Hunt and Patrick 2001). This was the context 
when, following the financial crisis which shook Indonesia in 1997 and the consequent 
departure of President Suharto in  May 1998, President Habibie announced in January 
1999 that he might consider independence for East Timor. Things moved quickly from 
there. In March 1999 preliminary agreement was reached for the UN to consult the 
people by direct ballot (Martin 2001) and the governance system was set for a radical 
change.  
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Thus, in summary, the governance system of East Timor at this time was multi-layered: 
traditional political and ritual authority systems were still largely retained, albeit 
discreetly; extensive Catholic Church structures and networks reached across the 
country and were trusted by the people; civilian cells and organisations of the 
clandestine resistance played critical information and mobilisation roles and supported 
the armed resistance; local civil society organisations, including NGOs, though limited, 
were often subversive in the ways they operated, and played an important role in 
linking to international civil society, particularly to human rights organisations and the 
international solidarity movement. The next chapter maps out major developments 
from this period to independence and beyond, with special reference to the roles of 
civil society, particularly NGOs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE STORMY TRANSITION TO NATIONHOOD: 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PERIOD 1999-2004 
 
Change in Indonesia in mid-1998 provided an opportunity which the East Timorese 
independence movement grasped. The transition to nationhood involved the conduct of 
a UN supervised ballot which invited the East Timorese people to accept or reject 
special autonomy with Indonesia. Rejection of this option meant a decision for 
independence (United Nations 1999b). After this, the process of putting in place the 
framework for a new state was to begin. However, the forced removal of people and 
the killings, destruction and burning which attended the announcement of the results of 
the ballot, meant that this process could only begin once the immediate humanitarian 
emergency had been dealt with. It also meant that the new nation started from a state of 
almost total destruction (Joint Assessment Mission 1999a, 1999b). Throughout the pre- 
and post-ballot periods civil society was extremely active and engaged, recognising the 
roles they could play in this time of rapid transition. In particular, from September 
1999 civil society tried to help the community understand and contribute to the 
processes of responding to the humanitarian crisis and forming the new nation.  
 
4.1 Grasping an opportunity: civil society’s role before the ballot 
 
Civil society in East Timor was quick to take advantage of the changed situation in 
Indonesia. In early June 1998, shortly after President Suharto announced his 
resignation, the East Timor Student Solidarity Council (ETSSC) formed and began 
organising public meetings, forums and huge demonstrations in support of 
independence, democracy, and reconciliation (Nicholson 2001). One courageous 
demonstration of some 10,000 people was organised at the time of a visiting foreign 
delegation. Martinkus (2001) described the flurry of student activity at the Turismo 
Hotel in August 1998, as the students firmly took advantage of the political space 
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created by President Habibie’s announcement of some sort of autonomy for East 
Timor. Liaising with foreign journalists based there, they took their campaign to the 
districts. At an early meeting they also invited contributions from NGOs and 
recognised the need to plan for development, as the province appeared to be on the 
verge of self-determination. The students held firmly to, and promoted, a non-violent 
philosophy (Taudevin 1999). 
 
The students’ mobilising activity, and their liaison with foreign journalists right under 
the noses of the Indonesian military, showed their courage and demonstrated leadership 
to the rest of the community: 
 
In the short reform period that accompanied Habibie’s offer of autonomy in mid-1998, 
it was the Dili-based students of the Solidarity Council, led by Antero Bendita da 
Silva, who were driving change…. The students’ open and noisy support for 
independence led the way for the rest of the population, including some influential 
people who had previously supported the Indonesians (Martinkus 2001:53).  
 
By April 1999, however, the situation had changed. The military had cracked down. 
Student leaders in Hera, Lospalos, Viqueqe and Baucau had all been arrested and Dili-
based students were living ‘underground’ or had fled to the hills (Martinkus 2001). 
Despite this, Timorese from within the Province and the wide diaspora, from political 
and civil society, gathered in Melbourne, Australia, in April for a Strategic Planning 
Conference to prepare for independence.31 
 
The roots of the September 1999 emergency were embedded in the 5 May 1999 
Tripartite Agreement signed by Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations which 
mandated the UN to conduct the popular consultation (United Nations 1999b). The 
Agreement made Indonesia responsible for peace and security in the pre-ballot period, 
which many found disturbing, notably the NGO SAHE, which wrote a critique of the 
                                            
31  I participated in this conference which brought together NGO leaders, political leaders and  
     others from inside East Timor as well as Timorese from Europe, Australia and the US, with their  
     international supporters, to work out policies and strategies in key areas for an incoming  
     administration. 
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Agreement and distributed it clandestinely in East Timor.32 Their fears proved to be 
well-founded. Yet despite the repressive and intimidatory climate throughout the 
period between May and August 1999, civil society activists played a key role in public 
education. With the United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET) 
gearing up for the conduct of the ballot, they took their clandestine education campaign 
to the rural areas. Students, women, church workers and other NGO activists, including 
many East Timorese students who abandoned their studies and returned from 
Indonesia, played key roles in the lead up to this ballot, fanning out across the country 
to inform and educate the mainly illiterate people about the processes of registration 
and voting.33 Their efforts undoubtedly contributed to the large numbers who 
registered to vote and the eventual turnout of 98.5 per cent. A very clear majority were 
against remaining part of Indonesia.  
 
While students, women’s organisations and the churches undertook political education, 
NGOs were also dealing with the human rights and humanitarian situation. As already 
noted, approximately 28-34 local NGOs were established by early 1999 and were 
operating programs, albeit under intensely difficult conditions. Another nine NGOs 
were formed outside East Timor itself by exiles or students (see Appendix B). In 
addition there was a small number of Indonesian organisations, social welfare groups, 
and faith groups, and a handful of international development NGOs present, some 
represented through their Indonesian offices, rather than directly in East Timor (Nest 
1999, Pedersen and Arneberg 1999). As the security situation deteriorated in 1999, 
many were unable to continue with their normal development programs and instead 
tried to prevent the situation worsening. The crisis was both a human rights and 
humanitarian one. Human rights violations were escalating. The Catholic Commission 
for Justice and Peace figures for April 1999 documented 308 human rights violations, 
including ‘disappearances, torture, houses burned and murder’ (ACFOA 1999:8). The 
human rights NGOs were kept extremely busy documenting and publicising abuses, 
and liaising closely with UNAMET officials monitoring the human rights, political and 
                                            
32 Respondent 80. 
33 Information drawn from numerous interviews and reflected in case studies (see Chapters Five to  
    Eight). 
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security environment. The large number of international visitors to East Timor during 
the months from May to the end of August also saw some NGOs  acting to brief the 
international community, including the media, about the situation, since the Timorese 
political leadership had to remain ‘underground’ for much of this period. 
 
The NGOs and church workers were also a lifeline for tens of thousands of internally 
displaced people (IDPs) across the country forcibly held in militia controlled camps, or 
otherwise affected by militia activity, accessing those they could with food and medical 
supplies in the most dangerous conditions. Credible estimates from church and NGO 
sources suggested that some 40-50,000 people were internally displaced by early June 
1999 and ACFOA’s report indicated that there was a significant humanitarian crisis in 
relation to inadequate food, water and health care, with access denied to many of the 
people in dire need (ACFOA 1999). The security situation was extremely poor, with 
militia intimidation supported by the Indonesian military (the TNI), and certain parts of 
the government in Dili and at local levels complicit in this.34  
 
Following the arrival of UNAMET in June 1999 a number of UN humanitarian 
agencies began operating, notably the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); these joined the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) which had operated there since 1997 (Hurford and 
Whalstrom 2001, McDowell 2000, Pedersen and Arneberg 1999). UNHCR and WFP 
began working closely with the local NGOs to provide assistance to the IDPs. POSKO, 
the local NGO coordination point in HAK’s office for a small number of NGOs who 
worked together during the 1998 drought, continued to function as a joint mechanism 
for NGOs responding to the IDP emergency, and as a liaison point for UN agencies 
(ACFOA 1999).35  
 
                                            
34 For example, one international NGO which had arrived with authority from the Health Ministry in 
     Jakarta to provide medical aid to IDPs was lied to by the bupati in Liquica who said that there were  
     none in that area, and he sent the NGO away (ACFOA, 1999:12). 
35 This information derives from my personal observation in East Timor and information obtained in the  
     case study of HAK (Chapter Six). 
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The only bilateral donor with a physical presence in East Timor prior to 1999 was 
AusAID, which had a Water and Sanitation Project in the Bobonaro District, through 
which it had developed the NGO Bia Hula (Taudevin 1999). The security situation had 
forced the evacuation of expatriate staff from the district to Dili, where they were 
providing some training to local NGO staff in project design and management, 
computing, and English language (Pedersen and Arneberg 1999). They were also 
trying to assist the emergence of the East Timor NGO Forum, a wider group than 
POSKO with a broader role than emergency relief, but in the security environment it 
proved impossible for NGOs to meet (ACFOA 1999, Pedersen and Arneberg 1999).36 
Thus the Forum formally existed but barely functioned in early 1999. The Forum had 
formed in 1998 in response to the need for coordination of emergency assistance due to 
the drought. It had been supported by AusAID, ACFOA and Oxfam, and its President 
was the head of Bia Hula. In June 1999, fourteen local non-government organisations 
(LNGOs) met and decided to reactivate it, and to formalise its structure, vision and 
mission. They set up a small board of three people and agreed to seek funding to 
employ a staff member to relieve the burden then falling on Bia Hula (East Timor 
NGO Forum 2000e:6). However this was apparently not the donor’s priority, as despite 
a proposal being presented to AusAID, there was no response before the ballot.37 
 
UNAMET had less than five months to register voters, prepare rolls, and organise the 
secret ballot (Smith and Dee 2003). Despite the poor security environment, persistent 
militia activity, and the internal displacement of people, the ballot itself proceeded 
successfully with a 98.5 per cent turnout of voters. However, before the UN announced 
the 78.5 per cent vote against autonomy with Indonesia on 4 September, the violence 
of the militia and Indonesian forces had begun. The announcement of the results 
triggered the full impact. There was widespread destruction, burning and looting of 
buildings, an unknown number of killings (perhaps as many as 1-2,000), and the forced 
removal of over 230,000 people to West Timor. The remaining population of around 
600,000 fled to the hills and mountains (Parliament of Australia 2000).  
                                            
36 Personal observation during my visit to East Timor June 1999 as leader of the ACFOA delegation (see  
     ACFOA 1999). 
37 Information obtained from NGO Forum at the time. 
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Even as the militia were running amok in Dili, as late as 2 September 1999, staff of the 
human rights NGO Yayasan HAK were still at work, receiving reports of the many 
human rights abuses and trying to communicate them to the outside world. That night 
their building, which housed several LNGOs, was burned down (Martinkus 2001). 
NGO staff and volunteers, like the rest of the population, fled—some to the hills 
surrounding Dili, others to West Timor and some to other parts of Indonesia, such as 
Bali and Jakarta. All but 12 UNAMET staff, along with refugees who had sought UN 
protection, were evacuated to Darwin, Australia (Martin 2001).  
 
4.2 The crisis after the ballot 
 
In the wake of the crisis United Nations agencies and international NGOs began to 
provide relief. This commenced in September 1999 with airdrops of food, aid convoys 
and provision of shelter and basic services, while INTERFET38 took responsibility for 
security. During this early period the CNRT established a National Emergency 
Commission, to deal with the crisis and to liaise with UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which was initially coordinating the international 
humanitarian response, a task subsequently taken over by the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET).39 Relief operations were soon 
expanded and broadened within a UN-sponsored Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 
(CAP) intended ‘to assist populations through the emergency stage as quickly as 
possible while laying the groundwork for full scale reconstruction and development’ 
(United Nations, 1999a:3). This was launched by OCHA in late October for US$199 
million for operations until June 2000 (United Nations 1999a). The OCHA, using the 
CAP framework, coordinated the sectoral and geographic activities of UN and INGO 
agencies and established limited mechanisms for consultation with, involvement of, 
and strengthening of civil society. Ideals of civil society participation were widely 
                                            
38 INTERFET was an Australian-led military operation which first entered East Timor and managed 
    security until UNTAET’s mandate began. 
39 UNTAET was mandated by the Security Council on 25 October 1999; however, it took some months 
    to become fully operational. 
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reflected in donor assessments and planning documents of the time (OCHA 1999, Joint 
Assessment Mission 1999(a), UNDP 1999).  
 
International non-government organisation (INGO) coordination began in Darwin 
during the tense period before humanitarian actors could enter East Timor. Efforts to 
link the INGO and donor community to the CNRT, who were regrouping in the city, 
began there facilitated by ACFOA, the peak body for NGOs in Australia which had 
well-established links with the key players (McDowell 2000, Zambelli 2001). But once 
in East Timor, the humanitarian effort swung into rapid action. CNRT leaders, left 
without a building in Dili, found themselves a base in Aileu, some 90 minutes drive 
away, without transport or support. Nor, at first were local NGOs present. As they 
began to regroup, the efforts of the OCHA NGO Coordinator to set up an NGO Centre 
and help them reestablish and link with international NGOs were significant, but INGO 
work went ahead largely without their input. Lack of access by local Timorese to the 
UN compound, language difficulties and a shortage of interpreters, as well as a lack of 
transport and office facilities exacerbated the problems facing most of them 
(Brunnstrom 2003, Hurford and Whalstrom 2001, Patrick  2001).40 
 
At a workshop held in Dili on 6 December 1999, 22 local NGOs resolved to 
reconstitute the NGO Forum, set up a group of seven people to prepare a proposal for 
the mission, role, membership criteria and form of the renewed body in light of the 
changed context; this was duly adopted in January 2000. Criticisms about local NGO 
exclusion from the recovery process were expressed at this workshop: 
 
National NGOs have been overtaken by the international NGOs who have resources, 
say they know everything and communicate in English. Local NGOs feel they have 
                                            
40 Information in this and the next paragraph is also derived from my own observations during this  
    period, in my role as Executive Director of ACFOA. Interview respondent 94 also described the  
    problems she  encountered trying to help reestablish local NGOs since there was no institutional  
    memory among  international organisations within East Timor immediately after the September  
    rampage. Respondent 28 added that it was difficult for local NGOs to partner too, as they were still  
    suffering from the trauma of the events of September 1999. Respondent 84, from a local NGO,  
    described his anger at the difficulty in getting to and from meetings (walking home some distance late  
    at night) and the lack of  translation. 
 95
been reduced to being observers and critics who have to ask for what they want (East 
Timor NGO Forum, 1999c:3). 
 
Some LNGOs and their INGO partners were extremely unhappy at the costly 
administration and urban bias of UNTAET and the lack of attention and resources 
being devoted to development in rural areas (da Cruz 1999, National and International 
NGOs 1999). LNGOs saw the international administration and humanitarian effort as 
‘another invasion’ (Brunnstrom 2003) or a new form of colonialism, with patronising 
values about people’s helplessness and pre-determined solutions (Working Group for 
Study and Examination 2000). INGOs were seen as operating in ‘service delivery’ 
mode, rather than taking an approach of engaging and mobilising local people in their 
response.  
 
Brunnstrom’s November 2000 study of the relationship between local and international 
NGOs (Brunnstrom 2000) confirmed this:   
 
Throughout the initial emergency period the collaboration between Timorese and 
international NGOs was marked by the difficulty of the two bodies to find a common 
platform to operate from……although the Timorese offered their experience and 
thorough knowledge of the country, the situation and the available networks, to the 
emergency operation, the international community did not include them in the work. 
Unfortunately it took several months before their ability to improve the efficiency of 
the relief operation was acknowledged and appreciated by the international 
community. Meanwhile experienced Timorese were employed as drivers, interpreters 
and security guards. “A Cream of Talent wasted” as expressed by one of the 
international interviewees (Brunnstrom 2000: 6). 
 
Brunnstrom’s interviewees identified many problems: Timorese NGOs mentioned lack 
of communication, exacerbated by international NGO staff’s lack of Tetum or 
Indonesian language skills. They also felt that ‘the international community used 
language as a criterion of greater importance than subject knowledge (agriculture, 
health, etc.) when judging the possibilities for collaboration or employment’ 
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(Brunnstrom 2000: 9). Timorese also felt that the international community was 
ignorant of the Timorese reality and cultural traditions. They were concerned that 
INGOs, rather than developing LNGO capacity, simply employed local staff to run 
INGO programs (Brunnstrom 2000: 9). Asked about partnership itself, the Timorese 
NGOs felt that even where partnerships existed, they tended to be unequal: 
 
Many TNGO representatives suggested that good partnerships exist when 
responsibilities are evenly shared and the work is based on transparency, mutual 
respect and accountability. The experience of the Timorese NGOs is however, that a 
top down attitude dominates the approach of INGOs and donors. This ‘donor-
implementer model’ does not leave much room for Timorese knowledge and 
experience to get expressed. … (Brunnstrom 2000: 9-10).  
 
Brunnstrom was not alone in noting these problems. A country-wide external review 
examining 10 months’ operation of CAP (Bugnion et al. 2000) revealed positive and 
timely achievements, but with significant shortcomings. The latter included a failure in 
the area of local participation, as highlighted by the reviewers: 
 
No initial framework agreement was established between UN agencies or INGOs 
working with local NGOs or local institutions to ensure East Timorese participation. 
As a result, local participants were mostly marginalised by the international 
community during the initial humanitarian response (Bugnion et al. 2000:3).  
 
Such observations reflected the widespread disquiet and protest from civil society and 
local political actors regarding lack of participation. The CNRT was one of the sternest 
critics. CNRT officials dismissed the limited roles of Church organisations and that of 
CNRT and LNGOs in distributing food and providing shelter as tokenistic. Their 
critique was directed at both the UN and INGOs for failure to consult East Timorese 
leaders and an arrogant approach (Cole-Adams 1999). Moreover, UNTAET was 
perceived to have failed to appreciate the existing informal clandestine governance 
system (Brinkerhoff 2007) or integrate East Timorese into its decision making 
processes (Chopra 2002, Suhrke 2001). The participation of Timorese people had been 
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undefined when UNTAET was established (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005) resulting 
in the almost total exclusion of both local political and civil society.  
 
There were various possible explanations for this lack of engagement with civil 
society,41  among them a reluctance to recognise and engage with civil society actors in 
the absence of a government. But such hesitation also extended to CNRT and fears that 
it was politically aligned (Suhrke 2001), divided and uncoordinated (Ife 1999:4). 
Attitudes of some UN and INGO workers were also patronising, superior or exclusive. 
Observing the initial aid effort, Ife (1999), for example, reports on the plans of aid 
workers to establish ‘civil society’ in East Timor, apparently neglecting or unaware of 
its previous existence and experience. Similarly, he reports half-hearted attempts to 
invite local people to planning meetings and the disturbing experience of attending UN 
emergency coordination meetings without local participation (Ife, 1999).42  It seems 
that Hughes and Pupavec’s observation that recent international interventions have 
tended to view local actors as dysfunctional and the international intervention as 
functional was occurring here (Hughes and Pupavac 2005). 
 
Donors were equally sceptical about the capacity of civil society as a vehicle for broad 
based reconstruction in East Timor. The Joint Assessment Mission led by the World 
Bank, for example, concluded that civil society was seriously undermined and that the 
‘small number of NGOs that had emerged over the last two years had yet to expand 
their capacity’ (Joint Assessment Mission, 1999b:11), without considering the real 
constraints which had operated beforehand, nor considering the potential for expansion 
which now existed. Acknowledging that local communities could be marginalised by 
the international humanitarian response with its ‘huge resources and expatriate 
dominance,’ the Joint Assessment Mission advocated the establishment of 
                                            
41 These included operational limitations such as inadequate preparation of emergency personnel,  
     inadequate planning processes and structures, too much haste, lack of NGO feedback mechanisms,  
     and  a level of guess work in needs analysis. In addition, key civil society leaders were not present in  
     East Timor at the commencement of the relief effort. The President of the CNRT, Xanana Gusmao,  
     and also Bishop Belo, the head of the Catholic Church, were in this category (Patrick 2001, Bugnion  
     et al. 2000:3 and 12). 
42 I also observed a number of these meetings in October 1999 which were conducted in English and  
    without Timorese participation. 
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‘representative, community based institutions, in order that the emergency phase may 
proceed with greater efficiency and community participation’ (Joint Assessment 
Mission, 1999b:6). They outlined a large-scale ‘Community Empowerment and 
Governance Program’ that established village, sub-district and district councils which 
were provided with training and facilitation for planning, and oversight of grants and 
credits for local recovery and development activities (Taudevin 2000). This seemed to 
neglect the many existing layers of governance (traditional, church, CNRT/clandestine 
and civil society) which already existed. In a notable absence, they did not outline any 
strategy for restoring or enhancing the capacity of the LNGOs which had previously 
operated. 
 
4.3   Conditions for LNGOs after the vote 
 
The violence after the vote left most LNGOs without equipment, transport or offices 
(East Timor NGO Forum 1999a). Staff and volunteers of LNGOs, whose leaders were 
amongst those targeted by the militia, had fled. However, the success of the ballot 
stimulated a 
 
‘tremendous outpouring of enthusiasm and energy to rebuild and reshape East Timor 
along more democratic and participatory lines. This enthusiasm was frustrated by lack 
of resources, and feelings of being ignored and excluded by donors and INGOs’ 
(Patrick 2001:59).  
 
As Patrick observed, donors often focused on short-term emergency relief projects and 
one-off, in-kind assistance, such as motor bikes, computers, building rehabilitation, 
office equipment and supplies,43 rather than ongoing support to local NGOs44 (USAID 
2001), although there were some exceptions (Patrick 2001). By March 2000 some of 
the older NGOs were firmly reestablished and starting to develop programs, with initial 
donor support. A flurry of activity saw many new LNGOs established and engaged in 
                                            
43 Respondent 11. 
44 For example, from September 1999-March 2000 USAID provided 60 small scale grants to the value of  
    $775,000, mostly in-kind (USAID 2001:3). 
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the rehabilitation effort (Meden 2002). In December 1999 only 24 LNGOs were 
recorded, but a year later this had grown to 112 (East Timor NGO Forum 2000e). This 
more than quadrupling in numbers may have been stimulated by various factors, 
among them the freedom to form in the new context, responses to the enormous needs 
(particularly on the part of university students whose studies had been interrupted and 
who felt they could help), expectations of funding opportunities, and high levels of 
unemployment and people’s need for income45 (Patrick 2001). 
 
The expansion of LNGOs also extended the scope of their activities to a range of 
sectors, including some where they had previously been less involved. As Patrick 
observed: 
 
This partially represented a response to acute needs and opportunities in East Timor in 
the post-vote period, including the rehabilitation of agriculture, health and education 
services. Additionally, LNGO activity expanded to address intensified needs among 
vulnerable groups such as children, widows and orphans. Human rights LNGOs 
consolidated an already highly visible profile in documenting abuse, undertaking 
advocacy and civil education, and lobbying for international investigation of violations 
incurred during the Indonesian occupation and by the militia (Patrick 2001:59). 
 
Despite these developments most LNGOs in the post-vote period lacked capacity and 
experience and an urgent need for organisational capacity building and coordination 
was evident. Their sustainability was also often questionable, and UNDP noted later 
that ‘a reasonable number’ created in the first two years might not survive in the long 
term (UNDP 2002a:4). NGOs and others recognised the need for standards and codes 
of conduct as well as training and other support, including registration procedures and 
regulations (Patrick 2001). As early as March 2000, UNTAET began to develop NGO 
regulations in consultation with CNRT, LNGOs and INGOs (UNTAET 2000). 
However the task was not finished prior to independence, in part at least because local 
                                            
45 Respondent 37 believed many formed to enable the members to get some income, and  
   donors were disappointed when they failed. Donor withdrawal of funding from NGOs by  
   2004 was then making it hard for legitimate, capable NGOs to access funds. 
 100
NGOs were reluctant to allow the UN to develop the regulation which would provide 
the framework for their relations with their yet-to-be-elected government (UNDP 
2002a). This was a relationship they wanted time to consider and negotiate themselves, 
in the context of a wider vision about the way in which government and NGOs should 
relate to each other in the new nation (Hunt 2000, UNDP 2002a). As Patrick observed: 
 
Other concerns about the majority of these newly formed LNGOs derived from their 
lack of organisational maturity and experience. These included the need for clarity 
about the nature of development and the organisational roles of NGOs. Critically, 
many of the new LNGOs had tenuous links with communities that they claimed to 
represent or wished to assist (Patrick 2001:60).  
 
Their community development and organisational and project management skills were 
also often weak, and their resources extremely limited (Patrick 2001, Shires and 
Crawford 2000, Walsh 2000a, 2000b). Around 90 per cent of the LNGOs were 
concentrated in the capital, Dili, and most of the district NGOs were very small and 
weak; many of these were youth organisations (Patrick 2001, Walsh 2000b). Thus 
while there were some experienced NGOs in Dili, as Patrick commented: 
 
 The lack of proven experience and resources of newer LNGOs probably contributed to 
their lack of involvement in the relief effort and explains why the focus of their 
activities largely remained in Dili searching for INGOs and donors to provide initial 
backing (Patrick 2001:60).  
 
Thus by late 2000 there had been a significant expansion of the NGO community in 
East Timor and the task was turning from relief and rehabilitation to shaping the new 
government administration and preparing the Timorese for government, as well as 
longer term development (Bano, Hunt, and Patrick 2001).  
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4.4 Shaping the new state 
 
After the initial exclusion of Timorese from decision making about the emergency 
response, the UN gradually increased Timorese control over the nation’s affairs. First it 
established a small National Consultative Council on 2 December 1999 whose 
membership included political parties, the Catholic Church and others, to advise the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), Sergio Vieira de Mello 
(United Nations 2000a). In response to still growing tensions about the need for greater 
Timorese participation in the transition, in July 2000 de Mello developed a more 
broadly representative National Council of 33 appointed East Timorese, including 
wider civil society representation. In the same month he established an eight-member 
Transitional Cabinet comprising an appointed Ministry of equal numbers of Timorese 
and international Ministers (United Nations 2000b). At the end of 2000 the UNTAET 
Humanitarian and Emergency Response (HAER) pillar completed its work and 
development was henceforth coordinated through normal donor procedures facilitated 
by the World Bank and the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) (United 
Nations 2001a).  
 
The next major step was the dissolution of the National Council and the CNRT, the 
registration of political parties and the election for the 88-member Constituent 
Assembly on 30 August 2001, whose mandate would be to develop the nation’s 
Constitution (United Nations 2001b). FRETILIN won 55 of the 88 seats in the 
Assembly (Dunn 2003)  and as a result of a strong advocacy campaign by women’s 
NGOs supported by international donors, especially UNIFEM, some 27 per cent of the 
elected members were women (Pereira and Sternberg 2007). The Second Council of 
Ministers, established in September 2001, was fully Timorese (United Nations 2001c). 
The Constituent Assembly debated and agreed the nation’s Constitution by March 
2002, extended its term to become the first Parliament, and in April that year Kay Rai 
Xanana Gusmao was elected the nation’s first President (United Nations 2002a, 
2002b). Within two years and eight months from the total devastation wreaked by the 
departing Indonesian forces and the militia, the basic institutions of the new nation 
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were created, and East Timor was finally in East Timorese hands (Smith and Dee 
2003).  
 
NGOs: from emergency response to nation building 
LNGOs and other civil society representatives initially played a part in the emerging 
nation’s administration through representation on the National Council. One NGO 
representative and one women’s representative had been invited to join the National 
Council. The NGO representative was one of the founders of Yayasan HAK, on behalf 
of the NGO Forum, while a representative of REDE Feto took the women’s NGO 
position. The NGO representative commented that UN policy always gave a place to 
NGOs and enabled them to play significant roles in the political transition. He stated 
that there was close consultation with the NGO Forum, and NGOs thus had an 
influence on the policies. Most notable was the fact that NGOs’ argument that the new 
Electoral Law should allow independent candidates, not just political parties, to contest 
the election was accepted, and indeed three women NGO candidates eventually stood 
(albeit unsuccessfully) under that provision. NGOs also argued strongly for 
consultation with the people about the drafting of the new Constitution, an argument 
not supported by the political parties, but eventually accepted by the UN which enabled 
the establishment of short-term District Constitutional Commissions for this purpose.46  
 
In 2000 three major conferences were held, each of which was significant for civil 
society and its role in East Timor’s future. These were the Tibar Conference, the REDE 
Conference and the CNRT Congress. 
 
The Tibar Conference  
From 29 May-2 June, an important conference ‘Reconstructing East Timor: Analysis 
of the Past and Perspectives for the Future’ Conference (2000) was held, auspiced by 
the CNRT with a great deal of donor support. Some 450 Timorese and international 
participants reviewed plans the CNRT and others had made at the earlier strategic 
planning conference held in April 1999 in Melbourne. That conference had envisaged 
                                            
46 Respondent 55. 
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Timorese taking over control without the devastating impact of the post-ballot 
destruction. The Tibar conference worked in ten Commissions, each of which 
considered prepared papers, a small number of which were by NGOs. The Governance 
Commission considered the design and structure of the new government, but also 
stated: 
 
‘Civil society organisations representing all sectors of the community, which are 
independent of the state and the corporate sector must be encouraged to debate and 
suggest policies and involve actively in the process of decision-making, 
implementation and evaluation.’(Tibar Document 2000:14). 
 
REDE network: giving women a voice 
In early 2000 a small number of women’s and women-related NGOs had come 
together with the idea of trying to give women a greater say in the nation’s 
development. From 14-17 June 2000 they held a national women’s congress, which 
was attended by over 500 women from all parts of the country. The national congress 
was preceded by a series of district women’s meetings, so the results drew heavily 
from women across the nation. It agreed a Platform for Action for the Advancement of 
Women of Timor Lorosae (REDE Feto 2000). The Platform identified the following 
issues as critical areas of concern: poverty, law and order, reconciliation and justice, 
culture of violence and decision making and institution-building. These were the 
priority issues for East Timorese women. Workshops on ten sectors developed 
recommendations in the following sectoral areas: Human Rights and Reconciliation; 
Legal/Judicial; Politics and Governance; Economics and Natural Resources; Social and 
Cultural Issues; Vulnerable Groups; Media and Communication; Agriculture and 
Environment; Health; and Education. The Platform illustrates clearly the long term 
priorities for East Timorese women in each of these sectoral areas. ETTA’s Gender 
Affairs Unit then used it as a basis for policy development for the Transitional 
Government, and the Congress also provided the stimulus to develop REDE and its 
ultimately relatively successful campaign for women’s representation in the 
Constituent Assembly (REDE Feto 2000). 
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The CNRT Congress 
In August 2000 the CNRT held its first Congress inside East Timor, an important event 
which  developed a ‘Pact of National Unity’, restructured the CNRT itself to enable it 
to function effectively through the transition process, and passed a series of important 
resolutions about that process and the desired future of the country. The Congress 
urged UNTAET, in order to avoid ‘suspicion and conflict between political parties and 
also between political parties and civil society… to enable the civil society to carry out 
its rights within the democratic system’, including monitoring government activities. It 
recognised that people should be able to criticise and provide ideas, hold others 
accountable, and exercise their rights (CNRT 2000:26). 
 
Thus by late 2000 the rightful place of civil society in the development of the new 
nation was formally accepted by major sectors of East Timor’s society, particularly 
political society. 
 
Preparing for elections through civic education  
The first significant step in establishing the framework for the new nation was the 
development of the Constitution. This was to be undertaken by the 88-member 
Constituent Assembly to be elected in late August 2001. This was the first time that 
East Timorese political parties would be free to canvass voters across the nation, and 
was to be the first real test of whether East Timor could manage its political affairs in a 
peaceful way. In preparation, there was to be a major civic education program 
developed to teach people about democracy and ensure that they understood what they 
were being asked to vote on. The secrecy and integrity of the ballot were to be key 
issues. But a major controversy erupted in October 2000 over UNTAET’s proposed 
eight million dollar project ‘Civic Education for Democracy in East Timor’. Local 
NGOs reacted angrily to a project which epitomised for them the way international 
efforts were still overlooking significant local capacity. It had been students and 
women’s groups as well as other activists now working for NGOs, who had carried out 
much of the voter education prior to the August 1999 ballot, under intensely repressive 
circumstances. ‘What qualifications would international staff bring which local actors 
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did not have?’ was the question on NGO minds. UNTAET eventually withdrew the 
proposal and started the project afresh, with a Steering Committee involving local 
NGOs and other civil society players47 (East Timor NGO Forum 2000d). The revised 
proposal saw 50 civil society representatives trained and then resourced to conduct 
civic education across the country in time for the Constituent Assembly elections.48 
However, the late start meant that the program was seriously delayed in getting 
underway and its reach less effective than it might otherwise have been. A similar 
exercise involving NGOs was undertaken again in early 2002 in preparation for the 
Presidential election.  
 
Civic education remained one of the key activities of the NGO community. A local 
group called Civic Forum was formed in June 2001, supported by the US National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), and was active in all 13 districts with 220 groups and over 
3,200 participants in 2003, promoting citizen participation and grassroots advocacy in 
the shaping of East Timor’s democracy (Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste 
2003a:4). NDI also worked with the young women’s group Grupo Feto Foinsa’e 
Timor-Lorosa’e (GFFTL) to run workshops to build women’s confidence to speak 
publicly and to voice their issues and concerns through Civic Forum.49 
 
NGOs, coordinated by the East Timor NGO Forum, were also involved in monitoring 
the election campaigns of the political parties in the lead up to the Constituent 
Assembly election and monitoring the election process. They attended and reported on 
the main party rallies, and the campaign meetings in the districts, as part of a strategy 
to ensure the election campaign remained non-violent. They also monitored the polling 
stations on polling day itself, to assess the fairness of the poll. At the conclusion of the 
ballot they issued a public report on the process.50 
 
 
                                            
47 The Steering Committee comprised representatives of REDE, NGO Forum, The East Timor Students  
    Solidarity Council and the CNRT; information supplied by respondent 93. 
48 Respondent 93. 
49 I attended one of these workshops during an earlier visit to East Timor in October 2003. 
50 Personal observation. This occurred during my time working with the NGO Forum in 2001. 
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The Constitutional Commission and the Constitution 
NGOs were extremely concerned about the short timeframe for development of the 
new nation’s Constitution, which initially was expected to be fully debated and 
finalised in only three months between the election of the Constituent Assembly 
members on 30 August 2001 and 15 December of the same year. Such a timeframe was 
seen to be totally inadequate for wide consultation across the community, particularly 
given the difficulties of communication in rural and isolated areas (East Timor NGO 
Forum 2001b, 2001c). NGOs recommended that a National Constitutional Commission 
be established to lead the consultation process, but this was not agreed by the political 
parties. In the event, UNTAET, swayed by NGO concerns, set up District level 
Constitutional Commissions, although there remained no formal process for the 
adoption of their reports by the Constituent Assembly. NGOs also lobbied hard for the 
new Constitution to enshrine basic human rights principles, such as freedom of speech 
and freedom of assembly.51 
 
By early 2002, NGOs and civil society more broadly had established themselves as key 
stakeholders in the new nation’s development, with views and ideas, and a 
commitment to a participatory and inclusive approach to nation building and respect 
for human rights. 
 
The shape of East Timor’s development: influencing the donors 
NGOs also had clear views about the nature of East Timor’s development which they 
had been actively advocating since as early as late 1999. Much, though not all of this 
advocacy in the initial period, developed through Working Groups organised by the 
East Timor NGO Forum. They quite quickly established their role in the debates about 
national development through dialogue with UNTAET, the World Bank and other 
donors in East Timor. It was some time before NGOs began to turn their advocacy 
attention to the fledgling East Timor Administration itself.52 Initially NGO advocacy 
focussed around the six-monthly donors’ conferences about the relief and development 
                                            
51 Personal observation during working period in East Timor in 2001. See also case studies of HAK and 
     FOKUPERS (Chapters Six and Seven). 
52  Personal observation during my period working with the East Timor NGO Forum 2000-2001. 
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effort which was underway. Some common themes which NGOs articulated included: 
the need for greater focus on rural areas; support to sectors such as health, agriculture, 
education, and attention to vulnerable groups (children, widows etc); greater efforts to 
use and develop capacity of local NGOs, and local resources, including for monitoring 
and implementation of reconstruction and development programs; longer timeframes 
and more thorough community consultation processes; human rights, justice and good 
governance; and international staff to build Timorese capacity. They argued these in 
many fora, but especially at the series of World Bank coordinated donor conferences 
which took place from December 1999 onwards in Tokyo, Lisbon, Brussels, Canberra, 
Oslo and in 2002, in Dili itself. For example, 24 LNGOs and many INGOs made a 
joint statement to the very first donor conference on 17 December 1999, which 
expressed NGO concern that: 
 
‘current development proposals appear predominantly urban-biased, when rural 
development and agriculture should be stressed’ (National and International NGOs 
1999). 
 
Such sentiments were echoed in many subsequent statements (for example see also: 
East Timor NGO Forum 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2001b). Since most of Timor’s poor live 
in rural areas, this concern for development to reach the rural poor seems well founded. 
The timeframe for the transition was one of the key issues raised by NGOs at the June 
2001 Donor conference in Canberra: 
 
 The current timeframe allows only four weeks for popular consultation on the 
constitution leading to the elections. Within a further three months, the development, 
drafting and adoption of the Constitution by the elected assembly is to take place. 
Consequently the views of many East Timorese men and women will not be heard       
(East Timor NGO Forum 2001b).  
 
The statement went on to request donors to financially commit to a longer timeframe, 
but the meeting rejected this call. Other matters raised at that meeting were the capacity 
of the new justice system and  the failure to bring perpetrators of serious crimes to 
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justice in Indonesia;  the need for donors to set and monitor performance indicators to 
ensure international staff were building the capacity of East Timorese nationals; the 
need for donors to support the decentralisation of decision making and greater 
participation of people in communities in development;  and the need for greater 
transparency in the reconstruction process (East Timor NGO Forum 2001a). In later 
years, NGO statements also reflected concern that donors respect East Timor’s 
independence (e.g. La’o Hamutuk 2003). 
 
Civil Society and National Development Planning 
In preparation for nationhood, the Second Transitional Administration undertook the 
preparation of a National Development Plan (NDP). The process took place within a 
very limited timeframe but importantly a special process was included to engage civil 
society and the wider community. In the first quarter of 2002, Kay Rala Xanana 
Gusmao, who subsequently became the first President, led a ‘Countrywide 
Consultation with Civil Society’. The process involved 980 gatherings across the 
country with some 38,293 people participating (Planning Commission 2002a). NGOs 
were involved through a small number represented on an oversight Committee,53 and 
individual NGO members joining in the consultations. 
 
The result of this process was a document East Timor 2020: Our Nation, Our Future. It 
illustrates that people had some clear expectations of what NGOs might be able to do 
for them in the future. Among the roles suggested for NGOs were provision of literacy 
and education, including technical training; training of health workers and operation of 
health clinics; assisting in agricultural development, including marketing and transport, 
provision of credit, and assistance in environmental management; assisting the poor 
and advocating on their behalf; assisting widows, especially with house building; 
promoting livelihood activities for women and training for youth; promoting peace, 
reconciliation, human rights, including women’s rights to live free from violence, and 
democracy (Planning Commission 2002a). These reflect many of the areas where 
NGOs had already become involved, but there was obviously scope for a great deal 
                                            
53  Respondent 85. 
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more to be done in a poor war-torn nation in which 46 per cent of the rural population 
were classed as living in poverty (Hill 2001, UNDP 2002b). 
 
The NDP itself was developed in a tight time-frame in the lead up to independence in 
May 2002, with very limited opportunity for NGO comment (East Timorese and 
International NGOs 2002). The draft report was written in English and NGOs 
reportedly had only one week to read selected chapters before public meetings to 
discuss them (La’o Hamutuk 2002). Nevertheless it recognised that NGOs and wider 
civil society had roles to play in assisting with service delivery particularly in areas 
such as education, agriculture, fisheries and forests, monitoring development, and 
promoting transparency in the public sector to minimise corruption (Planning 
Commission 2002b). How NGOs and other stakeholders would participate in the 
implementation of the National Development Plan remained to be determined. 
 
At the May 2002 donors conference, the first held in Dili itself, at which the National 
Development Plan was the focal issue, the NGO statement emphasised that despite the 
participation of civil society groups in the process, the timeframe within which the plan 
had been developed had not enabled an inclusive and informed debate about the plan 
across the community, commented on the sustainability of the use of Portuguese 
language in the education system, and the absence of the justice issue as a challenge to 
be dealt with in the NDP (East Timorese and International NGOs 2002).  
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the State of the Nation Report prepared prior to 
independence recorded the active and robust civil society existing, the prominent and 
constructive role they had played in civic education and constitutional development, 
and stressed the importance of NGO participation at all levels after independence 
(Planning Commission 2002c: 45-46). 
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4.5 NGOs and the new government  
 
Once the new government was in place and independence celebrated on 20 May 2002, 
UNTAET’s mandate ended and a new UN mandate was to be implemented by the UN 
Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET), essentially to provide the necessary 
support to the new sovereign government (United Nations 2002b). This period marked 
a significant change for NGOs. In the absence of a legitimately selected government, 
UNTAET had developed a close relationship with NGOs as one set of stakeholders in 
the new nation. Once a legitimate government existed, that became the focus of 
attention, and NGOs were no longer consulted as a matter of course. Neither were 
NGOs clear how to relate to their new government. 
 
Some monthly government-NGO meetings which had begun during ETTA’s period of 
administration continued. These included international as well as local NGOs, and 
tended to deal with issues such as taxation and import issues, regulation and 
registration, a standard memorandum of understanding for INGOs and updates from 
government about its structures and processes54 (UNTAET National Planning and 
Development Agency 2001). However, these meetings did not deal directly with the 
wider question of how the government saw the role of Timorese NGOs in national 
development. There was no formal policy, so NGOs began to explore for themselves 
where they might work with government. 
 
In August 2003 the new Government of Timor-Leste held a consultation with civil 
society on the development of a ‘High Level Mechanism’ to ‘encourage and facilitate 
the participation of all Timorese stakeholders in the implementation, monitoring and 
adjustment of the (National Development) Plan and other development activities in 
Timor-Leste’ (Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste 2003b:1). NGOs, church, 
women’s, youth, and other groups as well as representatives from different parts of 
government participated (Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste 2003b). Almost 
eighteen months later, in July 2005, a civil society working group set up to take this 
                                            
54  Respondent 86. 
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concept forward had barely met,55 and it seemed that this initiative was stalled. The  
reasons for this lack of enthusiastic engagement may be the sense that NGOs had 
limited input to National Development Planning and felt limited ‘ownership’ of it, and 
the speed with which the HLM was promoted, so they had little time to form a 
consensus view about it.56  There also appeared to have been some misunderstandings 
about whether the government or civil society was expected to lead this process, and 
the civil society chair, the CEO of Timor Aid, was exceptionally busy, including in her 
role chairing the Electoral Commission.57 
 
The issue of NGO legislation and registration again emerged, as NGOs felt that they 
had no legal basis for existence. The NGO Unit in the Ministry of Planning and 
Finance began considering the issue of NGO legislation and registration, trying to get a 
whole of government approach adopted. As a first step this Unit developed a nation-
wide database of NGOs, including the sectors and districts in which they were 
working. This was not an easy task, but they completed an initial survey and had a 
basic data base. This indicated that, in 2004, some 137 LNGOs had been identified, 93 
of them based in Dili (Ministry of Planning and Finance 2004). Efforts in mid-2004 by 
UNDP to help advance the process through a seminar  based on the early UNTAET 
draft regulation was not attended by key government Ministries, indicating their 
reluctance to discuss the matter publicly at the time.58 
 
By early 2005 it was believed by NGO personnel that the Ministry of Justice had an 
Associations Law drafted to grant legal status to for-profit and nonprofit organisations 
alike, pending the development of a Securities and Exchange Commission. It was not 
clear how that would relate to a law or regulation specifically on charities or nonprofit 
organisations, which the Ministry of Planning and Finance may administer. There was 
to be considerable work undertaken to clearly define NGOs and develop the key 
legislative base for their operation and registration. In the interim the old Indonesian 
                                            
55  Respondent 87. 
56  Respondent 88. 
57  Respondent 37. This respondent was a member of the Civil Society Working Group. 
58 The Workshop was entitled ‘Promoting an Enabling Environment for Civil Society in Timor-Leste’  
     held on 29 June 2004 in Dili. I attended this workshop during my fieldwork. 
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law still applied. In June 2005 the Council of Ministers passed what became Decree 
Law No. 5/2005 of 3 August on nonprofit-making corporate bodies. This legislation 
was directed to associations of all types, including both associations and foundations, 
each of which had previously been the subject of separate laws. This law set out the 
proposed relationship of these associations with the state as follows:  
 
Associations and foundations administering funds allocated by the State, benefiting 
from any form of assistance from the State or receiving funds from development 
partners for the purpose of implementing any activities included in the National 
Development Plan, are subject to direct oversight by the Ministry of Planning and 
Finance (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Government 2005: Article 11). 
 
The law had not been promulgated to associations but, as a Decree law it needed 
Parliamentary endorsement, to ensure that it was consistent with the Constitution, 
before it could come into effect. This was eventually granted in November 2005. 
NGOs seemed relatively unconcerned about this legislation, and paid seemingly little 
attention to it,59 although the NGO Forum had been organising regular meetings on the 
topic.60 NGO attention at the time was far more focussed on the Timor Sea Fund 
Petroleum Law, in which they wanted greater transparency and greater attention to 
community benefit.61 
 
By late 2004 the number of active Timorese NGOs had clearly reduced from earlier 
years, as the Ministry’s survey indicated, notwithstanding the difficulties in conducting 
it accurately. This was borne out by the NGO Forum’s own observations, as active 
NGOs, particularly in the districts, reduced in number for lack of donors.62  Donor 
funding to NGOs was reducing, as their attention turned to building the state’s capacity 
to deliver services to its population, and discussions about the form and funding of 
decentralised or local government began. Total donor funding of some US$4m to civil 
society (including both international NGOs and local organisations) in 2004-05 was 
                                            
59  Respondent 7. 
60  Respondent 74. 
61  Respondent 103. See also Cleary (2007). 
62  Information provided by respondent 74. 
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scheduled to fall to less than US$1.5m in 2005-06 and reduce further to around US$1m 
in future years. This was under one fifth of donors’ civil society support at the peak 
year (2003-04) of US $5.4m (Ministry of State Administration 2005:20) (Appendix F 
provides information about the major donor civil society programs of the period). The 
NGOs were therefore becoming increasingly reliant on their international NGO 
partners rather than official donors for funding.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In the period from May 1999 to May 2002 local NGOs had experienced many dramatic 
changes, and played a great number of roles. Initially supporting the population 
through their human rights and humanitarian work, they had been largely overlooked in 
the emergency response after September 1999, but soon regrouped and played an 
active part in trying to enable the population to have a say in the shape of the new 
nation and to participate in its development. They were actively involved in the pre-
election processes for the Constituent Assembly as well as advocacy around the 
Constitution. Their activities also focussed around donor conferences where they 
advocated consistently for a participatory, rural-focussed approach to development, and 
timeframes which would enable people to have a say. NGOs were less involved with 
the rather rushed process of developing the National Development Plan, which 
envisaged that NGOs would play some key roles, though a mechanism for ongoing 
review and engagement of civil society never materialised. As the new government 
settled into its work, NGOs were unclear how their relations with it would develop, and 
felt their way rather carefully in the new political environment. Their central role in the 
UN period had been eclipsed and the donor focus was now on supporting the new state 
to function effectively. 
 
The next four chapters provide detailed case studies of six leading NGOs during the 
period of transition covered by this chapter. Each provides some initial background 
about the history of the NGO and then explores the ways it responded to and tried to 
influence events in this five year period.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE CASE STUDY NGOS: CARITAS DILI63 AND ETADEP64 
 
 
The chapters which follow examine how the six Timorese NGOs selected for detailed 
study wove their way through the changing fabric of East Timor’s history, particularly 
over the five year period described in previous chapters. Fowler’s (1997) capacity 
framework referred to in Chapter One recognises that as the context changes, NGOs 
have to assess this and adjust their strategies. It brings together the internal 
organisational capacities of an organisation with the external conditions in which it 
operates, and it is this nexus which is of interest in this study. Of the six NGOs 
selected, two were established well before the 1990s; two established in East Timor in 
the mid-1990s and two formed in the 1990s initially outside East Timor by Timorese 
exiles in one case, and by Timorese students in Indonesia, in the other. This chapter 
focuses on the two older NGOs, Caritas Dili and ETADEP.  
 
5.1  Caritas Dili 
Caritas Dili is an agency of the Social Commission of the Catholic Church in the Dili 
Diocese. Its origins go back to the 1970s when a group of clergy and lay Catholics in 
Indonesia, during the famine of the mid-1970s, organised themselves to deliver relief 
from across the border at Atambua in West Timor. It was later named DELSOS 
(Delegatos Social) and moved to Dili where it mainly worked in providing relief to 
people who were displaced, organising groups to provide them with medicines and 
                                            
63 Prior to 1999 the predecessor of this organisation was known as Caritas East Timor. In this case study  
    the term Caritas East Timor will be used for the period until September/October 1999. After that the  
    organisation became Caritas Dili and is referred to by that name. 
64 ETADEP stands for Yayasan Ema Mata Dalan Ba Progressu (Road to Progress Association), and  
     translates as East Timor Agricultural Development Program. 
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other necessities through the parishes. It particularly tried to give support to orphans, 
widows and disabled people.  
 
By the early 1990s it had reorganised itself and become Caritas East Timor. It began to 
grow after 1996 when it started to develop a health program, and, later, a rural 
development program, including a revolving loan fund, and a women’s program 
particularly focussed on assisting widows. It also added an education and training 
program, which was intended to establish Caritas at the parish level, but this was never 
achieved, in part because of the security situation, in part because of a lack of 
organisational capacity. Up until early 1997 Caritas was very small. It had about six 
staff, including a driver; there was a Director and program staff, but no finance 
manager.65  
5.1.1  Caritas East Timor 1997-1999 
 
In 1996 Caritas East Timor was already operating a health program supporting 
Catholic health clinics and, with support from Caritas Norway, it began a tuberculosis 
(TB) program through those clinics.66 At that time many in the Timorese population 
preferred to get health treatment from Catholic clinics, which represented about a third 
of the total health clinics in the (then) province. Encouraged by Bishop Belo, and 
assisted by Caritas Norway who mobilised an international adviser, Caritas Dili 
recruited a Timorese doctor (who became the Minister of Health in the first Timorese 
Government) and began to develop a TB program to an internationally acceptable 
standard (i.e. that of the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung 
Disease/World Health Organisation IUATLD/WHO). Caritas Dili was aware that it 
was establishing a central TB Unit and creating a parallel system to the government, 
but in the circumstances felt justified in doing so.67 
 
                                            
65 Early history of Caritas East Timor was provided by respondent 27. 
66 The Indonesian Government health system began a TB program in 1998 a little later than Caritas Dili,  
    with three pilot clinics also aiming to reach a WHO acceptable standard. 
67 Details of the health program provided by respondent 33 and seminar by Dr Nelson Martins. 
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Caritas East Timor’s Rural Development Program (RDP) began in late 1997. It 
involved three farming communities (Casnafar, Faturia and Con Chin) high in the 
Comoro valley to the west of Dili, and was jointly funded by Caritas Australia and 
Caritas Aotearoa (New Zealand). The program involved assisting these communities 
with dryland farming, including terracing, distributions of seedlings for trees (such as 
mango, orange, candlenut, jackfruit and coconut) and provision of water and sanitation. 
Group functioning was informal and relatively weak, but Caritas East Timor’s presence 
was seen as a form of political protection in a very intimidatory context. The RDP also 
began to extend into Oecusse, following food distributions there during the 1998 
drought, and to the Maubara District. The program initially had five staff but the 
numbers reduced in 1998 to three, and reduced again in 1999 when the Programme 
Manager worked partly for the World Bank, and also studied English in Jakarta for a 
number of months. He eventually left in April 1999 to study abroad.68 In 1997 Caritas 
also developed a Women’s Promotion Programme, to train parish women, especially 
widows, in basic skills such as sewing, food preparation, and building an understanding 
of women’s issues. This program grew out of the earlier work with widows.69 At this 
stage the idea of developing a parish education and training program to build a parish 
Caritas network had also been considered, but could not be implemented due to the 
security situation. Caritas had to rely largely on a loose network of individual priests 
and catechists, as community organising was too difficult.70 
 
All Caritas East Timor’s funding came from Catholic sources, some from the Diocese 
and the rest from international Catholic NGOs. The Catholic NGO partners had 
instituted an international forum with Caritas East Timor representatives, held twice a 
year from around 1996-97. At a Bali meeting of this forum in 1998, there was 
recognition by the Social Commission of the Diocese that Caritas East Timor needed to 
be restructured and strengthened. From an international donor perspective, Caritas East 
Timor’s reporting and accountability were weak, although it was doing its best with its 
limited skills in development management to respond to people’s needs in a hostile 
                                            
68 RDP information provide by respondent 32 and Caritas East Timor (1999). 
69  Women’s promotion program information provided by respondent 27. 
70  Respondent 35. 
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environment.71  At the urging of some of its donors, and, with their support and 
encouragement, Caritas East Timor undertook some organisational development. The 
TB Unit was already well advanced compared to the rest of the organisation, and a 
reorganisation attempted to utilise some of its strengths to help develop the capacity of 
the whole organisation. 72  
 
In 1998 a second Diocese was formed in East Timor, centred on the second largest 
town, Baucau. Caritas Baucau began to operate in July 1999, with responsibilities for 
the Eastern part of the country covered by the Baucau Diocese.73 The implications of 
these changes for Caritas East Timor were being absorbed as the emergency worsened 
in late 1998 and early 1999. 
5.1.2 The emergency period before the ballot 
 
By February 1999 the RDP was not really functioning as its staff were instead 
responding to the growing humanitarian and human rights crisis caused by militia 
violence. Caritas East Timor was organising food distributions and medical assistance, 
especially to IDPs in Dili, Atauro, Ainaro, Maubara, Hatolia, Liquica, and other parts 
of East Timor. Emergency food distributions were through church networks, and ‘on 
demand’. That is, they were provided when priests, nuns or catechists came to Caritas 
East Timor seeking assistance for the people in their parishes. Food distributions were 
also provided from the Caritas East Timor office (e.g. to IDPs) and throughout Dili in 
locations to which IDPs had fled, as well as to IDP camps whenever they could gain 
access to them. A team of volunteers had been formed to assist with all this work, 
mainly comprising health or social work students. This team was quite effective, but 
there were management difficulties and it was hard to get things done at times. By this 
stage Caritas East Timor had about 25 paid staff, but its management systems remained 
weak.  
                                            
71  Respondents 33, 27. 
72  Respondents 30, 33. 
73 Respondent 30. 
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It is probably fair to say that the then Director of Caritas East Timor was not focussing 
primarily on the operational management of Caritas East Timor’s response to this 
humanitarian emergency during much of 1999. Rather he was primarily supporting and 
nurturing the leaders of the resistance movement (CNRT) at a time of intense crisis in 
the resistance struggle.74 However, other staff managed the programs as best they 
could, in the very difficult circumstances. They had some support from fourteen 
religious Solidarity Volunteers provided by Caritas Australia and Aeotearoa to act as 
witnesses and to accompany them as they worked. Caritas East Timor was described 
by one international partner as ‘a hive of underground activity…programming was a 
bit secondary…’75 The Catholic Church itself was playing a leading role in protection 
of the population, and in convening negotiations between the conflicting parties in 
Indonesia and East Timor (Crowe  1995, Martin and Mayer-Reickh 2005). 
5.1.3   Response to the September crisis 
 
At the time of the emergency in September 1999 it was reported that the Director of 
Caritas East Timor, (and perhaps other Caritas East Timor staff) had been killed 
(Caritas Australia 1999). Believing this to be true, Caritas Internationalis immediately 
asked Caritas Australia to act temporarily as Caritas in East Timor, to assume the role 
which would normally fall to the local Caritas member as the Liaison Agency for a 
Caritas Internationalis emergency response. In late September Caritas Australia found 
out that the Director was alive, and other Caritas East Timor staff started reappearing. 
An initial meeting between Caritas East Timor’s Director and staff and key staff of 
Caritas Australia took place in Dili on 4 October 1999 (Hunt 2002).  
 
Initially Caritas East Timor pulled together the staff and volunteers it could and tried to 
console people who had been severely traumatised. Without resources to address their 
                                            
74 Personal observation and an interview with respondent 32 who was a senior staff member of this  
    NGO. It was through this NGO that a visiting NGO delegation  to East Timor which I led in June  
    1999 was able to make contact with and meet resistance leaders then in hiding. 
75 Informant 97. 
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material needs, they focussed on people’s emotional and spiritual needs until material 
help arrived. Then they formed several teams to help provide food, water, clothes and 
basic necessities. However, with the influx of international aid, it was evident that good 
coordination would be vital. To this end, Caritas Australia organised a conference in 
Darwin designed to plan coordination among Catholic agencies in East Timor. Held on 
19-20 October the conference involved both Bishops from East Timor, and was 
addressed by the recently released CNRT leader, Xanana Gusmao, and CNRT 
diplomatic representative, Jose Ramos Horta—an historic meeting of all four East 
Timorese leaders. The conference tried to establish a framework within which the 
members of Caritas Internationalis would work with the local Caritas organisation. One 
of the first tasks was to help reestablish Caritas East Timor. Their office had been 
trashed and looted, but was still standing. Bishop Belo subsequently announced that the 
former Caritas East Timor office would became Caritas Dili, while the Baucau Diocese 
would form an independent Caritas Baucau. Caritas Australia, which had committed to 
reestablish Caritas East Timor in Dili, replaced office equipment and materials trashed 
or looted during the rampage, for what became Caritas Dili. It also provided funds to 
pay 80 Caritas Dili staff (31 permanent and 49 volunteers) until March 2000. US-based 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) focussed its efforts on Baucau (Hunt 2002). 
 
However, the previously close partnership between Caritas Dili and Caritas Australia 
soon became seriously strained. Caritas Australia was already conducting food aid 
operations as a contractor to World Food Programme (WFP) within the UN emergency 
framework, and this role overshadowed its role as a Caritas East Timor partner. As one 
former Caritas Australia staff member explained: 
 
Caritas East Timor was suddenly overrun by an international NGO (Caritas Australia) 
with expatriates who implemented their own program, sidelining Caritas East Timor. 
This was the only way it could have been done as emergency relief was urgently 
required (people had very little food) and Caritas East Timor did not have the capacity. 
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Additionally Caritas East Timor was unable to operate in an accountable and 
transparent manner acceptable to donors.76 
 
This quotation sums up the problems which emerged between Caritas Dili and Caritas 
Australia in terms of the latter’s lead role for the international Caritas emergency 
response. The initial circumstances contributed to the situation. When food aid 
deliveries by Caritas Australia began on 7 October 1999, Caritas Dili had not yet fully 
regrouped and certainly had not been reestablished. The initial meeting between Caritas 
Dili and Caritas Australia had only taken place three days before. The international 
community believed the people’s needs were urgent, and Caritas Australia, along with 
other INGOs, became involved in the emergency response. Caritas Dili’s Director at 
that time did not understand why international organisations were in such a rush, and 
felt Caritas Dili, which had performed this role before, should be involved. As it 
reestablished its staff felt excluded. Caritas Dili’s perception was that Caritas Australia 
was taking over its normal role.77   Priests were telling them there were people without 
food, but they could not respond as they always had. This was demeaning to them, 
given the major role they had played earlier. Caritas Dili was unwilling to operate 
according to the food distribution system which by then was in place, coordinated by 
the World Food Programme. It is evident that Caritas Dili wanted to operate according 
to the methods which it had used during the Indonesian occupation—using church 
networks, not recording names of recipients, setting rice aside for future needs, and 
generally not being transparent because it was dangerous to be so. This is how they had 
operated before and they were not willing to suddenly change. In their eyes, this was 
clearly the best method to ensure that food reached the neediest. But in the emergency 
system, the WFP had strict standards and criteria for food distributions and had the 
country divided up between INGOs to ensure coverage. Its accountability frameworks 
were not consistent with how Caritas Dili wanted to operate and were outside their 
capability at that time (Hunt 2002).  
 
                                            
76  Former Caritas Australia staff member involved in the food distributions, quoted in Hunt (2002:37- 
     38). 
77 In fact, the very strong mandate from Caritas Internationalis supported this. 
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Eventually Caritas Dili gave up the struggle to be involved in the general food 
distributions and decided to get back to development work. However, it provided food 
and support to FALINTIL people and other resistance leaders who were still in the 
mountains, and who were not receiving support from elsewhere. This conflict over 
emergency food distributions occurred in the wider context of UN exclusion of 
Timorese generally from the international response. For Caritas Dili, the whole 
experience affected their morale and strained their relations with Caritas Australia, one 
of their major partners. It also seemed to have affected their trust in partners to work 
with them on an equal basis. So while they knew they needed to develop their capacity 
and address management weaknesses they were cautious about how that would occur 
(Hunt 2002).  
5.1.4  Return to development programs 
 
Largely excluded from the emergency response,78 Caritas Dili gradually began to 
restore itself and its programs with a view to the longer term. The Health and Rural 
Development Programs recommenced, the former with major new responsibilities.  
 
Health Program  
At the time of the militia rampage in September 1999, 77 per cent of national health 
facilities had been damaged, senior health staff from all levels, especially doctors and 
other core professionals who were Indonesian, had fled to Indonesia, leaving the  
health system in a state of collapse (East Timor Tuberculosis Control Programme 
2003a:4). The Catholic Health clinics were also damaged, and international health 
NGOs moved quickly to start providing health services, often drawing on local clinic 
staff and using those facilities which remained. Caritas Dili initially helped identify 
health needs and assisted the redevelopment of a number of priority Catholic health 
clinics in parts of the country where no international NGOs were operating. These 
                                            
78 This applies to Caritas Dili’s experience in Dili and other parts of East Timor. In the enclave of  
     Oecusse, some Caritas Dili staff worked together with Caritas Australia staff and had a more positive  
     experience (Hunt 2002). 
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clinics were run by various religious orders, and Caritas Dili supplied cheap medicines 
to them.79 
 
In response to the severe trauma many people had experienced, Caritas Dili also 
developed a new psycho-social rehabilitation program with support from Caritas 
Australia. It planned to produce and broadcast a weekly radio program on Radio 
Kmanek, Healing Through Memory, run community level peace education programs 
and conduct workshops in trauma healing and reconciliation for community and church 
leaders. While it did some of this, the demands on the one trained Programme 
Coordinator were overwhelming, including for intensive counselling for 16 severely 
traumatised individuals and families, and support for church and other community 
leaders dealing with trauma of community members. Unfortunately when the 
Programme Coordinator left in August 2000 to join the East Timorese Government, a 
suitably qualified replacement could not be found. An Australian-Timorese volunteer 
recruited by Caritas to assist the Coordinator tried to help continue the program, but 
became sick and returned to Australia, and the program was then discontinued (Hunt 
2002). 
 
The TB Program 
The crisis itself exacerbated the pre-existing problem of high TB prevalence. In 
December 1999 UNTAET asked Caritas Dili to be the lead agency for the National TB 
Program. An agreement was signed in early 2000 between UNTAET, acting as the 
government of East Timor, international agencies with a range of support roles, and 
Caritas Dili giving them responsibility for establishing and running the Health 
Department’s National TB Program for five years (i.e. until 2005) (East Timor 
Tuberculosis Control Programme 2003a:5). It began operations in early 2000, 
effectively transforming the Catholic clinic TB program operating prior to the 
emergency into a national program. Caritas Dili was responsible for the development 
of the Central Unit of the National Tuberculosis Program (NTP), which managed the 
program overall, coordinated, plans, provided technical guidance to the field level, 
                                            
79  Respondent 34. 
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obtained resources and procured drugs centrally. Caritas Norway provided financial 
and technical support, while the World Health Organisation (WHO) provided technical 
support, overall management strengthening and staff training, and external monitoring 
and evaluation. Until the end of 2001 additional technical support was also provided by 
the Northern Territory Ministry of Health, supported by AusAID. The World Food 
Programme (WFP) initially also provided adequate nutrition to patients during medical 
treatment. Throughout, the Ministry of Health was formally responsible for the TB 
program, to ensure that it was developed in accordance with Ministry policies, that 
staff were trained, that it approved the Director and the annual plans, and that it had 
been well integrated with district health services (East Timor Tuberculosis Control 
Programme 2003a:53-55). This collaboration appears to have been extremely 
successful.  
 
In March 2003 a review report by the program’s Technical Advisory Committee noted 
that there had been considerable progress with Direct Observation Treatment Service 
(DOTS) expansion, including some satellite centres in sub-districts to get treatment 
closer to patients, the NTP was functioning in all 13 districts of East Timor, including 
27 laboratories functioning in the districts, treatment outcomes had improved, and a 
NTP manual and laboratory manual had been developed and was available. The report 
also recognised a number of major challenges, including the need for improved 
laboratory services, a national health education program, strengthening training 
capacity at the centre and gradual expansion of the DOTS programs to the sub-district 
levels (East Timor Tuberculosis Control Programme 2003b, Caritas Diocesna Dili 
2003). By the end of 2003, the program was covering eight per cent of the population 
and 78 per cent of the sub-districts (Caritas Diocesna Dili 2003). It was seen by many 
as a ‘shining light’ of the reconstruction process in East Timor. This is attributed to the 
fact that the TB program was not based on the fallacy of a Timorese ‘blank slate’, a 
problem which afflicted other aspects of the reconstruction; in the emergency period it 
worked with the single political voice, the CNRT; and it combined the expertise of the 
locals and expatriates, drawing on international best practice, but applied it with sound 
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knowledge of the local context and a willingness on the part of local people to learn 
from international experience (Martins 2004). 
 
Gradually, in line with the UNTAET agreement, the NTP was handed over to the 
Ministry of Health to run from 2005, drawing largely on East Timor Government staff 
that had been trained by the program. Initially all staff were employed by Caritas Dili, 
but  from 2002 the Government began a recruitment process, so that gradually some 
Caritas staff were shifting across to government positions, and Caritas continued their 
training.80 Not all Caritas staff were to go across to the Ministry, which had no doctor 
position, for example, and Caritas Dili expected to continue to provide support, 
especially to the Catholic clinics.  
 
The TB program tried to expand its use of community volunteers, who were selected 
after a one day workshop at sub-district level, involving community leaders and key 
people.81 At the workshop, health staff explained the TB situation and how the 
community could help address it, and then community volunteers were identified by 
the community itself. Once suitable volunteers were selected, Caritas provided follow-
up training to them. One approach, especially for people in isolated areas who could 
not reach or afford transport costs to a clinic, was to have volunteers who could go to 
their areas, providing health education and collecting sputum for TB testing. Thus the 
model for the TB program involved government, NGOs (in some districts) and 
community volunteers.82 
 
In 2005, as Caritas Dili’s role in the National TB Program wound down, it was 
planning to develop new roles in health, and while it continued to support work on TB 
in Catholic health clinics, in future it wanted to focus on community participation in 
broader health education. Its focus would be on prevention of the major diseases in 
East Timor, notably malaria, respiratory tract infections, diarrhoea, and prevention of 
                                            
80 For example, at the end of 2003, 43 per cent of the 60 NTP staff were employed by the Government,  
    while 56 per cent were employed by Caritas Dili  (Caritas Diocesna Dili 2003: Table 5). 
81 In earlier attempts, the local clinic selected the person for training, but the community-selection  
    method  seems to have been more effective (respondent 34). 
82 Respondent  34. 
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maternal mortality. The Ministry of Health was also realising that, due to its limited 
resources, it would achieve more by working with NGOs in some districts. The staff of 
the Ministry of Health went monthly to each district to help with planning, and to 
define tasks for NGOs, but there was limited planning capacity in the districts and 
technical expertise was hard to find. In June 2004 the Government decided that each 
District Health Management Team could include an NGO, since it was difficult for 
government staff alone to meet the people’s needs.83   
 
HIV/AIDS Program 
Caritas Dili’s HIV/AIDS program was a new initiative closely related to the National 
TB program. This initiative provided for a dedicated HIV education program with 11 
staff, including a coordinator in each district. Its efforts were focussing on health 
education messages to young people in a context in which HIV data was very limited. 
These messages were being disseminated through young people in the parish structure, 
including the Catholic Scouts, and the apostolic workers. However, because of its 
Catholic base, only the first two parts of the ‘A (Abstain), B (Be careful) and C (use a 
Condom)’ message were being promoted. While HIV-related activity was begun by 
NGOs, the Government made it a priority, developed a National HIV strategy, and 
established a National Council on HIV/AIDS, although there were concerns at Caritas 
Dili that this Council was not really functioning.84  
 
Rural Development Program (RDP) 
The objectives of the restored RDP program demonstrated significant continuity with 
the earlier program. These were: to increase family income by increasing production; 
increase the farmers’ technical agricultural knowledge; enable farmers to analyse their 
problems and identify their needs; facilitate access to water in the villages; and build 
the capacity of the RDP staff themselves. The program continued to focus in the same 
three localities in the Comoro Valley, some new areas in Maubara, and on sustainable 
agriculture and agroforestry, terracing, water supply, fish ponds, horticulture and 
                                            
83 Respondent 34. 
84 Respondent 34. 
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training in general analysis. However, the program was by then able to encourage 
community organising and promote exchanges to enable farmers to learn from others.85 
Caritas Australia and Caritas Aotearoa remained its partners in this program. After the 
emergency, restoration of funding from Caritas Australia was slow, in part because 
there were accountability problems outstanding from an unfortunate experience during 
the emergency period.86 However, funding and support from Caritas Aotearoa had 
enabled Caritas Dili to recommence their program in April 2000, initially without 
Australian support. By mid-2000 the RDP had a new coordinator, one field officer, and 
an assistant coordinator, and was looking forward to recruiting a second field officer. 
Staff had also overcome some early transport problems which had restricted their 
ability to get to the field. The delay in the restoration of Caritas Australia funding had 
also limited what Caritas Dili could do. This and the stop-start nature of progress after 
September 1999 affected communities and damaged Caritas Dili’s credibility, although 
as it returned to its previous level of operation, communities reportedly appreciated that 
it had picked up where it left off in early 1999. 87 
 
Getting community groups to work well was not always easy, and staff trained in the 
Indonesian ‘modernisation’ approach to agriculture were not necessarily skilled in 
community development or strengthening traditional agriculture systems in sustainable 
ways. In 2002 a new group who lived in Barcaun approached Caritas Dili for help. 
They wanted to restore 13 hectares of land which they had abandoned during the 
Indonesian period and needed help to clear and plough it. Caritas arranged for  
ETADEP to plough the land, while the community agreed to repay Caritas Dili with 
the harvest from two hectares of the land as a contribution towards Caritas’ Social 
Assistance program, to be used as food distribution or revolving seed programs. One 
further development was activity in a new area, Maliana, which began in 2003, 
                                            
85 One exchange program on terracing had occurred in 1998, but such activities were interrupted by the  
    worsened security situation, the crisis of September 1999 and its aftermath (Respondent 32). 
86 In 1999 AusAID provided Caritas East Timor with A$200,000 via Caritas Australia for medicines for  
    the emergency response. Because of difficulties in obtaining medicines at the time, they were  
    purchased through Surabaya and brought in by boat. The first batch arrived and was distributed. The  
    second batch, due to arrive the week of the rampage, was never delivered, causing accountability  
    problems for both Caritas Dili and Caritas Australia. 
87 Information about the Rural Development Program provided by respondent 32. 
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focussing on water and sanitation, following a specific parish request. Thus the 
program was expanding and developing some early ideas about sustainability.88 
 
One of the difficulties that the RDP faced since 1999 is that it experienced a succession 
of coordinators. One went to work for UNDP, another became a Member of the 
Constituent Assembly (now the Parliament), a third moved to another NGO. Finding 
an appropriately qualified coordinator, and then keeping him or her, has been 
particularly difficult. The coordinator in place in late 2004 started in late 2002 and the 
program seems to have attained more stability since then. He said that now the country 
is free, they want to help people feel the independence. The capacity of farmers was 
different now. Farmers’ groups were able to make proposals to Caritas Dili, whose 
staff then went to the area to assess them. They also gave these groups Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) training, to enable them to do problem identification and 
planning and identify their own priorities. Some early assistance in reflecting on and 
evaluating the RDP has come from Caritas Aotearoa, whose staff has made six-
monthly visits assisting with planning and reporting, and tried to arrange special 
‘accompaniment’ and support for this program—although finding the right staff to 
provide specialist rural development support was  difficult (Caritas Dili 2003).89 
 
In the past, due to the security situation, Caritas Dili could not work closely with other 
NGOs, but it was now able to become an active member of the agricultural network, 
HASATIL. Caritas Dili found this very helpful as a way of building their staff’s 
capacity, through sharing experiences and drawing on other NGOs for training 
themselves and community partners. HASATIL also facilitated exchanges and helped 
with evaluation. For example, HASATIL put Caritas Dili in contact with the Buka 
Naroman Group in Baucau. This group, supported by SAHE, had done terracing, 
horticulture, organic compost, composting toilets and banana production, and was 
growing mangoes, cashew nuts and corn. Ten farmers from five groups supported by 
Caritas Dili made this study visit in October 2003 (Caritas Dili 2003). Caritas RDP 
                                            
88 Respondents 32, 30. 
89 Respondent 32. 
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staff also participated in one exchange visit to learn more about agriculture in Kupang 
in 2003, through a personal contact of the program coordinator there, and three of their 
partner farmers participated in an agricultural study visit to Solo in Java, organised by 
HASATIL in July 2004.90 CRS provided other useful support through its agricultural 
adviser and training in community organising, program planning, monitoring and 
evaluation. The program developed a positive relationship with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and Caritas Dili participated in training provided by the Government. 
While the NGO and the Government were both heading towards the same goal, Caritas 
Dili staff said that technical implementation may be different. For example, Caritas 
Dili was promoting organic fertilizers, while the Government was supporting chemical 
fertilizers, which many farmers could not afford.91  
 
The goals for the future were (1) to strengthen the communities, and (2) to strengthen 
the capacity of the staff at Caritas Dili, both in the technical level for those who work 
in the field in agriculture, and at an organisational level, in terms of management and 
leadership. It was considered particularly important that staff learned how to organise 
people, so that the people could organise themselves.92 It is notable that the 2003 RDP 
Annual Report notes a number of problems with groups not working well together or 
failing to carry out agreed tasks. Conflicts and problems within groups seemed to have 
been a significant constraint on the program’s success. Some groups seemed to have 
lost interest in specific activities (e.g. terracing), while others made considerable 
progress (Caritas Dili 2003). There was a tendency of groups to identify needs and then 
expect Caritas to supply them, perhaps reflecting the Indonesian top-down approach. 
Caritas Dili’s own staff were still working through their own understandings of rural 
community development, so these issues remained challenging for them. Caritas Dili 
RDP was planning 2005 as a year of transition for the groups it was then supporting, so 
that it could leave them to carry on without support and shift Caritas Dili RDP attention 
to other areas. According to the RDP strategic plan, the program wanted to have a 
                                            
90 Respondent 32. 
91 Respondent 32. 
92 Respondent 32. 
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presence in all 27 parishes in the Dili Diocese within five years.93 This appeared to be a 
response to pressure from the church to assist across a wider area. In July 2004 the 
RDP program was evaluated before any major changes were made. This evaluation 
revealed that although there had been achievements, the problems with existing 
groups’ ‘ownership’ of and commitment to the sustainability of the projects remained, 
that farmer groups lacked organisational capacity, and there were communication 
problems within them, as well as between the groups and Caritas Dili. The report 
outlined a number of recommendations to address these difficulties (Caritas Dili 2004).  
 
The Women’s and Social Assistance Programs 
The Women’s Program and Social Assistance Programs operated on a very limited 
basis with local Caritas Dili funds in 2001 and indicated some continuity with the 
widows’ support program operating prior to the emergency. The enhancement of the 
women’s program which Caritas Dili had envisaged as part of a strategic planning 
process in 2002 took some time to be developed due to lack of funding. In 2002 some 
15-25 women were trained in a range of largely domestic skills, but their ability to 
follow up at the parish level depended very much on the support of the local priest, 
which was often not forthcoming, apparently because the priests were busy. So Caritas 
tried again. It received funding for a new Women’s Program in late April 2004 and by 
mid-year candidates from the parishes were being identified for training. Women were 
to be trained over one year to become trainers in a range of skills such as sewing, 
cooking, tais making, and handicraft making. The parishes were asked to identify 
women who had family in Dili who could accommodate them during their training, or 
whom the parish would support during the training period.94 
 
The Social Assistance Program would be developed in future at the parish level. As a 
step towards this, an education program supported by UK-based Catholics for Overseas 
Development (CAFOD) aimed to strengthen basic parish capacities in areas of office 
administration, computer skills and the empowerment of people at parish level. Dili 
                                            
93 Respondent 32. 
94 Respondent 31. 
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Diocese comprises 26 parishes. Caritas Dili began by working with just seven of 
them95 providing training to parish volunteers in computer skills, secretariat 
management, small business, leadership, and training of trainers. They needed to obtain 
more computers to enable staff to practice their computer skills,96 although a further 
problem was lack of electricity in some locations. The parish training program was 
evaluated in March-April 2004 and it appeared that parish priests and others at parish 
level were very grateful for the support (Caritas Diocesan Dili 2004).  
5.1.5 Changed approach in 2003 
 
Though Caritas Dili retained its vision to develop the people, achieve social justice and 
promote Christian life based on Catholic social teachings, there was a noticeable shift 
in its approach, particularly after 2003. In 2002 Caritas Dili went through an internal 
process of strategic planning which involved some discussion of devolving Caritas to 
the parish level through greater voluntary involvement of people in the parishes and 
more grass roots engagement.97 This led to some reorganisation to further strengthen 
management, including creation of a new position of Secretary, which was filled in 
January 2003. The new management, and the growing link with the Caritas network in 
the Philippines, led to a quite noticeable change within Caritas Dili. This approach was 
not really signalled in the 2002 Strategic Plan, but came about subsequently. The new   
approach reflected the question which Caritas Dili was asking itself, ‘What does 
independence mean for Caritas Dili?’98 It had moved from the emergency to a 
development phase, but with a particular perspective, which was to slowly develop the 
people to be more self-reliant, and to enable Caritas Dili itself to be more independent 
of donor funding. Senior staff were concerned that many projects only ran for two to 
three years, while what was needed was funding to ensure sustainability of programs, 
particularly at the parish level. They discussed with their Caritas partners the need to 
strengthen Caritas Dili institutionally, and strengthen the parishes to provide services in 
                                            
95 The participating parishes were Dare, Aileu, Atabai, Ainaro, Maubisse, Balibo, and Liquica. 
96 A priest in Australia was endeavouring to find computers for them (respondent 30). 
97 Respondent 35. 
98 Respondent 30. 
 131
a sustainable way. Equally they wanted to encourage ordinary people to be more self-
reliant—not to wait and depend on help coming from outside, or from the 
Government.99  
 
The Director of Caritas Dili in 2004 clearly felt that these changes would only be 
achieved slowly. He thought that international people were in a hurry; many had no 
experience of the conflict and what people went through, and development would take 
time. As another senior staff member said, many factors had affected people: over 400 
years of colonialism, including 24 years of Indonesian occupation, which affected 
people psychologically; people were not free to do what they wanted—they had to 
defend their right to one plate of food a day; though they were free, in the transition to 
independence, they lost everything, and did not know where to start, where to obtain 
materials or anything, they were starting from zero; the experience of the Indonesian 
period was one in which Indonesians did not activate people  to work, instead they just 
enriched themselves, so people had no skills or experience; finally, in the emergency 
period, everything was given for free, and people were paid for their labour, so the 
previous Timorese ethic of voluntarism had been damaged.100 Caritas Dili in 2004 
wanted to restore the ethic of voluntarism, and had again disagreed with Caritas 
Australia, this time over payment of staff in Oecusse for emergency food distributions 
following the food emergency in early 2004, a program which Caritas Dili was 
implementing with Australian funds. Caritas Dili felt that volunteers should do the 
work.101 
 
In the health area these changes in Caritas Dili could be seen most clearly. During the 
Indonesian period there was a vision to develop a parish-based network, but this was 
almost impossible because of the activities of the military and military intelligence, 
who monitored their every move. Caritas Dili started in 1997 to move towards this 
parish-based approach by building a link with Filipino partners of Caritas Norway. In 
that year Caritas Dili’s doctor and his Norwegian adviser went to Manila to see the 
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ways in which a Catholic organisation there was undertaking community health work. 
They brought back manuals and ideas but these could not be developed in the 
repressive environment of that time. Efforts to send another staff member to the 
Philippines in 1999 failed, with the military intercepting him at the airport (he 
eventually went in 2000 for three months of training). In the interim, the only outreach 
had been through catechists who were still able to travel, and were the only effective 
link outside Dili itself. Senior staff from the TB program were also able to move 
around, but always under the watchful eye of Indonesian intelligence. As long as 
Caritas kept the Ministry of Health informed of their activities, the relationship with 
Indonesian authorities remained cordial.102 
 
In late 2004 the community health strategy was being put in place, with Caritas Dili 
trying to develop health volunteer networks attached to the Catholic clinics. Caritas 
Dili planned to support and nourish the network of volunteers, and cooperate with the 
parish-level clinics. It wanted to extend this approach to other aspects of its work, 
especially in the social development area. The model was directly based on the 
experience of the NGOs in the Philippines, where parish-based volunteers are involved 
in a variety of programs. Three senior Caritas Dili staff visited the Philippines in 2003 
to learn from the experiences of the Social Action Centre of Pampanga (SACOP) in 
particular. This visit was facilitated by Caritas Norway.103 SACOP had shifted from a 
focus on relief work, through a period of livelihood strategies, to its focus on ‘tapping 
the potentials of parishes to develop their own social action programs according to the 
needs of their parishioners and communities’ (SACOP 2004:2). The Diocesan Action 
Centres in the Philippines were the main partners of the National Secretariat for Social 
Action, Justice and Peace, of Caritas Philippines, whose major goal was ‘social 
transformation’. The Social Action Centres worked through Basic Ecclesiastical 
Communities (BEC) to empower the poor and marginalised ‘so that they could actively 
partake in the process of social transformation’ (SACOP 2004:2). This direction, which 
they referred to as a ‘paradigm shift’ began in earnest in 1998, and included ‘a change 
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from supporting short-term projects to strategic programs that are BEC based’ 
(NASSA 2004:2). The Philippines experience seemed very relevant to Timorese, since 
organisations there had to adjust to new conditions after the downfall of the Marcos 
dictatorship, in the same way that Timorese organisations were trying to adjust to the 
new conditions in their country.  
 
Thus Caritas Dili’s early focus on social assistance was being replaced with a goal of 
social development through a parish-based program. The objective was to encourage 
people to help themselves to develop, not to remain forever poor, nor to wait for help 
to come from outside. Caritas’ efforts would be to encourage people to become more 
educated and to achieve development themelves so that they could live with dignity. At 
the same time they wanted to develop parish-based income generating projects, so that 
a percentage of their profits would enable Caritas Dili to maintain some limited social 
assistance projects. They also hoped to develop action research teams from the various 
Commissions of the Catholic Church at the national, diocesan, and parish levels, to 
investigate the causes of the problems that people faced, and develop possible 
responses.104 
5.1.6  Structure and relationships  
 
When Caritas Dili began (as Caritas East Timor) it was a foundation, but by late 2004 
it saw itself as a local NGO. Since the change of name from Caritas East Timor to 
Caritas Dili it had no legal status under existing Indonesian foundation law. It had no 
Board, but reported directly to the Bishop and remained the responsibility of the Social 
Commission of the Diocese.105 The period between July 2000 and July 2001 saw many 
staff changes, as five senior staff moved to other positions, two with UNDP, one to the 
government, and two to study. However, a Finance Manager was appointed in an effort 
to strengthen financial management across the organisation. Certainly Caritas Dili has 
grown since its early period, though it is hard to establish a clear picture of the 
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fluctuations in its staff size from September 1999 when it had around 30 staff, to 2004 
when it returned to that level.106  In 2000 it had some 46 staff and many volunteers. At 
the end of June 2004 Caritas Dili had five staff working in the RDP program, eleven in 
health (nine in the National TB program and two in HIV/AIDS), three in the 
Training/Education area and eleven in administration. However, the health program 
had additional staff in the districts. 107 
 
For some years, CAFOD had provided for all core costs of the secretariat, but 
commencing in 2003 Caritas Dili agreed to a new regime with its Catholic NGO 
partners, to set administration costs at ten per cent of the organisation’s budget and 
share them across each program (Caritas Diocesna Dili 2003). Although not fully 
achieved, this meant a reduction in administrative staffing and some changes in staff 
conditions. This move was very much welcomed by the donor partners, who had been 
pressing for reduced administration costs. The  Director in place in 2004108 had worked 
at Caritas Dili since before the emergency but had taken up the Director’s position in 
September 2000. He was slowly developing the organisation’s management and 
capacities. By 2004 the organisation had a Vice Director, a Secretary, and coordinators 
for each of its major programs. Together with the Director, these formed a Committee 
of Management which, from February 2003, had met fortnightly. All major program 
decisions were taken by that group. They were trying to develop a sense of ‘ownership’ 
of the organisation, and a sense of staff commitment towards its values and goals. In 
particular, they wanted to develop in staff a sense of commitment to the value of 
providing service to the community. The organisation still needed significant capacity 
development, and it identified the need for this especially in the administrative area, in 
computing and in language development (English, Portuguese) as well as in social and 
rural development.109 Partners pushed them to learn English, for example,110 and in 
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particular program areas, such as health and rural development, partners played 
important roles in developing technical and management skills.111 Caritas Dili has also 
had considerable help in the financial area since 2000, with a trainer working with 
them in 2004 to introduce the MYOB financial package to manage their accounts.112  
Caritas Dili discussed its capacity building needs with its Catholic partners, and 
emphasised to them the need for time and space to learn. Early efforts at capacity 
building, according to one source, involved staff trying to teach each other, and were 
not very effective.113 More recent capacity building efforts seem to have drawn more 
on partners and models in Philippines and Indonesia.114 
  
Caritas Dili had five consistent donors, all members of the Global Caritas 
Internationalis family. CAFOD (UK) funded Education and Training as well as the 
HIV/AIDS program; Caritas Norway funded the National TB Program; Caritas 
Australia and Caritas Aotearoa together funded the Rural Development Program, and 
Caritas Portugal, the Social Assistance Program. A new Fisheries Program, supported 
by Caritas Japan, was beginning in July-August 2004.115 Most donor partners realised 
that Caritas Dili found it difficult to meet the much more stringent accountability 
requirements which partners had required since 1999.116 
 
Relations with other stakeholders 
Caritas Dili was very close to the resistance movement before the 1999 ballot, and 
there remained close personal links with members of the government, but Caritas had 
not been involved in formal advocacy roles at all.117  Caritas Dili’s Director said the 
organisation did not involve itself in politics as it was afraid Caritas would be 
perceived to be supporting a particular political party. Its main relationship with the 
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Government was through its service delivery role with the National TB Program, 
through which it was influencing the Government’s approach to this disease. It had a 
close relationship with the first Health Minister (a former Caritas East Timor doctor) 
and the Vice Minister of Health as well as the Director of the Health Department. One 
of the issues which had caused some uncertainty was the time the Government took to 
clarify what role it saw for Catholic health clinics in the newly independent country.  
 
Caritas Dili’s national partners outside the Government were ETADEP, from which it 
hired tractors, Klibut Alizados Cartilosa Timor Leste (KACTL) an NGO working with 
people with disabilities, and the East Timor NGO Forum, of which it was a member. It 
was also a member of HASATIL, the sustainable agriculture network, which was 
working in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture.118 Caritas Dili also drew on 
expertise from international partner NGOs (CIIR and CRS) to conduct the evaluation 
of the RDP (Caritas East Timor 1999). 
 
By late 2004 Caritas Dili was reflecting on what independence meant for it, and 
realising that its reliance on project-based outside funding meant that it was not 
independent as an organisation. It no longer received any financial support from the 
Dili Diocese, so felt very dependent on donor support. The leadership team was 
beginning a process designed to give the organisation autonomy and resources for 
future use at national, diocesan and parish levels. They recognised that this meant 
starting with themselves, so that by being stronger as a national institution they would 
be in a position to assist the diocesan and parish levels to achieve similar goals. Thus in 
2004 Caritas Dili was in the process of purchasing land and generating its own socio-
economic enterprises. The first venture was cow raising in the Loes valley. Caritas Dili 
planned to raise cows to provide jobs for people caring for them, and also to sell the 
cows and generate funds. Another proposed venture was to develop a pharmacy to 
supply medicines to Catholic clinics, and later, to develop grape-growing, on a profit-
sharing basis with the landowners.119  
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5.2  ETADEP (East Timor Agricultural Development Program) 
 
ETADEP is a foundation which began operating in 1987. It comprised staff formerly 
employed in an agriculture and rural development program run by US NGO, Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS).120  As explained in Chapter Three, CRS was one of only two 
international NGOs which had been allowed by the Indonesian Government to enter 
East Timor in 1979 during the severe famine which followed the Indonesian invasion 
of 1975. CRS had completed its emergency program by the end of 1981, and had been 
doing development work for a few years. However, the security situation and 
communication problems were making it difficult to work, so they decided to close 
their program but continue working in East Timor by forming a local NGO.121 
5.2.1   ETADEP’s early years 
 
ETADEP’s goal was rural development, especially agricultural development and water 
supply. At the outset there were just ten people who formed a board, three of whom 
formed a paid executive, while the rest were volunteers.122 Early funding was obtained 
from USAID by CRS and the program was a continuation of the type of activity that 
staff of the newly-formed NGO had already been undertaking for five years in the Loes 
Valley, near Maubara in Timor’s north-west. Initial work involved provision of tractors 
to farmers to extend rice production.123  Many rice fields were abandoned in the 
conflict of 1975, and rice fields had been damaged by a tall weed (saccarum 
spontaneum grass) which farmers could not remove by their usual methods—using 
manual tools then grazing cattle and buffalo. The tractors enabled farmers to cultivate 
these fields which had been abandoned, and hence increase rice production.124  The 
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work soon expanded to areas around Loes Valley, such as Sare (Ermera), Siamando 
(Maubara), Bilimau (Cailaco) and Atabae. The main activities were wet and dryland 
agriculture, distribution of livestock (cattle and water buffalo), vegetable growing for 
women, agricultural training, and building drinking water facilities. There were soon 
some 81 groups in Raimate area (in the Loes Valley) alone, involving over 800 
farmers.125 Gradually the program spread to other areas of East Timor, so that in the 
Indonesian period  ETADEP worked with around 100 farmer groups across the 
country, supporting agriculture, water supply and small business development, 
including credit provision. ETADEP gave the groups a great deal of support and 
training, as well as seeds and tools, and made equipment available through credit.126 
 
The supply of tractors and other agricultural machinery was a significant part of 
ETADEP’s program. The large tractors were available for hire, while smaller 
equipment, such as hand tractors, paddy threshers, and rice mills, as well as livestock 
such as cattle and buffalo, could be purchased through the credit programs. ETADEP 
had 26 tractors in the early years, a legacy from CRS, although by 1991, only four 
remained in good condition, so the remaining 22 were sold. In 1993 USAID provided 
four new tractors, bringing the total number of tractors owned by ETADEP to eight. 
One of the problems which ETADEP has always faced has been the high cost of 
maintaining these tractors and the difficulty and cost of getting spare parts from 
Jakarta.127 
5.2.2 Expansion and new roles 
 
During the 1990s ETADEP started to expand its roles and its impact in several ways. 
These included in information provision, developing credit unions, and extending 
Integrated Development Programs into new areas. After the Pope’s visit, and the slight 
opening of East Timor in 1989, ETADEP became a contact point for people visiting 
                                            
125 Respondent 43. 
126 Respondent 38. 
127 Respondent 43. 
 139
from abroad. Visitors such as ambassadors, embassy staff, and others from Jakarta, 
would all come to ETADEP for information or ask for news by phone. This 
information role was additional to their core work of agricultural development. 
However, their ability to travel around East Timor doing agricultural work enabled 
them to quietly obtain a lot of information which outsiders wanted about what was 
happening in East Timor.128  In 1990, ETADEP joined with the Credit Union 
Cooperative Organisation (CUCO) in Jakarta to develop a credit union program in East 
Timor. This initiative was supported by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), a German 
Foundation. The idea was to encourage farmers to save through a credit union and 
build up capital, so that they could borrow from this source, rather than be dependent 
on local money lenders charging exorbitant interest rates. This cooperation led to 22 
primary credit unions being established across East Timor, with a considerable capital 
base of millions of rupiah. A few years later, in 1997, ETADEP helped establish a new 
organisation to support and network all the credit unions, Poskopit (Cooperative) Hanai 
Malu, which later became an independent national credit union organisation. 129 
 
From 1992 to 1998 ETADEP also gained support from KAS to extend into new areas 
with an Integrated Development Program in Manututo (Laclo, Laclia and Laclubar) 
and Natarbora, although with less significant results. Natarbora was selected because 
around 1996 the Indonesian Government had a plan to develop a sugarcane plantation 
and forestry operation there. ETADEP realised that this would mean farmers would 
lose their land, so they went to the area and informed the farmers about the proposal. 
At the same time, they offered their own program to help improve the conditions in the 
area, including provision of four tractors, and assistance with water supply, agriculture 
and agroforestry. Apparently, as a result, when East Timor’s Governor, Abilio Soares, 
went to the areas to discuss the project the people did not attend meetings to hear what 
he had to say and he was very angry, but the Indonesian project did not proceed. 
However, ETADEP’s work was difficult at that time because the security situation was 
very repressive. Community participation was not strong as the project area was 
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closely monitored by a nearby Indonesian military post and it was very difficult to have 
a community meeting. As a result, community maintenance of the facilities and 
equipment was also poor.130 This situation changed after 1999, and by 2004 ETADEP 
had 15 groups in three locations in Natarbora, including a women’s group focussing on 
vegetable growing, and one mixed group of men and women. 131 
 
By the mid-late 1990s  ETADEP had grown to a staff of around 30 persons, sometimes 
as many as 40, with four major programs managed and organised according to donor 
projects. These projects were: 
1) a CIDA program of agriculture and block fund for  farmers’ groups: since its 
inception in 1989 that program supported around 15-20 group projects per year; 
this fund supported groups anywhere in East Timor, according to need. The 
block fund was a part of CIDA’s bilateral aid program to Indonesia; 
2) Oxfam projects of agriculture  and training in the rural areas; 
3) AusAID water supply: ETADEP was one of the local NGO partners of the 
AusAID Water and Sanitation project in Bobanaro; ETADEP was active in 
Cailaco, a sub-district of Maliana; and 
4) field projects funded by KAS, especially in Natarbora and the Loes Valley. 132 
During Indonesian rule the staff were able to develop their technical skills through 
participation in training in other parts of Indonesia, in Kupang, Jakarta and Irian Jaya 
(the latter in relation to water supply), and through links with Indonesian NGOs such as 
Bina Swadaya, which also worked in East Timor.133 
5.2.3 1990s: the environment worsens  
 
Throughout the 1990s ETADEP’s work was conducted in the difficult security 
environment prevalent in East Timor. Although staff had a working relationship with 
government departments relevant to their areas of work, especially the Agriculture 
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Department, whenever they went out to the rural areas they feared meeting the military 
and being harassed and intimidated. In 1992, after the arrest of Xanana Gusmao, the 
Director of ETADEP was arrested and imprisoned for four and a half months. He is 
married to (then military commander) Xanana Gusmao’s sister, and the close family 
relationship made the Indonesian military suspicious of him. Though the military never 
tried to close ETADEP down, they certainly tried to control its activities. Indonesian 
military would be posted near the office and staff members’ homes, and they were 
conscious of being constantly under surveillance.134 
 
Some staff were clearly pro-independence. Their choice to join an NGO reflected the 
fact that they did not want to work for the Indonesian Government, and they wanted to 
help the people. Some had been students in Indonesia where they had been active in the 
clandestine movement. Working with ETADEP enabled them to act as a bridge 
between the people in the rural areas, Dili, and the outside world. News about pro-
independence activity in Dili or outside of East Timor boosted rural peoples’ morale. 
Information about human rights issues in rural areas could also be gathered and 
brought back to Dili. ETADEP staff who were pro-independence (not all were) gave 
significant support to FALINTIL, such as food, money and information. ETADEP’s 
facilities enabled them to act as a communication channel between the resistance inside 
East Timor and Xanana Gusmao when he was imprisoned in Jakarta. As one staff 
member explained, this activity was not done in the name of ETADEP, but ETADEP’s 
role in rural development clearly provided an opportunity for individual staff to pursue 
their political objectives.135 
 
By 1997 ETADEP had expanded to two Dili offices, the old one (its location during 
this study) and a new one which became the main office. ETADEP had established the 
new building with assistance from USAID, and rented the top floor to Yayasan HAK 
and FOKUPERS. ETADEP also had field offices in Natarbora (Manututo) and 
Raimate (Ermera), the latter acting as a base camp for the equipment since the early 
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CRS period.136  As the situation worsened in 1998-99, access to the Loes Valley 
became very difficult. In 1998 and 1999 many guerrillas concentrated in that area and 
people from Maubara and Liquica fled there. FALINTIL had themselves planted rice in 
this area, and were probably also supported by the local population to the extent of 
their capacity—hence the military sensitivity about it. ETADEP was fortunate to have 
an Indonesian staff member who was able to negotiate access with the Indonesian 
military and undertake visits there.137  
 
However, by June 1999 it was impossible to continue normal programs, so ETADEP 
joined with friends at Yayasan HAK in the newly formed network ‘POSKO’ to provide 
emergency assistance to refugees in the Maubara area. On one occasion, returning 
through Liquica, their convoy was attacked by militia and one of the ETADEP drivers 
was badly injured. Five years’ later his eyes remained damaged. 
5.2.4 After the violence: beyond an emergency response in the UNTAET period 
 
After the September 1999 violence ETADEP staff regrouped in November and 
December. Some had fled to Dare in the hills behind Dili, others to Indonesia, but they 
came together and decided to reestablish the organisation. They did so with support 
from USAID, CIDA, AusAID, CARE and Oxfam. AusAID’s Team leader helped to 
reorganise the local NGOs. USAID provided basic transport (two motor bikes) and 
office equipment, including a computer, and others provided funding. The large new 
office had been burned down, and the UN did not want to give them use of the old 
office building, which was still intact. However, one UN staff member knew it had 
been theirs, and he supported them to reestablish there. Meanwhile, the land on which 
the new, larger office had been built was taken over by an investor from China, who 
built a hotel on the site, and began paying monthly rent to ETADEP. Two tractors had 
survived the destruction, and these were put to immediate use. January is the planting 
month, so this enabled some rice to be planted straight away. At that stage, in the 
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emergency period, ETADEP provided everything to farmers for free as they had plenty 
of donor money. With help from CIDA Jakarta, they were also able to access some 
CIDA funds which had been deposited in their Indonesian bank account before the 
emergency. They used this to provide credit to rural groups, as well as machines for 
rice husking, animals, fishing equipment, and support to start small businesses.138 
 
In 2000 ETADEP again received support from CRS for three years (2000-2002), to 
respond to the emergency and rebuild their agriculture and livestock program. Once 
again they built up to about 30-35 staff, and soon had a program with a number of 
donors, including CIDA and CARE. The CIDA program was one of the largest. From 
2000-2004  ETADEP had an agreement with CIDA to provide C$120,000 a year for an 
Integrated Agriculture Program restricted to just four areas (no longer across the whole 
country). These were Manututo (Natarbora), Ermera, Bobanaro (Cailaco Sub-District) 
and Maubara (Loes Valley). 139 Instituto Marques Vale Flor (IMVF) and Oxfam also 
provided funds to support the Loes Valley program.140 In addition the Oxfam project 
was supporting a range of small scale activities near Dili, which particularly 
encouraged the involvement of women in agriculture and agroforestry.141 
 
One CRS staff member who had not been involved in the Loes Valley program since 
1991 returned there in 2001 and saw considerable progress. Clearly agricultural output 
had increased, many more people were educated, houses had better rooves, and people 
were no longer hungry. Agroforestry work undertaken between 1982 and 1990 was 
paying off, in that people now had access to a variety of fruit. Overall, according to this 
staff member, the improved agricultural production appeared to have improved social 
conditions considerably.142 The situation in Natarbora had also changed dramatically. 
In the Indonesian period, it was hard for people to cultivate their land in the hills 
because the military suspected them of making contact with FALINTIL. They were 
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only able to grow things on small areas of land around their houses. In the new 
environment they could plant many more hectares and produce a lot more. The new 
problem was one of marketing, and for many farmers there were difficulties in setting a 
price, so prices varied dramatically across the country. 143 
 
 ETADEP’s concerns about other post-conflict players 
During the UNTAET period, ETADEP had little success influencing the UN or the 
World Bank. It seemed to them that these organisations were ‘all talk and little action’, 
particularly when it came to provision of health services in rural areas. They were 
concerned as well about the Community Empowerment Program (CEP),144 especially 
the credit component. The CEP gave loans but provided no support to people about 
how to manage their loans or their projects.145 Similarly they were critical of the UN 
Shelter program which only provided roofing materials. ETADEP staff wondered 
where people were supposed to get nails, wood, stone and sand to complete the 
house.146 
 
ETADEP also discovered that the Chinese Government had given three or four tractors 
to each district as part of the emergency response, but people did not know how to look 
after them. ETADEP felt they could not say anything to the political leaders, (‘we are 
only small people’) but already the tractors had broken down.147 ETADEP felt that had 
all the tractors been located at Natarbora, or some at Uatulari (Viqueque District), they 
could have been properly maintained and boosted rice production for the whole of East 
Timor, as these are major rice growing areas. Another disappointment concerned an 
irrigation system in Hatolia which was rebuilt in 2000-2001 by the UNTAET 
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Agriculture Division and which the population worked hard to finish in January 2002. 
Shortly afterwards it was damaged by a flood and was no longer functioning. ETADEP 
believes this was because there were so many foreigners involved in the construction 
who did not listen to the local population. ETADEP raised this problem with many 
areas of government, among them the Secretary of State and the Minister for 
Infrastructure, the Minister of Agriculture, the President and the Prime Minister. 
Nothing changed, and this had a very negative impact on the population. The people 
wanted to protest to the Government about it. 148 
5.2.5 Changes since independence 
 
Since independence there had been enormous change. There were now many NGOs, 
often without donor support, although quite a few were still operating in 2004. 
ETADEP had generally good relations with other local NGOs, but most of them had 
limited organisational and program capacity. ETADEP was an active member of 
HASATIL, the network for sustainable agriculture, which was working with them to 
build capacity. This network was providing training in agriculture and advocating 
about sustainable agriculture. About 20 or more NGOs were members of HASATIL, 
about five of them international NGOs, the rest local organisations. HASATIL was 
meeting monthly and had organised two major exhibitions about sustainable 
agriculture in Dili in August 2002 and 2003. It was promoting local, organically grown 
produce, and trying to encourage investment in local agriculture.149 
 
Certainly in the post-ballot period ETADEP had access to a lot more ideas and 
knowledge than previously to link with their considerable experience. Such 
opportunities were simply not available before:  HASATIL had facilitated short study 
visits to Indonesia; CIDA had contributed a range of experts and trainers; Oxfam 
arranged a study tour to the Philippines; the World Bank sent ETADEP staff to 
Mozambique and some had also been to Costa Rica. In late 2004 two new donors 
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provided international training opportunities—in rural development (in Japan and 
funded by Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA] and capacity building (in 
Hong Kong, funded by Oxfam Hong Kong).150 These tours and training opportunities 
enabled staff to significantly improve their knowledge, which was bringing impressive 
results. For example, ETADEP staff said that Raimate, which used to produce about 
1.5 tons per hectare of rice annually, had doubled that amount. They were starting to 
focus less on quantity and more on the quality of the agricultural produce. Still, East 
Timor consumed almost twice as much rice as it produced, and an annual shortfall of 
30 tons of rice remained in 2004; thus it remained important to increase the quantity 
produced.151  ETADEP had also accessed training within East Timor, for example on 
financial management, organisational management, gender issues (the latter provided 
by FOKUPERS), and alternative health (facilitated by SAHE).152   
 
Relationships between ETADEP and the communities changed too. In the past it was 
often difficult for ETADEP to work with the farmer groups for security reasons. In 
such situations they would work through a priest, who would form the group under the 
church’s umbrella. ETADEP would then provide the priest with a hand tractor, other 
equipment or animals for the group, and he would in turn report back on the group’s 
achievements to ETADEP. ETADEP could now work directly with the farmer groups 
and communities without fear, in a bottom-up approach, compared to the top-down 
technical assistance approach of the Indonesian period. ETADEP could work more 
effectively with communities to better identify the problems and needs.153 
 
Relationships with the Government had also clearly changed. ETADEP formed a 
collaborative partnership with the Government. In particular it was working with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which had an Integrated Rural Program to support 
communities in the villages. ETADEP undertook field surveys and made proposals to 
the Government, which it could then incorporate into its own program. There was some 
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152 Respondent 40, 38, 39 and Fundacao ETADEP 2003, pp.10-11. 
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good collaboration.154 For example, ETADEP was developing an agroforestry project 
in Ailoc Village in Christo Rei Sub-District of Dili, as part of a reafforestation plan 
supported by the Ministry of Agriculture’s Agricultural Rehabilitation Program of 
Natural Resource Management.155  ETADEP was also particularly involved (along 
with Halarae) with a Government Field Farm School in Aileu, where two of its staff 
trained to be trainers in Integrated Pest Management (IPM). ETADEP supported four 
groups in Aileu, specialising in cabbage growing who were trialling this IPM approach 
as part of the Field School’s program. This Farmer Field School was supported by the 
Victorian State Government (Australia).156  In 2003 one ETADEP staff member was 
also involved with a government study of cooperatives in Sumatra.157  Every month 
there were coordination and information sharing meetings with the Government (with 
the Vice Minister for Agriculture) for all organisations working in Agriculture, which 
ETADEP attended. By late 2004 the Government had not determined its agricultural 
policy and ETADEP was unclear about what the World Bank approach entailed, but it 
appeared that the Government-NGO coordination mechanism may, in time, address 
some of these issues.158  Earlier, in 2002-2003, ETADEP also worked with the 
government Water and Sanitation Service and the AusAID bilateral Community Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project (CWSSP) to help provide clean water and sanitation to 
communities in five areas where they were working. This involved rehabilitation of 
drinking water and sanitation facilities, well drilling, and/or community training.159  
5.2.6 ETADEP in 2004-05 
 
In late 2004 and early 2005 ETADEP retained its original focus on agriculture and 
rural development, including water supply and credit provision. It had to reduce the 
geographical scope of its work, but strengthened its effectiveness and was able to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the changed environment, both in terms of its 
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156 Information obtained during my visit to the Project 9 July 2004. 
157 Respondent 41. 
158 Respondents 89, and 42. 
159 Respondents 4, 40 and Fundacao ETADEP 2003, p.10. 
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way of working with communities and its own professional skills development.160  In 
terms of its internal management, ETADEP had 23 staff.161 Its board, some of whom 
were now living in Indonesia, was not really functioning,162 but it had a monthly 
meeting of its Director and program coordinators, and all staff met annually to review 
the programs. It had barely changed from its pre-1999 structure, with four program 
coordinators responsible for the following programs: 
 
1) Oxfam Program and Secretary of ETADEP: the Oxfam program was the 
reforestation program in Dili; this program, which ETADEP was also trialling 
in other highland villages, involved contour terracing, planting nitrogen-fixing 
and animal fodder trees, polyculture and, in some areas, coffee and vanilla 
plantings. The goal was to stop soil erosion and depletion, rebuild the soil’s 
fertility, conserve water, and increase food production to improve nutrition. 
2) Natarbora Program, previously supported by CRS, now with ETADEP’s own 
funds; and 
3) CIDA Program in the Loes Valley: the Natarbora and Loes Valley programs 
involved support for dryland and wetland agriculture, through making tractors 
and cattle available for land preparation, and piloting a ‘renca’ system of land 
preparation (‘renca’ is a system of land preparation for wet rice cultivation 
using buffalo). In Ermera, this also involved agroforestry, and in the highland 
areas, distribution of goats and pigs. ETADEP owned some eight tractors and a 
milling machine which were available for these programs; 
4) CIDA Credit program: this provided credit for around 30 farming groups per 
year to purchase agricultural tools and machinery which would boost their 
income (e.g. hand tractors, grain grinders, threshing machines). This was a 
revolving credit fund, which provided no-interest loans, and distributed credit 
mainly, but not exclusively, in the areas where the other programs were 
operating.163 
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161 Activity Report of ETADEP for the Year 2003, Fundacao ETADEP p.12. 
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163 Respondent 38 and Activity Report of ETADEP for the Year 2003, Fundacao ETADEP. 
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 ETADEP provided a range of training to its farmer groups on issues such as group 
management, bookkeeping, agricultural techniques, making and using organic 
fertilizers and pesticides, organic agriculture and agroforestry systems, making cooking 
stoves, environmental issues, and gender. They also facilitated ‘comparative study’ 
visits for farmer groups to help them learn from each other and solve their own 
problems. These have included a study visit to learn about farming in West Timor 
(Fundacao ETADEP 2003). From August 2003 to August 2004 ETADEP also had a 
Filipina-Canadian ‘Cooperant’,164who helped with the agricultural activities, provided 
training to farmer groups especially in plant breeding and seed multiplication, and 
taught English to ETADEP staff. She also worked particularly with the women’s 
groups. Five of ETADEP’s farmer groups were women’s groups whose activities 
focussed on horticulture and literacy.165  
 
The major challenge ETADEP faced was sustainability and reduced dependence at 
several levels. In the pre-independence years, donors always supported ETADEP and 
the NGO was never without funding. In addition, CRS helped them considerably with 
project design, while ETADEP focussed on program implementation. Since 
independence, donor demands had increased, especially with the new results-based 
management approaches and use of log frames, so that although ETADEP’s finance 
and administration was well managed, it was hard to meet all the new requirements 
and, at the same time, to be less reliant on its former sponsors. In terms of financial 
sustainability, ETADEP was self-funding 20-25 per cent of its work in 2004. But it 
found that since independence, donors had decreased their funding, and the NGO was 
not sure whether CIDA funding would continue for them in 2005.166  Though it was 
developing links with some new donors (e.g. Misereor, a German NGO) a sharp 
reduction in funds could cause ETADEP some serious difficulties in the future. At 
another level, ETADEP was challenged to achieve greater sustainability in its 
agricultural approaches. This meant that staff were starting to question the continued 
                                            
164 A ‘cooperant’ is a volunteer development worker. 
165 Respondent 39. 
166 Respondent 38 and 43. 
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use of tractors, and shifting towards encouraging farmers to use cattle and learn to 
make their own agricultural implements, including ploughs. This was because they 
believed that this would be more sustainable for farmers in the long term. Their goal 
was to enhance people’s capacity in sustainable agriculture, so that they would not be 
dependent on hand-outs. They felt they needed to break a dependency mentality that 
the earlier Indonesian period fostered, and which was reinforced during the emergency. 
They also needed to strengthen the farmer groups’ capacities for self-management.167 
 
Finally there were challenges facing ETADEP and its farmer groups which were 
outside their control. One big problem was the poor state of the roads, especially in the 
rural areas. ETADEP believed that the Government needed to give priority to fixing 
these roads. In addition, donors have helped restore irrigation systems, but much of this 
help has been short-term, and the systems have broken again, because there was no 
planning about how they would be maintained. This also needed attention.168  
 
5.3 Conclusion: the capacities of Caritas Dili and ETADEP 
 
Caritas Dili’s vision of assisting Timor-Leste’s poor remained, but its strategy to do 
that changed from a combination of welfare-type activities and development programs 
constrained by the repressive circumstances, to ideals of social transformation, self-
reliance and empowerment. This was a considerable shift in outlook over the five-year 
period, and was particularly marked after 2003. This occurred largely through network 
linkages facilitated by its partner, Caritas Norway, to a Catholic Church agency in the 
Philippines whose circumstances it could relate to, as they had earlier experienced a 
transformation from militarised dictatorship to democracy. The organisation struggled 
to find and keep capable senior program staff, and its management systems have been 
weak as it tried to cope with the changes in paid and voluntary personnel and the 
increasing demands of its funding partners from the Caritas Internationalis network, 
who viewed its administration as too inefficient and costly in relation to the programs. 
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However, it restructured and tried to address these problems. It was able to mobilise 
external resources from international Caritas partner NGOs, but its funding from the 
Church had dropped since the emergency. Concerned about its dependence on 
international donor funding, Caritas Dili began to develop ideas about how to become 
more financially self-reliant, although these ideas would take some time to mature. 
 
Its skills in external relations were put to the test during the period immediately 
following the emergency, when there were tensions with its international partners and 
UN agencies, particularly over food distributions. Nevertheless, it restored and 
extended relations within the Caritas Internationalis network, despite its difficulties in 
managing the requirements of some of the Catholic international NGO donors in the 
new environment. As a church agency Caritas Dili kept a distance from the new 
Government in some respects, notably avoiding open advocacy, yet assisted it 
considerably through operating and developing the national TB program for five years, 
in partnership with a number of international organisations.  
 
The organisation found that the changed context assisted its ability to achieve 
outcomes, but the staff struggled with the new challenges of managing and supporting 
community groups (such as farmers’ groups) and working with the parishes. They 
needed new community development and facilitation skills, as well as higher levels of 
skill in reporting and managing donor-partner relations. In the health area, the 
combination of sensitively provided external support and expertise and local 
knowledge, seems to have led to higher levels of program success.  
 
In terms of its commitment to help people grow sufficient food to meet their needs, 
ETADEP’s overall vision did not change, although it became much more aware about 
sustainable and organic approaches to agriculture than it was in the Indonesian period. 
It gained these ideas from networking through HASATIL, international NGO linkages 
and through its relations with other Indonesian and Timorese NGOs. Interestingly, in 
the period immediately following the emergency ETADEP was quick to assist people 
to restore agricultural production as fast as possible. It has had a very stable team of 
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people in key roles who were broadening and strengthening their skills, despite losing 
some staff after the emergency;169 it had a very straightforward program and 
management structure and well-established management systems which have served it 
adequately for many years. These features have changed very little, although it has 
easier facility for electronic communication than before the 1999 emergency. ETADEP 
found that mobilising financial resources became more difficult towards the end of the 
study period, when it seemed that a long-standing relationship with a major donor 
(CIDA) might not continue as that donor withdrew its key program decision-makers to 
Jakarta. However, ETADEP had started to build new donor relationships and had the 
capacity to mobilise some funds itself through rentals.  
 
In the period before the emergency ETADEP’s skills were in maintaining sufficiently 
good relations with the Agriculture Department to keep the Indonesian military from 
frustrating or preventing its operation. In the UNTAET period it had little engagement 
with the other post-conflict players and was critical of the unsustainability of much of 
the aid provided, especially for agriculture, water supply and irrigation. However, it felt 
unable to change that situation. Later, ETADEP seemed relatively confident in its 
relations with the new Government’s Department of Agriculture, and was working 
collaboratively with them on a small number of projects. It was also able to work 
directly with farmer groups, rather than through individuals. 
 
There is evidence from before the emergency that even in that difficult environment, 
ETADEP had a capacity to achieve outcomes. Much of that capacity was retained, 
although ETADEP began to question the sustainability of some of its approaches in the 
new context, in terms of both environmental and financial sustainability. ETADEP also 
played a key role in spawning other NGOs in Timor-Leste (e.g. HAK, Halarae),170 but 
Timor-Leste has lost the valuable national credit program and organisation which it 
nurtured in the 1990s.171  Interestingly, neither a ‘tabula rasa’ nor a ‘return to normal’ 
                                            
169 Timorese staff interviewed for this study had been at ETADEP between five and seventeen years. 
170 See Case study of HAK and Respondent 67. 
171 Other credit programs have now been established, although it is not clear to me whether their scope is 
     equivalent to this earlier program, which provided banking services through credit unions for farmers.  
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approach to development was adequate in the case of Timorese agriculture, and in 
ETADEP’s role. The new situation required a new response, but there were existing 
capacities to build on. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
HAK ASSOCIATION (PERKUMPULAN HAK)172 
 
 
The HAK Association began as a legal aid office in Dili in August 1996. It was started 
by a group of activists who had studied at university in Indonesia during 1990, one of 
whom had studied law.173 In Indonesia they were involved in the clandestine 
movement, and came into close contact with human rights organisations there. In 1991 
the Santa Cruz massacre occurred in Dili, and they became aware that the international 
human rights community was interested in East Timor, yet there was no East Timorese 
human rights organisation. They could also see some changes in Indonesia; it had 
established its own Human Rights Commission (Komnas Ham), and they felt that with 
strong enough international pressure change would come, although nothing was 
changing in East Timor itself at that time. They believed that what was needed was an 
institution which could bring some pressure to bear, help reduce violations in East 
Timor, and open a little space for activists to start to speak, and start to shift the 
struggle.174  The Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), an Indonesian 
human rights NGO which provided legal assistance to those students arrested following 
the Santa Cruz massacre, encouraged this group to set up a human rights organisation 
in Dili. Over time, two of them returned to East Timor and began working at ETADEP 
on agriculture projects. Out of hours, they worked on human rights. Working 
voluntarily at first, this small group of former students began to provide legal aid to 
assist political prisoners detained because of their struggle for independence.175   
 
                                            
172 Yayasan HAK: In Indonesian, Hukum = Law, HAK Asasi = Basic Rights, Keadilan = Justice. The  
      organisation changed its name and status from Yayasan HAK (HAK Foundation) to Perkumpulan  
      HAK (HAK Association) during the study period. It will generally be referred to simply as HAK. 
173 Respondent 56 and HAK Brochure. 
174 Respondent 55. 
175 Respondents 55 and 56. Respondent 102 indicated that although this had not been publicly  
      acknowledged until after 1999, all had been involved in RENETIL. 
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Their desire to establish an organisation was realised in 1996 when they opened a small 
legal aid office, employing the lawyer, with other members of the group working as 
volunteers. Human rights activists in Indonesia and Indonesian legal aid and human 
rights NGOs supported, guided and provided funds for them. The initial idea was 
simply to provide legal aid. The organisation soon found that its services were greatly 
appreciated by political prisoners and others experiencing human rights violations. 
They found that Timorese people wanted to keep struggling, but needed space within 
which they could become even braver. People really appreciated that a Timorese 
organisation had been formed, and whereas before they had often taken their concerns 
to the Bishop, they soon began bringing them straight to HAK.176 One of the biggest 
caseloads related to conflicts over land arising from the forced movements of people 
during the Indonesian occupation.177  
 
In March 1997, the legal aid office became the ‘Law, Basic Rights and Justice 
Foundation’ and started to build its staff team.178  Altogether there were five staff, all 
of whom had been students in Indonesia. Two remain with HAK.179 The organisation 
was soon ‘inundated’ with people, and their problems.180 The first official donor to 
HAK was the Australian Government, which provided funds to run the organisation for 
one year, while they set up a management and financial system. HAK itself did not 
want to take on too much at first to ensure they had capacity; to demonstrate that they 
had the management and accountability systems which donors required. Their 
experience at ETADEP had made them very aware of what was needed.181 
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6.1  HAK in the late 1990s: its early roles 
 
In the early years the Foundation had two main roles: prisoner legal aid and monitoring 
and campaigning on human rights. Their focus was on the political prisoners and the 
serious human rights violations which were being perpetrated by the Indonesian 
military (TNI) and the police. Their main activities in this context were advocacy and 
litigation (Marut and Meijer 2003:7). 
 
As well as conducting legal aid activities for political prisoners, they documented 
human rights abuses and conveyed their findings to human rights organisations outside 
the country, especially Amnesty International (London) and Human Rights Watch 
(New York). Initially, as it was difficult to get information out, they sent it via the 
Indonesian human rights groups. Later, when encrypted emails were available they 
utilised this technology and also sent information directly to the international 
organisations. A former Amnesty International (AI) staff member said that their links 
with HAK were very useful, the information provided was very accurate and up-to-date 
and their effectiveness was very evident to an AI delegation which visited East Timor 
in May 1999.182 
 
To monitor and document human rights abuses HAK’s staff had a considerable 
network of contacts in each of East Timor’s thirteen districts, through church, CNRT, 
student and youth channels. Their experience with ETADEP meant that they had been 
able to quickly form this network across East Timor, while their student experiences 
enabled them to network within Indonesian groups. From time to time they had 
national meetings to share information. Shortly before the September 1999 crisis they 
were on the verge of setting up internet links across East Timor to facilitate 
communication with this network, with support from US NGO, The Asia Foundation 
(TAF).183 They also worked closely with Bishop Belo, who sometimes promoted joint 
campaigns with them on specific issues. For example, in 1998 there was a rape case in 
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Ermera which HAK and the church investigated. The report was sent to friends in 
Jakarta, who protested outside Komnas Ham (Human Rights Commission) and the 
Indonesian Parliament. In addition to the monitoring and case work, they conducted 
grass roots human rights education work, encouraging people to stand up for their 
rights under Indonesian law.184  
 
The HAK team had to operate in an extremely intimidatory environment. To give 
themselves space to work, the Director constantly emphasised to Indonesian authorities 
that they were ensuring Indonesian law worked well, arguing that by strengthening 
Indonesian law, integration would work better, and the international community would 
not be able to attack Indonesia. HAK’s Director developed a good working relationship 
with the Head of Kodim185 who accepted this approach and would order the release of 
HAK staff detained by more junior officers or stop harassment and threats they were 
experiencing. Both civil and military leadership in Dili thus accepted HAK’s role and 
its upholding of Indonesian law. HAK strengthened its freedom to operate by 
condemning violations of human rights against police or military as well as those 
perpetrated by them.186 Yet it seems that HAK was clearly classified, at least by the 
police, as a pro-independence organisation.187 
 
During the early period they had a small office in Balide, but in 1998 they moved to a 
new building (destroyed in the 1999 violence) with other NGOs, including ETADEP 
and FOKUPERS. They had already grown rapidly, and had around 25 people working 
with them, around 17 of whom were paid staff, the rest volunteers, including friends 
from Jakarta. They had only two East Timorese lawyers, so their legal team was 
boosted by three lawyers from Kupang (West Timor). They also had the support of 
some Indonesian lawyers as mentors, and to help with special problems or cases; they 
came from the NGO, Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Yogyakarta and Jakarta. Friends in 
Indonesia had helped them find donors, and they were receiving support from three 
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185 Kodim  stands for  Komando Distrik Militer - District Military Command. 
186 Respondent 55. 
187 Respondent 59 recalls that on a whiteboard at the Dili Police Station, when HAK staff were arrested,  
      was a list of pro- and anti-independence organisations. HAK was listed as pro-Independence. 
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international NGOs: HIVOS (Netherlands), Community Aid Abroad (CAA, Australia), 
through an office in Kupang; and from The Asia Foundation (TAF).188 Part of CAA’s 
support was the placement of an experienced NGO worker from Indonesia in East 
Timor to work with the local NGOs it was supporting. She worked closely with both 
HAK and FOKUPERS.189 
 
6.2  HAK in 1999 
 
In January 1999, as the violence increased and many people became displaced within 
the country, HAK, assisted by the Indonesian NGO worker, organised a workshop on 
‘Disaster Preparedness’ to which it invited other NGOs including Caritas  East Timor 
and church humanitarian workers. This was supported by AusAID and UNHCR. From 
this workshop, HAK formed the coordination network, POSKO, involving several 
NGOs (e.g. Timor Aid, ETADEP, Bia Hula), and many church workers, and obtained 
funds from AusAID and the New Zealand Government for emergency assistance.190 
This was distributed in areas such as Same, Liquica, and Suai as well as Dili, under 
intensely difficult circumstances. HAK was supported in this work by a number of 
volunteer activists who came from the Indonesian Humanitarian Mission for Timor 
Lorosae (MKITL). The UNAMET Humanitarian Office relied heavily on POSKO for 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, providing POSKO people with the means for 
transport and the UN’s ‘protective umbrella’. Indeed, it was largely staff and volunteers 
from POSKO who comprised UNAMET humanitarian convoys.191  
 
Also in the lead up to the 1999 ballot, HAK formed the ‘Committee for an Honest and 
Just Referendum’, whose role was to inform the people about the referendum and to 
monitor the process. The Committee involved HAK staff and volunteers as well as 
activists from Indonesia and a couple of volunteers from England and the USA.192 
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192 Respondent 56 and HAK Brochure.  
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These foreigners were important, since they helped protect HAK from militia attack. 
HAK regularly provided UNAMET with reports about the human rights and security 
environment, which was far from ideal. As a result of their popular education outreach 
and monitoring work HAK would dialogue with UNAMET about the modalities for 
the popular consultation, expressing grave concerns about the security arrangements. 
Their monitoring picked up a lot of indications that militia were planning the violence 
which ensued. HAK argued that the Government of Indonesia (GOI) had a conflict of 
interest, and that international agencies should have a stronger security role to enable 
the UN to guarantee people’s security and their freedom to vote.193  
 
Throughout this period they worked closely with key UNAMET staff, particularly the 
Head of the Mission, and staff from the Political Affairs Department. HAK had wanted 
the referendum postponed, because they felt the security situation was inadequate. As 
late as 24 August 1999 they called for an immediate improvement to the security, so 
that people could vote in an environment free from violence and intimidation, or delay 
the ballot. Though UNAMET staff in Dili appeared to share their concerns, the 
decision was made in New York to press ahead. HAK was disappointed with the 
international community, which, as one staff member said, had not been convinced for 
many years about the atrocities committed by the GOI. That such atrocities continued 
in the presence of the international community, which failed to enforce its own 
resolutions, surprised the HAK team.194 
 
After the ballot, as the violence flared, many HAK workers decided to stay at their 
office. The HAK staff and volunteers were in touch with friends in the mountains and 
phoning reports out to Amnesty International in London, and the East Timor Action 
Network (ETAN) in the USA. They were still at their posts when the militia attacked 
the Catholic Bishop’s compound. On the night of the fifth of September, the militia 
attacked the HAK office,195 and Indonesian friends who had made an evacuation plan 
for HAK staff put it into operation, getting them out of  East Timor to Bali and 
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Jakarta.196 While in Jakarta they worked to provide assistance and information to the 
refugees in other parts of Indonesia, including how to return to East Timor. HAK’s 
Director meanwhile, assisted by international groups, especially Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch, went to the USA and Europe. His initial purpose was to 
address a Special Session of the UN Human Rights Commission called to discuss the 
crisis. He joined Jose Ramos Horta, and Catholic Bishop Belo there. While in the USA 
he also met with the Legal Department of the UN as well as very senior people at the 
State Department,197 the Congress, USAID, and the World Bank, while in Europe he 
met with members of the European Union. USAID offered immediate assistance to get 
the staff of HAK back from Jakarta to reestablish the organisation.198 
 
6.3 Reestablishing HAK  
 
Meanwhile some HAK members who had stayed in the hills returned to Dili and began 
assisting World Vision with food distributions, using some old trucks which they had 
found. They tried to reorganise POSKO, but soon found that they could not compete 
with the international aid organisations, and abandoned the idea of resuscitating that 
network, at least until others returned from Jakarta.199 The HAK staff and volunteers 
still in Jakarta divided into two groups. The first group returned to Timor in October 
with a satellite phone provided by Xanana Gusmao, while the other group stayed in 
Jakarta until November, continuing their work with refugees and raising funds to 
reestablish the HAK office in Dili. USAID gave assistance in kind. This provided a 
table, computer, and motor bike which arrived in January 2000. Other assistance was 
provided by Community Aid Abroad (CAA).200  
                                            
196 The plan involved chartering a plane to evacuate them, which was made possible by support from  
      within the Chinese business community in Jakarta whom Indonesian human rights groups had  
      assisted  at the time of the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in 1997/8. The HAK staff, then detained in  
      Police  Headquarters, had to bribe a police commander with their car to facilitate their safe passage 
      to the  airport to board this plane (respondents 94 and 65). 
197 Respondents 55 and 56. For example, at the State Department he met with Stanley Roth, Assistant  
      Secretary for Asia-Pacific. At the World Bank, he met with Sarah Cliffe who was appointed to head  
      the World Bank Mission in East Timor. 
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HAK quickly reestablished two programs, the first, using a truck provided by CAA, 
was food distribution as part of the overall emergency response. They also assisted 
other international organisations with aid distributions in the districts (Marut and 
Meijer 2003:7). The second area of work was human rights investigations. HAK’s 
initial role was to investigate the overall situation of people in the country and provide 
this information to the UN agencies (such as UNHCR and UNDP), with whom they 
had already established relations, and to other local NGOs, such as Timor Aid. At first, 
HAK provided staff to the UN agencies and they provided the transport. Gradually, 
after some difficulties, HAK obtained equipment and transport of their own.201 HAK 
was also very involved in the process of reconciliation and repatriation of refugees 
during this early period. They worked with an NGO in Kupang, West Timor, to 
provide information to refugees and facilitate communication with their families, to 
create the conditions under which they could decide to return. Before the CAVR was 
established, HAK had already undertaken some community-level reconciliation work 
in Suco Cassa, Ainaro (Yayasan HAK 2001a).  
 
While the Director remained lobbying in Europe and the USA, one of the other staff 
stepped into the role of Director in East Timor, a position he subsequently retained. 
Organisationally HAK still had three teams, but these were: (1) legal and human rights 
(2) emergency assistance, and (3) administration. At this point HAK’s numbers had 
grown again with about 45 activists, including many students, who were helping in 
whatever ways they could, and the organisation had established humanitarian aid bases 
in a number of districts (Marut and Meijer 2003:7).  
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6.4      Beyond the emergency: HAK’s new roles in the UNTAET  
           period 
 
While the HAK team responded to the emergency situation they began thinking about 
how to return to their vision and mission, and bring their focus back to human rights 
and advocacy in the new situation. At the end of 2000 HAK had a strategic planning 
meeting in Maubara to consider how to reorganise their structure and adapt to the new 
situation. At this meeting they redefined their roles in the new context, considering 
how a human rights organisation could best contribute. They decided there were three 
key roles: 
1) to do what they could to develop a new state system which would guarantee 
human rights; 
2) to pursue justice for the victims, to guarantee them justice; and 
3) to promote human rights among the people.202 
Then, in early 2001 when the emergency operation ended, HAK closed down its 
emergency post and decided to maintain three branch offices (known as Rumah Rakat 
or People’s Houses), redeploying many of the emergency staff team who had been in 
the districts, as well as some other staff, to those offices. The objective was to 
strengthen HAK’s links to the districts and make themselves more accessible to the 
people. Before the emergency they had only been able to operate from Dili, and had 
relied on their network of individual contacts for communication with the rest of the 
country. The three offices between them were responsible for three regions of East 
Timor: the office for the East in Baucau, the Central region in Maubisse, and the 
western Region in Maliana. These offices helped implement all aspects of HAK’s 
work.203 
Developing a state which would guarantee human rights 
HAK’s new mission, set out in its first four-year plan developed in 2000 was ‘to 
establish a society in Timor-Lorosae which is more just, more prosperous and more 
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democratic’ (Marut and Meijer 2003: 9). This was refined later: ‘to promote human 
rights in all aspects of the reconstruction and development of Timor-Lorosae’ (Yayasan 
HAK 2002:5).204 The later statement reflected a clearer sense of what HAK itself could 
do, and certainly reflected the type of work it has done since mid-2000. From the 
development of UNTAET, through the transitional period, to the installation of the first 
government of the independent state, HAK monitored the legislative process, and tried 
to generate public awareness about what was important to the establishment of a good 
state system from a human rights perspective. HAK also assisted UNTAET develop the 
transitional judicial system. HAK’s founding Director, by then returned to East Timor, 
became a member of the Judicial Council, which was responsible for this major task, 
and very early on, two HAK lawyers were recruited as judges.205 
 
As UNTAET developed the National Council (NC), HAK’s founding Director was 
invited to become a member, a very important role in relation to HAK’s objective. The 
National Council was a body which worked almost entirely by consensus, so members 
had to listen to each others’ arguments, negotiate with each other and try to 
accommodate the range of views which might exist.206 As representatives of different 
constituencies there was also an inbuilt accountability mechanism back to those 
groups. The National Council members consulted NGOs through the East Timor NGO 
Forum which enabled NGOs to have real input and some influence. NGOs were able to 
propose or suggest amendments to laws, and they used these opportunities.207 For 
example, it was HAK’s National Council member, supported by NGOs, who 
successfully argued that the Electoral Law should make provision for independent 
candidates, not just political parties.208  UNTAET also drew on HAK’s legal expertise: 
the SRSG gave HAK every piece of draft legislation for comment, and they had 
considerable input on key regulations (Yayasan HAK 2001a). Assisted by the then 
Director of the NGO Forum and a representative from RENETIL, they also provided 
training to the National Council members about how to develop legislation (Yayasan 
                                            
204 Translated  from the Indonesian by myself. 
205 Respondents 55 and 59. 
206 Respondent 55. 
207 Respondent 59. 
208 Interestingly this enabled the current President to nominate as an independent candidate in 2007. 
 164
HAK 2001a:8). Throughout this period they worked very closely with the UN Human 
Rights Unit to ensure that draft legislation met human rights standards.209 
 
During the election period for the Constituent Assembly, HAK were very involved in 
civic education. Their Director was a member of the National Commission for Civic 
Education organised by UNTAET which played a critical role in communicating to the 
community about the election and overcoming their fear of political violence.210  HAK 
was also involved in its own campaign of citizen education covering  ‘the transition 
process moving towards full independence, the role of the UNTAET Transitional 
Government, general elections for the Constituent Assembly and the President of the 
Republic, the content and process for formulating the Constitution, along with the role 
of the people in this formulation’.211 HAK published a new journal ‘Cidadaun’ 
(Citizen) specifically to communicate to the public issues related to their newly earned 
citizenship during this early period,212 although they were unsuccessful in their 
argument for a wide popular consultation about the Constitution. By this stage HAK 
had over 50 volunteers, and more wanting to join. In particular students from the 
University of Timor-Leste (UNTL) and people from the rural areas had been attracted 
to HAK and wanted to play a role in its work.213 
 
After the elections, HAK soon became active in the Constitution making process, with 
support from The Asia Foundation. In preparation for this HAK and FOKUPERS had 
together formed a Constitutional Education Working Team, including members from 
other NGOs, to study and learn about other Constitutions, and to conduct public 
meetings in thirteen districts. The Team had two goals: 
 
1) to support the work of the Constituent Assemble (sic) in writing a new constitution 
for independent East Timor; and 
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2) to give the chance for East Timorense (sic) to share their opinions on the 
constitution, both in terms of process and content (Yayasan HAK 2001b: ii). 
 
The team conducted meetings in each of Timor’s thirteen districts between March and 
June 2001, involving 1267 people from diverse backgrounds, among them youth, 
women, members of political parties, religious organisations, various professions, 
traders, peasants, fisherfolk, police and government officials (Yayasan HAK 2001b). 
The workshops provided education about the process of constitution-making, 
conducted dialogues, and gathered opinions about what should be in a constitution. The 
many participants clearly emphasised the need for genuine participation in democracy. 
A full report was presented to the Constituent Assembly (CA) members on 21 
September 2001, in the early weeks of their deliberations. It incorporated people’s 
views about the constitution making process, the basic principles which should be 
included in the Constitution, especially regarding Timorese nationalism, the type of 
state that they wanted to see formed, issues to do with land and the economy, and 
human rights matters (Yayasan HAK 2001b). This report was apparently ‘very 
important’ for CA members at that time.214  The report formed part of a wider 
campaign by NGOs, with strong input by HAK, on the human rights principles which 
should be enshrined in the Constitution. HAK was active in presenting its ideas when 
the CA held public hearings. It made formal submissions to the relevant Commissions 
of the CA on a Bill of Rights and on Principles of National Sovereignty and appeared 
before them on several occasions (Yayasan HAK 2001a:7).215 It actively monitored the 
Constitutional drafting process, and lobbied CA members on key human rights issues. 
While a separate Bill of Rights was not adopted, many of the rights recommended by 
HAK were enshrined directly into the Constitution and HAK felt that it had been 
relatively successful with its lobbying.216 
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 Pursue justice for the victims 
HAK has consistently worked to pursue justice for the victims of human rights abuses. 
Even before September 1999, they started to gather background information about TNI 
leaders, and afterwards, as well as trying to help provide aid to people, they carried out 
investigations of the atrocities which had been committed, and passed on documents 
found at Indonesian military headquarters to an International Commission of 
Inquiry.217 They were also pushing the UN for proper investigation of the many human 
rights violations. To this end, HAK was involved in the UN’s establishment of the 
Serious Crimes Unit, coming into conflict with the head of UN Political Affairs over 
this. According to one HAK staff member, this UN official opposed it because he saw 
it as a ‘back door’ to an International Tribunal.218  
 
By 2001, issues of justice and reconciliation for East Timor were being dealt with in 
three fora, all of which HAK staff closely monitored. These fora were the Ad Hoc 
Tribunal in Jakarta, and the UN’s Serious Crimes Unit and the newly established Truth, 
Reception and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) within East Timor. HAK 
continued to campaign for an International Tribunal to deal with crimes against 
humanity, which the other processes were not addressing, and coordinated an Alliance 
for an International Tribunal involving students, victims and NGOs. Throughout the 
transition period, HAK also worked closely with international NGOs, including 
Indonesian human rights organisations, and the UN High Commission on Human 
Rights, to keep the need for an international tribunal on the agenda. For example, they 
worked with the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) to bring a case to the Federal 
Court, D.C. USA, against Vice Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, Lt Gen Johnny 
Lumintang, for his involvement in killings in Ainaro in 1999, at which HAK staff and 
several other victims  testified (Yayasan HAK 2001a:15).219 The Chair of HAK’s 
Human Rights Advocacy Division also had the opportunity to address the UN Security 
Council and dialogue with members of the US Senate and Congress on the issue of 
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crimes against humanity (Yayasan HAK 2001a:15). In late 2001 HAK, FOKUPERS 
and Oxfam jointly researched the demands of the victims for justice, and in October 
that year HAK, in cooperation with various NGOs, held an international seminar on the 
International Tribunal (Justice and Accountability in East Timor 2001). When 
President Gusmao visited Jakarta in 2004 to meet with Indonesian Presidential 
candidate and former Head of the Indonesian Army, General Wiranto, HAK organised 
a protest and wrote to their President to express the feelings of the victims about this 
meeting. This was the first ever protest against President Xanana Gusmao.220 
 
Outreach to promote human rights among the people 
During the emergency period, when HAK staff and volunteers went out to the districts, 
they found that people there needed information; in particular they needed help to 
access the aid which they knew had arrived, but which they did not know how to 
obtain. They were dealing at a very practical level with very basic socio-economic 
rights. Then people brought many types of problems to HAK, some of which it could 
not solve; these included family conflicts, land conflicts, legal problems, and jealousies 
between villages about why some got aid and others did not. The HAK staff would try 
to find ways to help people, or refer them to others who might provide advice or 
assistance. They would also explain existing laws to them because people, including 
traditional or local leaders, often did not understand the laws. This problem solving and 
conflict resolution work has continued, with HAK always trying to solve the issues 
presented to it within a human rights framework.221 
 
During the early transition period, HAK ran many human rights education and training 
programs for people in the districts, and for different groups such as the police, high 
school teachers, and specific communities, especially those facing particular human 
rights problems. They also developed a series of human rights training modules in 
cooperation with the UN Human Rights Unit, and broadcast human rights radio 
programs through church and community radio stations in Dili, Los Palos, Maliana and 
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Liquica. HAK’s Branch offices worked with a range of the new NGOs which had 
formed in the districts. Most of these were initially funded and supported by the UN 
Office of Human Rights, which was unable to do much capacity development work to 
strengthen them, so it encouraged them to build their skills by working closely with 
HAK. HAK worked with five new local NGOs in the Districts of Aileu, Ainaro, 
Maliana, Ermera and Viqueque; HAK staff encouraged them to participate in its 
activities, invited them to workshops and events related to human rights, and involved 
them actively in its investigation and monitoring work so that they could learn 
investigation and advocacy skills by working together222 (Yayasan HAK 2001a). 
 
The focus of HAK’s work clearly shifted from violations of civil and political rights 
before the emergency, to issues of domestic violence and socio-economic rights 
afterwards, including problems with health, education, agriculture etc. Indeed, an 
evaluation report by consultants engaged by HIVOS, suggested that HAK had become 
confused as a human rights NGO, in trying to meet all the demands placed upon it. As 
they saw it, HAK’s role was to promote human rights understanding by the people and 
ensure that the Government fulfilled its human rights obligations to them. It was not its 
role to try to satisfy those obligations itself. However, HAK staff thought they needed 
to provide practical support, not simply offer rhetoric about human rights (Marut and 
Meijer 2003:13). 
 
6.5 HAK in 2002-2004  
 
After the formal declaration of independence, HAK’s work continued in similar 
directions. HAK had planned to develop a new strategic plan in 2003, but as 
UNMISET’s mandate was extended, and the nation was still in a transition phase, they 
delayed this until late 2004 and continued on the path set in 2001-02.223  
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From Yayasan to Perkumpulan 
HAK articulated its values in its first public Annual Report: 
 
(1) humanity, meaning non-violence and non-discrimination 
(2) equality, meaning prioritising local resources with a gender perspective 
(3) justice, with the principals (sic) of democracy and sustainability 
(4) democracy, with the principles of solidarity, transparency, accountability, 
participation, liberty and responsibility (Yayasan HAK 2001a:1). 
 
This broad set of values is evident in both its internal management changes since 1999, 
and in the approaches HAK has taken in its program work. The gender perspective is 
one area however, in which it remained quite weak and Marut and Meijer noted that 
while internal democracy was good, and staff felt that it ‘supports their work and 
strengthens their commitment’ (Marut and Meijer 2001:11), they noted that there were 
age and seniority differences which were evident (Marut and Meijer 2003). 
Organisational democracy was one area that HAK recognised required work. 
 
When HAK began it was established as a Foundation under Indonesian law. It had only 
a few people involved at board level, among them the current chair. One decision of 
the strategic planning meeting held at the end of 2000 was to change HAK’s status to 
become an association, giving ultimate power to a membership base. This took time to 
implement because of other demands, but in November 2002 HAK deliberately 
democratised itself, transformed itself into an association and invited people to become 
members. Since then the highest level of decision making has been through a 
Members’ General Meeting, held every four years, and a Members’ Annual Meeting. 
In practice, there have been two general members’ assemblies a year—one held mid-
year to evaluate progress of activities, and one at the end of the year to do annual 
planning, and approve new members224(Yayasan HAK 2001a:23). 
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The association started with around 100 members, and had grown to 120 members by 
mid-2004. These included legal professionals, international human rights supporters, 
farmers, activists from other NGOs, MPs (from FRETILIN and PSD), and members of 
the middle class, as well as the staff and volunteers of HAK, all of whom paid US$25 
per year in membership fees. The General Meeting of members formulates guidelines 
for HAK’s programs and receives reports from the Executive Board (senior staff) and 
the elected Member’s Representative Council. The members also elect the Executive 
Board to their positions for a period of four years. The Member’s Representative 
Council (MRC), elected for a four-year period, supervises the implementation of the 
program guidelines by the Executive Board. The Council in 2004 comprised nine 
members, including a Supreme Court Judge, a member of parliament, a prosecutor, the 
manager of the Islamic Community, and two international human rights activists living 
in Timor-Leste. The Chair was the Moderator of the Protestant Church.225 The entire 
staff met towards the end of every month, with two representatives of the MRC 
present, and this meeting was followed by the monthly meeting of the MRC itself in 
the first week of the subsequent month. This change in organisational status was ‘a 
monumental step taken by the HAK founders and staff’ (Marut and Meijer 2003:10) 
reflecting a desire to internalise democracy, and develop greater commitment through 
staff participation in decision making and greater organisational transparency and 
accountability.  
 
In addition to these changes, since the early period when there were essentially only 
two functions, HAK has restructured its management several times. From 2001-2004 it 
had six divisions, but these were reduced to five during 2004.226 In late 2004 HAK was 
led by a Director, an Associate Director, and Directors of each division (together 
known as the Executive Board) with the following functional divisions: 
• policy advocacy;  
• legal aid; 
• research and documentation; 
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• community empowerment;  
• membership services and mobilisation. 
These divisions had weekly and monthly meetings for reviewing and planning their 
work. 
 Between them, the Divisions managed five program areas:227 
1. Formulation of program and policy recommendations that guarantee the 
fulfilment and protection of human rights.  
2. Empowerment of social groups and defence for victims of human rights 
violations. 
3. Protection of society’s creativity, knowledge, assets and interests. 
4. Strengthening the network for enforcement of human rights. 
5. Development of organisational management (Yayasan HAK Brochure).  
 
The following sections set out the type of work which the five Divisions have 
undertaken until late 2004. 
 
Policy/Advocacy 
The goals of HAK’s policy/advocacy area were to ensure that all government policies 
protected human rights, and to ensure public discussions were held about key policies 
or regulations before public hearings were held in the Parliament. HAK conducted 
political analysis and used its newsletters to share information and perspectives on 
current issues with a wider audience. To achieve these goals, HAK established 
relations with the first President of Timor-Leste, the Parliament, and the Ministries. 
HAK worked closely with the President in his Commissions for Veterans and Former 
Combatants, with two senior staff participating as members of the Commissions and 
HAK staff assisting as required with workshops and resolution of problems at local 
levels. The President also invited HAK to be actively involved in his ‘National 
Dialogues’ and to help when people went to him about problems in the rural areas 
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(Yayasan HAK 2001a, 2002).228 But he clearly disagreed with HAK about an 
International Tribunal. 
 
Hak was actively engaged with the processes of the first Parliament. In 2004 HAK was 
monitoring and trying to influence a range of laws under consideration. These included 
the Amnesty Law (which would have wide powers to grant amnesty to perpetrators of 
violence, and in HAK’s view would damage the judicial processes), the Election 
Commission law (especially relating to local government elections); the law relating to 
the new Office of the Provedor (which then appeared likely to have a range of powers 
similar to a Human Rights Commission, an Ombudsman and an anti-Corruption 
Commission), and the proposed NGO law. As HAK often obtained early drafts of laws 
it was able to set up small working groups with other interested NGOs to discuss them 
and form positions as a basis for lobbying. Other areas in which HAK was previously 
involved related to the citizenship law, land and property, and immigration, and it was 
expecting to have input on forthcoming laws on investment and security.229 When the 
amnesty law was first tabled in Parliament HAK mobilised people from the remote 
villages to write to Parliament against the proposed amnesty provisions. As a result, the 
law was put on hold, and had not been reintroduced by late 2004, apparently because it 
lacked support.230 
 
Between 2002 and 2004, HAK also worked closely with a number of Ministers and 
other senior Advisers in the first Timorese Government, in particular the Justice 
Minister, the Minister for Interior (responsible for Police) and the Adviser to the Prime 
Minister on Human Rights. With the Justice Minister they worked on judicial system 
matters; for example, they helped the Government set up a mediation team for dealing 
with land disputes. HAK became involved because they had experience in resolving 
such problems in Maliana and the Viqueque District before the Government had any 
mechanism. HAK had also assisted with the resolution of a particularly difficult land 
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conflict in Uatulari.231  In addition HAK staff worked with the Justice Minister to 
undertake human rights education activities and provided human rights training to 
police at the Police Academy and in the districts, the latter with the UN Human Rights 
Unit. They were monitoring police and addressing abuses they found occurring.232 
 
The Human Rights Adviser to the Prime Minister involved HAK, the NGO Forum and 
REDE Feto as the key NGOs to be members of a Joint Government-Civil Society 
Working Group on the National Human Rights Action Plan. This was initiated by the 
Government, and after some preliminary work, including public hearings in seven 
districts, the Prime Minister’s Department held a Consultative Workshop about the 
plan in Dili in December 2003. In 2004 HAK was working with the Adviser on 
gathering base-line data from the districts as a first stage of the planning process. Her 
office worked with HAK in a range of training workshops and seminars, and they were 
working towards HAK being allowed to make visits to prisons and hospitals in the 
future.233 
 
Despite these very positive relationships, there were some contradictory trends as well. 
For example, the Vice Minister for Justice was known to have said that NGOs were 
illegal organisations,234 and some MPs wanted to change some of the laws passed in 
UNTAET period—for example, defamation was recognised as part of the civil law at 
that time, but some MPs wanted it treated as criminal law, which represented a threat to 
freedom of speech. HAK also continued budget monitoring, particularly in the sectors 
of agriculture and the judicial system. They had written, with some concerns, about the 
impact of the proposed investment law on national development.235  
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There were also a number of HAK’s activities which required an international 
response, for example, the issue of the establishment of an International Tribunal, the 
question of the maritime boundaries and distribution of the benefits of resource 
exploitation in the Timor Sea, and the role of international organisations in East Timor. 
In relation to the international issues, HAK continued its major coordination role for 
the Alliance on the International Tribunal; it ran a 12-month campaign plan which 
involved a range of activities at the local level with victims and their families, and at 
the international level through bodies such as the UN Commission on Human Rights. 
In 2004, for example, in conjunction with the Empowerment Division, they held a 
workshop in Oecusse with community leaders, police, and government representatives 
about the actual process of seeking justice, and the political realities facing the 
International Tribunal campaign, bearing in mind broad national interests, the 
Indonesia-East Timor border question and other factors. The campaign was finding 
progress difficult and was considering new strategies, such as a ‘Popular Tribunal’. 
HAK also worked with other NGOs on the campaign about maritime boundaries in the 
Timor Sea between Australia and Timor-Leste, and distribution of the benefits of the 
oil and gas reserves, making statements and comments about the issue.236 In early 2004 
one of HAK’s members had joined a joint NGO study tour looking at the impact of 
natural resource industry in Nigeria, organised through the NGO La’o Hamutuk. The 
campaign was also building links with Australian civil and political society.237 
 
Legal Aid  
By this stage the Legal Aid Division no longer took on all the cases which came to 
HAK, but only those it considered to be strategic for policy advocacy. Strategic cases 
might involve the police as suspects, or be related to labour issues, the environment or 
domestic violence. For example, in the six-month period January-June 2004, HAK was 
consulted about 40 cases, many of which it referred to alternative processes, rather than 
litigation. There were 22 cases where HAK accompanied the complainant(s) to meet 
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with another institution which had the competence to solve their specific problem. 
Three cases were taken to the court, eight followed a process of mediation, and others 
remained unresolved.  
 
When HAK was asked to assist, it always started with mediation and only used 
litigation if that failed. For example, in Uatulari, where there was a complex land 
dispute which HAK was helping to resolve, the initiative came from the community 
and HAK to establish a Mediation Commission, comprising women, youth, local 
leaders, church leaders and others. In early June 2004, a meeting involving local 
authorities, such as police, local leaders, the Land and Property Unit, LBH (a legal aid 
NGO), CAVR, and the Ministry of Justice, agreed to establish this Commission. 
Mediation cannot resolve everything though.238 On 18 May 2004, HAK registered a 
case in the Dili District Tribunal to give it legal standing to take the UN to court for 
failing to take certain cases forward, thus depriving victims of the possibility of justice 
and compensation. This was part of HAK’s efforts to gain justice for the victims of 
serious human rights violations.239 
 
Research and documentation (previously called Monitoring and Investigation)  
This Division was responsible for monitoring human rights violations from the past 
and the present. It actively investigated cases of violations caused by the Police and the 
Defence Force, as well as in the prisons. It was also monitoring court processes. In a 
significant development, the Police Commander had approached HAK to join a team to 
look at how to build the capacity of the police, based on HAK’s own data and the 
policies and regulations governing the police. As well as assisting in police training in 
response to this request, HAK assisted victims who had been beaten by police, with 
two police officers jailed as a result of court action; a further case was pending against 
a number of police allegedly involved in sexual violence.240 
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At the same time HAK was involved in data collection about human rights violations 
from the past (from 1975-1999). Data from this period was provided to the CAVR and 
the UN Serious Crimes Unit. HAK was also monitoring the processes of these two 
institutions to ensure victims were properly served by them. HAK was disappointed, 
for example, that the Serious Crimes Unit prioritised some cases over others, which 
they feared would never be dealt with. They were also concerned that the staff of the 
CAVR who facilitated the process of reconciliation were inexperienced and did not 
have a human rights background. They believed that sometimes victims were forced to 
sign reconciliation agreements, and that there was no monitoring of  how those 
agreements had been implemented. HAK was nevertheless using the process of 
reconciliation to identify the violations which had occurred. HAK was also aware that 
the UN was planning to select a person to evaluate the Jakarta Ad Hoc Tribunal and the 
Serious Crimes process in East Timor. During 2004, the Government of Indonesia did 
not agree with the UN about the expert to be chosen, so the UN was waiting until after 
the Indonesian Presidential elections to make the appointment. HAK was trying to 
influence this process to recommend an International Tribunal.241  
 
As HAK could not possibly do all the monitoring and investigation work with its 
limited resources it was developing a network of human rights advocates in the 
community including eleven interested NGOs in Dili, and a network of victims’ 
families, the latter particularly to encourage them to participate in the process of 
obtaining justice for human rights violations of the past.242 
 
Community Empowerment 
The Community Empowerment Division had two main roles:  
1) generating public debate about law and human rights; 
2) training for people in public institutions, NGOs and others about human 
rights.  
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As an example of the approach taken by this team, it had conducted twelve ‘base 
discussions’ in the first half of 2004 (i.e. approximately one per fortnight), in several 
locations in the Districts of Same, Suai, Liquica, Baucau and Maliana. In some of these 
places they worked closely with the Justice Department.243   A June 2004 visit to Suai 
by members of the team illustrates the range of issues the Community Empowerment 
Division might have dealt with during these open ‘base discussions’ with people at 
local levels. The issues discussed included: poor information and communication about 
the process of development; rights of people to participate in the political process and 
the relationship between representatives and their constituents; gender equality issues  
(e.g. in civil cases, the victim is not listened to, only her family); and socio-economic 
rights, such as marketing problems for corn growers faced with poor roads.244 
 
The Empowerment Division’s key idea was to reinforce people’s ability to be involved 
in the nation’s development, through having information about how to participate, and 
the ability to do so. HAK saw its role as a facilitator of such participation. Training was 
provided on general human rights principles as well as on specific issues, such as 
human rights and law, or human rights and customary law; or how to resolve problems 
through formal mechanisms. They also had a range of educational materials about 
common problems they found at local level, such as gender issues. This Division also 
published the newsletter ‘Direito’ about human rights issues, and produced radio 
programs for public education. Formerly published in Indonesian, since 2004, Direito 
was published in Tetum, although the HAK newsletter continued to use the Indonesian 
language. The radio programs were broadcast on Radio Timor-Leste, and Radio 
Rakambia, as well as various community radio stations in the districts245(Yayasan 
HAK 2001a, 2002). 
 
Until December 2004 HAK ran three ‘People’s Houses’, one each in Baucau (for the 
East), Maubisse (for the Central region) and Maliana (for the West). There were 
generally about five program staff located in each ‘House’, one from each of the 
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Empowerment, Policy/Advocacy, Investigation, and Cases Divisions, as well as a 
person who had responsibility for administration and finance, and security staff. Staff 
members from these districts returned to Dili once per month for the general staff 
meeting, where they both gathered and provided information, and maintained good 
communication between the main office in Dili and the districts. The three ‘People’s 
Houses’ were very helpful to the work of the Empowerment  Division, as they made it 
easier to reach people at the base and to quickly get feedback from people in the 
districts and sub-districts—to know about conditions there and respond to them. 
However, in December 2004, in light of reduced funding, the three ‘People’s Houses’ 
were closed, although HAK continued to run activities in the districts.246 
 
Finally, this team was responsible for HAK’s participation in the NGO networks 
HASATIL (Sustainable Agriculture) and Dai Popular (Popular Education). In relation 
to HASATIL, HAK was trying to strengthen the capacity of other members in relation 
to advocacy, and facilitate links with the Agriculture Department and international 
organisations. For Dai Popular, HAK was responsible for information in the regions.247 
 
Membership Services and Mobilisation 
This Division was responsible for strengthening the capacity of staff and the 
management of HAK, as well as relations with donors and members. For example, in 
early 2004, it organised for administrative and finance staff to take a study tour to 
selected NGOs in Indonesia; it also arranged HAK staff participation in training at 
Timor Aid in relation to standardised Tetum orthography. This Division worked with 
other Divisions to make proposals to donors, negotiate with them, as well as ensure 
narrative and financial reports were completed and the annual audit of HAK’s finances 
was undertaken.248 
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247 Respondents 62, 68. See also Appendix B for more information about HASATIL and Dai Popular. 
248 Divisional Reports to the Board for the Period January - June 2004: Membership Services and  
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This Division was responsible for organising meetings of the Members Representative 
Council, half-yearly members’ meetings, and providing members with a regular (three-
monthly) newsletter which reported in detail about HAK’s activities and its financial 
situation. It also prepared an Annual Report. HAK tried to get its members involved in 
areas where they had skills.249 Although there were several women on the board of 
HAK, and one female senior staff member, most of HAK’s staff and volunteers were 
young men. Many of these had been activists in the past, and were former students. In 
part this male culture may be because some of the female activists had joined 
FOKUPERS, which was previously under HAK’s auspices as a project on women’s 
issues (see next Chapter). HAK and FOKUPERS continued to work closely on major 
issues. For example, they worked together with some judges to draft Domestic 
Violence legislation which in mid-2005 both were hoping would soon be tabled by the 
Justice Minister in the Parliament.250  
 
6.6 Organisational development to meet the challenges HAK faces 
 
In August 2003 a team of evaluators commissioned by HIVOS251 undertook a very 
significant review of HAK (Marut and Meijer 2003) which made a number of 
recommendations particularly stressing the need for HAK to be more focussed in its 
activities. This review was seen by HAK staff as very helpful, but clearly HAK still 
faced a number of challenges in late 2004. These included: promoting a culture of 
human rights and rule of law in the new nation; finding an appropriate relationship 
with the Government; determining a clear focus and role; developing staff and 
organisational capacities; and achieving financial sustainability. Some of the challenges 
can be summed up in the words of the Director: ‘In the Indonesian period we faced a 
dangerous enemy. They could kill us. In the new context there is no clear enemy.’ He 
explained that it is very hard compared to the Indonesian period as ‘the enemy’ can 
appear from anywhere, including from any problems within HAK itself. To meet these 
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251 HIVOS is a Dutch NGO, now part of the international Oxfam network, which was supporting HAK. 
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challenges, the organisation had to develop an understanding of its context and 
strategically respond. 
 
Promoting a culture of human rights and rule of law in the new nation 
The big challenge at the end of 2004 was to imbue the nation with a culture of human 
rights. At a formal level, human rights principles were enshrined in many articles of the 
nation’s Constitution, and the Government had ratified many international human 
rights instruments, but putting human rights into practice was the critical issue. Police 
violations of human rights were still common, and HAK saw that it was extremely 
important that a culture of impunity was not allowed to develop. HAK was active 
pursuing cases against police in relation to their violence and human rights abuses 
against civilians. They were keen to keep building a community based network of 
human rights activists who could monitor and defend human rights across the 
country.252 Maintaining and promoting the rule of law, educating people about the law, 
and ensuring no backsliding on human rights in areas of law already passed by 
UNTAET, or in new legislation, were also very important tasks. The environment 
remained difficult, with high levels of unemployment, and uncertain security, 
especially with the departure of the UNMISET peacekeeping mission in May 2005. 
The subsequent violence in 2006 (Kingsbury and Leach 2007) indicates that HAK’s 
fears of a return to violence and loss of respect for human rights were well founded. 
 
Finding an appropriate relationship with the Government  
HAK had a complex relationship with the Government after May 2002. The challenge 
HAK faced was how to balance close engagement with it in some areas with public 
criticism in others. HAK, along with other ‘Farol’ NGOs, was criticised occasionally 
for supporting the Government, but as one staff member commented ‘These are the 
same people before, like us—we’re just in a different place’. HAK did not want the 
process of nation building to fail, they want to help stabilise the country and ‘make it 
like our dream’.253 Many staff felt they could not simply criticise. They needed to make 
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a contribution themselves. Being too publicly outspoken may have invited government 
criticism that the NGO was being political, or anti-government, not a charge that HAK 
wanted levelled at it. Thus some international observers may have felt that the 
organisation did not always put human rights above all else,254 or that it was not using 
all the tools at its disposal in its advocacy (e.g. media) (see for example Riberio and 
Magno 2004). But in late 2004, HAK was still able to use old resistance networks for 
influence behind the scenes, so was less reliant on public comment. Yet of all the 
NGOs in East Timor, HAK was the one organisation which had the clout, the 
experience, and the public reputation to be able to publicly criticise the state where that 
was warranted.255  The continuing challenge for HAK was how to maintain an 
influential relationship with the Government, while remaining firm in upholding 
human rights if these were compromised by different organs of the state from time to 
time. It was still early for HAK to feel confident about the role the state would play, 
since their past experience was only with an extremely oppressive government; to 
international observers they seemed at times to be ‘feeling their way cautiously’ in the 
new environment. Yet they, like other NGOs, had to try to create democratic space in 
the new nation, and as one HAK member said ‘it is logical that the Government will be 
nervous—NGOs have been working long before the Government, and they have a lot 
of experiences.’ 
 
Language was another issue affecting government relations. In HAK, the spoken 
language was largely Tetum; until mid-2004 all the written material was in Indonesian. 
But communication with the Government had to be in Portuguese. This led to 
considerable translation costs. HAK had dialogue with the Government on the matter, 
but the Government quoted the law back to HAK, saying Portuguese was in the 
Constitution. On a more positive note, HAK worked closely with the Government 
through an initiative called the ‘Rolling Think Tank’ which brought together 
government and civil society players to conduct joint research into key development 
issues. This initiative came from the National Directorate of Planning and External 
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Assistance Coordination (NDPEAC) in the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The first 
joint study was of lessons learned from the World Bank’s Community Empowerment 
and Local Governance Project, and was published in March 2004. The initial team 
comprised three from the Government (two from NDPEAC, one from President’s 
Office) and three Timorese NGOs, plus one INGO who provided a volunteer for two 
months to work with the team (NDPEAC 2004).  
 
Determining a clear focus and role  
From a small legal aid office HAK had grown significantly in both the size and scope 
of its activities over the five years. It responded flexibly to the rapidly changing 
situation, and, because of its capacity and its broad interpretation of human rights, took 
on a range of roles well beyond its original focus. But the challenge it faced was that, 
with the likely resources at its disposal in the next few years, it could not be really 
effective if it kept trying to do everything it was doing in 2003-04. Its staff and 
volunteers were very overworked, meeting all the expectations which had been created 
of HAK. It had built enormous trust at community level, and needed to maintain that, 
but could not stretch its resources infinitely. It needed to refine its focus, especially in 
light of the growing capacity of other organisations, (e.g. in monitoring, cases etc).256 
The Strategic Planning process started in August 2004 was intended to address this 
challenge.  
 
Developing staff and organisational capacities  
HAK staff and volunteers had participated in a great deal of training in East Timor and 
internationally,257 but what staff said had been most important was the internal learning 
which had been fostered within HAK, through monthly gatherings of staff and 
volunteers. It was through these monthly meetings that staff who had undertaken 
training or study tours had been able to share with others the results of their 
experiences. These meetings also provided an opportunity for collective discussion of 
how to solve problems facing individuals or the organisation as a whole. Some of the 
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most valued help was ‘accompaniment’ by more experienced NGO staff from 
Indonesia, or, in one case a young lawyer from Australia, who remained with them for 
long periods. Through this kind of help they said they had learned together. Seeing 
how other NGOs elsewhere had developed and overcome similar problems to those 
they faced had also been very valuable.258 There were continuing challenges of 
building staff skills and commitment, and strengthening the organisation itself. For 
example, some newer staff may not have had the activist commitment of the founders; 
or students, who always volunteered in the Indonesian period, may want to be paid.259  
These were internal challenges to build and maintain a really competent, effective 
organisation. There were also new skills, such as legal skills, which some staff felt 
were necessary to help them debate new laws and regulations. 
  
Achieving financial sustainability  
One further challenge was clearly the development of financial sustainability, with the 
independence to determine the organisation’s own directions, and not be drawn into 
donor agendas. At the end of 2004 the impact of reduced funding was clearly being 
felt. HAK’s donor base had changed somewhat over the period since 1999 and by 2004 
HAK was building its own fundraising strategy, although there was still no staff 
member dedicated to fundraising. HIVOS, CAA and Asia Foundation were the main 
funders shortly after the 1999 crisis, but in mid-2004 HAK’s key funders were: 
HIVOS, which intended to give long term general support, and was committed for a 
three year period; The Asia Foundation for legal aid work, though HAK said they had 
tried to intervene on internal management and they may not continue support in 2005; 
Ireland Aid, for police monitoring; and Finland, for general human rights work and 
justice work.260 Previous donors who were not funding HAK in 2004 were AusAID, 
CAA, and CRS. CRS had invited HAK to join their ‘Engaging Civil Society’ capacity 
building project, but had many conditions with which HAK did not agree, so they had 
declined their support. HAK’s own fundraising took the form of a membership fee 
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from over 120 members, and an agreement among staff that a percentage of 
consultancies and per diems they earned went into HAK’s general funds. HAK staff 
were obliged to donate 40 per cent of their income earned from activities such as 
‘consultation services, case mediation, and facilitating trainings organised by other 
institutions’ (Yayasan HAK 2001a:24). HAK’s funding levels increased annually from 
2001-2003, but declined considerably by 2005.261  By mid-2005, HAK had seven 
donors, but the total funds raised appeared likely to continue to decline. Yet HAK had 
also raised more from its own earnings than the contribution of any single donor (US 
$37,762 to 30 June), approximately 30 per cent of its half-year budget.262 
 
While donors used to come knocking on HAK’s door before 1999 and soon afterwards, 
that situation had undoubtedly changed at the end of the study period. Official donors 
appeared to be more focussed on the Government since 2002. HAK also perceived that 
some NGO donors (like CRS and TAF) who said they had a ‘partnership’ approach, in 
practice did not treat HAK as an equal—they wanted HAK to implement their own 
programs rather than support HAK’s directions and approaches. HAK was unwilling to 
‘partner’ on this basis. It was therefore actively considering alternative approaches to 
financial sustainability, such as the possibility of opening a for-profit law office to 
finance its not-for-profit work.263 
                                            
261 The table below shows HAK’s budget and key donors over five years: 
Year  US$  Donors 
2001  223,133   6 donors (three large-Oxfam, HIVOS,TAF- and three smaller)  
2002      287,000   4 donors, plus own funding ($90,000) 
2003      321,010   5 donors, plus own funding ($53,0000) 
2004     Total NA  4 donors, plus own funding 
2005 (to 30 June)   124,331  7 donors, plus own funding. 
262 Financial report sighted at HAK Mid-Year Review Meeting 3 July 2004. 
263 One respondent was considering using the proceeds of an international award towards this goal. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
HAK’s vision was initially limited to defending the rights of political prisoners and 
contributing to maintaining open, or widening, the space for people to assert their right 
to self-determination. As events unfolded that vision shifted to one of asserting and 
trying to help provide for the basic human rights of people in extreme circumstances, 
ensuring justice for the victims of serious human rights violations and developing a 
state and society committed to upholding human rights. The vision became clearer and 
more specific as the organisation developed and circumstances changed, and along 
with this the range of strategies and approaches expanded. 
 
The organisation went through phases of expansion and contraction, and its programs 
and management structure changed several times during the period of study. The 
organisation had an ethos of democratic participation, had reconfigured itself from 
being a foundation to become a membership-based association, and its ability to 
support and sustain district-based or regional centres outside Dili also varied with the 
level of funding it obtained and the tasks it undertook over the study period. 
 
HAK’s ability to mobilise resources was initially very closely linked to Indonesia and 
limited Australian sources. Then its support came from a wider range of international 
sources and was highest during the UNTAET period, when it also had a very high level 
of input to various aspects of state building. As donor funding to NGOs fell, and in 
light of HAK’s unwillingness to shift its own program directions to match aspirations 
of major US NGO and foundation donors, by late 2004 HAK was adjusting to lower 
funding levels, and trying to generate more of its own funds. Yet it was also still 
finding new donors willing to support its approach. 
 
HAK had very strong relationships with a network of individuals from the CNRT, the 
church, students, women and other sectors of society prior to the 1999 ballot. In the 
new environment HAK was able to develop more extensive networks with new human 
rights NGOs and established community structures in the districts, the UN Human 
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Rights Office and related bodies, and to strengthen its international NGO relationships. 
Its relationships with the independent Timorese Government were good, particularly in 
terms of the relationships it had from the pre-ballot days, and it was widely recognised 
as having particular expertise to contribute.  
 
It certainly appeared able to achieve outcomes during each phase of the tumultuous 
changes it went through. As the 2002 evaluation report said:  
 
The overall conclusion of our assessment is that HAK has been able to influence the 
TL society in the implementation and enjoyment of human rights… it has succeeded in 
establishing the channels through which the information  and awareness on human 
rights can be spread into the districts and  the different sectors of society. As a 
genuinely TL institution it has integrated international standards with local values and 
opinions of the common people. HAK has succeeded in finding and using the entry 
points to influence national policy as well as attitudes in society (Marut and Meijer 
2003:5). 
 
HAK’s major challenge was to manage the many expectations which had been 
generated for the organisation, and to focus its programs to match its resources.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
FOKUPERS:  FORUM KOMMUNIKASI UNTUK 
PEREMPUAN TIMOR LORO SAE264 
 
 
In June 1996 an East Timorese woman participated in a workshop held in Soe, East 
Nusa Tenggara, where she met and heard stories from women from other parts of 
Indonesia, including West Papua and Nusa Tenggara Timor.265  The woman returned to 
East Timor with the idea which had been discussed at that workshop, that women’s 
health was closely linked to human rights. On her return she discussed this with others, 
and with support from friends at ETADEP, the newly-formed human rights NGO 
Yayasan HAK, and an Indonesian NGO, Pikul, gathered together a group of people 
interested to explore the issue further. In June 1997 this group, supported by the 
organisers of the Soe workshop, organised a workshop in Dili about women’s health. 
Here the participants discovered that women had many problems, with complex  and 
interconnected causes, many related to military violence, whose resolution could be 
summarized as ‘the protection and strengthening of women’s basic rights’ 
(FOKUPERS 1999:8). This was seen as ‘the kernel to decreasing problems, poverty 
and threats which mean that women are predisposed to poor health’ (FOKUPERS 
1999:8). As one participant explained, the workshop helped them come closer to each 
other and they developed a commitment to do something about the situation. 
Subsequently they held a number of group discussions to develop their plans 
(FOKUPERS 1999). 
 
Seventeen people decided to form FOKUPERS as a result of that workshop. Thus on 
15 July 1997 FOKUPERS was formed as a forum under the umbrella of Yayasan 
                                            
264Translation: East Timorese Women’s Communication Forum. 
265 NTT is the Province of Indonesia which includes West Timor, the neighbouring Province of then 
     Timor Timur (East Timor). 
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HAK266(FOKUPERS 1999). Their initial challenge was to learn more about the issues 
of women’s health and human rights, so they spent the first six months studying and 
learning. In July-August 1997, with assistance from an Indonesian NGO partner of 
Oxfam’s, Pikul, five of the women participated in a Women’s Health and Human 
Rights Course  in Kupang, West Timor, held as part of a workshop on Participatory 
Research organised by Jaringan Kesehatan Perempuan Indonesia Timor (JKPIT)—
Network for East Indonesian Women’s Health. There they learned from the 
experiences of other participants, especially about approaches to consciousness-raising, 
and were introduced to how to conduct participatory research. At the workshop, the 
five Timorese women identified those in East Timor whom they considered the most 
vulnerable: rape victims, war widows, women political prisoners and wives of political 
prisoners, and women working in the coffee plantations. FOKUPERS’ primary vision 
was to support women who were suffering, and these were the groups they identified as 
most in need of help (FOKUPERS 1999:11-13).  
 
With support from Oxfam and HAK they started to build up their staff. Initially only 
one woman was employed, then three, and later four by 1999. All the others worked 
voluntarily, whilst also being civil servants, NGO workers,267 or students. Their early 
work focussed especially in Viqueque where, assisted by a local priest and nuns, they 
made contact with a village called Craras, known as the ‘Village of Widows’. All the 
village men, as well as some women and children, had been killed at a brutal massacre 
in 1983, when the Indonesian military were trying to wipe out remaining supporters of 
FRETILIN. Disguised as church workers and conducting their meetings as prayer 
gatherings in chapels, the women realised the huge grief and trauma the widows were 
experiencing268 (FOKUPERS 1999:14-15). They tried to support them by offering 
friendship and accompaniment. Initially they had no training in counselling and were 
somewhat overwhelmed by the challenge these women’s experiences presented to 
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     and ETADEP, for example. 
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them, however they felt they could offer friendship.269  Less difficult, but much 
appreciated, were their visits to prisons. Short 15-minute weekly visits which, to avoid 
arousing suspicion, they made to all prisoners, not just political ones, enabled them to 
slowly piece together stories and facilitate communication between prisoners and their 
families. They were trusted because one woman had herself been a political prisoner 
and others were also wives of prisoners. These women had been giving each other 
mutual support even before FOKUPERS started (FOKUPERS 1999:15-16). 
 
It was too difficult to reach the women working in the coffee plantations, so they soon 
focussed only on the victims of the war and political prisoners and their wives.270 They 
worked in small groups, just inviting women to share their stories, which they 
recorded, and befriending or accompanying them. For example prisoners’ wives shared 
their experiences of trying to find where their husbands had been detained. They 
worked for some time with the separate groups of women, documenting their stories 
and supporting them as best they could. By 1998 they were ready to bring all the 
women together, and so held a three day workshop with the different groups, 
encouraging them to share their experiences. From this workshop, the women started to 
develop a plan of what they wanted to do. Some particularly wanted economic 
empowerment, so FOKUPERS began to facilitate help for them in agriculture, and 
monitored their progress. Also in 1998, FOKUPERS published its first book about the 
women’s stories, carefully disguising who they were to protect them. The book is 
called ‘Menilam Kamerau’ (‘Make the dry season lighter’). Throughout this period 
they did not talk about working for human rights; they just said they were working on 
women’s health, but they saw that by helping these women they were making their 
contribution to the struggle for independence.271 
 
By now, with help from an Indonesian NGO worker in Kupang supported by 
Community Aid Abroad (CAA), they had already developed links with a range of 
human rights organisations, among them Indonesian women’s and human rights 
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NGOs, Amnesty International, and the United Nations Human Rights Commission, to 
whom they were passing information about human rights violations against women. In 
an important development, FOKUPERS invited the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women to visit East Timor. She came in 1998, and met with the 
victims of the violence whom FOKUPERS had gathered together to testify to her. 
About 50 women from the different groups of victims testified, an event which 
FOKUPERS believes helped the international community become more aware about 
the violations going on in East Timor.272  Other international visitors followed, to 
whom FOKUPERS provided information.273 FOKUPERS had also become a member 
of JKPIT, and began to participate in their annual meetings, where they were able to 
share their experiences with others doing similar work, and get further training. They 
also invited volunteers from Indonesia to come and work with them, to learn from their 
experience. The valuable initial support from HAK and Indonesian NGO Pikul 
continued as they built their skills.274 In the districts they worked closely with local 
nuns, who constantly pushed the boundaries of what was possible in the difficult 
military environment.275 
 
7.1 The late 1990s and the UNAMET period 
 
By late 1998 the women were becoming more courageous than ever. As one staff 
member commented, ‘we had HAK behind us and Justice and Peace Commission in 
front of us,’276 so although they were afraid they acted courageously. In October one 
member of FOKUPERS and a representative of GERTAK, another East Timorese 
women’s NGO (since renamed  ETWAVE), participated in a JKPIT meeting  in Jakarta 
which inspired them to hold a seminar in Dili on 25 November 1998, with other NGOs, 
on the theme ‘Perspectives of Timorese Women’. It involved speakers from the church, 
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legal groups, and women themselves. With GERTAK, they also organised a silent 
procession, with banners about stopping the violence against women, at which 
GERTAK members gave out flowers to the passers by—a silent message for peace277 
(Wesley-Smith 1998, Gabrielson 2002). On International Human Rights Day in 
December 1998, FOKUPERS organised an exhibition of posters and photos about 
violence and human rights violations against women, and invited the Korem278 military 
commander and other senior military staff. The commander came and acknowledged 
these violations were going on, and made a significant donation to FOKUPERS by 
buying a copy of their newsletter Babadok at one hundred times its usual price!  They 
maintained their focus on education as well, using activities such as a quiz for junior 
high school students, to pass on information about women’s health and women’s 
rights.279 
 
By November 1998 FOKUPERS had established a safe house in Dili in which women 
in need of support and counselling could come and stay. They told the military that it 
was for women who were sick. Previously women just stayed with FOKUPERS’ staff 
in their homes, but it was becoming very hard to support all the victims as the violence 
worsened in late 1998 and early 1999, so the safe house offered a better way to deal 
with the situation. They still worked closely with HAK, who tended to focus on the 
legal aspects of each case, while FOKUPERS looked after the social and emotional 
needs of the women. Some of the women were so badly affected by their experiences 
that they were crazy, and the FOKUPERS women, who had received no formal 
training, had real difficulties coping with them. They did their best, but were 
sometimes really stressed by what they had taken on.280  Structurally, the women had 
organised themselves into two Divisions, one dealing with counselling and assistance 
to women, another with dissemination of information and education about women’s 
health and human rights. By now FOKUPERS was becoming known internationally, 
and participated in May-June 1999 in a speaking tour to Japan organised by the East 
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Timor Japan Coalition. After UNAMET arrived in East Timor in June 1999 some 
FOKUPERS women joined forces with friends from other NGOs, and formed four 
teams who went out to the districts to campaign for the CNRT and explain to people 
how to vote in the 30 August popular consultation. They also prepared radio broadcasts 
for the Catholic radio station about the ballot. Despite their close association with 
HAK, the FOKUPERS women did not become involved with the POSKO emergency 
activities in the pre-ballot period, but kept their focus on the women human rights 
victims.281 
 
7.2 The aftermath of September 1999 
 
As a result of the conflict, the women were scattered; some fled to Dare, others to 
Indonesia, but by October-November 1999, with help from the CAA worker, they 
began to regroup. They started by having a three-day workshop for their own healing, 
and to enable them to plan their next steps. They decided to work separately from 
HAK, as there were so many people wanting to help the women victims of the 
violence, and HAK was very busy helping with refugee support (some of the women 
had already been helping HAK while they waited for others from FOKUPERS to 
return). So they began a six-month emergency program. They began to reach out to the 
women in the villages, starting in areas where they knew the violence had been 
particularly bad, for example in Suai, Liquica, and Maliana and around Ermera. They 
went house to house, to slowly gather information about what had happened and 
approached the victims, with the idea of offering friendship, being like a sister to them. 
Community reaction to such women victims was often to shun and isolate them, so this 
friendship was a first step in countering such local attitudes.282 However, the 
FOKUPERS women soon realised that they did not have the skills to deal with the 
grief and trauma they were confronting, so, through a nun with the contacts, they were 
able to get help from experienced counsellors from the Philippines. They held a week-
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long training workshop which provided some very valuable learning for them. 
Although they formed teams who went to all districts to provide counselling, they 
concentrated their support on three groups which they helped form in the centres most 
seriously affected—‘Nove Nove’ in Maliana, (women whose fathers or husbands had 
been killed on 9 September 1999), Mate Restu in Suai, and Rate Laek in Liquica. Apart 
from the trauma, the women needed economic help.283 
 
The Nove Nove group in Maliana got some emergency funding from the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID)284 to form a cooperative, and to 
provide some training in skills such as sewing, cooking etc.; the group also obtained 
three tractors, which they located in different aldeas (villages), to help with farming. 
Rate Laek developed a cooperative, a small restaurant and some traditional craft 
activities, and in Suai support was given to individuals for farming and kiosks. With 
the departure of the large UN presence after May 2002, the restaurant in Liquica 
closed. A 2002 evaluation of these activities was salutary though. It found some of the 
activities were not going well, because in the emergency period too much money had 
been provided without sufficient preparation. The women had become dependent on 
the aid funds, and it had changed their attitude. They just waited for funding from 
FOKUPERS, as they had no experience or training in how to run a business. For 
FOKUPERS, the impact of this period on the groups and themselves was negative. In 
Maliana, for example, the cooperative’s   building remained, but the cooperative was 
not functioning in late 2004, although a group of about five of the women were renting 
the building from the group as a whole and made and sold clothes from it.285  
 
During this early period, FOKUPERS developed three Uma Feto, or ‘women’s houses’ 
in Maliana, Suai and Liquica respectively, intended as places to provide support for 
women survivors. Each had a coordinator and office manager and one motor-bike for 
transport around the district, as well as support from a Dili-based staff member of 
FOKUPERS. The roles of the Uma Feto were to coordinate the women’s groups, 
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provide training and education to women on issues of gender, domestic violence, 
health and human rights, and to support economic activities among women. The Uma 
Feto also provided mediation support to women experiencing domestic violence, 
coordinating with local leaders (Chefe de Suco) to get formal agreements signed by the 
perpetrators to prevent further violence. However, these Uma Feto were not as 
successful as had been hoped, for a range of reasons, partly to do with the inexperience 
and turnover of staff in those locations and their consequent lack of ability to respond 
to the problems women brought to them, and partly due to the difficulties of 
communication with Dili286 (FOKUPERS 2003:9). 
 
A review in late 2003, as part of a strategic planning process, made FOKUPERS 
realise that their approaches had been inadequate—they had been too ‘project based’ 
and they had not prepared the mostly illiterate women well enough to run their 
businesses, so the groups remained dependent on FOKUPERS. A subsequent 
organisational and institutional development process facilitated by FOKUPERS’ Dutch 
NGO funding partner, HIVOS, which involved consultation with groups FOKUPERS 
had helped, suggested a change of strategy in the future to assist the whole community 
where the group was based, rather than just the group. This was because sometimes the 
community was jealous if only the victims were assisted. In November 2003 the Uma 
Feto in Suai and Maliana closed, pending the development of a new approach. By late 
2004 all the Uma Feto offices had closed, and Uma Feto was understood as a concept, 
rather than a structure. In the past, there was a tendency for inexperienced Uma Feto 
staff to wait for women to come to them. The new idea was for FOKUPERS staff to go 
out to women in the community and create an Uma Feto ‘space’ wherever women 
could be brought together. Only one staff member was employed in each district in 
2004, and their job was to work with a range of community groups on advancing the 
situation of women. For example, there were now four groups FOKUPERS was 
assisting in Maliana, and two in Suai, doing handicraft and agriculture; and a new 
group in Liquica was focussed on agriculture, planting a variety of vegetables. The 
focus became community development, in the sense of helping women to define their 
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needs and their problems, identify priorities, and link them to other organisations, such 
as government officers or NGOs working on water, sanitation or health. FOKUPERS 
was also supporting a newer group in Ermera. In this village, women requested 
FOKUPERS’ help as they had many cases of women dying in childbirth, and a high 
rate of infant mortality. The area had no nurse, and though FOKUPERS had very few 
resources, they developed an educational approach to try to prevent this situation 
continuing.287 
 
The thrust of all this new work was to encourage self-help, avoid dependency, and 
insist on local contributions to overcome the dependency mentality. However, this 
approach was difficult when major donors, such as USAID, gave groups a lot of 
materials without asking for any contribution. Some women would not join a 
FOKUPERS-organised group because they did not give them money, rather they 
encouraged them to work by themselves with what they had, and not to be dependent 
on the government or anyone else. FOKUPERS was also supporting women to 
advocate on their own behalf, and hoping to make them more self-reliant, although 
because government decision making was so centralised, often the advocacy had to be 
undertaken by FOKUPERS in Dili. FOKUPERS’ early work with the survivors of 
some of the worst atrocities led them to join wider NGO campaigns for justice, which 
continued. But at the same time, their attention also turned to the opportunities for 
women in the process of forming the new nation288(FOKUPERS 2003:14). 
 
7.3 Women in the new nation 
 
In February 2000 FOKUPERS reviewed its emergency work and developed a new 
strategy for the longer term. All their members participated in a workshop which led to 
the development of a Strategic Plan for 2000-2002 with four strategic aims: 
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1. To ensure that women can live free from violence and those who become 
victims of violence have the opportunity to rebuild their lives 
2. To ensure women’s issues are recognised and women’s interests are represented 
in decision making processes within the transition 
3. To strengthen women’s social, economic and cultural rights at community and 
national levels 
4. To ensure democratic and transparent governance structure and mechanisms for 
FOKUPERS, as well as best-practice management procedures (Hunt 2001).  
To carry out this plan, FOKUPERS was then structured into four divisions: 
1. Assistance—which in turn had three sub-divisions: Investigation (in all 
districts); Counsellors (all of whom were trained); and a safe house or ‘shelter’ 
(in Dili, with space for ten women). 
2. Education and Training—in particular to victims after counselling. They tried 
to empower the women through training on human rights, gender, violence, 
reproductive health, and later, voter and civic education. 
3. Advocacy—they supported women’s campaigning, lobbying and provided legal 
aid. HAK helped FOKUPERS with legal expertise.  
4. Administration (Hunt 2001). 
 
Thus, while FOKUPERS continued to support the women survivors in the three groups 
from Liquica, Maliana and Suai, the organisation simultaneously turned its attention to 
ways of getting women and women’s issues considered in the structures and policies of 
the emerging nation. To do this it had to educate and mobilise women themselves, as 
well as work directly with those who held power at that time. The Advocacy Division 
of FOKUPERS was given good donor support, and played an important role from early 
2000 onwards, largely through working as part of REDE and networking with other 
women’s groups. FOKUPERS played a key role in organising the first ever East Timor 
Women’s Congress in June 2000. The Coordinator of FOKUPERS at the time was 
trusted by the CNRT to bring together 15 women’s organisations as REDE (East Timor 
Women’s Network) in March 2000 to prepare for the Congress, which she 
subsequently chaired. This involved a series of district women’s meetings, so that 
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women from across the nation could have input. Five hundred women from across East 
Timor then participated in the national gathering whose outcome was a ‘Platform for 
Action for the Advancement of Women of Timor Lorosae’ (REDE Feto 2000). It 
highlighted a number of areas as of critical concern: poverty, law and order, 
reconciliation and justice, the culture of violence, decision making and institution-
building. In particular the women highlighted the historical exclusion of women from 
the CNRT resistance structures as well as traditional power structures, and their 
continued marginalisation from the decision making structures of the emerging nation, 
including the National Council, which was seen as ‘unrepresentative’ and ‘not 
consultative’ (OPE 2002). The ‘Platform for Action’ was widely distributed within and 
outside the government structures, and used by UNTAET’s Gender Affairs Unit as a 
basis for policy development for the Transitional Government289 (OPE 2002:73-74).  
 
The next key focus of women’s groups became getting women elected to the 
Constituent Assembly at the August 2001 ballot. One of the Women’s Congress 
demands had been that women should hold 30 per cent of all places in the Transitional 
Government, so the women argued that this should apply to the Constituent Assembly. 
In March 2001 REDE had put a proposal to this effect to the National Council which 
was rejected, largely due to the opposition of the UN Electoral Assistance Division. In 
response, the angry women’s groups protested in front of UNTAET’s building. 
However, the UN ultimately put some affirmative action steps in place (Pires 2000). In 
May, the SRSG met leaders of political parties, ‘to urge them to guarantee democratic 
principles of participation and place women in winnable positions on their party lists so 
they would be equally represented in the Constituent Assembly as well as incorporate 
women’s concerns in to their party platforms’(OPE 2002:77). He provided an incentive 
of additional broadcast time for parties if at least 30 per cent of their candidates were 
women (Pires 2000).  
 
As well as efforts to get political parties to place women in winnable positions on their 
party lists, FOKUPERS and other women’s groups supported three independent 
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women candidates, among them its own Coordinator, ETWAVE’s Coordinator, and 
another individual. There was considerable donor support for all this electoral work, 
which was led by the Gender Affairs Unit of UNTAET, UNIFEM and REDE. Training 
was given to 150 potential women candidates, representatives of political parties and 
other civil society groups. From these experiences a new women’s organisation was 
formed, the ‘Women’s Caucus’, whose focus became women’s political representation. 
Special efforts were also made by the Independent Electoral Commission to ensure that 
women participated fully in the process of the elections, including as electoral workers 
(OPE 2002) and special efforts were made by the National Steering Committee for 
Civic Education to achieve 40 per cent women’s participation in its education team and 
to utilise strategies to maximise women’s access to information. Twelve of the 52-
member education teams were from REDE, some four of them from FOKUPERS. The 
result of these efforts was that 27 per cent of the Constituent Assembly members were 
women. Women were also given some important positions in the newly-formed 
Second Transitional Government, three as Ministers or Vice Ministers, and two as 
Advisors to the Chief Minister. One of these was the former Coordinator of 
FOKUPERS who became the Adviser on Equality (OPE 2002). 
   
NGOs were concerned over the extent to which people were going to be consulted 
about the Constitution which was to be drafted by the Constituent Assembly. 
FOKUPERS joined with HAK to form the Constitutional Education Working Team 
and present a report on community consultations to the Constituent Assembly, referred 
to in Chapter Six. Constitutional protection of gender equality was enshrined in Article 
17 of the Constitution which states that, ‘Women and men shall have the same rights 
and duties in all areas of family, political, economic, social and cultural life’ 
(Democratic Republic of East Timor 2002). However, as the second Congress of East 
Timorese women held in July 2004 recognised, a great deal needs to be done for that to 
be realised.290 FOKUPERS provided the Chief of the Steering Committee to plan and 
organise this Congress, which reviewed progress against the 2000 Platform for Action 
and set new goals for the forthcoming four years. Several FOKUPERS women were 
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workshop facilitators, and according to REDE they worked hard in many aspects of the 
Congress, including providing transportation.291 
 
In late 2004 FOKUPERS again become involved in the issue of women’s 
representation and participation in the upcoming Suco elections. After training 
facilitated by Women’s Caucus, using experienced Filipino trainers, FOKUPERS took 
responsibility for Maliana District, and committed to educate and encourage women in 
that district to play their part and make their views felt in the Suco election process. 
The Suco Councils each have two of the five seats designated for women.292 
 
A key contact point in the Timor-Leste Government is the Office for Promotion of 
Equality (OPE), and FOKUPERS worked closely with that Office in a number of areas, 
notably on the domestic violence legislation. Soon after independence, the Government 
of Timor-Leste ratified the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) along with a number of other key human rights 
instruments, and in 2004 FOKUPERS was assisting the Office for the Promotion of 
Equality (OPE) to prepare the first national report to that body. In addition 
FOKUPERS helped identify women with potential to the OPE, which then enabled 
them to access opportunities and training. FOKUPERS also contributed to workshops 
and programs with other areas of the Government, facilitated by OPE. For example, 
they were involved with the Ministry of Education in curriculum development on 
gender and human rights as part of civic education; they have been involved in a week 
long workshop to undertake a gender analysis of the Sector Investment Program and 
report to donors their findings; they have been involved in a workshop on Women and 
Rural Development with UNIFEM, OPE and the women’s political NGO, Caucus. The 
OPE works closely with both FOKUPERS and Caucus—promoting women’s political 
participation in the case of the latter, and on  education and advocacy on violence 
issues especially with FOKUPERS; the Adviser on the Promotion of Equality had 
endorsement from the Prime Minister himself to work with FOKUPERS on the 
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Domestic Violence legislation. The trust between OPE and FOKUPERS enabled them 
to work together well to advance women’s equality in East Timor.293 
 
7.4 Keeping the focus on violence 
 
While all this activity proceeded, FOKUPERS remained focused on its core concern, 
violence against women. The Assistance Division continued with individual and group 
counselling sessions, providing individual counselling to over 460 women and 
children, 584 children, and facilitating counselling of almost 1,000 people, mostly 
women, in 48 groups in all districts across East Timor between 2000 and 2003. They 
also played an important role in the work of the CAVR, counselling and preparing 
witnesses for CAVR hearings and activities, as well as providing their expertise to 
other NGOs, such as health NGO, Pronto Atu Serbis (PAS) and Timor Aid. Between 
2000 and 2003 their Dili safe house provided sanctuary for 339 women and children, 
assisting them through counselling, education, building networks and using skills to 
develop economic activities. Women from the districts who needed intensive 
counselling and support were brought to Dili, so the safe house played an important 
role (FOKUPERS 2003:1-2). Funding for the safe house was a frequent problem, 
especially since UNICEF, which previously provided funding, decided it could only 
provide support to children. This stimulated the development of a special children’s 
house, Knua Hakiak, which provided a safe place for the children and a child care 
centre for children of FOKUPERS’ staff, volunteers and partner organisations while 
they were at work. Knua Hakiak initially served only eight children, but by late 2004 
provided services to 25, and had become a centre for children’s activities in its 
locality.294 
 
This Division also supported many women involved in cases against perpetrators of 
domestic violence or rape (a total of 120 women were supported between 2000 and 
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2003). It also assisted children who had been victims of incest. Wherever possible it 
helped resolve these cases through mediation, and/or monitored the processes of the 
court in instances where the court dealt with them. There were many problems the 
women faced in their work, among them poor court processes, perpetrators released 
without conditions, or without the victims’ awareness, and the difficulty of bringing 
evidence. FOKUPERS also worked to inform about and advocate for laws to prevent 
violence. It created a data base of cases of violence, including rapes, murders, torture, 
and domestic violence, documenting 451 cases in a report on gender-based violence it 
published in 2002 (FOKUPERS 2003:2-3). FOKUPERS also produced and 
disseminated 40,000 copies of the book Buibere (Winters 1999), which recorded the 
results of a workshop in which 21 women gave accounts of their experiences of various 
forms of violence. An OPE report in early 2002 noted that FOKUPERS and ETWAVE 
were the main sources of information in the country on gender-based violence (OPE 
2002:35). The prevalence of domestic violence initially surprised the women, who had 
previously focussed on military and political violence, but it became a significant 
community issue, thanks to their efforts, and the support of some key agencies and 
donors.  
 
In early 2002 FOKUPERS began the task of getting domestic violence legislation 
drafted. They coordinated the team which was leading this work, and held widespread 
debates, seminars and discussions with the community and key players in the justice 
system and the church, as well as with survivors themselves in Dili, Liquica and 
Lospalos. In particular they tried to understand the experiences of the women who 
attempted to take cases to the court. They worked very closely with the OPE, and in 
October 2003 OPE and the legislative team presented the draft Bill to the Ministerial 
Board (FOKUPERS 2003:5).295 They had support in their lobbying of MPs from the 
National Movement Against Violence (MNKV) which organised a special workshop 
about the Bill, and coordinated a lobbying session of Members of Parliament (de 
Araujo 2004). The Draft Bill was delayed in mid-2005 pending the finalisation of the 
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nation’s overarching Penal Code, as the Minister for Justice wanted the Bill to be 
consistent with that Code.296 This caused a considerable delay in the law being enacted. 
 
Throughout the study period, FOKUPERS took opportunities to pursue advocacy for 
justice for victims of violence in the Indonesian time (Farsetta 2002), especially the 
women and children they worked with in Suai, Liquica and Maliana. They worked 
closely with other human rights NGOs on this, especially with HAK and the National 
Alliance for International Justice. For example, they met with Mary Robinson, then UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, in 2000 and 2002. On the latter occasion they 
presented her with a letter from women members of the victim groups, and urged a 
resolution of the justice issues from 1999. In late 2001 they joined with HAK and the 
international NGO Oxfam to research the demands of the victims for justice in the lead 
up to a major international seminar in Dili on the idea of an International Tribunal. 
They also helped the United Nations Serious Crimes Unit which carried out an 
investigation of a 1999 massacre in Oecusse; their role was to provide counselling 
support,297 a role which they also played with the CAVR when it held hearings or 
obtained evidence from women.298  In 2003 and 2004 they continued lobbying various 
senior UN officers in Timor-Leste about justice matters for the 1999 victims, but with 
little success (FOKUPERS 2003:4-6).299  
 
Finally, at an operational level, FOKUPERS tried to work with the police and justice 
system to develop a set of Standard Operating Procedures for cases of violence against 
women and children, including a Code of Ethics for working with victims. They 
frequently received referrals from a variety of sources, including other NGOs, and 
police in the districts often sought their help. For example, women were often referred 
to FOKUPERS if they needed a safe house, but lack of transport facilities sometimes 
meant that the police transported victims and perpetrators together to Dili in the same 
vehicle. FOKUPERS had four cars, which enabled them to help, but there was a major 
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cost to maintaining them. At the court in Dili, FOKUPERS also tried to be present to 
support and assist women giving evidence, and in 2004 had been providing a lawyer 
whom the women trusted to give them legal advice (FOKUPERS 2003:6-7).300 
 
7.5 Education and awareness raising on women’s rights 
 
Throughout the life of FOKUPERS the women emphasised the importance of raising 
women’s awareness about human rights, especially women’s rights and issues of 
gender violence. Although workshops and activities were held across the country, the 
greatest focus remained on the three districts where FOKUPERS was supporting 
groups of survivors. Initially the focus was just on women, but gradually they realised 
that for change to occur they needed to be talking to men as well, so education 
activities were designed for both (FOKUPERS 2003:7-9). FOKUPERS also used 
various forms of media to disseminate its message. Its own newsletter, Babadok, 
presented many of the issues, while it used radio to get similar concerns to a wider 
audience. From 2000-2002 the women broadcast on Radio UNTAET and Radio 
FALINTIL; in 2001 until 2003, they also broadcast on Radio Timor Kmanek (the 
Catholic Radio station). Each year they produced between 26-30 broadcasts on each of 
these radio stations. They produced a number of brochures on violence and human 
rights, and frequently worked with other organisations promoting a gender perspective, 
and providing information on gender violence, women’s rights and women’s health. In 
addition, they linked with organisations and networks in Timor-Leste and overseas, 
working on issues of gender violence, sexual exploitation, and women’s human rights 
(FOKUPERS 2003:7-9). They were seen by the OPE as playing an important role in 
this educational and awareness raising work.301 
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7.6  Strengthening FOKUPERS’ own capacity 
 
FOKUPERS placed considerable emphasis on building staff capacity. In the early 
period rapid staff turnover was a constant problem; as fast as FOKUPERS could train 
women, they found higher paid or perhaps more prestigious jobs in other organisations. 
The lack of staff capacity and experience in the districts, coupled with the 
communication problems, contributed to some of the difficulties they experienced. 
Turnover of staff in the financial management area has also been quite difficult. Thus 
FOKUPERS had to expend a lot of effort training new staff all the time (FOKUPERS 
2003:13-15). Some of the training they undertook internally, while for other support 
they drew on outside organisations. In a couple of cases staff took international study 
tours (e.g. to Indonesia, Malaysia) to witness and learn from the work of similar 
organisations. One staff member said that seeing the work of basic organising in 
Indonesia had been really very helpful. They worked hard to build up their staff’s 
capacity to administer and manage the organisation in a professional way, and to learn 
from their early experience to improve their effectiveness (Hunt 2001).302  
 
FOKUPERS engaged with a wide variety of official and NGO donors since late 1999, 
including UNICEF (from 2000-2003), UNFPA, UNHCR, Oxfam, CRS, IRC, 
Grassroots International, UNIFEM, The Asia Foundation, YWCA, Misereor (German 
NGO), and HIVOS (which has provided three year funding). International NGOs 
HIVOS and CRS have been working closely with FOKUPERS to help with 
organisational development. A process of organisational development initiated by 
FOKUPERS itself in 2003, which HIVOS supported, was seen as extremely useful. 
One staff member commented that a lot of the capacity building help had been very 
short-term; what was most needed was continuing support, as even when projects 
finish FOKUPERS’ capacity still needs building towards greater sustainability; so 
many of the women were new to all these issues and there had been a lot of staff 
changes. Staff also commented that while they valued the training made available on 
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human rights and women, they also needed more focus on skills needed to run the 
organisation and help to develop systems and procedures.303 
 
FOKUPERS was aware that organisational strengthening was still needed. For 
example, the board was not really functioning as it should: although it met six times in 
2003, during 2004 it was becoming even more difficult to coordinate the busy 
schedules of board members to get them together for meetings, and it seemed they 
were not so clear about their role; however, they were consulted as need arose, often on 
a one to one basis. Staff management board or coordinator meetings, on the other hand, 
were held regularly, and a meeting was held at the end of each month for all staff to 
review their work, discuss problems or issues, coordinate activities, and plan for the 
future. A more thorough evaluation meeting was held every six months, with all staff 
reflecting on their work in each division, and making recommendations for changes in 
the next period. The end-of-year evaluation meeting also considered the efficiency with 
which FOKUPERS carried out its work, reviewed staff and reassigned them as 
required. The shared commitment to work together, support each other and work for 
the women of East Timor was one of the key factors which had kept them going 
through some difficult times (FOKUPERS 2003:10-11).304 
  
By late 2003 it was time for FOKUPERS to renew its strategic planning, and it did this 
through a four-day workshop facilitated by friends from an Indonesian NGO network, 
and attended by all staff, board members, and work partners, 27 people in all. For many 
of the FOKUPERS staff this was their first experience of such an exercise, so it was 
slow, but people learned a great deal, and the outcome was a new mission and vision. 
The Vision was:  ‘To achieve a world where there is gender justice and equality 
between men and women’, and the Mission: ‘To build power through policy advocacy 
and assistance models’ (FOKUPERS 2003:11). The strategic challenges identified 
related to developing FOKUPERS as an organisation, how to create a whole 
government system for dealing with domestic violence, and how to design an 
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assistance model to strengthen women who had been victims of violence. The 
workshop also identified the values which guided FOKUPERS, among them 
democracy, participation, justice, equality, accountability, and the ideals of human 
rights. A follow up three-day Program Planning Workshop was held about a month 
later, with groups working on three areas: assistance, advocacy and institutional 
development, sharing with each other and rearranging some responsibilities among the 
Divisions. This meeting really reinforced the need to shift from an approach of ‘giving’ 
to one of ‘empowering’ through community based organising activities (FOKUPERS 
2003:11-12). The Divisional structure then involved three major Divisions: Assistance 
(including the Safe House), Advocacy and Basic Organising (through the Uma Feto), 
plus an Administration Section and a new section to focus on Fundraising. A new 
German volunteer had joined FOKUPERS’ Assistance Division in 2004 to work with 
them for the next three years. 
 
The HIVOS-supported review activity undertaken in 2003, known as ‘ODID’, was 
very important to FOKUPERS. This had involved a consultation with members of the 
communities which had been assisted by and worked with FOKUPERS to ascertain 
their situation. It also included consultation with all staff to ascertain their 
understanding of their responsibilities and how these connected to the situation of the 
people FOKUPERS was trying to help, and to the vision and mission of the 
organisation. It was rather a shock to FOKUPERS that no-one in the communities 
raised domestic violence as their primary concern. Rather, their major concerns were 
related to the local economy, to lack of marketing and transportation, and issues facing 
women heads of households, older women and children. People felt FOKUPERS 
should work directly in the villages, help the large number of cases in the Eastern part 
of Timor-Leste, and teach literacy. Clearly, FOKUPERS was not well equipped to 
respond to all these needs, but by using an empowerment approach to its work hoped to 
help women find their own solutions. FOKUPERS believed that rural people really 
needed local NGOs in their districts, but there was not currently sufficient capacity 
there (FOKUPERS 2003:15). 
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7.7 Challenges  
 
Throughout the period since the 1999 emergency, FOKUPERS faced and overcame 
many challenges. By late 2004 they saw the major ones as the heavy workload and 
enormous expectations placed on them, to support the women who needed help, and to 
take on roles which other institutions expected of them (e.g. the police, victim’s 
families etc.); difficulties in gaining cooperation and coordination with other 
institutions involved in the cases; the uneven capacity of FOKUPERS’ own staff, so 
that certain staff carried a very heavy burden of work, and staff turnover had been high 
for a variety of reasons (e.g. taking other jobs, health factors, and private factors); in 
addition they did not have staff with strong English or Portuguese language skills 
which were needed for international relations and formal government correspondence 
and interaction; requests for help from other organisations which were important for 
networking but took up valuable time; and the constant stream of national and 
international visitors wanting information (including this researcher!). Other challenges 
related to funding, especially of the Safe House for women, which was partly related to 
donor reluctance to fund such ongoing needs but also related to FOKUPERS’ limited 
ability to prepare proposals and do fundraising with donors305 (FOKUPERS 2003:14-
16). Nor did FOKUPERS have the kind of capacity which an NGO like the Alola 
Foundation, headed by the then First Lady of East Timor, had to attract and support 
international volunteers to help. Whilst the First Lady used her networks of support to 
help FOKUPERS raise short-term funding to keep the Safe House open in early 
2004,306 FOKUPERS seemed to be finding it hard to raise such funds themselves. 
 
The big challenges FOKUPERS saw for the future were to shift the organisational 
paradigm towards an empowerment approach, to overcome the dependency they 
experienced among the women in the districts, to get the government system better 
resourced and able to take on the issue of gender violence more effectively, and to 
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build their organisational and staff capacity to be able to do all this successfully 
(FOKUPERS 2003:14-16).  
 
7.8  Conclusion 
 
FOKUPERS’ vision evolved and deepened but remained concerned with relieving 
women’s suffering, particularly from the violence they experienced, whether associated 
with militarisation or household violence. The latest wording of the vision probably 
drew on their interaction with the international community, but also reflected ideas 
held by the women of FOKUPERS since they began. Their strategies shifted to reflect 
changing circumstances, but the dual focus on practical assistance and advocacy has 
been there from the start. FOKUPERS struggled to reconcile the scope of its staff’s 
range of expertise with women’s expressed needs for economic development strategies. 
FOKUPERS claimed no particular expertise in that area, yet knew women needed such 
help. FOKUPERS’ recognition of the need for its own institutional development led to 
it making concerted efforts to get FOKUPERS’ staff and volunteers trained to enable 
the organisation to perform its roles. It made enormous efforts in this area, with a great 
deal of emphasis on building a team of women with sufficient skills to run the 
programs. It used reviews, internal and external training opportunities, international 
visits and in-house volunteers to develop its capacity, but recognised that it needed 
long term consistent support with training and with organisational development, such 
as development of policies and systems. The constant turnover of trained staff meant 
that the process of capacity development had to be a continuing one, and the focus had 
to be not only on issues of gender violence and women’s rights, but on organisational 
management as well.  
 
FOKUPERS managed to mobilise significant financial resources but had to do this 
through often relatively short-term project arrangements with a relatively wide range of 
donors.307 Those few which have made three-year commitments were very much 
                                            
307  FOKUPERS had long term support from NGOs: HIVOS, Oxfam, CRS. Other shorter term funding  
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appreciated by FOKUPERS, but timeliness of funding has sometimes been an issue.308 
The decision by UNICEF to focus its funding only on children meant that the women’s 
shelter’s funding was very uncertain and short-term for some time. In terms of external 
relations, FOKUPERS built links with other NGOs and UN bodies from the start, and 
has continued to do that more easily since late 1999. Its links with other NGOs in 
Timor-Leste, both national and international, were relatively strong, the local ones 
particularly through the REDE Feto network, in which FOKUPERS played a key role. 
It also retained a strong relationship with HAK, and the two organisations have worked 
together on issues relating to legal and human rights matters, including justice for the 
victims of serious human rights violations. While FOKUPERS has drawn on the 
experience of international NGOs such as HIVOS, Oxfam and CRS, it also drew on 
other ‘southern’ NGOs for support or training, especially from the Philippines and 
Indonesia. It had good relations with the Gender Unit of UNTAET and with sections of 
the new Timor-Leste Government, especially the Office for Promotion of Equality. Its 
ability to achieve outcomes was evident in quantitative terms, in relation to the number 
of cases supported and women and children assisted, although it struggled with the 
magnitude of the demands it faced given its capacity. Its advocacy work appeared 
relatively successful, but these were still early days in terms of achieving its vision of a 
properly functioning system for victims of violence.  
                                                                                                                              
      was from a large number of UN and other donors, varying in number at any time, according to   
      projects  or activities  supported (see Section 7.6). 
308 Respondent 46. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
TIMOR AID AND SAHE 
 
 
The two NGOs which are the subject of this chapter began operating outside the 
territory which is now Timor-Leste. Both ran early activities in, or from, Jakarta, and 
were only able to develop their work inside Timor-Leste fully after September 1999 
when they could function openly. Timor Aid operated initially from Darwin and was 
started by Timorese political exiles and their supporters, whereas SAHE was initiated 
by Timorese students in Jakarta. Their organisational trajectories after 1999 were, 
however, very different. 
 
8.1 Timor Aid  
 
Timor Aid had its origins with Timorese activists linked to the resistance movement 
who were living in Australia and Jakarta. In 1996 a group of them began the East 
Timor International Support Centre (ETISC) in Darwin, Australia. Since 1990 
members of this group had run the CNRM office in Darwin, but ETISC was a political 
advocacy organisation to serve the broader post CNRM-resistance in their struggle for 
independence. They also had a representative in Jakarta.309 With the impending 
announcement in January 1999 of the referendum, they sensed that it was time to 
support the resistance in new ways, not only through advocacy, but through 
development activities. Recognising that they needed a humanitarian organisation to 
make a tangible difference inside East Timor, in 1998 they formed Timor Aid with an 
office in Darwin. However, because of difficulties gaining registration in the Northern 
                                            
309 Respondent  82. Field notes from Timor Aid Open Day, speech by Respondent 82. ETISC was one  
      of  the main channels for financial support of FALINTIL, the Timorese resistance in general, and  
     Xanana Gusmao in Cipinang Prison. They supported Jose Ramos Horta’s diplomatic work overseas.  
     They also provided funding for  the students uprising in Jakarta against the Suharto regime, which  
     finally collapsed, and Indonesian NGOs supporting Timor, such as ELSAM, SOLIDAMOR and  
     INFIGHT. 
 211
Territory they registered the organisation in Victoria as a nonprofit, membership 
organisation; shortly afterwards they also arranged registration in Indonesia as Yayasan 
Timor Aid. The latter became the ‘project-implementing arm’ for the organisation in 
East Timor (Timor Aid 2004a).  
 
In January 1999 they recruited a local Timorese development worker who had been 
working with an international NGO in East Timor to be the Executive Director of 
Yayasan Timor Aid, and opened a small office in Dili. The organisation had little 
money, but he gathered together a total of five staff who moved around the country 
making small contributions to communities for things such as fishing nets, motors for 
fishing boats, agricultural tools and equipment, school bags, support to orphanages etc. 
In total they supported over 100 small projects before the ballot, and provided training 
and some scholarships for study in Indonesia.310   Timor Aid’s staff also provided food 
relief to IDPs during the violent period in the lead up to the ballot. To carry out these 
development and relief activities they had a network of people across East Timor 
connected to the resistance and FALINTIL through whom they worked. They also 
supported some projects in West Timor, consciously focussing beyond East Timor 
alone to protect the organisation politically, as the work inside East Timor was 
dangerous311 (Timor Aid 2004a:3). Also in January 1999, the East Timor Training 
Centre (CeTTiL) opened in Jakarta as a project of ETISC, funded through its Darwin 
office, and began training Timorese students in English, Portuguese and computer 
skills (Timor Aid 2004a:8). The Centre operated in Jakarta until September of that 
year, when it had to close due to the political situation. However, with some 500 
students each carrying one item such as a chair or computer back into Timor, this 
Centre transferred its operations and reopened in December 1999 in Becora, Dili.312  
The former Director of that Centre became the Deputy CEO of Timor Aid in Dili.313 
Funding support for all these activities came from churches, youth and community 
                                            
310 Respondents 82, 83. 
311 Respondents 82, 83. 
312 Respondents 82, 83. 
313 Respondent 83. 
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groups in Australia, North America and Europe, that had been mobilised by key 
exiles.314  
8.1.1 After the ballot 
 
During the violence following the August 1999 ballot, the Timor Aid office in Dili 
along with all its records and equipment, was destroyed. But the staff survived, and 
quickly joined by colleagues who had previously worked with ETISC, and with huge 
support from the international solidarity movement, played a critical role in the 
emergency response. The Darwin office became a focal point for international 
solidarity, support and information, and  a ‘Mercy Ship’ full of humanitarian supplies 
left Australia very quickly after the emergency, mobilised by Australian activists and 
the Australian Foundation for Asia and the Pacific (AFAP) a Sydney based Australian 
NGO. AFAP had formed a relationship with Timor Aid’s Darwin president as early as 
1997, and in 1998 had provided some funds for its early work inside Timor.315  As the 
emergency erupted in September 1999, AFAP and Timor Aid organised a meeting in 
Sydney and with support from the Portuguese community there and international 
NGOs, the barge was immediately commissioned.316  Its presence in Dili on 29 
September 1999, loaded with 300 tons of food, other emergency supplies, and a 
medical team, soon marked Timor Aid out as a local organisation with some capacity 
at a time when little else was functioning. It was only a few days before the barge 
arrived that contact was made with the Timor Aid staff inside Timor. The office was 
reopened in Dili on September 27 and Timor Aid staff from Darwin and Dili quickly 
organised transportation, personnel and a warehouse; there were many people to help 
unload the ship and guard the warehouse, and plenty of local support to get the goods 
out to the districts very quickly.317  
                                            
314 Respondent 82 
315 Respondent 14 
316 Respondent 82  
317 Respondent 82. Field notes from Timor Aid Open Day Speech by Respondent 82. Timor Aid paid  
     people a daily rate in Indonesian Rupiah, TA’s then President (who later became CEO) bought petrol  
     or the trucks from the Indonesian military through the fences of the Port of Dili. Soldiers were  
     waiting for their ships to embark and were selling whatever could be sold before the final departure 
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During the emergency period Timor Aid, largely with the contract management 
capacity of key AFAP staff on the ground, attracted a large number of donors, 
undertook a diverse range of projects and grew very rapidly. Relations between the 
CEO of Darwin’s Timor Aid, now in Timor, and the original Timorese local director 
were difficult, and by November the latter had left, gaining a job with a bilateral 
donor.318 Timor Aid became an implementing partner for UNHCR’s shelter program in 
five districts (Viqueque, Same, Suai, Ainaro and Oecusse), with funding through 
AFAP, providing shelter to some 33,800 families319 (Timor Aid 2004a:8). It also 
undertook some small Quick Impact Projects especially relating to infrastructure—
building refurbishment, about 60 kilometres of road maintenance to enable WFP food 
distributions to occur in certain districts, as well as irrigation systems, electricity 
supply and a hospital. Relations with UNHCR were fraught with difficulties, partly 
caused by the rapid turnover of UNHCR staff, partly by the inexperience of Timor Aid 
and its limited financial capacity. It was also difficult for Timor Aid to manage 
community expectations to implement medium and long term projects, as they were 
simply delivering shelter kits to lists of households provided to UNHCR by the church 
or the CNRT, and there were problems in some communities about who received aid 
and who did not. Equally, the sheer logistical difficulties were very challenging; many 
places were badly destroyed, roads damaged and isolated areas were hard to reach.320 
In addition, in partnership with UNICEF, Timor Aid re-roofed 15 primary schools in 
two districts and, with funds raised from School Aid and AFAP, complemented this by 
repairing walls with traditional materials, and providing desks and other school 
supplies (School Aid 2001). 
 
                                            
318 Respondent 14. 
319 Respondent 82. The shelter kits involved enormous logistical operations. Timor Aid implemented  
     some 60 per cent of UNHCR Emergency Shelter projects including reconstruction of public market  
     places in the districts Timor Aid was operating. The projects involved unloading barges and  
     helicopters of shelter material i.e. cement, timber, zincs, tents, etc in  the five districts before 
     distribution, and managing 50 trucks and five warehouses on  a 24 hours  per day, seven days a week  
     basis.  
320 Respondent 82. 
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Timor Aid also played a role in health service provision in the emergency period, 
assisting the establishment and funding of four health clinics, in Bairo Pite, Becora and 
Batugade (all in Dili), and in the District of Ainaro, and supporting their operation until 
the end of 2001. With the support of the St John’s Ambulance Services from 
Queensland, Victoria, and NSW, Timor Aid provided an ambulance service until June 
2001, when this was handed over to the ETTA Ministry of Health. Timor Aid worked 
closely with the church because it was the only organisation which had a structure that 
reached to the people.321  
 
In December 1999 the relocation of the East Timor Training Centre into Dili under 
Timor Aid’s auspices, enabled Timor Aid to provide courses to help Timorese young 
people to gain skills necessary to get jobs in the changed environment (Timor Aid 
2004c).322 Timor Aid also ran a special eight week course in languages and computer 
skills for 500 students in August-September 2000, a special program for former 
FALINTIL fighters to help them get jobs, and Tetum language courses for foreigners 
(which had over 300 graduates). Timor Aid also managed a scholarship fund, funded 
by STATOIL, the Norwegian State Oil Company (Timor Aid 2004a: 9)323 and on-the-
job training for 223 students whose tertiary studies in Indonesia had been interrupted 
by the ballot and its aftermath, enabling them to complete their studies and prepare 
themselves for work in East Timor. Eventually, as funds ran out, the Training Centre 
was closed.324  
 
Timor Aid had grown from five staff in mid-1999 to 420 in 2000, some 90 per cent of 
whom were Timorese; the rest were expatriates from various parts of the world.325  It 
was by far the largest local NGO, and had very significant donor support from diverse 
                                            
321 Respondents 83,82. 
322 Respondent 83. 
323 Respondent 82. The scholarship fund was funded prior to the ballot, after the Nobel Peace Prize was 
     awarded to Bishop Belo and Dr Jose Ramos Horta. 
324 Respondent  82. 
325 Respondent 82. Through this early period from late 1999 through the Year 2000 Timor Aid employed  
     a total of about 600 staff, operating in six districts, of whom around 50 were foreigners. Only 20 of  
     the latter were paid (with the UNHCR funds); the rest were volunteers, including Australian doctors  
     and ambulance officers.  
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international sources. One factor in the support for Timor Aid is thought to be the fact 
that, unlike other local organisations, it had a website before the 1999 crisis and so it 
very quickly became known internationally.326 The English and other language skills of 
the former exiles were also undoubtedly valuable. It was also seen by donors as 
knowing the country, and importantly the local language and it appeared to have the 
capacity. Indeed, it drew on its extensive ETISC base and experience, and its 
investment in people through the East Timor Training Centre (CeTTiL).327   
 
Despite this, it did not have the administrative or management systems it needed to 
cope with the rapid growth and it had enormous problems, in part due to the influx of 
international volunteers, many of whom were recruited from activist backgrounds and 
did not necessarily have the right skills for project management. Early on a group of 
expatriates did much of the organisational management. The place was riven with 
conflicts among the international staff group and with the (Darwin) CEO of Timor Aid, 
whose management style only exacerbated the difficulties.328 As one person said, ‘there 
were too many internationals there way too long’, and with English as the main 
language between them, the Timorese staff were often excluded from important 
communication.329 Many of the latter were also unused to the fast pace of work, and 
may have resented the internationals’ hard-driven approach.330 
 
Timor Aid’s early record keeping was poor, its personnel records incomplete, essential 
information disappeared as short-term international volunteers left, taking their 
personal laptops with them, and money hand carried from Darwin was not properly 
recorded. There were big disparities between the incomes of some expatriates and local 
staff which also caused tensions. Such rapid growth in the difficult post crisis 
circumstances was inevitably going to cause problems. AFAP later recognised that its 
own capacity to attract contracts, which caused the rapid growth, was the real 
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327 Respondent 82. 
328 Respondent 18. 
329 Respondent 14. 
330 Respondents 82,18. 
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problem.331 This growth also caused jealousies, among both local and international 
NGOs, who saw Timor Aid as a major competitor for funding.332 In fact, after the 
emergency, Timor Aid drew limited funds from in-country donors, such as UNICEF 
and UNHCR, and flourished because of outside support from the international 
networks in which they had become known (Timor Aid 2004: 32-35).  
 
Despite the difficulties, Timor Aid continued to expand its activities. In September 
2000 a  Timor Aid fund, financed largely by US$66,000 from Jose Ramos Horta’s 
Nobel Peace Prize, was established to provide small loans to generate economic 
activities through establishing and strengthening small businesses and providing jobs, 
particularly as the emergency programs phased out at the end of the year (Timor Aid 
2004a: 32-35). Timor Aid also took a leading role in organising a significant 
conference on Sustainable Development in East Timor in February 2001, with support 
from international volunteers and some 10 different donors, including multilateral, 
bilateral and NGO agencies (Sustainable Development and the Environment in East 
Timor 2001, Timor Aid 2004: 9). This was a significant event, which brought experts 
in sustainable development to Timor and got people thinking about natural resources 
and approaches to development for the future.  
 
Timor Aid also undertook programs for women, training them in counselling and 
therapy for torture and trauma survivors, basic health education, Tetum literacy and 
income generation through traditional weaving and handcrafts333 (Timor Aid 2003:2). 
Another early project involved supporting the restoration of fishing through two boat-
building training projects funded by AusAID and the Government of Iceland, which 
subsequently became the subject of some controversy over allegations about 
mishandling of the funds. Timor Aid denied these allegations,334 and operated three 
other projects related to fishing, two to help with preservation by salting (in Oecusse), 
                                            
331 Respondent 14. 
332 Respondent 82. 
333 Field notes from Timor Aid Open Day. 
334 The local manager of the boat building project had actually misappropriated most of the boat building  
     equipment but after Timor Aid took him to court he was ordered to return the stolen material. Timor  
     Aid was able to retrieve almost everything which had gone missing (information provided by  
     respondent 82).  
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one involving distribution of fishing gear, the other two related to training marine 
mechanics and marine engine survey (Timor Aid 2004b). The idea was to try to restore 
the fisheries industry, and develop a fisheries unit for the nation as one strategy for 
reducing poverty and generating income for East Timor from the rich marine resources 
available. From its early days Timor Aid also developed a welfare program for the very 
poor, aiming particularly to help disabled people, orphans,335 street children, and 
school hostels for rural youth. This involved working closely with the various orders of 
nuns operating in East Timor who generally provide such services336 (Timor Aid 
2004c). 
8.1.2 Changes in the organisation  
  
Late in 1999 Timor Aid had reconstituted itself as an East Timorese NGO, with a 
structure involving five founding board members, two of whom were exiled activists, 
the other three senior people who had been inside the country, now a Member of 
Parliament, a leader of the Protestant church and a surgeon respectively. Though the 
Australian office remained open, the Jakarta operation closed and the locus of activity 
was East Timor (Timor Aid 2004a:5). In early September 2001 Timor Aid began 
dramatically downsizing as its shelter project came to an end in mid-September, and a 
number of other projects had run out of funds (Timor Aid 2001). Part of the reason for 
this was delays in payment from UNHCR, which had caused Timor Aid to ‘borrow’ 
from other projects to finance the shelter work. Timor Aid faced a serious cash 
crisis.337  The statement announcing the downsizing explained the reasons for the 
redundancies, the terms under which they would occur, and noted that in line with the 
organisation’s Timorisation policy, the CEO’s role would soon be taken over by a 
Timorese person, who remains its Director, and that she would be supported by ‘a few 
expatriate professionals’(Timor Aid 2001).  
 
                                            
335 Orphanges in East Timor take children who have lost one or both parent(s), or whose parent(s) cannot 
     afford to look after them. 
336 Field Notes from Timor Aid Open Day. 
337 Respondent 82. 
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The change of Director and implementation of the Timorisation policy was a turning 
point for the organisation. Timor Aid reduced from over 300 staff to around 45 by 
October 2001. At this stage, in addition to the main office in Dili, Timor Aid had five 
district offices, in Viqueque, Manufahi, Ainaro, Covalima and Oecussi (Timor Aid 
2004c). The Darwin office was also closed in early 2002 and all resources were 
focussed in East Timor.338 The much smaller Timor Aid had to seriously think about 
what programs it wanted to continue and how to rebuild. In this process of internal 
review and redirection an international volunteer played an important role. It was clear 
by then that in the early period Timor Aid had taken whatever money donors had 
offered and embraced an enormous range of tasks. They had been reactive, shaped by 
donor funding priorities, and now had to gain greater control of the directions they 
wanted to take.339 They were gradually doing this at the end of the study period.  
8.1.3 From emergency to development projects  
 
Between 2001 and 2004 Timor Aid managed and completed 34 different development 
projects, which could be grouped into different sectors: fisheries (7), health (6), 
capacity building (10) income generation through weaving (3), 
infrastructure/rehabilitation (6), and two miscellaneous projects (the Sustainable 
Development Conference already referred to, and a Photographic Archive Project). 
Some of these, such as the fisheries projects and the health work, have already been 
described. They generally began during the emergency period, but continued beyond it 
and were only completed after the end of 2000. The six infrastructure/rehabilitation 
projects (the UNHCR shelter, road and youth centre rehabilitation, school and church 
roofing and irrigation projects) also began in the emergency phase but were not 
completed when that phase formally ended (Timor Aid 2004b).  
 
By late 2004, Timor Aid had some 11 major donors for around 12 projects and was 
gaining greater focus in its work. Most of these projects were in some way building on 
                                            
338 Field notes from Timor Aid Open Day. 
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the work undertaken in the previous four years. Only one of these projects was 
supported by three official donors based in East Timor. All the others (apart from the 
funds for micro-credit provided by the Nobel Prize) were supported by international 
NGOs or official donors in Europe and Australia who had no permanent presence there 
(Timor Aid 2004a and 2004b).  
 
The following outlines some of the major areas in which Timor Aid had been, and was 
continuing to work. There were three major groupings of activity which could be 
discerned: capacity building, civic education and poverty reduction, as well as a 
number of specific activities which reflected earlier interests, such as disability and 
social welfare.  
 
Capacity Building 
Many of the projects which Timor Aid supported were what it described as ‘capacity 
building’ activities. These included Tetum literacy work, capacity building of Timor 
Aid staff in Dili and the districts, as well as NGO staff and community organisations in 
four districts. Timor Aid’s effort to promote Tetum language has been significant, 
initially working with an expatriate linguist, and more recently with the official 
National Institute of Linguistics (INL) which he now directs. Timor Aid had published 
about 20 Tetum books by late 2004, and around 12 of these were being supplied free to 
all primary and high schools in every district, as well as universities and the 
Agriculture Ministry. Timor Aid was also responsible for gaining the funds to enable 
the INL to develop an approved orthography for Tetum,340 and then to offer training 
related to it.341 The use of the Tetum language reflected a strong nationalist statement, 
as during the Indonesian occupation Tetum was only able to be used under the 
protection of the church through a Tetum mass. Indonesian language was mandatory 
elsewhere. Timor Aid believes that language is the most powerful symbol of national 
identity, and this idea was, and remains, the driving force behind this project.  
 
                                            
340 The Council of Ministers approved this orthography in April 2004. 
341 Respondent 83. 
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In early 2002, with support from German NGO Bread for the World, Timor Aid began 
a two year capacity building project primarily for its staff (some training was also 
available to other NGOs). This approach was adopted because Timor Aid realised that 
although they were invited to a lot of workshops and training, these did not match the 
skills they needed. They needed to do their own capacity development, based on a 
proper assessment of their actual needs. The program initially provided two expatriate 
counterparts along with funds for internal and external training in a wide range of 
essential skills, such as computer skills, English language, project management, 
accounting and gender issues. One expatriate left after three months but the other 
remained with Timor Aid for three years working on a local salary. She worked on a 
daily basis with two key local Timor Aid staff counterparts and was responsible to pass 
on her knowledge in all areas of project management, proposal and report writing, 
financial management etc. She was available to work with the Timor Aid staff on any 
problems they encountered in their work—it was on-the-job mentoring, which was 
seen as a very successful approach, attributed largely to her qualities and abilities to 
work with Timorese people in an empowering way. English language training 
continued with the goal of enabling staff to write reports in English (in late 2004 they 
were written in Tetum or Indonesian and translated). The Timorese staff were expected 
to remain with Timor Aid for at least two years and apply what they had learned. 
Gradually Timor Aid was developing policies, such as its personnel policy, and 
management guidelines; and it had in place management processes, such as a weekly 
Management Committee involving the Director and the Heads of the Departments. All 
the managers were local, and only the textiles adviser was a ‘malai’342 who had lived in 
East Timor since she was a child.343  Other support was provided by a staff member 
with financial expertise from the AFAP who spent lengthy periods during regular visits 
mentoring staff in financial management.344 
 
As well as capacity building for Timor Aid’s Dili-based staff, the organisation also 
mobilised funds to strengthen its district staff, NGO partners and community groups in 
                                            
342 ‘Malai’ is a Timorese word for foreigner. 
343  Respondent 82. 
344  Respondent 14. 
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four districts (Dili, Oecussi, Manufahi and Covalima). It implemented at least four 
significant capacity building projects.345 Several of these projects were seen as 
complementary—focussed on district level capacity building of Timor Aid staff, local 
NGOs and community based organisations in those districts. The initial idea was to 
train 24 East Timorese Development Officers (12 of whom would be Timor Aid staff, 
the rest from other organisations), using a volunteer trainer. The numbers increased to 
55 altogether in later phases. The training was designed to cover a range of 
communication, participatory methodology and team management skills, as well as 
issues of needs analysis, project design, project cycle management, livelihood issues 
etc. The last project focused on more specialised skills in administrative and technical 
areas as well as language and information technology (Timor Aid 2004a: 11-14 and 26-
30).  
 
Timor Aid found that sending staff out to courses provided by others was useful when 
specialised equipment and resources which were not available internally were needed, 
but the quality of the external training varied. Internal training, though a little more 
expensive, achieved much better attendance rates and the quality was considered to be 
higher.346 Altogether some 45 Timor Aid people took part in Timor Aid sponsored 
computer classes, 40 in English and 8 in Portuguese classes. Timor Aid was trying to 
create a pool of Timorese trainers to reduce reliance on foreign consultants. Altogether, 
over a four-year period, Timor Aid  provided training to almost 1,000 people, with the 
largest numbers trained in health education (228), trauma healing (200) and Tetum 
orthography and grammar (110). Smaller numbers were trained in various aspects of 
project development and management, as well as specific skills, like book-keeping and 
weaving (Timor Aid 2004a: 47).  
 
 
                                            
345 The first of these was funded by Just World Partners and DFID, running from October 2000 - May  
      2004; the second, from July 2001-June 2003, funded by Bread for the World; another project, funded 
      by Fastenopfer (a Swiss organisation) from Nov 2002-Dec 2003; the fourth, a continuation of the  
      District Strengthening by Fastenopfer from  1 June 2004-1 June 2005; and the fifth, a far smaller  
      project funded by an Austrian organisation, running from June 2004-June 2006.  
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Civic education and youth civic education 
 
Timor Aid identified the importance of working with the young people of East Timor 
as a high priority to build a truly democratic nation. They were doing this especially 
through two civic education projects—one working directly with the Education 
Ministry the other with youth and youth organisations. The major Civic Education 
Project, working closely with the Ministry of Education and the National Civic 
Education Commission, began in October 2003. This three year project, supported by 
the Belgian Government, was intended to design a civic education curriculum for 
secondary schools to be approved and used by the Ministry of Education as a national 
syllabus. A Working Group comprising representatives from Timor Aid, the 
Government, national and international NGOs such as HAK, East Timor Study Group, 
the National Democratic Institute (USA), and The Asia Foundation (USA) was guiding 
the project. The project allowed for a process of development of this curriculum, 
advocacy for its adoption, and activities to promote greater awareness among young 
people about democratic processes in the new nation. By late 2004 the first phase, the 
organisation of a National Civic Education Workshop, had been completed. The 
workshop involved around 40 people with interests and expertise in civic education, 
among them representatives from the National Commission of Civic Education, the 
Ministry of Education, international organisations, civic education teachers and people 
concerned with civic education from each district. This workshop assessed what 
materials already existed, and developed the approach to the program, including the 
draft program and its methodology, how to select teachers for the trials, and how to 
monitor and evaluate the process. The next phase of the project involved Timor Aid 
supporting the trialling of the curriculum by around 60 teachers in six districts, which 
would then be assessed by another national workshop in mid-2005. Timor Aid helped 
the teachers, organised district meetings to enable them to compare experiences, and 
later in the project planned to organise two ‘Youth Festivals of Democracy’ to give 
young people a chance to air their views on citizenship and democracy347(Timor Aid 
2004a:15-18). 
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DFID also made major funding available through the INGO Just World Partners for the 
Youth Civic Education program to operate in the same six districts, including Dili. This 
project only began in mid-2004, but Timor Aid planned to train and assist young 
people to undertake well-planned and coordinated civic education in their districts, to 
build the capacity of youth organisations, to foster interactions between young people 
and government officers, including opportunities for young people to work in 
government offices, and network among themselves. The project included provision 
for some youth study tours and work experience with youth organisations overseas 
(Timor Aid 2004a: 44-46). Related to the civic education work was an additional 
project on women’s advocacy and literacy. It involved developing ‘learning circles’ 
with rural women in three districts, with the goal of strengthening women’s literacy but 
also raising their awareness about issues of governance and human rights, and 
encouraging them to be involved in decision making348 (Timor Aid 2004a and 2004b). 
8.1.4 Poverty  reduction 
 
Timor Aid argued that alleviation of poverty was crucially important in East Timor, 
and had a number of strategies to support poverty reduction in the emerging nation, 
among them weaving, micro-credit, and an integrated program which incorporated 
psycho-social, cultural and economic development. Timor Aid planned to implement 
such integrated projects in all districts it operated. They tried to combine micro-credit, 
health education, clean water supply, trauma therapy, adult literacy and youth civic 
education in the villages in order to offer a solid comprehensive package of projects 
that might have a greater impact in the development of local communities than single 
sector programs.349  
 
Income Generation through Weaving 
From its early days, Timor Aid actively tried to help women in a variety of ways, 
among them income generation through weaving the traditional Timorese tais. Tais are 
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traditional cloth, woven on a portable backstrap bamboo loom, in many different 
designs characteristic of each district.350 Timor Aid identified the possibility of making 
the process more efficient using an upright loom technology common in Thailand. In 
January 2003 trainers from Thailand began training some 22 people in three districts in 
the construction and operation of these looms. The idea was that using these looms 
production would be more commercially viable and efficient. At the same time, the 
project researched markets for the products so that a commercially viable textile 
industry could be developed. In the next phase of the project a group of Timorese 
trainees were scheduled go to Thailand to observe the weaving industry there. As the 
skills of the original 22 trainees grew, they in turn were expected to train another 20 
women in the three districts, so that a pool of over 80 weavers would be able to make 
Tais using the upright looms (Timor Aid 2004a:21-26).351  
 
In addition to this training work, and to help with marketing, Timor Aid had funding 
from USAID to develop a catalogue of traditional Timorese Tais. This project involved 
fieldwork to identify and collect samples of different types of tais, to photograph many 
tais and the weaving process, and develop a digital register of the many varieties of tais 
weaving available across East Timor. The project planned to work initially in a 
minimum of five districts, but to help women across the country in the long run. From 
the samples recorded, the project was developing a catalogue, both hard-copy and on-
line, with a view to marketing and training and for cultural reference. A very attractive 
brochure about Timorese Tais has been produced as a basic tool for marketing tais to 
the world. A small book was envisaged as well.352 Timor Aid was hoping to find 
funding for a marketing specialist to work on the international marketing for the future. 
This tais work was supported by USAID. Earlier support came from UNIFEM, CIDA, 
KFB (Austria)353 and others (Timor Aid 2004a: 21-26). 
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352 It was planned that the Timor Aid website would develop a link with the Tais website, which is  
     expected to have the detailed specifications which buyers may need, cultural information of interest  
     to  tais buyers and sellers from the solidarity movement, as well as ways people can support the  
     program (Timor Aid Report 2004a:15). 
353 CIDA is the official development cooperation agency of Canada; KFB is an Austrian Catholic  
     women’s group. 
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Micro-credit 
The micro-credit program launched in September 2000 grew rapidly. By December 
2000 loans had already been given to 80 small groups, some 33 per cent of them going 
to women. By May 2003 the scheme had provided some 280 loans to groups, a total of 
1,162 people, with 47 per cent of the loans going to women354 (Timor Aid 2004a:32). 
Most of the microfinance activity was in Dili, Liquica and Baucau, and priority was 
meant to be given to orphans, widows and those with no other finance capacity. 
According to Timor Aid’s report, the facility: 
 
provides small loans to groups of 2-5 people with existing businesses. Most of the 
beneficiaries were former business people who wanted to start anew after their homes 
and businesses were burnt by retreating militias. 
 
Initial loans could not exceed US$500, but after that, could increase to US$1,000 if the 
need was demonstrated and the initial loan was repaid satisfactorily. Loans were 
offered over a 12-month period, at a 15 per cent interest rate. However, repayments 
were hard to achieve, and Timor Aid was planning to review its method of giving loans 
and revising its approach.355 Unfortunately, the experience of the World Bank’s 
Community Empowerment Project, which gave loans without proper training and 
supervision, gave the impression to some Timorese that loans were really grants. 
Confusion also arose because the World Bank’s first round of funding was grants, and 
only later loans were introduced. The result of all this was that repayment rates on the 
World Bank CEP project were as low as 30-40 per cent. Many (though not all) NGOs 
had been having problems with loan default rates as a result (NDPEAC 2004, Moxham 
n.d.).  
 
Integrated Poverty Alleviation Project 
The early work with women in literacy and counselling, continued in the form of a 
major Integrated Poverty Alleviation Program, funded by Austrian NGO, 
Dreikoenigsaktion (DKA). Earlier work was funded by the European Commission 
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(EC). From mid-2001, Timor Aid began work on this project with four major 
components: 
1) a community health education component in six districts (in addition to the  two 
districts where this work was undertaken in the previous project, namely Ainaro 
and Maliana);  
2) trauma healing in six new districts (in addition to five districts where this was 
already operating);  
3) distribution of national language books and orthography training in all 13 
districts; and  
4) capacity building courses in the four districts where Timor Aid had offices.  
The community health work involved revising a community health education manual, 
training eight community health project officers, who, in teams of two, were to run 
workshops monthly for three months, making a total of 72 workshops in six districts 
with follow-up to the women who participated; these women were then expected to use 
simple materials provided to share their knowledge with other women in their villages. 
This program operated in close liaison with the Ministry of Health.  
 
The second area of work has been trauma healing, and involved training some 300 
trauma healers in six districts, mostly teachers, clergy, health staff and youth leaders, 
who would have influence through their jobs and would be able to spread their 
knowledge and experience. The training used a model called ‘Capacitar’ which uses 
body-mind-spirit practices, such as Tai Chi meditation, body movement, breathing 
exercises, acupressure, massage techniques, and various other approaches to help 
people identify trauma and deal with it holistically and constructively. The most 
promising people trained at district level were then identified and given further training 
to become a national pool of trainers, through a series of five- to eight-day long 
advanced workshops. All this training was supported by an expert trainer from 
Capacitar International (USA) who was gradually passing on her skills to the Timor 
Aid staff and trainers, to enable them to run all their own training at every level. 
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The final component was an extension of the Tetum language work already 
undertaken, but which had been limited to development of the orthography, production 
of more books, and training a limited number of people in the standard orthography. 
This project, designed especially to support teachers so that they could teach in Tetum 
language, involved training more orthography trainers, and then supporting them to 
provide orthography training across the country with school teachers as the priority 
group, but also others such as media, writers, translators, NGOs, and government 
officers, who may contribute to dissemination of the standard orthography. Once the 
Ministry of Education had set up a teacher training institution, the teacher trainers 
would also be trained, so that they could contribute to the dissemination process to 
reach the teachers of East Timor. The project was intended to facilitate annual language 
conferences, production of ten books, including a Tetum dictionary, teaching manuals 
for primary and secondary school teachers, as well as an adult literacy book. Other 
books would be for topics prioritised by the Ministry of Education. 
 
This last component also involved continued strengthening of Timor Aid’s efforts to 
build its own staff capacity and that of other local NGOs and community based 
organisations (CBOs) where it was working. Thus training in management, computer 
skills and languages (English and Portuguese) would continue. Related to the Tetum 
promotion aspect of the poverty alleviation project was Timor Aid’s continued role 
operating a Tetum language school (Timor Aid 2004a:35-42). 
 
Disability work and social welfare 
Timor Aid was one of the early local organisations to assist people with a disability. 
They did this through distributing equipment (e.g.braille equipment, wheelchairs, 
crutches) and assisting disabled children and their families, including advocacy for 
their rights to education and health care (Timor Aid 2004a:10). They also helped 
develop disability services and handed over functions to other local organisations, such 
as the NGO Katilosa, which provides vocational and rehabilitation programs for young 
people with physical disability and hearing impairment (Secretary of State for Labour 
and Solidarity 2003). The latest project in 2005 involved a Training of Trainers for sign 
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language, enabling a number of trained signers to share their skills with others.356 In 
addition, Timor Aid continued its support for a variety of social welfare projects, 
drawing on various (mainly individual) donor supporters and working with the church 
to identify needs.357 
 
Photo Archive project 
Working closely with the then Foreign Minister, this USAID-funded project, using 
special photography expertise, set up a national photo archive for East Timor especially 
for use in tourism promotion. A photographer working with an assistant travelled to all 
parts of Timor-Leste photographing many locations of interest and capturing 
underwater scenes, wildlife and landscapes. The project enabled a Centre for 
Photographic Studies to be set up in the Independence Hall in Dili which hosts the 
archive of thousands of photographs from all over East Timor. The archive houses 
special photographic equipment to store, edit and manage the original film and digital 
copies of the material. A Timorese Centre Administrator manages the whole operation 
and was training another person. This project came about through Timor Aid’s close 
relationship with the then Foreign Minister and was a response to the need to turn 
international perceptions of Timor as a war-ravaged country into perceptions of the 
country as a beautiful tourist destination. At the end of the project, in 2004, Timor Aid 
handed the whole collection, the equipment and the trained government staff over to 
the Timor-Leste Government, which was able to use the archive themselves and sell 
rights to its use (Timor Aid 2004:18-21). 
8.1.5 Restructure and redirection 
 
Timor Aid changed its structure again in 2002; previously it had four departments: 
Emergency, Logistics, Housekeeping and Assets, and Volunteers. The first two were 
big departments during the emergency. The Housekeeping and Assets Department, for 
example, managed three houses (where many staff and volunteers lived) and a number 
of warehouses. By late 2004 there remained four departments, but with different 
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responsibilities: Projects; Finance and Administration; Logistics (which included 
assets, security, cleaners etc.) and Human Resources. There were three district offices, 
each with three program staff and security officers.358  
 
In October 2003 Timor Aid held an important Strategic Planning Workshop facilitated 
by an international NGO, the Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA), which was given 
responsibility to develop the strategic plan for Timor Aid. ICA used a participatory 
process which involved five major steps: a historical scan, developing a practical 
vision, identifying underlying challenges, developing strategic directions, and 
integration of the strategic directions into the workplans for each Department. The 
vision for Timor Aid which was developed at that workshop states: 
 
Timor Aid’s vision is of a peaceful, just East Timor with the capacity to bring 
prosperity to people so they can live in dignity and harmony with each other, the 
environment, and the region.  
 
Its mission statement says that Timor Aid’s contribution to this will be to ‘model 
organisational excellence in undertaking programs to achieve sustainable economic, 
social and cultural development outcomes.’ This involves helping eradicate poverty 
through small enterprises, promoting Timor’s culture and identity, reducing its external 
funding dependency, having offices in every district, and good relations with the 
Government (Timor Aid 2003).  
 
Many challenges were identified and some strategies to address them devised. These 
strategies were to focus on the limited skills and confidence of Timor Aid staff, the 
wider community fear of change related to mistrust of individuals and institutions, the 
sense of uncertainty and staff insecurity which inhibited individual contributions to 
Timor Aid, the need to project a clearer, more focussed image to government, NGOs, 
donors and civil society partners, and to assist the nation with improved 
communication, to extend the Tetum language program. The strategic directions 
                                            
358 Respondent 82. 
 230
continued the focus on capacity building for the organisation, especially in areas of 
leadership, management and fundraising; they also involved reviewing the existing 
projects in terms of the new directions, improving conditions for staff through 
including them more in decision making, helping them with healing, trauma 
counselling and mental health, providing more clarity and transparency in terms of 
duration of projects and contracts; it was also agreed to be more active in external 
affairs to project an image of positive project work, and also to strengthen Tetum 
language activities (Timor Aid 2003).  
 
By 2004 Timor Aid had rebuilt to some 80 staff, only one of whom was expatriate, 
between them managing and implementing some 12 projects. On 5 October 2004 
Timor Aid held an Open Day, as part of its new strategy, to celebrate its sixth birthday 
and showcase its work. The day was attended by various donor representatives, a few 
local NGOs and friends and supporters. Until this time Timor Aid had still been 
operating under the original Constitution registered in Melbourne. Timor Aid’s new 
Constitution was completed in 2006 to comply with the new Timor-Leste NGO 
legislation.359 
8.1.6  Relationships with government and others 
 
Timor Aid established good relations with the Government of East Timor, in part 
because of the personal relationship it had with the first Foreign Minister who, as a 
former exile based in Australia, had close personal ties with Timor Aid’s leaders from 
the outset. He was both the chairperson and patron of Timor Aid until 1999, after 
which, due to the demands on him, he stepped down as chairperson, but retained the 
role of patron.360 However, Timor Aid has deliberately worked closely with the various 
Ministries in program related areas, notably in Health and Education, as well as the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the latter in relation to the micro-credit program which 
provided farmers with credit for seeds, tools, small livestock, fishing gear etc. in order 
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to help them improve their livelihoods. Thus they have seen their role as 
complementary to government.361 However, working closely with the government was 
not always easy, as it had limited capacity itself, and was sometimes slow in 
responding to ideas, and agreeing to take on initiatives. It required patience and 
persistence to make collaboration work. The maintenance of good relations also 
required continuing attention. Whilst Timor Aid worked largely in areas prioritised in 
the National Development Plan, they believed it was not ambitious enough in seeking 
to reduce poverty. Timor Aid argued that in such a small country it should be possible 
to eliminate poverty altogether.362 The CEO of Timor Aid was clearly well respected 
by and well connected to government. She chaired the Electoral Commission for the 
Local Government elections and was also selected to chair the NGO Committee on the 
High Level Mechanism, an initiative designed to coordinate between Government, 
civil society and others in relation to the implementation of the National Development 
Plan. Unfortunately this interesting initiative seemed to have stalled in late 2004-early 
2005. 
 
Timor Aid was not funded by international NGOs based in East Timor, and believed 
this was because they were angry to be ‘upstaged’ by a local organisation which could 
do so much. They believed other LNGOs also disliked Timor Aid because they were 
jealous of the funding to which they had access. In fact, as Timor Aid point out, unlike 
most other LNGOs, they did not get most of their funding from organisations which 
were based in East Timor.363 There was also a lot of criticism about the management 
and administration of Timor Aid, especially in the emergency period. As Timor Aid’s 
CEO commented, ‘When there was the crisis everyone rejoiced, and there were 
rumours going round that Timor Aid was going to close its doors.’  It survived, though 
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learned the lesson to not accept all offers of funding, but to think carefully about 
whether they related to the Strategic Plan.364 Timor Aid remained a member of the 
local East Timor NGO Forum, but played a low key role in public advocacy, and was 
criticised locally for failing to speak out about the Timor Sea issue.365  Timor Aid had a 
close relationship with the Bairo Pite health clinic, acting as a national adviser to it, and 
also worked closely with a number of small local NGOs in the disability area. Its 
finance staff trained and supported the finance staff at Bairo Pite clinic, and at another 
NGO, the Peace and Democracy Foundation.366  
 
One international NGO link which has obviously been valuable is that with AFAP, an 
Australian based international NGO linked to a strong Pacific network—the  
Foundation for the People of the South Pacific International—which Timor Aid also 
joined as the East Timor partner in 2000. This network in turn is linked internationally 
with Just World Partners (UK) and Counterpart (USA).367 These links seem to have 
been very important to Timor Aid. AFAP was the organisation which mobilised the 
Mercy Ship in conjunction with Timor Aid, and thereby put Timor Aid on the 
humanitarian map in East Timor. AFAP itself, feeling somewhat responsible for the 
rapid expansion of Timor Aid and the subsequent difficulties, remained engaged to 
help them work through the issues, maintain their donor support, and build their 
organisational capacity, especially in financial management.368 Links through the 
founders’ personal Catholic networks have also been important for accessing funds in 
Austria, and these in turn have led to other connections in Europe. These broad 
relationships have linked Timor Aid to some 18 donors, while its internal networking 
meant that it was working with a number of other local and international NGOs across 
the country at the end of 2004. The challenges it faced at the end of 2004 related to 
continuing its capacity building so that Timorese could manage all aspects of the 
organisation’s work confidently and capably, implementing its strategic plan, 
rebuilding its reputation after the early difficulties, and gaining recognition for what it 
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was doing. The deputy CEO was in Australia studying for two years, and the long term 
volunteer’s three year term was to end shortly, which would leave the management a 
little weaker, especially in terms of maintaining its proposal writing efforts and abilities 
to seek out and access funding opportunities for the longer term. However, overall, the 
organisation was far stronger, and seemed to have maintained its early vision to help 
improve the humanitarian situation in East Timor. In these early years it recognised 
that unless it focussed on developing its own capacity it would not be able to fulfil that 
role, so it put significant effort into internal capacity building to enable it to work 
effectively for the long term benefit of the Timorese people.369  
 
8.2 SAHE Institute for Liberation (SAHE)  
 
The SAHE Institute for Liberation (SAHE) had its origins in Indonesia in 1998. A 
number of Timorese young people living and studying in Jakarta, who were involved 
with the clandestine resistance movement, came together concerned that no debate was 
going on among them about issues in East Timor. They had no real knowledge of their 
own history, culture, and politics nor any depth to their ideas about democracy. One 
was working as advocacy coordinator for an Indonesian human rights NGO, ELSAM 
(the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy) so they initially started meeting every 
Friday evening in its offices; and at the same time they had meetings once or twice 
during the week with students. The Friday evening sessions covered a wide range of 
different topics, including study of various books about revolutionary thought, history 
of East Timor, and international affairs. These meetings went on regularly for five 
months. The group also began to translate important books into Indonesian, so that they 
could be more widely read.370   
 
ELSAM had links with the emerging Yayasan HAK, channelling international funds to 
it, and giving it a range of human rights support. On one occasion, the now-Director of 
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HAK went to a workshop organised by ELSAM in Jakarta, where he met the group of 
Timorese. He agreed that HAK would provide funds to publish one of the group’s book 
translations, Dr Helen Hill’s history of FRETILIN. The ‘SAHE Study Club’, as SAHE 
was first known, was formed soon afterwards at a three day workshop  organised  and 
facilitated by two Indonesian human rights and Timor solidarity NGOs, ELSAM and 
Fortilos, and attended by about 35 students. The name SAHE was to honour Vicente 
Reis Sahe an early FRETILIN leader who had promoted Paulo Freire’s ideas about 
popular education. Disconnected from their own history, none of the students had 
known about Vicente Sahe but they had become aware of him through their reading 
and study. At this workshop there were intense discussions about law, culture, politics 
and history, and shortly afterwards they translated and published two more books, 
Freire’s Letters from Guinea-Bisseau and a book by Samora Machel about another 
former Portuguese colony, Mozambique. Some of the books had been brought back to 
Jakarta by the ELSAM advocacy coordinator who had obtained them during a visit to 
Canada in 1997, where he had been for a conference, others were from friends 
overseas. SAHE’s meetings, organised by a core group of just five or six people, were 
soon attracting a growing number of students, and debate about history, culture, 
politics and democracy was alive and well among Timorese and some Indonesians in 
Jakarta371 (Hill 2002: xiii). 
8.2.1  SAHE’s role in the lead up to the 1999 ballot  
 
A significant development occurred in May 1999 when SAHE analysed the May 5 
Agreement between the UN, Portugal and Indonesia which authorised the August 
ballot. Their analysis was published as a small booklet and 4,000 copies were 
distributed inside East Timor by the CNRT. This also led to discussions about the 
Agreement in newspapers, with SAHE warning that it was a trap because the 
Indonesian Government controlled security. Shortly before the referendum the CNRT 
held a secret three day workshop at the Canossian centre in Kaikoli attended by about 
200 people. ELSAM’s Advocacy Coordinator spoke at this event drawing on the study 
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and analysis which the group had been doing. Soon after this he was seconded by 
ELSAM to work with Yayasan HAK in Dili, leaving others to continue their efforts in 
Jakarta. Not long afterwards, others who had been in Jakarta also returned to Dili in the 
tense atmosphere leading up to the referendum. The resistance movement was still 
entirely clandestine and there was no culture of debate or discussion allowed. The 
group wanted to continue publishing and promoting underground discussions. They 
published bulletins which they distributed in small numbers, asking people to duplicate 
them themselves and share; they also held a few training sessions and discussions, but 
the climate of fear and intimidation made things difficult until the ballot,372 and the 
subsequent traumatic events gave way to an entirely changed environment.  
8.2.2 The September 1999 emergency  
 
At first, the huge influx of humanitarian assistance after September 1999 and the 
arrival of the international community with its own agenda, as well as the sheer 
physical circumstances, made it hard for the activists of SAHE to concentrate on their 
original ideas. These ideas, which had been strongly influenced by what they 
discovered FRETILIN had been doing in the mid-1970s (Durnan 2005, Hill 2002),  
were about people having the power to decide their own fate, people who were really 
independent, not recipients of international aid or charity. However, it was obvious that 
they neither knew what the Timorese people wanted, nor was SAHE known or trusted  
by people inside the country (unlike HAK which was widely recognised), and at first 
they had little or no means to assist. Nevertheless, like a number of other local NGOs 
they obtained early support from USAID in the form of a computer and motorbike, and 
three months’ costs, which enabled them to function more easily. During this post-
referendum period the SAHE Study Club of Jakarta transformed itself into the SAHE 
Institute for Liberation in Dili. They initially worked from a base in HAK’s office: they 
did not want to duplicate what HAK was doing, but wanted to help HAK in some way. 
So they began by organising some discussion workshops and publishing very simple 
material which people could copy and pass on. They organised discussions with youth 
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groups and university students on topics such as nationalism and culture, trying to 
create space for discussion about the future of the nation. Most of the members had no 
experience in working in an NGO and they were very idealistic. Yet they realised that, 
given the people’s current circumstances, idealistic dreams would be of little use. What 
they needed to do was translate these ideas into practical action.373  
8.2.3  Developing a focus 
 
The group decided to focus on training for youth and building relationships directly 
with communities and community organisations. They saw that their role as an NGO 
should be to help the community interact directly with the state, not act as an 
intermediary between the two. In early 2000 they decided to go to Bucoli (in Baucau 
District), to Vincent Sahe’s community (Bexley 2003) where they met people who had 
known him and been his students. The initial discussion in Bucoli was a very moving 
affair—people talked all night, and some were crying as they talked about what a great 
man Sahe was. For the young people of SAHE Institute it was a momentous occasion 
and it inspired them to work with the community in Bucoli to try out the ideas they had 
been discussing. So they began work in Bucoli on literacy, using a Freireian approach 
like that used  in the mid-1970s by Fretilin cadres (CAVR 2006 Section 5), only 
providing what people needed and genuinely could not provide for themselves. As they 
acknowledged, the people knew how to organise themselves; they had been doing so 
for years as the clandestine part of the resistance movement. The people also organised 
weddings, funerals and other events, so the SAHE activists were learning community 
organising from them, rather than the other way round. They began with a small group 
doing literacy, then the people were interested in traditional medicine, and they soon 
developed cooperatives, a resource library and a community radio, the latter using 
second-hand equipment given by friends in UNTAET. Some members who had taken 
an opportunity to learn about organic fertilizers, started to train others to make and use 
                                            
373 Respondents 80, 81. 
 237
them, and this soon caught on, with requests for them to carry out the training in other 
communities.374  
 
At the same time, they had decided to work in three main areas: publishing, popular 
education and research. They began publishing with a small booklet in Tetum about the 
roles of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in international 
development, released in 2001 (Soares 2001). This book was a critique of the 
development approaches these institutions promoted and the debt into which they led 
countries. The World Bank had the booklet translated into Portuguese and 
representatives came to the SAHE office to discuss its contents, arguing that it was an 
out-of-date representation of World Bank policy. SAHE invited the Bank to provide 
more updated information, but never received it. Thus, after the Constituent Assembly 
election in August 2001, SAHE distributed the booklet to the new Assembly members 
and it provoked considerable comment.375 
8.2.4 The School for Activists (Escola Ukun Rasik A’an)376 and an educational 
role 
 
The idea of a school for organising as an approach to education grew out of SAHE’s 
philosophy about communities being able to decide things for themselves, and the 
group’s thinking about what could be done to strengthen communities to do this. They 
recognised that people were strong, they had a spirit of independence and self-
sufficiency, and they had shown that without any support they could defeat the 
Indonesians, so that was something to remember always. SAHE’s idea was simply to 
keep that spirit going, with any funding they could offer merely supplementing it. They 
saw their own role as a supportive one, helping for example with training, education, 
and media development (radio and film-making). They saw that they needed to work 
wherever the community wanted to start (e.g. literacy) but gradually they would work 
across a range of sectors, towards giving people a wider perspective and integrating 
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these sectors together. Other organisations were keen for SAHE to develop their 
Activist School, as there was a general feeling that more community organisers were 
needed who could share knowledge and work with the spirit of voluntarism which had 
sustained the resistance movement. This community organising had provided food and 
medicines to FALINTIL, passed letters to and from them, and helped achieve political 
independence. But SAHE was well aware that the political independence did not have a 
strong cultural, educational or economic base. Not all the people’s problems were 
solved because the Indonesians had gone. What was needed was a strategy to transform 
and apply the knowledge people had gained during the occupation to the new situation. 
So the Activist School started. 
 
For the first Activist School, which got underway in 2002, 21 participants were 
selected by their communities, each of whom had committed to work in those 
communities with the knowledge they gained. The school, modelled on a Brazilian 
social organising approach, and drawing on early FRETILIN experiences of organising 
in 1974-75 in East Timor itself, was organised as a series of blocks of learning, 
combined with periods of fieldwork. There were five blocks of learning, each lasting 
seven to ten days, followed by two to three months working back in the community, so 
that the entire program lasted at least a year to eighteen months (Durnan 2005). The 
five blocks covered (1) History and social analysis of East Timor; (2) Community 
organising (with local resources); (3) The agricultural system, the health system, and 
cooperatives; (4) Culture; (5) Evaluation of the organising, and planning follow up and 
other new classes. A total of 14 students completed this program. In the next two to 
three years the participants were expected to maintain a process of learning, to 
encourage more community organisations to be involved in this approach, and to 
generate more activities which would self-fund. As a result of this school, by late 2004 
there were some 10 more people actively involved (from 10 districts and 11 
communities) as well as around four or five people in Liquica and the community in 
Bucoli. These ideas were also being taken up through other NGOs, such as Kadalak 
Sulimutuk Institute (KSI), a student led research institute, and HAK.377 
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Another initiative was to work on traditional medicine, and in 2004 SAHE hosted two 
people with expertise in this area from Jakarta to work with a group in Faulara 
(Liquica) to build skills in making and using traditional medicines. Also in Liquica 
they trained a group of people in making organic fertilizers; this group had given 
training sessions in another three or four communities before the end of that year. 
SAHE’s work on organic composting and simple composting toilets was also being 
spread by simple, practical training. Thus the emphasis was on building up local 
community members’ skills and then facilitating them to share those skills with others. 
SAHE also took its approach more widely into the education sector, and acted as the 
coordination point for a vibrant Popular Education Network, known as Dai Popular. 
This was set up in 2001, and in 2004 had some 36 organisations involved. Most of the 
members were community organisations, seeking to learn from each others’ 
experiences, and relate together with international organisations (Durnan 2005). They 
used ‘popular education’ as a tool for work in other sectors, such as agriculture, human 
rights, and health.378  
 
An important and growing aspect of SAHE’s work was its development of media. In 
2001 SAHE began publishing a journal, ‘Libertasaun’, written in Tetum, with issues 
covering topics such as nationalism, education, and the international financial 
institutions. From time to time SAHE also published small books and pamphlets on 
topical issues. All this literature was popular with students, and indeed some 500 books 
brought back from Indonesia by SAHE had all been taken by students. SAHE also had 
a production studio in which it could produce radio and CD-Rom. It produced a 
number of CD Roms, for example about self-reliant development, the International 
Tribunal, and about agricultural reform in the coffee industry. In making these, SAHE 
worked with other NGOs in the networks to which it belonged. CD Roms were cheap 
to produce and the CDs were used for educational activities by SAHE and others. Thus 
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SAHE continued its original ideas of promoting education, debate and discussion, 
using the research and media skills it had developed.379  
8.2.5 SAHE and nation building 
 
Unlike some other NGOs, SAHE as an organisation did not play a role lobbying or 
advocating about the Constitution, although two of its former members stood as 
candidates for FRETILIN for the 2001 Constituent Assembly election and were 
elected. SAHE’s view was that while individuals might wish to get involved in the 
debates around the Constitution, the NGO itself would not, as it believed that it was the 
people who should be directly involved in the discussions. Their observation was that a 
lot of organisations were doing national level advocacy, but very few were organising 
the community. They did not want to be an NGO who was advocating nationally 
without connecting to the community. In fact, their main attention was focussed 
narrowly on two communities (Bucoli, Liquica) with any national level work only 
undertaken through networks with others and the Activist School. Similarly they were 
not involved in the processes surrounding the National Development Plan.380 
 
They felt that although it was the efforts of the resistance which led to them having 
their own government, once UNTAET took over the people were left behind. As they 
saw it, rather than transform the knowledge and experience of the resistance, and use 
the former clandestine networks to build cooperatives, develop literacy and so on, the 
leadership took power to do things for the people. But the problem they saw was that 
East Timor was very dependent on international aid, and they did not believe that the 
funds were in East Timor’s own control. As they saw things, the Government did not 
organise the community to recognise and understand the problems facing the country, 
instead they got caught up making laws and policies. So for SAHE, the Government 
lost an opportunity to build on the spirit and voluntarism of the resistance period to 
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develop community organisation and self-reliance.381 However, SAHE’s membership 
of various NGO networks took them into dialogue with Government, as for example 
the meeting that they organised for HASATIL with the Prime Minister. This was an 
‘off the record’ discussion in early 2004, during which NGOs talked to the Prime 
Minister about a range of issues, especially to do with the World Bank and its role in 
East Timor. SAHE appreciated that although there were some problems, the 
Government was facing a lot of constraints and there were good people, like the former 
Director of the NGO Forum who was by then a Secretary of State, struggling to do 
what they could.382 
8.2.6 Relations with other NGOs 
 
SAHE was active in a number of NGO networks, taking a lead role in Dai Popular 
through which, among other things, it lobbied government for a national literacy 
campaign (Durnan 2005). SAHE also played a very active role in HASATIL, the 
network of NGOs interested in sustainable agriculture, and in the two NGO networks 
active on the Timor Sea issue. It was also a member of Knua Buka Hatene (KBH), a 
Training Centre set up jointly with the women’s group Grupo Feto Foun Timor-Leste 
(GFFTL) and the trades support organisation, LAIFET383, with support from Australian 
trades union NGO, APHEDA384. They used this link to develop their training ideas and 
to provide training to other community organisations.385 
 
Most of their funding came from international NGOs, especially three from the 
international catholic network, CAFOD (UK), Trocaire (Ireland), and the Catholic 
Bishop’s Conference of Japan. Oxfam (GB) and the Finnish Government also provided 
support. They appreciated these donor partners, who supported their approaches and 
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383 Labor Advocacy Institute for East Timor. 
384 Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad, the overseas aid arm of the 
     Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
385 Respondents 81, 68. In  May 2003 I conducted a review of APHEDA’s program in East Timor and  
     became aware of SAHE’s role in KBH through that experience. 
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were not always asking for immediate results, which would draw SAHE’s energy away 
into hours of reporting. They were happy that they started with only one funder, but by 
late 2004 there were many organisations wanting to support them, and the ones they 
worked with were very different in their approach compared to their initial donor, 
USAID.386 
8.2.7 Organisational structure and sustainability 
 
SAHE operated as a small collective of eight members and some additional volunteers, 
and they were keen to stay small, despite offers of support and opportunities to grow. 
There was an overall coordinator, but all decisions were taken collectively and 
everyone met twice a week—on a Monday for planning and evaluation of their 
program, on Friday to make organisational decisions. The key challenge they faced was 
how to become self-sufficient, or at least partially self-fund. They were trying to build 
up income through selling books and films, by making films for other organisations, 
and facilitating for others. In late 2004 they were hoping to soon open a bookstore, and 
also branching into selling T-shirts. They knew this was going to be a difficult process 
to build up their earned income, but they were making a start. They saw a huge need 
for community organising, and felt not enough was happening on the ground. For 
them, the key challenge was for individuals to build their own capacities so that they 
could help communities organise themselves to be more self-reliant.387 
  
8.3  Conclusion 
 
Timor Aid emerged from the self-determination struggle and saw Timor-Leste achieve 
that goal. However, it soon realised that for this to be meaningful and to deliver further 
benefits to ordinary Timorese people they had to have a greater sense of community 
level self-determination, in part through poverty reduction. They also seemed to have 
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understood that the process of building a new democratic nation needed to have long 
term attention and hence the focus on civic education, especially for the youth. Thus 
Timor Aid’s revised vision, developed in late 2003, focussed on a ‘…peaceful, just 
East Timor with the capacity to bring prosperity to the people…’ (Timor Aid 2003:3). 
Their programs have been very broad and diverse, with considerable attention to 
poverty reduction (with a broad encompassing understanding of poverty and 
exclusion), building Timorese identity (through language, culture, crafts and other 
media), civic education and work with youth.  
 
They experienced major changes in their people and management systems over the five 
years, initially expanding very rapidly with international support, but without the 
systems to adequately manage the growth, then experienced a sharp reduction in 
personnel and a need to rethink and rebuild the organisation for a more sustainable 
future. This involved developing Timor Aid’s own internal strategy and training 
program activities to build the skills of its staff and the NGOs with whom it worked in 
the districts. One element of this was long term in-house training and mentoring 
support from an international staff member working on local salary. Thus Timor Aid 
focussed heavily in the 2002-2004 period on building its own organisational capacity 
to manage and report on the types of programs it was undertaking. This involved not 
simply staff training but also organisational restructuring following a late-2003 
strategic review process. 
 
Clearly Timor Aid had enormous capacity to mobilise resources in the immediate 
emergency response phase, but it simply did not have the management capacity to 
match. It nevertheless retained a strong international network from which it derived 
resources, particularly through diverse international NGO and donor government 
sources developed during the period when its key members were in exile, rather than 
from sources based in Timor-Leste. In this sense it may have added to the sum of 
resources available for programs in East Timor. In particular it worked with networks 
of international NGOs, to obtain resources from the US, Europe and donors involved in 
the Pacific region.  
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This capacity to access resources was clearly linked to the skills Timor Aid had in 
external relations, initially through the East Timor solidarity and church movement 
worldwide, later through donor organisations mentioned above. Its external relations 
with the East Timor Government, particularly then Foreign Minister, Jose Ramos 
Horta, and certain key departments, built on relationships established over many years 
in exile. However, its relations with some other local NGOs have been difficult in the 
early years, in part because it generated such a high profile in the emergency, driven by 
returning exiles, and in part because it had not very actively engaged in joint advocacy 
with other NGOs. Timor Aid seemed to prefer ‘quiet diplomacy’ directly with the 
Government. There seemed to be deliberate attempts in late 2004 to reach out and build 
better relationships with non-government and other players within East Timor. Thus 
despite its early difficulties, Timor Aid established itself as an organisation with 
capacity to achieve outcomes in a range of program areas.  
 
The group who started the SAHE Study Club in Jakarta had an initial vision which 
drew on East Timorese history (particularly FRETILIN’s approach in the 1970s) and 
involved educating themselves and other Timorese students about how East Timor 
might develop as an independent democratic nation. But their return to Dili in mid-
1999 forced them to confront the pressing challenges facing Timorese people at that 
time. However, in tune with their initial educational role, they focussed a great deal of 
their energies on education—both for themselves and for the communities they were 
trying to help. They tried to develop empowering educational support to foster 
community networks for self-help. They endeavoured to build a pool of skilled 
facilitators through their small community groups in Liquica and Bucoli and through 
their Activist School. Thus their vision became clearer following their reading and 
research in Jakarta and their assessment of what practical help they could offer once 
they returned to East Timor. They remained a small group—developing a wider, 
relatively loose network—with little need for sophisticated management systems. They 
operated as a collective, in a participative way, which was practically possible given 
their small size. They mobilised limited but important resources from donors, but 
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probably more significant, they concentrated on mobilising the existing skills and 
capacities of the people themselves and transforming those for the new circumstances. 
 
The external relations they focussed on have largely been the two communities they 
worked with, their network of Activists and other popular education NGOs. They have 
not seen direct relations with government as important, and have limited their donor 
relations to a small number of like-minded organisations which supported their 
approach and did not expect immediate returns. The Popular Education Network was 
an important one through which SAHE’s ideas could be tested with others, and in other 
settings, and through which they lobbied for a national literacy campaign. Their 
continuing links with Indonesian NGOs also helped them develop practical ideas. 
There is no doubt that SAHE had capacity to achieve outcomes, some of which were 
expected to spread further through word of mouth and example.  
 
These quite different NGO stories complete the detailed case studies of East Timorese 
NGOs. The next chapter attempts to draw together from the case studies some 
conclusions about what happened to these local NGOs as organisations through the 
tumultuous period 1999-2004. It identifies the key roles local NGOs played through the 
various phases of the multiple transitions East Timor was undergoing and examines 
their major organisational and capacity development challenges and strategies.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
CHANGING NGO ROLES AND CAPACITIES IN 
A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
Chapters Three and Four elaborated the enormous changes in East Timor, among civil 
society itself, in the governing structures and processes, and through the dramatic 
increase in the number of international organisations present there. The following 
chapters described the trajectories of six significant NGOs in this period, 
demonstrating how actively engaged they were throughout. This chapter draws 
together the main issues and trends arising in terms of the roles key local NGOs in East 
Timor played during this period—how they tried to engage with and influence events, 
and negotiate changing relationships, changing themselves through the process. This 
chapter focuses on the NGOs as organisations, and reflects on them in relation to 
Fowler’s and Fisher’s frameworks and perspectives referred to in Chapter One. It 
comments on these NGOs’ capacities, how significantly the context affected them, and 
highlights some capacity development strategies these NGOs found particularly 
effective through the period. It also identifies areas in which they struggled. The final 
chapter will address the broader question of their contributions to democracy, 
development and peacebuilding.  
 
9.1 Local NGOs through the transitions: the challenges of context 
 
One of Smillie and Hailey’s conclusions about NGOs is that ‘context is everything’ 
and yet this is usually ignored by NGO observers (Smillie and Hailey 2001:161). This 
study strongly affirms this finding about the importance of context to NGOs. NGOs in 
East Timor were almost amoeba-like in the way they adapted to the very rapidly 
changing context in which they were operating. Table 2 summarizes the findings so far, 
tracing the transitional phases the emerging country experienced—the broad challenges 
it, and the NGOs in particular, faced in each period, and their responses to them.  
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Phase 1   Late 1998 to May 1999 
At the beginning of the study period, Timorese NGOs inside the province were 
operating in a repressive and dangerous environment. They were largely oppositional 
to the Indonesian state, but had to operate ostensibly within its laws and under the 
surveillance of its officials. They were at times threatened or harassed by state agents 
and had to be highly sophisticated and wily in the way they functioned. The result was 
that the small number of Timorese NGOs operated as best they could, sustaining 
people with urgent humanitarian needs, trying to protect people from serious human 
rights abuses and documenting the many violations which occurred for dissemination 
via international networks. Their ‘normal’ programs, in areas such as agriculture, 
credit, and water supply were considerably disrupted. Relations with the community 
were essentially through key individuals, particularly members of the Catholic Church 
or religious orders, the CNRT, or youth, student and women’s groups (many of which 
were becoming increasingly courageous in their campaign for self-determination). 
Working with groups was almost impossible, and only the church provided a protective 
umbrella for people to meet together safely. The NGOs developed a level of trust with 
certain individuals in their own communities and internationally through whom they 
could work. The repressive situation also shaped the donor environment, as 
international NGOs were viewed with suspicion by the Indonesian Government, and 
those that were present had to maintain a low profile, often as part of a broader 
Indonesian program. Other INGO donors made only brief visits to the province and 
although INGOs and bilateral donors knew NGO capacities were limited, capacity 
development was extremely difficult. AusAID was the only bilateral donor based in 
East Timor and was operating a water and sanitation program through which it 
developed the NGO Bia Hula.  
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Table 2 Phases in the study period and NGO responses 
 
 
Socio-political context Core Problems NGO roles and  issues Key relational 
challenges 
Support provided by 
official donors and INGOs 
 
1. The last phase of the 
Indonesian occupation (from 
late 1998 to May 1999) 
 
 
Human rights violations. 
 
Displaced persons needing 
food, water, and access to 
medical care 
 
Humanitarian relief.  
 
Human rights protection and 
documentation 
 
Information provision to 
outside world 
 
Some support and protection 
to resistance and population. 
 
 
With Government of 
Indonesia and militia: 
maintaining space to 
operate. 
 
Providing information 
and reporting to 
predominantly 
international NGOs 
 
 
 
Finance 
Networks for information 
provision 
International NGO presence 
and solidarity 
 
 
NB: Only limited number of 
official donors. 
 
 
 
2. UNAMET presence from 
June 1999-30 August 1999: 
the lead up to the act of self-
determination 
 
Human rights violations  
Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs)  needing 
food, water, and access to 
medical care 
 
Population needed 
information about conduct 
of the ballot. 
 
Humanitarian relief.  
 
Human rights protection and 
documentation 
 
Information provision to 
UNAMET and outside world 
 
Some support and protection 
to resistance and population 
 
Civic education re act of 
self-determination 
 
With Govt of Indonesia 
and militia: maintaining 
space to operate, 
especially as ballot drew 
closer 
 
Providing information 
and reporting to 
UNAMET and 
international 
governments, 
organisations and NGOs 
 
Developing partnership 
with UNAMET and UN 
agencies 
 
 
Finance 
 
Networks for information 
provision 
 
International NGO presence 
and solidarity 
 
 
Only limited number of 
official donors. 
 
 
Working in partnership e.g. 
UNHCR working with 
NGOs re food distribution 
etc. 
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3. Period of the Emergency 
(September 1999-mid-2000) 
 
Population displaced 
 
Infrastructure destroyed 
 
Services collapsed 
 
Initially no government 
then UNTAET 
administration 
  
Human rights violations 
 
Traumatised people 
 
 
Humanitarian relief 
 
Human rights documentation 
and information 
 
Trauma counselling and 
support 
 
Reestablishing NGOs 
 
Advocacy for Timorese 
participation 
 
Reestablishing 
partnerships and finding 
role in international 
emergency operation. 
 
Understanding influx of 
NGOs, multilateral 
agencies, bilateral 
donors and their roles. 
 
Reestablishing NGOs’ 
own relationships, NGO 
Forum etc 
 
Mostly short-term (3 
month), in-kind support and 
equipment, transport, office 
establishment.  
 
‘Partnerships’ of various 
sorts with international 
humanitarian community. 
 
4. Emergency to 
rehabilitation period and 
establishment of transitional 
processes for independence 
(Mid-2000-May 2002). 
 
Need to rehabilitate all 
essential infrastructure and 
deliver essential services 
 
Need to establish political 
structures and processes for 
transition to independence. 
 
 
Transition from immediate 
relief to longer-term 
development programs 
 
Civic education for transition 
to self-government  
 
Advocacy for greater 
Timorese input to decision 
making  
 
Organisational development 
and strategising. 
 
Understanding the 
organisational 
landscape and 
establishing longer term 
relationships with 
UNTAET and ETTA 
structures, INGOs, 
multilateral agencies 
and bilateral donors. 
 
Linking community to 
the international effort 
and disseminating 
information. 
 
 
Finance, training, and 
advice; networks, 
mentoring, reviews etc  
 
Major projects eg to provide 
frameworks for NGO roles 
in civic education 
 
‘Partnerships’ with 
international NGOs. 
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5. Independence—the initial 
12-18 months (May 2002- 
early 2004) 
 
 
 
Strengthening the state 
institutions and the state’s 
ability to provide essential 
services to the community.  
 
Begin implementation of 
the National Development 
Plan.  
 
Communities seeking 
support to address priorities 
of health, education and 
agriculture. 
 
Longer-term development - 
finding roles. 
 
Greater development of 
democratic structures and 
institutions. 
 
Finding approaches to 
organisational sustainability. 
 
Relationship-building with 
government. 
 
 
Develop relationship 
with new Government 
and maintain civil 
society space 
 
Review programs and 
deal with reduced donor 
support for NGOs 
 
Develop greater 
effectiveness in work 
with communities. 
 
 
Networks and reduced 
funding 
 
Training and advice, 
reviews, and shared 
learning 
 
‘Partnerships’ with 
international NGOs. 
 
6. Independence—later 
period: early 2004 to mid-
2005. 
 
Withdrawal of most 
international forces and 
support   
 
Consideration of 
decentralisation. 
 
National Government’s 
stability and capacity to 
manage the nation.  
 
 
 
Finding strategies for 
organisational sustainability. 
 
Developing Government-
LNGO relationships 
 
Empowering people for 
greater self-reliance 
 
Reducing presence and 
funding from 
INGOs and official 
donors. 
 
Improve relationship 
with new Government 
and maintain civil 
society space. 
 
Develop less dependent 
relationships with 
communities - focus on 
community 
development 
 
 
Networks and reduced 
funding 
Training and advice, 
reviews, and shared 
learning 
 
‘Partnerships’ with 
international NGOs 
 
NGOs as contractors in 
major aid project. 
 
Phase 2   June 1999 to 30 August 1999 
As the UNAMET team arrived in East Timor, the situation remained tense and 
difficult, but NGOs developed new relationships with elements of the UN presence. 
Human rights NGOs such as HAK developed a relationship with the political section of 
UNAMET, while it and others involved in emergency response developed relationships 
and activities with the UN High Commission for Refugees and World Food 
Programme whose presence was a response to the growing numbers of Internally 
Displaced People. NGOs also became involved with the civic education effort, to make 
the population aware of how to register and vote in the ballot for self-determination. 
The Catholic Church and its NGO, Caritas East Timor, played a particularly significant 
role supporting the resistance leaders as well as the wider population. Most NGOs were 
forced to suspend their normal programs during this period and simply do whatever 
they could to respond to the emergency facing the population and to maintain a human 
rights presence in the province. They advocated strongly for a more secure 
environment for the conduct of the ballot. It was also during this period that many 
Timorese students studying in Indonesia returned to East Timor to assist civil society 
groups provide community information and education in preparation for the ballot. 
  
Phase 3  September 1999 to mid-2000 
After the ballot, NGOs were targeted and their staff had to flee in several directions. 
When they returned, it was to a different organisational environment altogether. The 
international humanitarian community had arrived in East Timor and the United 
Nations was taking over (or had already assumed) administrative responsibility, 
initially through INTERFET and then in the form of UNTAET. The struggle at that 
stage was for recognition by the international players and for acceptance that LNGOs, 
along with other local leaders, had a role to play. LNGOs had two responses to this—
some withdrew frustrated from efforts to work within the UN framework and began to 
regroup and identify things they could do with the community, often with INGO or 
prior donor support (e.g. Caritas Dili, ETADEP, Yasona).388 Others explored working 
in partnership with INGOs or multilateral agencies such as UNHCR with whom they 
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already had relationships, and found ways to contribute to the internationally led 
emergency response (e.g. Timor Aid, HAK). Human rights NGOs also immediately set 
about gathering evidence and documenting the many violations which had just 
occurred. The community’s needs, which were considerable at that stage, motivated 
LNGOs to respond to the immediate circumstances, such as providing food, trauma 
counselling, and ways of generating income or livelihoods. Some NGOs also 
recognised that an urgent requirement was to plant the crop for the coming season, so 
agricultural NGOs were quick to try to supply the necessary seeds and tools to allow 
people to plant again and start fending for themselves. This was a period of 
considerable turmoil and initial exclusion of most LNGOs, although those with pre-
existing international NGO partnerships were able to draw on their international 
support quite rapidly to develop at least short term plans and deliver some programs, 
generally in partnership with INGOs and a small number of UN agencies. However, 
the experience of exclusion actively contributed to the re-formation of the East Timor 
NGO Forum, an organisation which played an important role in the UNTAET period. 
 
Phase 4   Mid-2000 to 20 May 2002 
As the emergency response shifted into a rehabilitation phase, many of the NGOs 
realised that they needed to review their situation, assess the needs of the people, and 
their own capacities, and determine what they could do for the next period. During this 
phase there were many demands upon them as the people’s situation remained 
extremely difficult and UNTAET began the longer-term task of rebuilding the 
country’s infrastructure. At the same time UNTAET began to establish some Timorese 
governance and administration, in preparation for the transition to independence. 
Criticisms of the exclusion of Timorese from the emergency phase led to the inclusion 
of NGO and church representatives in key bodies established to advise the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative in East Timor. In the absence of a legitimately 
elected government, NGOs were seen as one source of legitimacy for the UNTAET’s 
decision making about East Timor’s future. By 2001 the NGO Forum and its many 
Working Groups had become extremely lively with NGO people actively engaged with 
international donors and the UNTAET administration on a range of sectoral and 
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transitional process issues. East Timorese NGO representatives also had seats at the 
table at official donor meetings coordinated by the World Bank.  
 
This was also the period during which NGOs began to develop or redevelop their 
programs in key communities; addressing people’s socio-economic needs became 
important, along with addressing their information needs and resolving local conflicts. 
For some NGOs this was a time of expansion and an opportunity for interaction 
between the communities and the national developments. It was a chance for some to 
engage the community on broad policy issues facing the new nation (HAK, 
FOKUPERS). For one, it was a period of major adjustment to reduced funding 
following the emergency (Timor Aid). Others simply pushed on with their 
development work (Timor Aid, ETADEP, SAHE). From 2001 many NGOs played 
important civic education roles, helping to explain to the community the process of the 
ballot for the Constituent Assembly, and, once established, informing the community, 
gathering their views and advocating about the proposed Constitution. Thus the NGOs 
had an important role throughout this phase. They were included in many key 
processes, and they in turn advocated for processes that would enable greater 
community inclusion. A few key donors had introduced civil society programs, mainly 
focussed on community socio-economic development and civic education for 
democracy, and often directed to LNGOs through international ones, who were meant 
to be providing capacity building support. 
 
Phase 5  20 May 2002 to early 2004 
As the nation attained independence in May 2002, East Timorese NGOs recognised 
that things were likely to change again, and several of the case study NGOs reviewed 
and reassessed their context and their work in late 2002 or in 2003. At this point they 
were realising that not all their community level programs to date had been as 
successful or sustainable as they would have hoped, and they were feeling their way in 
their relationship with the various organs of the state (e.g. the President, Parliament 
etc.) and the new Government.389 Some were beginning to work with the relevant 
                                            
389 Apart from the case study NGOs this was true of others, e.g. respondent 71 described how his LNGO 
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Ministries, both as individual NGOs and through NGO networks, while others were 
simply working at community level, with only limited contact with the central 
Government. It was starting to become clear that communities were going to have 
develop greater self-reliance as the Government had little capacity to respond to the 
many community issues arising. 
 
Phase 6 Early 2004 to mid-2005 
By 2004 relations between Timorese NGOs and the Government had become a 
significant concern. From a period of lively inclusion in national debates, NGOs found 
themselves left on the margins, with ambivalent legal status and no easy channels of 
engagement. There had been no legislation to establish the status of NGOs, and there 
was concern that when such laws or regulations were created they might be designed to 
control NGOs rather than to facilitate their operation. Although there was an NGO Unit 
within the Ministry of External Affairs, some NGOs were nervous about its attempts to 
establish a register of NGOs, and liaison meetings with the Ministry tended to be 
information provision sessions from the Government to NGOs. In an attempt to address 
this situation NGO networks became more important as it was through these networks 
that NGOs experimented together in engaging the Government, for example through 
sectoral departments such as the Ministry of Agriculture Forests and Fisheries 
(HASATIL), or the Ministry of Education (Dai Popular). However, while some 
networks supported the Government, for example in its struggle to gain a fair deal over 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the Timor Sea, others came into conflict 
with it, particularly with the President, over issues of justice for victims of serious 
human rights violations (ETAN 2005). So while there were examples of excellent 
cooperation between NGOs and the new Government there were parts of the 
Government suspicious of NGOs and their political motives.  
 
Donor relations were also changing, with far greater demands for accountability and 
reduced donor funding for local NGOs as donors focussed on strengthening the 
                                                                                                                              
     had good relations with the President, and that the Parliament read reports it produced, and  
     respondent 79 described considerable interest in one Ministry in learning more about her LNGO’s  
     approach in  developing policy in that area. 
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Government. The move towards decentralisation and establishment of local 
government structures attracted official donors, whose investments shifted towards this 
goal, at the expense of civil society programs (Ministry of State Administration 2005). 
Funding levels fell and many of the post-1999 NGOs closed down or faded away. 
Some survived in the short term as contractors to official donor programs, but the 
sustainability and capacity of even the well established NGOs became a central issue. 
Faced with these new pressures and a situation of considerable uncertainty, it is 
unsurprising that a number of NGOs found themselves dealing with the challenges of 
reduced funding and staff reductions, as well as trying to work with communities in 
which pressures were building. It was becoming evident that getting people working 
together in community groups and trying to help them engage with the new state was 
fraught with difficulties. Local communities expected relations with outsiders to reflect 
the top-down provision of goods or services with which they were familiar in 
Indonesian time, and which had unfortunately been more than reinforced through ‘aid 
dependency’ created during the previous few years. NGO staff struggled as they tried 
to shift towards a community empowerment and community development approach, 
but in a difficult environment and without adequate skills or experience. 
 
Thus over the five year period of this study the overriding challenge the NGOs faced 
was how to negotiate their way through the changing context and in particular, the 
changing relationships: with the Government; with donors and the international 
community; and with other smaller NGOs or community groups and the local people at 
district or sub-district levels. These changes were at the heart of the challenge, and in 
turn affected their ability to both mobilise resources and demonstrate outcomes. 
Although each of the case study NGOs remained true to their original values, they had 
to constantly reassess their roles in this rapidly changing context, and adjust their 
activities and relationships accordingly. This also required them to make frequent, and 
times major, changes in their organisational structures in response, which will be 
discussed later.  
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9.2  Overview of LNGO roles  
 
It is notable that local NGOs in East Timor played all the roles identified elsewhere by 
Hulme and Goodhand (2000) and all but one390 of those identified by Leonhardt et 
al.391 (2002), although in neither earlier study was the role of local NGOs distinguished 
clearly from the work of international NGOs. This study emphasises that local 
Timorese NGOs were active in each of these areas; I have summarized the roles they 
collectively undertook throughout this period in Table 3 (see next page). 
 
As indicated above, NGO roles and emphases changed with the changing 
circumstances, needs and opportunities. These NGOs did not follow Korten’s 
organisational development phases in any ordered way. Rather, they were adaptive and 
responsive to the context in which they found themselves, shifting roles as they 
assessed that the circumstances required. Thus Korten rightly pinpoints NGOs as 
organisations of change and adaptation, but this study shows that in contrast to 
Korten’s rather evolutionary approach to NGO stages, Timorese NGOs undertook roles 
in at least three of Korten’s phases (i.e. relief and welfare, community development, 
and sustainable systems development) often almost simultaneously. At the beginning 
of the study period most were involved in either humanitarian or human rights 
documentation case work, clandestinely supporting the people’s movement for 
independence. That is, through these activities, they were contributing to a social 
movement (the final stage in Korten’s typology). But when opportunities arose to 
influence the institutions of the new nation, they were quick to shift towards advocacy 
                                            
390 NGOs as organisations were not directly involved in peace negotiations in East Timor, although the  
      church played an extremely important role in the lead up to the UN-supervised ballot, with its Dare  
      meetings, and individuals associated with NGOs were involved (Crowe 1995, Cristalis 2002, Kohen  
      2001). 
391Hulme and Goodhand identified NGOs involved in: mediation/conflict resolution; building peace 
     constituencies; demobilisation; human rights monitoring and protection; constitutional reform; local  
     capacity building/institutional strengthening; socio-economic development; reconciliation; judicial  
     reform; supporting local leadership; and advocacy/education. Leonhardt et al found NGOs: providing  
     input to the peace negotiations, addressing past violations, promoting specific issues relating to the  
     justice system and impunity, promoting community dialogue and debate on violence and political  
     issues, promoting women’s rights and roles, assisting peasants to have a voice, and supporting  
     returning  refugees. 
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and education for sustainable systems development at the national level.392 At the same 
time, they were building up their community development projects and approaches. 
The context affected their specific objectives at any time and the roles they would play. 
 
Table 3 Summary of NGO roles throughout the study period 
 
• Emergency response: humanitarian work (food, medical, shelter etc.), 
supporting IDPs and returning refugees; 
• Human rights and legal development:  human rights work and legal protection, 
addressing current and past violations, promoting specific issues relating to the 
justice system and impunity, education and advocacy around constitution 
making, promoting women’s rights and roles in decision making; 
• Community education: information provision and education, civic education, 
assisting rural people to have a voice and helping them with problem solving, 
as well as dealing with aid dependency; 
• Conflict resolution and conflict management: assistance with demobilisation, 
reconciliation, dealing with land conflicts, information provision, community 
conflict resolution, promoting community dialogue and debate on violence,  
       human rights and other issues; 
• Economic development: activities such as agriculture, weaving, marketing, 
tourism development, and other livelihood activities; 
• Social development: literacy work, water supply and sanitation, health 
activities; 
• Psycho-social and cultural development: Tetum language, weaving, trauma 
counselling and related programs; 
• Advocacy and research on a range of issues arising from the above work. 
 
                                            
392 For example, HAK was quick to work towards a state with a Constitution and laws which embedded  
     human rights; FOKUPERS was working towards an effective legal and support system to deal with  
     violence against women; Caritas Dili was assisting the Government to develop the system for TB  
     prevention, treatment and control; SAHE was advocating for a national literacy programme; Timor  
     Aid was promoting national civic education curriculum. 
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It is also evident that since many former students created new NGOs in early 2000, the 
energy of the people’s movement, which had achieved its single goal of independence, 
quickly dissipated, and in time, as donor funds reduced, many of these new NGOs also 
became defunct or closed down altogether. NGOs did not lead or generate a people’s 
movement (in this case a movement for independence) as suggested by Korten, but 
they were contributors to it. Most of the NGOs operating in the earliest period had a 
symbiotic relationship with the people’s movement for independence. Some NGOs 
helped the clandestine movement within East Timor; others grew out of it, including its 
exiles, and some NGOs benefited from the leadership provided by a number of 
independence activists who found in NGOs a site from which they could contribute to 
the creation of their nation. However, it could be argued that NGOs were influential in 
taking up the women’s struggle within and beyond the independence movement. Since 
2000 the members of the REDE network have certainly sustained the women’s 
movement in its continuing struggle for greater gender equality. 
 
The findings also strongly endorse Fisher’s point that ‘to govern is to structure the field 
of possible actions of others’(Fisher 1997:458) since the changing national governance 
regimes they experienced between 1999 and 2004 clearly had a major impact in 
structuring the possible roles which NGOs could effectively play, and the strategies 
they subsequently adopted. However, they also shifted their own civil society 
governance to some degree by forming NGO networks to enable them to more 
fruitfully engage with parts of the Government than most could have done alone. It is 
also clear that the NGOs in this study were to greater and lesser degrees, and in 
different ways, trying to be transformative of their society. FOKUPERS’ attempts to 
empower women through their campaigns against domestic violence were probably the 
most significant, though HAK’s efforts to entrench a broad human rights culture also 
envisaged a major transformation. SAHE, and in the later period Caritas Dili, tried to 
empower communities, although the latter in particular was finding it difficult; Timor 
Aid’s work to transform language use to Tetum and to build on traditional weaving to 
generate income was transformative in terms of cultural development, in contrast to the 
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colonial period during which Timorese culture had been ruthlessly suppressed. 
However, all these transformations would take many years. 
 
9.3 How the changing context affected the NGOs capacities 
 
Experience among Indonesia’s NGOs, following its own transition to democracy, 
indicates that local NGOs were struggling to reorient themselves to new roles and new 
partnerships, that their accountability was weak, coordination poor, and they could be 
distant from the rural poor (Antlov, Ibrahim and van Tuijl 2005); they did not have the 
capacity to shift the policy agenda, were overly reliant on foreign donors and some 
were struggling financially (Rosser, Roesad and Edwin 2005). Some of this is also true 
for East Timor’s NGOs, who have undergone a much more complex and dramatic 
transition.  
 
As the political environment in East Timor changed over the five year period, and 
NGO roles changed, they had to be highly flexible and adaptable in structure and 
strategy, constantly restructuring and reorganising to retain relevance and influence. 
Their visions and missions became more specifically articulated as the context 
changed, although all of the case study NGOs remained true to the development and 
human rights values and issues which initially stimulated their formation. It was their 
strategies and approaches that had to change. These organisational changes in turn 
demanded a whole new repertoire of skills to enable NGO staff and volunteers to 
address new situations and problems. Much of that learning had to take place ‘on the 
run’ during these fast-paced transitions, when NGOs were already under considerable 
pressure. Furthermore, this learning had to be constantly renewed because in many of 
the organisations staff and volunteers changed as organisations expanded and 
contracted with funding available—in some NGOs, staff turnover was at times 
considerable, and training new recruits a constant challenge. A number of former NGO 
leaders moved into key government or parliamentary positions; others were offered 
scholarships and went overseas to study for lengthy periods. In some cases this 
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weakened NGOs, at least temporarily, but generally new leadership emerged and the 
team within the NGO sustained the work. All of the case study organisations undertook 
organisational restructures or reconfigurations, often major ones, and in some cases 
two or more in the period of study, in addition to less significant organisational 
adjustments which they made frequently. These were initiated as context changed and 
the staff (and volunteers) realised that they would have to reassess their goals, their 
strategies, and hence the organisation’s structure to support any changed strategy and 
program configuration. At times a crisis, such as a change in funding levels, 
precipitated the structural change. Thus the area which most found constantly 
challenging was that involving people and systems of management. Yet all the case 
study NGOs had a leadership group with a broad vision about the province’s, later the 
country’s, future and how their organisation might contribute to it, combined with the 
flexibility to respond to opportunities to advance in that direction. These leaders had a 
capacity to analyse this complex and evolving context and respond to it in the ways 
they thought appropriate.  
 
In light of the challenge of NGO survival (Banerjee 2003:6), it is worth reflecting on 
how they developed their capacities through this period of intense change. Two 
important survival capacities seemed to be associated with the areas of relationships 
and resources. These NGOs developed their capacities for external relationships, 
initially with INGOs and other potential allies, later with other organisations, Timorese 
and international. Their early relationships were often strongly based on trust and 
common vision (e.g. towards self-determination), but the changing environment soon 
involved NGOs in managing multiple new relationships with international donor 
organisations, bilateral, multilateral and non-government, from many different nations, 
and in some new languages. Partnering and negotiations with diverse organisations, if 
not entirely new to some, developed at expanded levels and often with new 
organisations. Managing new donor arrangements with diverse accountability and 
funding requirements, mostly in English, was challenging. Often essential skills to deal 
with outsiders and donors (e.g. English language, and report writing) were confined to 
a very small number of usually senior NGO staff already under intense pressure. 
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Financial and narrative reporting requiring higher level project management skills had 
to be strengthened considerably, as donors changed their expectations and began to 
demand more of the NGOs in the new context. Timorese NGOs needed stronger 
organisational management systems, financial skills, the ability to communicate with 
foreign agencies in English, and greater expertise with information technology. Even 
those working only with INGOs found project management requirements becoming 
more onerous. At the same time some donor funding of NGOs—swamping an NGO 
with few management systems, only providing short-term program funding with 
insufficient support for staff and organisational development, or unexpectedly 
changing established funding arrangements which an NGO had come to rely on—also 
affected NGO organisational capacities. Equally, NGOs unable to predict and adjust to 
possible shifts in donor strategies by forming new donor relationships were potentially 
in jeopardy. Similarly, NGOs which struggled to maintain donor confidence in their 
management and reporting were at risk of experiencing reduced funding support. 
 
At the same time relationships with the community and local NGOs and CBOs were an 
important strength in the capacities of the well-established and better-known NGOs 
(especially ETADEP, HAK and Caritas Dili among the case study NGOs). They had 
extensive relationships at local level, generally enjoyed a high degree of community 
trust and legitimacy, and compared to other foreign agencies, had a deep knowledge of 
the country, including the political, social, cultural and economic context, and many 
local contacts. Despite this, they also struggled with the challenge of community 
trauma, conflicts and jealousies and the difficulties of making groups function 
effectively. There were many areas in which they knew they needed greater staff skills 
and organisational capacities. 
 
9.4   NGOs developing their capacities  
 
During the study period official donors and INGOs used various capacity development 
strategies and approaches to help strengthen Timorese NGOs. Apart from funding, 
these included partnership projects between INGO and LNGOs, many training 
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workshops on development issues (such as human rights, organic agricultural 
strategies, advocacy, gender, civic education) or project management (project 
management, financial management, information technology, English language), 
exchanges and networking. The capacity development strategies which case study 
NGOs reported to be of greatest value involved relationships, networking and 
exchanges, accompaniment and mentoring, and reflective learning.393  
 
Relationships, networks and exchanges 
It is important to note that linkages with international development and human rights 
NGOs have been an important factor in the emergence, development and strategies of 
local NGOs in East Timor from the outset (for examples of NGO links with US 
organisations, often through Indonesian NGOs, see Simpson 2004). Of the six NGOs 
studied in depth, four—HAK, FOKUPERS, SAHE and ETADEP—were strongly 
oriented to Indonesian networks, Timor Aid was strongly connected to Europe and 
Australia, and Caritas Dili to international Catholic networks, especially those in 
Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. Other LNGOs interviewed were 
similarly connected and described how these relationships contributed to their work.394 
Despite the rupture of September 1999, NGO relationships with Indonesia remained 
strong. Because of the shared language, familiar context, and trust developed in the 
Indonesian period,395 Timorese NGOs preferred to have Indonesian NGO trainers, 
attended NGO conferences, and made study visits to Indonesia (e.g. to learn about 
financial self-reliance, agriculture, traditional medicine, gender etc.). There is no doubt 
that a strong affinity remained with Indonesian NGOs, and those Timorese NGOs 
initially established with Indonesian NGO support continued to receive assistance from 
their Indonesian colleagues as required. 
 
                                            
393 Note that I have not made an assessment of NGO capacities against any particular criteria. This  
     section  is derived from interviews with NGO respondents and reflects their assessments of what was  
     most  useful to them in developing the capacities they assessed that they needed. 
394 For example, respondents 53,54,45,67. 
395Respondent 16, a senior INGO staff member, emphasised that capacity building did not work unless  
     trust existed, and people known in the resistance period were trusted.  
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At the same time new linkages were formed, particularly with NGOs from Latin 
America, the Philippines and other parts of South East Asia. International NGOs 
brought to East Timor connections to a wide range of organisations across the world, 
and selectively drew on those to help Timorese NGOs build their capacity to address 
the specific issues emerging in East Timor over the period. One can trace the 
emergence of Dai Popular (Durnan 2005), and the Men Against Violence group (de 
Araujo 2004), specifically to such linkages which international NGOs fostered.396   
HASATIL also developed through a linkage between an Australian permaculture 
activist who volunteered with Timor Aid and a Timorese man who then studied 
permaculture and became the first HASATIL coordinator.397 
 
Nationally the development of a number of significant networks which included local 
NGOs (and in most cases included, or had support from international NGOs) made a 
considerable contribution to capacity development in areas of sustainable agriculture, 
gender issues, popular education, and advocacy (e.g. about Timor Sea and World Bank 
matters, human rights issues). These national networks have in turn fostered 
international networking with ‘peers’ in other developing countries and thereby 
brought important international experience to Timor-Leste.398  Local NGOs gained 
ideas and learned from others’ experience—as all the case study NGOs recognised, 
learning has occurred between these national networks and individual Timorese NGOs, 
Indonesian NGOs, or NGOs from other developing country contexts.  
 
International networking with ‘northern’ NGOs and others, notably where international 
funding support was reliable, over at least a three year timeframe, where there was 
good communication in their own language, and where the support facilitated their 
directions, was also highly valued and contributed to capacity. Time spent by these 
organisations in developing good relationships with Timorese was really important.399 
This type of support enabled local NGOs to review or evaluate their work from time to 
                                            
396 Respondents 13,76, 77. 
397 Respondent 68. 
398 Respondents 76, 77 strongly emphasised the value of these networks and connections. 
399 Respondents 76, 77 and 23 were among several respondents who made this point. 
 264
time and develop new strategies. Examples include NOVIB’s relationship with HAK 
and FOKUPERS, and Caritas New Zealand’s relationship with Caritas Dili. However, 
not all the relationships with ‘Northern’ NGOs were entirely successful. Where 
Northern NGOs had unrealistic expectations about capacity levels,400 or tried to 
promote their own agendas or models over those of the Timorese NGOs, the 
relationships were less than satisfactory, and in once case in this study, a partnership 
was ended by the Timorese NGO as a result. Success was more likely where the 
international NGO, through processes of review involving the local NGO itself, 
fostered critical thinking about approaches and programming, which might lead to 
improvements initiated by the local NGO. 
 
A particular type of networking is exchanges, by which is meant visits by NGOs or 
community members to different parts of the country or the world. Capacity developed 
from NGO exchanges—both inward by NGO or community activists from other 
(usually developing) countries to East Timor and outward, to other developing 
countries facing similar issues. Sometimes these were facilitated by INGOs that could 
identify potential organisational exchange opportunities to address particular problems 
or contexts facing Timor-Leste NGOs. Internal exchanges within Timor-Leste were 
also used successfully to demonstrate new ideas, agricultural techniques or other 
technologies, for example between farmer groups.  
 
Accompaniment /mentoring 
The term ‘accompaniment’ was used by some of the NGOs. It referred to the 
placement of people with specific expertise and experience in the NGO to work 
alongside the local staff and share skills, experience, and strategies with them, often on 
a local wage. This was long term assistance—from one to three years, or longer in 
some cases—and it required particular sorts of experienced or skilled people to do it 
well, supporting local development rather than taking over. Such people worked 
together with the local staff on the same programs. This involved passing on particular 
professional experience (e.g. legal expertise to a human rights organisation or 
                                            
400 Respondent 22. 
 265
organisational and project management expertise, for example). Several examples of 
this strategy were highly valued and successful in building local capacity, in situ 
(examples included in Timor Aid, Caritas Dili, FOKUPERS, HAK,401 and ETADEP). 
In one case, (Caritas Dili) such a person also worked with a wider network of 
international specialist health support to the local staff. Case study NGOs reported that 
some of the strongest capacity developed where this strategy was used, as it was a 
sustained, steady approach which allowed people to learn and develop at their own 
pace, and organisational systems necessary to support them were built steadily. 
 
Reflective learning 
For a number of NGOs, a very important driver of their learning was regular sharing 
among themselves—analysing the context and solving problems together; sharing 
learning from training individuals had attended, sharing skills and knowledge with 
each other. Having regular ‘review’ meetings, monthly, six-monthly or annually; 
having special  externally-facilitated reviews, strategic planning workshops and the 
like, were all valued and NGOs saw these as major ways in which they developed 
capacity. HAK, FOKUPERS, SAHE, and to a lesser extent, Timor Aid and Caritas Dili 
all used many of these processes. Capacity also developed from organisational 
restructuring following reviews, so that structures no longer suited to previous periods 
were changed to address future needs. 
 
Some NGOs also learned from the community itself. For example, they learned how 
earlier reformers had developed literacy and related programs, and then developed 
programs based on these earlier methods (SAHE). They also developed capacity by 
researching the communities they worked with, reviewing their programs, exploring 
community priorities, learning from past mistakes and adjusting strategies in response 
(FOKUPERS, Caritas Dili, ETADEP, Timor Aid). In some cases they did some of their 
learning in partnership with a government department (e.g. ETADEP with the Ministry 
of Agriculture). Overall, the capacity development which seems to have been most 
successful is that which NGOs developed internally, often with support of enlightened 
                                            
401 HAK had a volunteer foreign lawyer for a lengthy period (respondent 56). 
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international NGO partners. Helping emerging or re-emerging NGOs make 
assessments of their changing context, and transforming and re-skilling themselves to 
keep pace with the transitional processes, was an important aspect of capacity 
development. It seemed that organisational adaptability was facilitated and stimulated 
by such international networking and deliberate learning and capacity building 
processes. In contrast, little of the formal training offered to NGOs focussed on either 
organisational change management or community development approaches in post-
conflict environments. Yet these were critically important skills needed by NGO 
leaders and key staff. 
 
Ironically, as the more capable NGOs were surviving, and had learned a great deal 
from the past five years to shape their future contributions to the nation, their resource 
capacities were shrinking. Financial and other resources, which came both from 
international non-government agencies and from bilateral and multilateral donors who 
saw the value of civil society organisations, have been crucial to the capacity of 
Timorese NGOs. While many were trying to generate income, they were mostly 
heavily reliant on international support for their programs. Those which survive are 
likely to be those local NGOs which have used the period since Year 2000 to 
consolidate strong partnerships with international NGOs committed to Timor-Leste for 
the long term, or those service delivery NGOs which official donors can engage as part 
of their programs, although this remains a risky strategy as official donors reduce their 
focus on civil society. The likelihood of the Government funding NGO programs 
seemed patchy at best as this study concluded. While government support was 
forthcoming in a few areas, such as work with the disabled, at the end of 2004 there 
was no clear policy basis to underpin the Government’s approach to its potential civil 
society partners, nor any concerted donor strategy to foster one, with the exception of 
UNDP’s efforts which remained somewhat frustrated.402 
 
 
                                            
402 In late 1997, following a change of government in 2006, it seemed that the Xanana Gusmao-led 
     Government was likely to fund NGOs and the Church in its budget. The details were not yet available  
      however (Personal Communication respondent 102, 6 January 2007). 
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9.5  Conclusions 
 
The research has demonstrated the experiences of NGOs in one rapidly changing 
context, negotiating their way through the shifting sands of multiple transitions and a 
multitude of new relationships. It reinforces Fisher’s perspective that what is important 
to the study of NGOs is the ‘fluid web of relationships’ within which they operate and 
indicates that they are highly adaptive. The NGOs which were central to this study 
certainly saw themselves as challenging (Indonesian) power at the outset, and in 
various ways most of them remain committed to transforming East Timorese society in 
some way—by empowering women, ensuring people are more aware of their human 
rights, or addressing rural poverty directly through programs (such as agricultural or 
other livelihood projects) and through advocacy; their relationships with international 
and Indonesian NGOs which shared such concerns and approaches appeared to be very 
important for them, as well as their networking with other Timorese NGOs. 
 
This study also strongly affirms Smillie and Hailey’s assessment that change 
management is a major feature of NGOs and that ‘balancing diverse challenges is the 
key to NGO management’ (Smillie and Hailey 2001:3). NGOs which pre-existed the 
crisis and played a range of roles in the struggle for liberation were largely excluded 
from the emergency response immediately after September 1999 (except for Timor 
Aid). However, they regrouped and played important roles in the state building phase 
during the UNTAET period. Then roles and relationships changed again following the 
shift to the new government, but gradually confidence and relationships were building; 
however future NGO roles were far from clear in early 2005. The first Timor-Leste 
Government had no clear position about its relationship with NGOs or their role in 
development. In their relations with the community, NGOs were grappling with the 
aftermath of the Indonesian period and emergency period—which created 
dependency—and facing the challenge of community development. Official donor 
interest in NGOs which was generally project based and short term, appeared to be 
waning just as NGO capacities were strengthening and they had something more to 
contribute. Change was a constant for these NGOs; they were constantly challenged to 
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assess and reassess the context in which they were operating, and to adjust their 
strategies and relationships to match. While they felt that donors tended to focus their 
concerns on reporting and financial accountability, the NGOs were struggling to make 
their community based programs work, undertake effective advocacy, manage constant 
organisational change, build the capacities of their staff and volunteers to undertake 
everything from basic administration to conflict resolution, proposal writing and high 
level lobbying, and generate funding to sustain their activities. They used relationships 
and networks, ‘accompaniment’, and learning from each other and the community to 
build their capacities. 
 
The final chapter turns to reflect on these findings in light of experiences elsewhere and 
theories about NGOs and civil society in development, democracy and peacebuilding. 
It demonstrates how the detail of the case studies contributes to established theory by 
suggesting that civil society and development practice, which has been strongly based 
on de Tocqueville’s approach to civil society, is not particularly helpful in a post-
conflict setting. Instead, an adapted Gramscian approach, viewing civil and political 
society as interrelated sites in which a struggle to embed non-violent means of  
apportioning power is being waged, could be of greater analytic and practical value.
 CHAPTER TEN 
 
NGO CONTRIBUTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION: 
THE CASE OF TIMOR-LESTE 
 
 
This chapter discusses the extent to which NGOs contributed to democracy, 
development and peacebuilding in the post-conflict transitional environment of Timor-
Leste. It draws on the six case study NGOs as well as data from other sources, 
including interviews, to reflect on some of the key issues which research in post-
conflict or transitional settings elsewhere raises. It thus seeks to answer the question, 
‘How does the actual experience of these local East Timorese NGOs relate to theories 
about the roles of civil society and NGOs in various phases of transition to democracy, 
nation building and post-conflict peacebuilding?’ posed at the outset. This research 
documented the work of six significant East Timorese NGOs through this critical 
period, and situated this within the wider civil society and transitional environment. 
 
10.1 Local NGOs and the transition to and consolidation of     
           democracy 
 
NGOs clearly played a supportive role in the transition to democracy, particularly from 
the mid-1990s, along with the higher profile role of the national political movement, 
the CNRT, and the three arms of the liberation struggle: the diplomatic front, the 
clandestine front and the guerrilla fighters. Some Timorese NGOs had been formed for 
humanitarian purposes (e.g. ETADEP, Caritas Dili, and the Protestant church NGO, 
Yasona), but in conducting their vital work contributed to the political struggle for 
independence, conveying information, supporting agriculture in areas which might feed 
the fighters; and caring for the injured through health services. Caritas Dili, through its 
church links, gave particular help to resistance leaders. Others, such as HAK and 
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FOKUPERS, were formed to protect political activists by advocating for their human 
rights, and assisting the victims of violence and their families. Through their external 
linkages to NGOs in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia, and from there (or directly) 
to the global NGO world, Timorese NGOs played a vital role of information 
dissemination about the human rights violations and climate of fear and repression 
which engulfed the place. In this way, they helped the international NGO community 
keep up the pressure in international fora, particularly following the 1997 Asian crisis 
(Simpson 2004). As the process of self-determination was underway, NGOs, the 
church, students and women’s groups were the ones who disseminated information to 
the population about the August 1999 ballot, fanning out across the country in very 
repressive circumstances to inform and educate the population about how to register 
and vote. Thus while local NGOs were only one part of the mix of  national and 
international efforts to force Indonesia to give East Timorese people their act of self-
determination and their own nation, they played important supportive roles in the 
democratic transition. 
 
NGOs consolidating democracy 
After the ballot, and once recovery from the emergency was over, NGOs made 
contributions to shaping the Constitution and had some input to the processes of 
forming the state, through their representation on the NC and NCC, and in a variety of 
other ways outlined in previous chapters (see also CRS 2004). Their role was to 
encourage a more inclusive process, to try to entrench human rights, and to stimulate 
community discussion about the issues involved. The UNTAET period was the most 
inclusive of NGOs and their expectations about their roles in a more democratic setting 
were crystallised during this period. It was one in which they had a voice, some clear 
avenues for input to decision making, and some active networks and working groups 
for formulating NGO positions on key issues. Throughout this phase and the period 
since independence, particular NGOs have tried to play what White referred to as a 
‘constitutive’ role (G. White 1996)403 to embed a new culture of respect for human 
rights, including women’s rights, and non-violent resolution of conflict. In this work 
                                            
403 See Chapter Two. 
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they have been (i) trying to set limits to state power, but also (ii) encouraging the state 
to set limits to the power of other parts of civil society with a propensity for violence. It 
is early days to assess the role of NGOs in helping to consolidate democracy. Political 
society remains conflictual, as struggles for power are played out among political elites 
and their followers. Democracy provided space for political differences to emerge or 
re-emerge, and the violence which erupted in 2006 made it clear that respect for human 
rights and commitment to non-violence have yet to take root across the society. NGOs’ 
and others’ efforts were insufficient when particular political and security sector 
leaders violated these norms. 
 
NGO experience also indicates that democracy is a complex idea and is only barely 
functioning. This is an environment in which western-style democracy is quite foreign, 
and more traditional power structures remain actively in place (Ospina and Hohe 
2002). Beyond elections, NGOs tried to weave some functional processes on the 
ground to solve real problems facing citizens in particular locations, through bringing 
together different local players (such as traditional leaders, UN or government 
administrators, and various citizen groups) helping citizens adjust expectations of their 
new state, and urging the state to respond to the challenges its citizens are facing. They 
encountered a number of problems, among them, the centrist tendencies of the state 
and the lack of decision making capacities in districts (during the UNTAET as well as 
post-independence periods), and the Government’s weak capacity and inability to 
respond in a timely way to problems citizens faced. A series of studies commissioned 
by the international NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS) about democracy and 
advocacy in Timor-Leste found that, while government officials and parliamentarians 
recognised that ‘NGOs have insights and experiences that are valuable for national 
development and that they have the ear of the people’, unfortunately: 
  
There are no (or very few) formal channels for NGOs to meet those who are 
responsible for the laws, policies and practices in Timor-Leste. NGOs therefore find it 
difficult to put a point of view, or the point of view of those on whose behalf they 
speak, to those who have power in the country’ (CRS 2004:3).  
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Their experience suggested that two years’ into nationhood, democracy had little 
meaning at the grass roots, and NGO attempts to mobilise citizens for advocacy had so 
far been rather ineffective due to the lack of state capacity to respond. On the other 
hand, by providing draft legislation to a Minister or to FRETILIN, the ruling political 
party in the first independent Government, a few NGOs were able to take the 
opportunity of this centrist approach to influence the legislative agenda. FOKUPERS’ 
experience with the draft Domestic Violence legislation was one example of this. This 
is consistent with experience elsewhere which suggests that civil society action is 
shaped by its interaction with the state (Choup 2003, Harvey 1998, Pearce 1999, 
Brinkerhoff 1999).  
 
The emerging NGO-government dynamic in East Timor also has to be situated within a 
generational context. Most of the NGOs were formed and led by young people and 
students brought up during the period of Indonesian rule. Their continued affinity with 
Indonesia is a feature of this 1999 generation of activists, many of whom were very 
critical of the Timor-Leste Government’s orientation towards Portugal, particularly its 
decision to use Portuguese language, which signalled to them a sense of exclusion from 
democratic debate (Bexley 2003). Prior to this, Timor Aid was first to support and 
promote the development of Tetum language, which became the other official language 
of East Timor, though there was little written material and virtually no books. It was 
also one of the SAHE members elected to the Constituent Assembly who co-sponsored 
the motion to make Tetum an official language in the Constitution.404 This language 
acts as an important intergenerational bridge between the Portuguese speaking older 
generation and the Indonesian speaking younger group, and functions as a lingua 
franca across much of the multilingual nation. Its symbolic status as the language of 
resistance during the occupation is also significant (Taylor-Leech 2005). While this 
language development work has now been taken over by the Government, Timor Aid 
continues to publish new Tetum material. Thus a local NGO helped establish this 
                                            
404 Email communication from Helen Hill 22/3/08. 
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important government program and continues to contribute to democratic and inclusive 
nation building through language material development. 
 
Strong linkages and partnership between the Government and NGOs could play a 
valuable role in building social cohesion across the generations, with their different 
language and international orientations. However in its early years the Government was 
ambivalent towards NGOs and many NGOs were unclear about the roles they should 
play, an attitude reinforced by their uncertainty about how the new Government would 
respond to them. NGOs which had only experienced repressive government had no 
blueprints or models to follow for a different type of relationship between themselves 
and the new Timor-Leste Government. Despite this, and the lack of a strategic 
governmental approach to NGO engagement, NGOs have largely strengthened the new 
state in a number of ways.  
 
NGOs strengthening the state 
Significantly, once the opportunity arose, a number of NGO leaders joined the 
emerging Government or key state institutions in important leadership roles. Three 
took up senior positions in the Ministry (e.g. as Health Minister, Vice Minister for 
Justice and Secretary of State for Labour and Solidarity respectively). Others became 
senior bureaucrats, such as the Prime Minister’s Human Rights Adviser and the head of 
the Office for Promotion of Equality. These roles offered them the opportunity to 
utilise leadership skills they had developed in NGOs, and offered them scope to 
develop their ideas into policies and programs for the nation. Eight former NGO 
leaders were also elected to the 88-member Constituent Assembly in 2001, on various 
party lists.405   
 
A number of NGOs worked with reform oriented parts of the Government to try to 
establish new social norms of respect for human rights and gender equality. HAK 
assisted the highly-regarded first President with his Commissions for Former 
Combatants and Veterans, and helped the Justice Ministry to resolve difficult land 
                                            
405 Respondent 92. Of these, six represented FRETILIN, one PSD and one PD. 
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disputes. Similarly KSI, a research, conflict resolution and advocacy NGO formed in 
September 2000, worked on land issues and promoted a land reform law to the 
Constituent Assembly in 2001. This was to strengthen Timorese people’s hold on their 
land in the face of threats related to earlier Indonesian and Portuguese titles. HAK and 
other NGOs also helped with judicial reform and monitoring the weak judicial 
processes. Ribiero and Magno (2004:36) considered that some NGOs (such as SAHE, 
KSI) whose ideology was congruent with that of FRETILIN, the party which formed 
the first Government, were more likely to influence FRETILIN politicians. 
Interestingly, in April 2005, when a Catholic Church-sponsored protest, apparently 
about the Church’s wish to see religious education made compulsory rather than 
optional in school curricula, brought thousands to Dili, HAK supported the 
Government against the Church.406  These NGOs supported the Government because 
they believed it had legitimacy; as one NGO leader said, ‘if this Government loses the 
trust of the people there would be no other government with the moral authority.’407  
NGOs were keen to make independence work; they saw that a stable, effective 
government which promoted human rights, had the capacity to solve community 
conflicts, and could empower East Timorese people, was essential—so they were 
working towards this. 
 
Ribeiro and Magno (2004:35) however, suggested that the Government of Timor-Leste 
may have seen advocacy NGOs, particularly those concerned with democracy, human 
rights and justice, as opponents. Certainly some NGOs found it hard to change from an 
oppositional role in Indonesian time, to openness to other possibilities with their own 
government.408  Some also believed that donors and international NGOs were 
                                            
406 This was a three-week demonstration outside the Parliament, which involved thousands of people.  
     The  church and the government are the two strongest civilian institutions in Timor-Leste. HAK and a  
     ‘Committeee in Defense of Democracy’ argued that the church had misled the people, and was  
     allowing itself to be used by other parties, that the demonstration was being supported by the US  
     ambassador (which the US Embassy subsequently denied), and that the church should be promoting  
     dialogue, not  protest. What the ‘Committee in Defense of Democracy’ failed to do was to educate the  
     people about  the separation of church and state in the Constitution, although it stated that the    
     church’s action was  unconstitutional (Komite Defeza  ba Demokrasia  2005). 
407 Respondent 73. 
408 Respondents 80, 90, 72, 13 and 16.  
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unhelpfully encouraging NGOs to be anti-government,409 perhaps because they were 
fostering western-style advocacy. Clearly in Timor-Leste personal relationships, family 
histories, the legacy of old power structures and resistance involvements were among 
the factors which affected how (and whether) people influenced others after so much 
turmoil. Individual NGOs had close relationships with a few Ministers or other key 
insiders, but relations with Parliament were weaker than in the CA period, perhaps 
because FRETILIN’s dominance restricted debate about alternative policies; however 
NGOs certainly responded to invitations to speak to the Parliament’s Commissions 
(Guterres and Pinto 2004).  
 
There were also signs in 2003 that a few NGO leaders were aligning themselves with 
parties other than FRETILIN (such as PD and PSD),410 a trend the Government was 
wary about, and an indication that the boundaries between political and civil society 
were not always entirely clear. The perception that NGOs were really the opposition in 
disguise was fostered when at one stage a number of NGO people, including in the 
leadership of the NGO Forum at that time, were known to have PD affiliations. The 
NGO Forum was not invited to represent NGOs at least one donor conference in 2003 
as a result, and the pro-FRETILIN ‘Farol’ NGOs distanced themselves from the 
Forum.411 The NGOs themselves were becoming politicised and somewhat 
fragmented.412 
 
Yet in fact there was little open NGO criticism of the Government except in a few 
areas. The clearest differences emerged between human rights NGOs and the 
Government in relation to the campaign for an International Tribunal to bring to justice 
those responsible for major human rights violations (Sarmento 2005). NGOs perceived 
                                            
409 Respondent  86.  
410 Respondent 8 and 78. 
411 Respondents 13, 7, 78, although one respondent believed that former RENETIL members involved in  
     the ‘Farol’ NGOs, were still perceived by Government to be pro-PSD or PD, and hence, anti- 
     government. In 2003 La’o Hamutuk was invited to represent NGOs in place of the NGO Forum at  
     the donor conference. 
412This point was made by respondent 73 at an informal Discussion Session about Civil Society in   
     Timor-Leste held in Dili on 18 June 2004, with visiting students from Victoria University in which I  
     participated. 
 276
that the national leadership tended to defend ‘the importance of national interests and 
diplomacy over the importance of human rights and justice issues’ (Ribeiro and Magno 
2004: 36). NGOs, on the other hand supported the victims who continued to seek 
justice (Kent 2005). Related to this, and NGOs’ concerns about impunity for the 
perpetrators of the worst violations, has been Timorese and Indonesian NGO criticism 
of the establishment of a Commission of Truth and Friendship by the Indonesian and 
East Timorese governments.413 Other criticisms related to specific laws which were 
perceived to breach basic human rights,414 and some limited concerns about economic 
development strategies.415 Some NGOs have also been concerned about corruption and 
abuses of government power,416 but seem to have found these issues difficult to 
address. 
 
It appears that generally NGOs had little leverage to hold government to account, thus 
this aspect of their role in democracy seems overstated in the NGO and democracy 
literature compared to their actual capacity in Timor-Leste. For example, Burton 
reported that: 
 
 a 2004 World Bank governance issues paper found that a strong Executive arm of 
government is emerging in Timor-Leste but institutions such as the media, President’s 
Office, local government, independent oversight institutions and civil society remain 
weak and under-funded (Burton 2005:6).  
 
She noted the undesirable situation that ‘Timor-Leste’s bilateral and multilateral 
development partners, together with UNMISET, appear to be the strongest functioning 
accountability mechanism for central government’ (Burton 2005:6). Civil society was 
clearly too weak or unwilling to fulfil this role. 
 
                                            
413 In 2005 a joint statement critical of this initiative was signed by, among others, HAK, FOKUPERS,  
     and  SAHE, along with four other Timorese NGOs and six Indonesian NGOs (Global Policy Forum  
     2004, ETAN 2005). 
414 See for example HAK’s criticism of the proposed Immigration Law, Newsletter HAK , No 1, 2003:1.  
415 Respondent 73 described efforts to promote cooperatives; respondent 36 discussed NGO efforts to  
     foster better marketing systems.  
416 Respondent 88. 
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Government itself, while recognising the valuable work of NGOs, and allowing some 
of them use of public buildings,417 was also critical of them in relation to their own 
transparency and accountability for funds, and, in some cases, for their lack of 
preparedness to coordinate with Government and other agencies, as well as the 
possibility that some (perhaps businesses purporting to be NGOs) were abusing tax 
concessions on imports (Ministry of State Administration 2005:6).418  As mentioned 
before, Government may also have seen some NGOs as political opponents, or as 
unnecessary, given that a Timorese Government now existed.419 The Prime Minister 
was reported to have claimed that some NGOs were simply corrupt stooges of foreign 
donors.420  
 
Yet there were areas where there was effective collaboration between NGOs and the 
Government, and it was noticeable that these reflected the close personal relationships 
which existed between the key players before the 1999 rampage. As one experienced 
international NGO staff member commented, ‘East Timor works on personal 
relationships,’421 and thus it was unsurprising that this modus operandi would shape 
Government-NGO relationships422 (see also Ribiero and Magno 2004:36). These 
government officials were previously strongly connected to NGO and activist networks 
in the resistance; they understood and trusted NGOs and were happy to work with 
them. The same may be less true for other areas of the Government, which still retained 
                                            
417 The ‘Farol NGOs’ are all in buildings which the government now owns; Halarae is in the upper floor  
      of  the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests building. 
418  It is likely that some organisations which are actually private businesses, are registering as NGOs to  
      gain  these concessions, thus sullying the reputation of genuine NGOs. Respondents 72, 75 and 90  
      were among several who indicated that some NGOs did not know how to move from protest mode to  
      working cooperatively with government.  
419 Respondent 17, 74.  
420 Respondent 13. By 2004 this respondent felt that  political space for civil society was becoming a  
      major issue. 
421 Respondent 19. 
422 For example, the Vice Minister for Justice was a former human rights NGO leader, as was the Prime  
     Minister’s Adviser on Human Rights and his Adviser on Promotion of Equality, who was formerly a   
     leader in FOKUPERS. The Minister for Health was a former Caritas East Timor (now Caritas Dili)  
     doctor, while two other Ministers in the first Government (Agriculture, Forestries and Fisheries, and  
     Labour and Solidarity) had close associations with international NGOs during their periods in exile,  
     and the latter led the East Timor NGO Forum during 2000-2001. The President was also  
     clandestinely  networked to Timorese student activists in Indonesia during his time in jail in Jakarta,  
     and so was keenly aware of the roles they played (Sword Gusmao and Lennox 2003). 
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some scepticism about, and distrust of, NGOs. These findings are consistent with 
Brinkerhoff’s (1999) finding that trust is critical to successful government-civil society 
partnerships. It is also interesting to note that quite early on the Transitional 
Government appeared to be aware that the work of NGOs, especially international 
NGOs, could undermine its own legitimacy and perhaps compete with it for donor 
funds. It was quick to ask foreign health NGOs to leave East Timor once the 
emergency was over, as it wished to run the very limited health system itself and felt 
INGOs, among other donors, had different approaches and priorities and ran only 
short-term projects, complicating health administration (van Schoor 2005, World 
Health Organisation 2004).423 However, the Government later worked closely with 
INGOs where they complemented its capacity (Snell et al. 2005, World Health 
Organisation 2004).  
 
But perhaps the most interesting aspect of the NGOs’ relationship with the state relates 
to NGOs’ tendency to raise with the community the meaning of ‘self-determination’. In 
this NGOs could thereby be seen to be both ‘mediating the community’s demands of 
and interactions with the state’ (G. White 1996) and supporting the neo-liberal model 
of the state so radically different from the all-powerful, repressive, developmentalist 
state of Indonesian time, or the more engaged citizenship model of UNTAET’s period. 
By mid-late 2004, NGOs were recognising that efforts to enable communities to 
advocate to the state were ineffective at local level, and were frequently ineffective 
even when raised by them or on their behalf in Dili. State resources in the early years 
were so tightly constrained, and government capacity so limited, that many of the 
community’s needs could not be addressed. To the extent that NGOs were encouraging 
communities to be more self-reliant and to seek their own solutions to problems, rather 
than wait for government to do things for them, NGOs were reorienting communities 
to a new norm of ‘community-level self-determination’, and hence reducing 
expectations of the state. In doing so, they were also, in effect, supporting the shift to a 
minimalist state, which the international donors, particularly the IMF and World Bank, 
                                            
423 Foreign health NGOs were asked to leave by the end of 2001, prior to Independence. This occurred  
      while I was in East Timor working with the East Timor NGO Forum. 
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desired and tempering community expectations of their government. Timor-Leste’s 
Government was emerging in a period in which global actors, who were supporting its 
early development, were operating a minimal state model (Pearce 1999); this 
Government also had weak capacity, yet the poverty and destruction of infrastructure 
and services demanded a stronger role for the state if peacebuilding was to succeed. 
NGOs had advocated against such a minimalist model in donor meetings, emphasising 
a more human development approach, with greater government investment in rural 
areas and essential services. But rather than mobilise the community to force a change, 
they shifted strategies themselves. This perhaps reflected their concern to maintain the 
stability of the Government and/or their frustration with their own efforts to achieve 
outcomes for the communities with whom they worked. The violence in 2006, which 
destabilised the Government and traumatised much of the Dili population, however, 
eventually forced the Government to shift direction to address the high levels of 
unemployment and problems in rural areas (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 
Office of the Prime Minister 2006). 
 
There is some evidence that NGOs also helped strengthen civil society, in that the 
major NGOs helped to build local community groups, such as local human rights 
groups, women’s groups, farmers’ groups and others, although generally, their ability 
to advocate was constrained by the factors explained above. However, these 
community based groups were able to play useful local roles in self-help, education 
and information sharing. NGOs also tried to develop participatory approaches in their 
work, but, like the state, they were inclined to ‘top-down’ and Dili-centred 
approaches424 which had been the norm among officials in Indonesian time. NGO staff 
needed training in participatory and community development approaches to their work 
if they were to foster more participatory democracy.425   
                                            
424  Respondents 7, 8, 15 and see also Holloway (2004b). 
425  Respondent 19. 
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10.2 Local NGOs in development 
 
Development literature discussed in Chapter Two suggests that NGOs can act as cheap 
service providers or promote and offer alternatives to neo-liberal development. During 
the 1999 emergency and UNTAET period, some official donors and some international 
NGOs provided services (e.g. food and shelter, credit, livelihood) to the population 
through local NGOs. Some saw small-scale grants to local NGOs and community 
groups (e.g. such as those provided through AusAID) as a quick way of helping 
rehabilitation (AusAID 2004). USAID also provided some microfinance grants through 
local NGOs, though the majority went to or through international NGOs (USAID 
2003). NGOs were also actively involved in delivering civic education to the 
population at critical times and, in later years, working with government and donors to 
develop a civic education curriculum for schools. NGOs (local and international) also 
acted as stop-gaps to provide services or programs while government developed, and in 
partnership with it on a few occasions (e.g. Caritas Dili, Timor Aid and ETADEP). 
However, with limited funding, staffing and resources, little government experience of 
NGOs’ programs or working with them (and no government evaluation of NGO 
effectiveness),426 there were few opportunities for NGOs to deliver government 
services. Overall, there was a limited range of government services available nationally 
by 2004, other than health and education, which were both predominantly state (or 
church) provided.427 Those services which NGOs delivered were largely donor-funded. 
The significant role of NGOs and civil society organisations in service delivery was 
noted in the donor related Sector Investment Program (SIP) for Local Governance and 
Civil Society. However, the SIP discussed  the policy issues which donor support for 
civil society groups raised, in contrast to the low level of  donor support through local 
government channels (Ministry of State Administration 2005:14).428 Official donor 
funds for NGOs dropped significantly after 2003-04 and were likely to remain 
                                            
426  Respondent 89. 
427 Government was also responsible for services such as power and water in urban centres, but had very  
      limited agricultural extension and no government marketing or rural transport services.  
428 Only about 10 per cent of the total funding provided by donors to civil society groups has been  
      channelled through local government in the four year period to June 2003). By 2005, however, donor  
      support to NGOs had been reduced to a third of its 2001-02 high of $30m (Ministry of State  
      Administration 2005:14). 
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considerably lower than in the earlier years (Ministry for State Administration 
2005:19-22) as the SIP signalled a shift in emphasis towards local government. 
 
Since 2002, however, a few NGOs have worked with donors in areas given priority in 
the National Development Plan (Planning Commission 2002b), such as agriculture, 
water supply and sanitation (e.g. Halarae, Bia Hula). As aid programs became larger 
and more programmatic, local NGOs were involved in them as ‘partners’. For example, 
Timorese NGOs were incorporated into water supply and sanitation programs as well 
agriculture and rural development programs supported by AusAID (CWSSP n.d.). 
However, these arrangements were on a contract basis with little expectation of 
ongoing support, thus as little more than ‘transmission-belts for aid’ (Fowler 1997:36) 
their sustainability was rather precarious.429  Many other NGOs however (e.g. Timor 
Aid, Alola Foundation, Yasona, ETADEP, Caritas Dili) independently undertook 
poverty reduction work through agriculture and rural development, integrated poverty 
reduction programs, and weaving or micro-credit projects, with support largely from 
international NGOs. Some began such activities through the rehabilitation period, but 
focussed on them more intensively as other state building advocacy reduced after May 
2002. 
 
Advocacy about development 
Throughout the period NGOs also advocated to donors and government authorities for 
a more inclusive, rural focussed development, and for real opportunities for people to 
participate (Hunt 2004). They argued for a more human development approach (as 
promoted by UNDP), rather than a neo-liberal model. In practice, East Timor adopted 
an open neo-liberal economic model,430 but placed high priority on human 
development, specifically health, education and agriculture, in its expenditure, in line 
with priorities set out in the UN Millennium Development Goals, and Timor’s own 
Magna Carta, which were expressed in the National Development Plan. Certainly 
multilateral bodies had a significant influence on the shape of East Timor’s 
                                            
429 Respondents 7, 8, 24, 29, 4, 1. 
430 See Anderson (2005) for a discussion about East Timor’s capacity to develop independently under  
      neo-liberal policy presecriptions. 
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development, providing early and continuing advice to the Government, although 
Government also asserted some of its own views on a number of issues (Cleary 2007). 
 
Some NGOs cautioned about particular development approaches the country might 
take. For example SAHE drew attention to the risks associated with borrowing from 
the World Bank and IMF, and may have contributed to a climate in which East Timor 
obtained grants, not loans, in the early period. Similarly, active Timorese civil society 
campaigning and protests in Dili (and through civil society connections with the Timor 
Sea Justice Campaign in Australia) about the injustice of Australia’s position in 
relation to seabed boundaries and the distribution of revenues from the Timor Sea oil 
and gas resources may have helped the Timor-Leste Government leverage a better deal 
than first proposed by Australia. Furthermore, La’o Hamutuk, a post-1999 monitoring 
and advocacy NGO, initially run by a combined team of Timorese and international 
activists from the US East Timor Action Network (ETAN), drew attention to the issue 
of the ‘resource curse’ which plagued other resource rich but otherwise poor countries. 
Assisted by international development NGOs, such as Oxfam, they organised a civil 
society tour to Nigeria, to learn what could go wrong in a nation whose development 
was resource dependent. Their work contributed to making civil society members 
aware of the dangers of a windfall of natural resources, and through their education and 
advocacy efforts, might help East Timor avoid some of them. Some of these NGO 
activists are now members of the Petroleum Fund’s Consultative Council which has 
responsibility to manage the resource earnings in a sustainable and transparent way for 
the long term benefit of the nation. 
 
NGOs tried to demonstrate alternative approaches to development through a number of 
their own programs. The HASATIL sustainable agriculture and Dai Popular education 
networks provided valuable fora for local and international NGOs to explore 
‘alternative’ ideas (e.g. such as organic agriculture, or training resistance activists to be 
community education and development workers) and for both to dialogue with 
Government about them. The NGO Roman Luan, on Atauro Island off Dili, also led 
the way on alternative models of tourism by establishing a successful small, 
 283
ecologically sound, community based tourism venture on the island, which was 
bringing development benefits to local villages. In this case the power of a good 
example appeared to be influencing Timorese thinking both in the community and the 
Government, about how to maximise the potential benefits of tourist interest in East 
Timor.431   Thus some NGOs tried, in small ways, to foster development alternatives, 
but their scope was limited. HAK struggled to effectively articulate a human rights 
approach to development, especially concerning social and economic rights. While it 
realised that these rights were highest priority for people in East Timor, it was unable 
to find a way to effectively promote them, particularly as it was aware of the limited 
resources and capacity of the Government in these early years.  
 
While some NGOs tried to ‘seize the past’ and build their identity on pre-colonial 
cultural values, others tried to develop the new norms associated with liberal 
democracies. Yet these were not necessarily in opposition. East Timor was trying to 
bind together into a modern nation people from diverse language and ethnic groupings, 
returning exiles and those who had remained, and generations divided by the heritage 
of different colonial languages, all in a situation of extreme poverty. NGOs such as 
Haburas drew on traditional cultural taboos to promote environmental protection; 
Timor Aid promoted Tetum language (as did ETDA)432 to foster a national identity and 
means of communication essential in such a fragmented society (Leach 2003);  Alola 
Foundation, Timor Aid and others drew on traditional tais weaving to generate income 
for women, a development priority; HASATIL led the way in thinking about 
sustainability based on indigenous knowledge of traditional food crops while being 
linked into worldwide farmer movements (McKenzie and Lemos 2005). Each NGO 
drew on tradition to meet contemporary needs. 
                                            
431 Respondent 79. 
432 Respondent 45. 
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10.3      NGO roles in post-conflict peacebuilding  
 
Like any post-conflict society, East Timor’s peace was fragile, and by early 2005 it had 
a number of features which indicated a propensity for return to violence, among them: 
extreme poverty, a high proportion of unemployed youth, significant numbers of 
demobilised fighters with little to do, a weak justice system, continued impunity for the 
major perpetrators of the worst atrocities, and the possibility that people may want to 
settle old scores. Engel had earlier noted that ‘underlying tensions remain extremely 
high and the potential for violence is real and already being demonstrated on a small 
scale throughout the country’ (Engel 2003:172). There were a number of ways in 
which NGOs tried to address this situation, although the violence evidenced among the 
security forces in May 2006 and its aftermath was clearly beyond their scope.  
 
Most obviously NGOs worked in the early years of the UN administration and the new 
Timor-Leste Government to disseminate information, and to defuse potential conflicts 
among citizens caused by misinformation, which was seen by Engel as a significant 
threat to stability (Engel 2003:178). HAK in particular played a valuable role in this 
regard with its ‘base discussions’ in the sub-districts, and its promotion of a human 
rights culture. Local NGOs also worked with communities settling returning refugees 
and IDPs, to ensure their successful reintegration. This work was often undertaken in 
concert with international NGOs and UN agencies. The weak judicial system was 
cause for concern, and NGOs maintained pressure on the international community and 
the Government to get it working effectively. One NGO, Justice System Monitoring 
Project (JSMP), as its name implies, monitored the operation of the justice system, to 
try to make it more effective and accountable. In addition, some concerns about human 
rights violations by the police force were raised by HAK, and its staff became involved 
in police human rights training. The strong emphasis on human rights in the 
Constitution and in promoting human rights across the country was seen by them as a 
major mechanism to prevent return to widespread violence. A number of local NGOs 
established after 1999 also contributed directly to post-conflict peacebuilding, among 
them the Peace and Democracy Foundation (which undertook mediation and training), 
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various community radio stations, and the NGO La’o Hamutuk, each of which 
contributed to communication and information provision among people in the districts.  
 
Land disputes were identified as a potential trigger for violent conflict in East Timor 
(Fitzpatrick 2002). As mentioned above, a number of NGOs worked to help resolve 
some of the major conflicts around land issues, or made proposals for land reform (e.g. 
KSI, HAK, SAHE) (Ribeiro and Magno, 2004: 53-56). A number of NGOs, including 
HAK and FOKUPERS, also worked closely with some of the key institutions 
established to address past violations and reduce the risks of future conflicts related to 
them. HAK’s assistance to the President’s Commissions for Former Combatants and 
Veterans Affairs was one example, while FOKUPERS assisted the Truth, Reception 
and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) with its healing workshops for witnesses who 
gave public testimony (CAVR 2006). Many NGOs supported and participated in the 
activities of the CAVR, and at least two of its Commissioners and some of its staff 
were former or current NGO leaders. Local NGOs (often supported by INGOs) were 
prominent among the few agents of development activity in rural areas, where they 
tended to attract young people. Engagement with community radios, youth centres, 
cultural activities, and various NGO programs were some, albeit small, avenues for 
people to channel their energies constructively. 
   
In line with findings elsewhere, women were poorly represented in formal peace 
negotiation processes and early UNTAET structures, but early action by women’s 
NGOs was critical in setting an agenda for women. The June 2000 Women’s 
Conference was extremely important in providing women with a forum to articulate 
their priorities and develop strategies to pursue them. For example FOKUPERS and 
other women’s NGOs, such as ETWAVE and the wider REDE network, played an 
important role in redefining peace—recognising that violence against women did not 
stop when East Timor gained its national liberation. Their work to bring attention to the 
extent of violence against women and to try to reduce it was very important. With 
support and encouragement from international NGOs, which enabled a tour of Men 
against Violence from Nicaragua to East Timor, a local group of Men Against Violence 
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also became active (de Araujo 2004), since women needed the support of men to make 
a difference in this traditionally very patriarchal culture.  
 
10.4 The impact of donors on civil society 
 
The experience of the NGOs suggests that donors were influential; but for the NGOs 
which are the focus of this study it was international non-government donors as well as 
official bilateral and multilateral donors which were important. Appendix F outlines 
the main official donors to civil society in Timor-Leste during the study period. The 
most influential donor in East Timor was the World Bank. It played a key coordinating 
role and managed the Trust Funds established for the operation of UNTAET, for the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction, and to support the new Government’s budget and 
development work after independence. The World Bank ‘consulted’ local NGOs, 
although the early consultations were often frustrating for the East Timorese, as they 
were conducted in English, and related to English documentation, a language few 
spoke at the time. Although it enabled LNGOs to participate actively in donor 
conferences it convened, the World Bank made no effort to help rebuild the existing 
civil society. Indeed it actively chose, through establishing the Community 
Empowerment Program, to create its own ‘civil society’ structures (although it did not 
call them that) in the form of local development councils, none of which have been 
sustained,433 probably due to their weak legitimacy and decision making authority and 
the priority given to distributing funds rather than developing their governance (Dureau 
2003, Hohe 2005). It also established a number of ‘Community’ Radio Stations, though 
many of  those it initiated also seemed to have been poorly sustained by 2006 (UNDP 
2006b). Its impact on civil society was the legacy of these programs, notably the 
problems with micro-credit which the CEP experienced, which affected some other 
NGO credit programs (Moxham n.d., NDPEAC. 2004). 
 
                                            
433 Respondent 19. 
 287
In relation to other official donors several trends are evident. Firstly, official donors 
had a variety of different strategies at different stages of the transitional process. In the 
pre-1999 period, official donors were very limited and were not engaged in genuine 
civil society strengthening programs. Most civil society support was coming from 
international NGOs (and a few official donors) located outside East Timor. As the 
emergency deepened in the lead up to the ballot in 1999 official donors were engaged 
in humanitarian support through NGOs, for example AusAID through Caritas Dili, and 
UN WFP working with POSKO (Nest 1999). During the September 1999 emergency 
the experience of Timorese civil and political society was one of exclusion. 
Nevertheless, a number of UN agencies and bilateral donors, as well as international 
NGOs, provided some immediate, short term support to restore basic facilities. This 
enabled NGOs to function and supported limited NGO roles in the humanitarian 
response. The UN also provided NGO coordination facilities, though these were 
initially utilised more by international than local NGOs.  
 
After the emergency phase, a number of bilateral donors provided support to civil 
society. USAID had an explicit agenda to strengthen civil society’s role in democracy 
which was clearly reflected in the types of activities it funded, among them civic 
education, human rights advocacy, media, election monitoring etc. (see Appendix F). 
AusAID’s civil society focus was to promote poverty reduction, community 
development, good governance, sustainable livelihoods, human rights, women’s 
empowerment, peace and reconciliation and assist particularly vulnerable groups 
(AusAID 2000). While it encouraged activities to include ‘civic education about the 
roles, rights and responsibilities of civil society in a democratic East Timor’, AusAID’s 
concern with democracy promotion was far less emphasised than USAID’s. UNDP 
was active early in 2000 to assist in NGO capacity building through training, and help 
with the establishment of the NGO Forum. This later extended into a further training 
program related to advocacy, more support for  capacity building of the NGO Forum 
and a small grants program. In the last phase of this study the new UNDP program was 
focussed on strengthening NGOs and other civil society groups, especially community 
radios, for advocacy and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP 
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and UN Volunteers. 2006). UNDP was one of the only donors which tried to engage 
both civil society and the Government of Timor-Leste around the nature of their roles 
and relationship and the legislative framework for NGOs.  
 
Much of the assistance was short term (Engel 2003), and reviews and evaluations 
consistently recommended longer timeframes and greater support for organisational 
strengthening, and for program implementation-related capacity development, such as 
community development skills (see for example Oxfam/MAFF 2004, AusAID 2004, 
Sharan 2003, Shires 2003, Walsh 2000b, UNDP 2002a). The training and capacity 
building emphasis of donors tended to fall on project management and skills for 
interacting with them, such as English language and project and financial 
management,434 which, while necessary, was insufficient. At the same time, they could 
be critical of local NGOs’ donor and project orientation, yet that was fostered by the 
short term project nature of the donor system itself.435  
 
A number of international NGOs also ran civil society capacity building projects; one 
with a high profile was CRS’ ‘Engaging Civil Society Project’ (ECSP) which ran from 
October 2002 until the end of May 2005. Funded by USAID, its goal was ‘to create a 
stronger and more organized civil society, with civil society organisations (CSOs) 
participating effectively in political processes at all levels in East Timor’ (CRS 2005: 
1). To its credit CRS made its evaluation public, but the report found that the project 
concluded with ‘mixed results’ (CRS 2005:1). CRS worked with four NGO partners 
and twelve community based organisations, in a cascading model whereby each NGO 
partner of CRS was intended to work with and assist in capacity building three or four 
community organisations. A second objective was to build networks and coalitions 
among all the partners, while increasing the participation of marginalised groups within 
their constituencies. The third objective was to strengthen the advocacy capacities of 
all 16 CSOs to engage with government at national and local levels. Two of the 
original NGO partners (HAK and Justice and Peace Commission Baucau) did not 
                                            
434 Respondent 1. 
435 Respondent 8,13. 
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complete the partnership, HAK for reasons of ‘differences in modes of operation’; JPC 
Baucau withdrew after some financial issues were raised by CRS, but Haburas, 
subsequently joined in 2003 (CRS 2005:8). What is clear is that the advocacy model 
promoted through the project assumed that NGOs would use the media as a major 
channel for communicating their advocacy message to government (and the public) 
(CRS 2005:23). In Timor-Leste, this was not the main way in which the more 
experienced NGOs were undertaking advocacy (da Costa Gama 2004), since they had 
personal relationships with many of those they were trying to influence. Furthermore, 
this model was unlikely to be helpful at a time when Government-NGO relations were 
sensitive at best, hostile at worst. The idea of building advocacy coalitions among the 
partners was not very successful, as the diverse partners had little in common to 
campaign about together, although some of the CBOs started to collaborate. Yet NGOs 
were already adept at forming and using coalitions whenever they had common 
interests. Finally, the fact that even when the Project finished all political decision 
making remained centralised in Dili, that Ministries had very weak capacity 
themselves, and local governments had no budgets to control meant that local level 
advocacy was rather pointless. This Project’s capacity building model seemed to have 
been promoted in a top-down mode without sufficient cognisance of the local 
conditions and context. Whilst it no doubt conducted valuable training, produced some 
useful materials in Tetum and Indonesian language, and engaged local government 
officials in all the districts, the sustainability of its achievements remains an open 
question, and the timeframes were again considered too short (CRS 2005). Other 
international NGO donors took a different approach. HIVOS for example provided 
three-year funding for its partners and assisted their capacity through engaging them in 
participative reviews. Others provided long term skilled personnel support or worked 
in alliance with the NGOs, sharing skills through working together.436  
 
Thus, donor support for civil society reflected different donor understandings of the 
role of civil society and different emphases. This study, like Ottoway and Carothers’ 
(2001) found that US agencies focussed more strongly on procedural democracy 
                                            
436 Respondents 13, 21. 
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promotion than others. For other official donors it seemed that NGOs were an 
expedient means of advancing other sectoral development objectives, for example in 
areas such as education, water supply and sanitation, livelihood, agriculture and 
livestock activities. These were targeted more towards community development and 
poverty reduction—important activities given the impoverished state of the country. 
 
Despite the different political leanings of  a few individuals in NGOs, I detected no 
strong ideological schism between different types of local NGOs in East Timor, other 
than perhaps a sense of camaraderie and some elitism among the group of NGOs 
located in the suburb of Farol, known locally as the ‘Farol NGOs’. These were 
generally the older, better established NGOs, but they included service delivery groups 
like ETADEP, human rights and advocacy focussed groups like HAK and 
FOKUPERS, and the media and community mobilising NGO SAHE as well as the 
newer NGOs such as La’o Hamutuk and Haburas. The major distinction was between 
the smaller, weaker NGOs in the districts, most of which were new, and the older, 
stronger, better resourced NGOs in Dili itself. However even their capacity was 
relatively weak and much of their resourcing rather tenuous. Nor did donor funding 
seem to affect the NGOs’ willingness to empower communities. In contrast to 
experience elsewhere, to the extent that some NGOs operated in a rather Indonesian 
bureaucratic fashion, donor support, particularly from the more progressive 
international NGOs (such as HIVOS or Oxfam), tended to encourage them towards a 
more empowering, participative approach. Some Timorese NGOs were quite selective 
about their partners. For example SAHE would only accept funds from non-
government organisations that shared its philosophical approach of social mobilisation 
and empowerment. HAK also demonstrated its unwillingness to continue with a 
Project which it felt was requiring it to operate in a manner it was unwilling to accept. 
Thus at least these Timorese NGOs were careful about the donors with whom they 
partnered. Others perhaps had fewer options, for example FOKUPERS was constantly 
struggling to fund its women’s shelter, and when UNICEF funds formerly provided to 
the shelter were restricted to assisting children, this catalysed their decision to run a 
child care centre. The service delivery NGOs such as Bia Hula and Halarae were more 
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dependent on official donors and such funding was more contractual and intermittent. 
There was no sense of long term partnership envisaged, at least by one significant 
official donor.437 
 
The increasing demand by both official and NGO donors for stronger financial and 
narrative reporting, generally in English, against key benchmarks or indicators was 
challenging for many NGOs.438 In fact a small number of international NGOs accepted 
reports in the Indonesian language and this was greatly appreciated by their local NGO 
partners. However, a great deal of NGO time and expertise was dedicated to report 
writing, often a task that only the most senior staff member could undertake. This drew 
such people away from the other challenges of managing their organisations, building 
staff capacity, and strategic engagement with the wider Timorese socio-political 
environment. Furthermore, the issue of sustainability was emerging strongly towards 
the end of the study period; donors were starting to require NGOs to demonstrate more 
clearly how their programs would be sustainable. But for the NGOs the issue was about 
their organisation’s sustainability, and the prospect was rather bleak. Some began to 
generate their own funds, through fee-for-service work to international organisations, 
rental of agricultural equipment, sales of items such as books, CDs, T-shirts etc., and 
membership fees. But such strategies could not sustain the organisations adequately. 
The best option for most was to develop a long term partnership with one or more 
international NGO which would remain committed to work with them over the longer 
term. Not all had been successful in this and their futures looked uncertain. 
 
10.5 Concluding comments 
 
NGOs expected democracy to be meaningful in people’s everyday lives, to help 
resolve the many issues of land conflicts, poverty, poor health, limited education, lack 
                                            
437 Respondent 4. 
438 At one stage when donors to the NGO Forum itself were becoming frustrated with the level of its 
     reporting, one NGO which engaged closely with the program it was funding and allowed the Forum  
     to  report in Indonesian, indicated that it had no problems. This suggested that writing the reports was  
     less of a problem than the language requirement. Information provided by respondent 19. 
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of clean water and sanitation, lack of income, marketing, and high cost of transport 
which faced people daily. Whilst they were prepared to expend energy and time to 
ensure the populace was educated about elections and understood formal democratic 
processes, for Timorese NGOs it seems that their concept of democracy was far more 
than electing a government. It was about the responsiveness of government to people’s 
problems and concerns. DFID refers to three qualities which states need for better 
governance and to meet the needs of poor people: capability to perform functions, 
responsiveness to citizens’ aspirations and needs, and accountability for what is done 
(DFID 2006:20). While the efforts of the international community in these early years 
were focussed on the first (capability to perform functions) and the literature about 
civil society tends to focus on the third (accountability) it was the responsiveness of 
government which NGOs in this extremely poor and devastated nation were most 
interested in. Like their Philippine NGO counterparts, NGOs did not approach 
democracy as an abstract concept of governance. NGOs saw democracy as to do with 
empowering people, overcoming their poverty and hardship and the human rights 
violations which so many had endured. Their Tetum concept of Ukun Rasik A’an 
which embraced self-determination, self-sufficiency and independence, itself fostered 
this more holistic and integrated approach. Thus Timorese NGOs, like their Filipino 
counterparts (Racelis 2000), took a ‘democracy through development’ approach. In 
East Timor, as in the Philippines, they talked about empowering people to participate, 
often through direct development activity, though some were engaged in policy and 
procedural development. It seems that the internationally-led state building process had 
to some degree neglected these aspects of responsiveness and development-driven 
democracy, or Ukun Rasik A’an. NGOs in this study clearly saw the need for 
development, and those that could acted to regenerate agriculture and livelihoods as 
quickly as they were able, even as the humanitarian relief was still underway, 
indicating the priority they gave to this work. Failure to achieve early development in 
post-conflict countries can lead to high levels of unemployment, encouraging some 
young men into crime or militia activity, forming a source of renewed conflict (UNDP 
2006a:27). Local NGOs in Timor-Leste had constantly advocated for attention to rural 
development from the earliest donor conferences, but this was slow to happen, and the 
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pool of unemployed youth appears to have contributed to the opportunistic gang 
violence that occurred in 2006 as the security forces collapsed (Kingsbury 2007, 
Wigglesworth 2007, USAID 2007).  
 
Return to civil society theory 
All the above suggests that ideas drawn from the de Tocqueville influence on thinking 
about civil society and development were not adequate in this post-conflict 
environment. In particular, the idea that civil society should act as a countervailing 
force to the government, or a mechanism to make it accountable, was not particularly 
useful in such a fragile nation as Timor-Leste. An alternative approach which may be 
more helpful to frame thinking in such contexts is an adapted Gramscian one, in which 
post-conflict development is seen as an ideological struggle within elites of both civil 
and political society, less about capitalist domination, than about the entrenchment of 
human rights and values of non-violence within a state and society. From this 
perspective, donors need to strengthen the institutions and relationships which would 
deepen the adoption of these values, since clearly the idea of democracy as a tool for 
non-violently apportioning power (Keane 2004) was not fully accepted in Timor-Leste, 
as the violent events of 2006 illustrated. This implies strengthening those aspects of the 
state and its relationship with civil society which accept and effectively promote these 
values. State building would have to be undertaken in concert with developing the civil 
society and the relationship between the two. The mechanisms, processes and avenues 
for participation would be essential aspects of state building. 
 
In East Timor, the post-conflict international effort was overwhelmingly about the 
development of a central state, yet there was a great deal of nation building to be 
undertaken. In particular, the task of  establishing the  moral framework of the nation—
embedding some common values of respect for human rights and peaceful resolution 
of conflict among the diverse social and political groupings—was extremely important, 
yet only weakly supported once the first elections had occurred in 2001-02. NGOs 
were well aware of the social tensions and challenges, but funding for such work was 
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hard to come by, and government resources for this were very limited too.439 On a 
national level NGOs such as HAK, KSI and Peace and Democracy Foundation, and to 
some degree the Justice and Peace Commissions in Dili and Baucau, and others, were 
trying to defuse or resolve local conflicts and promote non-violent conflict resolution 
approaches, but their resources were limited. HAK’s decision to close its ‘People’s 
Houses’ in the districts in 2003 reflected those limitations. Timor Aid’s effort to 
promote civic education in the curriculum was another initiative to embed some of 
these values in the younger generation. However, almost all of this work depended on 
international (often INGO) funds.440  
 
Furthermore, states are not separate from citizens but are deeply enmeshed and 
embedded in the social milieu in which they are created. What this study of NGOs has 
highlighted is that post-conflict development requires deliberate and careful 
development of the relationships between the state structures which are developed and 
the people they are to serve. This research, however, indicates that there was little 
focus on this by the international community in East Timor. Yet NGOs found that the 
critical issue in their work with communities was the changed role and nature of the 
state in relation to its citizens in the post-conflict environment; the state’s incapacity to 
respond to their day to day problems and development needs was creating major 
difficulties for communities. Furthermore, what East Timor badly needed was trust 
rebuilt between different groups within the society, and built between the society and 
the new state. Government-NGO relations needed to be actively developed which 
would help to build both types of trust. It seems likely that only once some level of 
trust was achieved could NGOs really influence the Government, rather than be 
dismissed by Ministers who wished to do so as irrelevant. This trust seemed to exist 
only where there were pre-existing relationships. This is not to suggest that NGOs 
cannot be critical of government where that is required, but it is to argue that such 
                                            
439 NGOs had the support of the various UN adminstrations’ Human Rights Unit and later the Prime  
     Minister’s Human Rights Adviser, but all of these, like the NGOs, had limited resources. 
440 PDF was in part funded by the proceeds of Dr Ramos Horta’s Nobel Peace Prize, but all the others  
     were largely dependent on international, mostly INGO, support. 
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criticism would have little positive effect if no underlying trust existed between them. 
The relationships and mutual understandings had to be built. 
 
Thus this study has illustrated the various ways local NGOs contributed to the 
democratic transition and democratic consolidation, post-conflict development and 
peacebuilding in East Timor. Every context is different, but the tendency of 
international development players to overlook the role of local NGOs in such settings, 
as occurred during the emergency response, is one which I hope this study has shown 
is a significant omission. Their contributions, while perhaps somewhat different to 
those posited in development theory, can be useful, and the study suggests some 
reconceptualisation may be necessary in theorising about the role of civil society in 
post-conflict development. 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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Appendix A   Preliminary Lists of NGOs  
 
 
This list has been developed from the following sources: 
• East Timor NGO Forum Contact Lists for: Bobonaro, Suai, Baucau, Manututo, 
Oecusse, Lautem (April 2003)  
• List of those attending High Level Mechanism Consultation Meeting, August 2003 
• Columbia University Data Base—21 October 2003 version 
• Constancio Pinto in Tanter et al. (2001)  
• NGO Forum documentation—formation documents 
• East Timorese NGOs—Interim Directory Feb 2000, East Timor 
NGOForum/ACFOA, and 
• Own knowledge from visits to East Timor and prior work with NGO Forum. 
These lists have been compiled from the best available information in late 2003/early 
2004. It is possible that they are not totally accurate as information on NGOs both 
before and after 1999 was hard to obtain, and particularly in the latter period, new 
NGOs were forming rapidly. However, it is as complete a list as this researcher could 
establish from the sources above. 
 
The first list is of NGOs identified as operating in East Timor prior to 1999, with 
comment whether they were still operating in late 2003 (in two sections: those who 
were members of NGO Forum and others). 
 
The second list is of other NGOs, new since September 1999 known to be working in 
three or more districts (a large number of NGOs were formed, but many only worked 
in one district). 
 
The third list is of NGOs founded and operating outside of East Timor before or during 
1999.
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List 1 
Local NGOs existing 
before September  1999 
 
LNGOs still existing 
late 2003 
 Operating in 3 Districts 
or more? 
NGO Forum founding 
members  
NGO Forum itself All Districts 
Y Timor Aid Timor Aid  Check Districts 
Y Kasimo (now Forte) Forte  Dili, Manufahi, 
Bobanaro, Ermera 
Y Hope Hope One District only?  
Puskopit  Hanai Malu ?  
Puslawita -  
Y Ledavo -  
Y Halarae Halarae Bobonaro only 
Y Bia Hula Bia Hula ? Districts? 
Y ETADEP ETADEP ? Districts? 
Y HAK HAK  Oecusse, Viqueque, 
Ainaro, Lautem, 
Bobonaro, Mahufahi, 
Covalima 
Binaswadaya Tim Tim -  
YBSL Lestari -  
FOKUPERS FOKUPERS ? Districts? and National 
USC -  
POSKO (Y HAK) No longer exists  
   
Others   
ETSCC / GFFTL ETSCC/GFFTL, but 
now separate - 
GFFTL doing socio-
economic work 
GFFTL working in 5 
Districts 
 
ETWAVE (Gertak) ETWAVE ? Districts now? 
Caritas East Timor Caritas Dili National / Western 
Caritas Baucau Caritas Baucau Working in nine parishes 
in Baucau Diocese.  
Commission for Justice and 
Peace - Dili 
Commission for 
Justice and Peace - 
Dili 
National/Western 
Commission for Justice and 
Peace - Baucau 
Commission for 
Justice and Peace - 
Baucau 
Eastern 
Hatimor ?  
FAT (Bobonaro) FAT  Bobonaro, Dili 
Naroman LS Fundasaun Naroman  Bobonaro only  
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PAS PAS Dili, Baucau, Lautem 
Satilos (YTLS) ?  
Yatina ?  
Yasona Yasona  ? Districts? 
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List 2 
 
Other NGOs - new since 
Sep 1999 (working in 3 or 
more Districts) 
Operating Districts 
Alola Foundation ? National  
 
CDEP Viqueque, Dili, Baucau, Aileu, 
Liquica 
  
Centro De Agricultura E 
Celerio Nacional (CACN) 
Manututo, Manufahi, Oecusse, 
Viqueque, Bobonaro, 
Covalima 
Community Development 
Lorosae 
Dili Manufahi, Oecusse 
CYDP Bobonaro, Liquica, Cova 
Lima,  
East Timor Agriculture 
Association 
Bobonaro, Dili, Manufahi, 
Manatuto, Viqueque , Baucau 
Father Antonio Maia 
Foundation 
(FAMF) 
Baucau, Ermera, Dili, Ainaro, 
Lautem, Aileu 
Formosa Aileu, Baucau, Dili, Ermera, 
Lautem, Liquica  
Forum Haklaken ba 
Progresso (FHP) 
Lautem, Liquica, Manututo, 
Baucau, Viqueque, Ermera 
Halibur Matenek Timor Oan 
ba Progresso (HMTOP) 
Lautem, Oecusse, Ermera, 
Dili, Cova Lima, Bobonaro, 
Viqueque 
Judicial Systems Monitoring 
Project  
National 
Moris Foun  Manututo, Balibo, Dili. 
Programa Be Mos 
(PROBEM)  
Viqueque, Lautem, Baucau 
Tane Hamutuk Timor 
(THT) 
Cova Lima, Dili, Manufahi, 
Bobonaro, Ainaro, Liquica. 
Y.O. Desenvolvemento 
Basico 
Dili, Baucau, Liquica 
Y. Timor Har’ri Dili, Liquica, Manatuto, 
Viqueque 
LAIFET  Several Districts. 
Associacao Mane Kontra la 
Violencia  
National 
Permaculture Timor Baucau, Aileu, Dili. 
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Lorosae 
Rumah Raykat I 
(Baucau) 
Baucau , Los Palos, Viqueque, 
Manututo 
YCDLDH Y. Comunidade 
Democratico, lei nos 
Direitos Humanos 
(Baucau) 
Baucau , Los Palos, Viqueque, 
Manututo 
Moris Rasik 
(Maliana) 
Maubara, Bobonaro, Maliana 
and others 
Forum Ham  
(Maliana) 
Bobonaro, Ermera, Liquica 
Perkumpulan HAL 
(Maliana) (Uma Raykat) 
Maliana, Oecusse, Liquica and 
Ermera 
Haburas ? 
La’o Hamutuk National 
HTO  ? 
Hotflima Covalima, Aileu, Dili 
 
 
 
List 3 
 
NGOs founded outside 
East Timor  
 
Operating inside post -
1999? 
Scope of Districts 
DHRF (Solo) ?  
ETDA (Melb) ETDA National/Dili 
ETRA (Syd) No  
CD Lorosae (Yogya) ?  
KMG (Talitakum) Talitakum  Dili 
SAHE Institute (Jakarta) SAHE  Liquica, Baucau, Dili 
Atamor (Portugal) ?  
ETHRC (Melb)  No  
Timor Aid (Darwin) See Yayasan Timor Aid 
(List 1) 
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Appendix B Examples of NGOs in Timor-Leste beyond the six  
Case Studies 
 
Information provided below comes from interviews with key NGO staff and 
documentary sources collected over the study period. The listing is in three categories: 
1) individual NGOs which existed prior to the emergency in September 1999 
2) individual NGOs formed after the 1999 emergency 
3) selected NGO networks. 
1. Organisations which existed before September 1999 
 
Bia Hula (Bubbling Spring) 
 
Bia Hula grew out of an AusAID water and sanitation project which began in 
Covalima District in 1992-93. The NGO component of the Project began in 1995; the 
newly-formed, independent NGO was registered in 1997, and provided with support to 
seek funding from other donors when the AusAID project ended late 1998/early 1999. 
AusAID also agreed to support Bia Hula for two years after its Project ended. Most of 
the people recruited to establish Bia Hula had NGO experience and/or technical skills  
(e.g. the Director was ex-ETADEP), and the AusAID project provided them with 
training in NGO management. The NGO was responsible for the community 
development component of the water supply project. Early on it had around 40 staff, 
but it had around 20-25 at the time of the crisis in 1999, and was entirely dependent on 
donors for funding. To overcome this dependence it began some commercial activities 
(block-making) on land it owned. After some significant difficulties in getting funding, 
Bia Hula was contracted to a new AusAID project (CWSSP) to provide community 
development services. This only supported the salaries of the fieldworkers in the 
Covalima and Maliana areas, not the Dili office or staff in other locations (e.g. Suai). 
Bia Hula had received short term funding from a variety of official donors and some 
international NGOs for specific projects, but by 2004 its organisational sustainability 
was far from assured, despite considerable efforts to interest other donors in funding its 
work. Few international NGO donors were still working in the water and sanitation 
 302
sector, official donors were only providing small grants to NGOs, and the future of 
AusAID’s interests in water and sanitation were unclear. 
 
ETDA East Timor Development Agency 
 
ETDA was formed in April 1999 out of recognition among members in the CNRT that 
a special agency was needed to ‘strengthen the capacity of East Timorese people to 
play an integral, active and coordinated role in the development of East Timor’. Its first 
project was a major Human Resources Survey, which was supported by an Australian 
NGO and the World Bank and conducted throughout East Timor and among the East 
Timorese diaspora living in Australia, over several months in late 1999-2000. In 2001 
it opened an Employment Centre (later to become a Training and Employment Centre) 
to help develop the human capacity to prepare to manage the nation. ETDA carried out 
training in key skill areas. It worked closely with the Transitional Government, and 
helped particularly with identification and training of potential civil servants. It also 
assisted with training and jobs for veterans. ETDA has also provided valuable 
translation and interpreting services for a variety of organisations, and is actively 
promoting Tetum language, for example through a Tetum book project based on oral 
histories of the veterans, and through preparing training manuals in Tetum. The 
organisation had 18 staff in 2004, and was also running English classes, and training 
for NGOs in the districts (e.g. IT, administrative skills etc.). 
 
ETWAVE  
 
ETWAVE started as GERTAK in November 1998 with a focus on women and 
children’s rights. It changed its name in November 1999 when it re-formed after the 
ballot. In 2001 it had a core of 17 women: 11 in Dili, 4 in Ermera, 1 in Ainaro, 1 in 
Viqueque and Los Palos, and some help in Liquica. Of these, five were paid staff in 
Dili and two in Ermera. All the rest were volunteers. They worked cooperatively and 
organised themselves through regular meetings. The districts where ETWAVE works, 
particularly Ermera and Liquica, are areas which had very bad experiences from April 
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to September 1999. ETWAVE has provided support to the women and children who 
were victims of violence. ETWAVE had three trained counsellors (trained by 
PRADET in East Timor and Sydney) who went out to the districts for three to four 
days at a time. They have also conducted training in small business under the UNHCR 
Quick Impacts Program. ETWAVE has had support from a range of donors, such as 
UNHCR (salary for staff, computer, car and motor-bike) UNICEF, AusAID and 
international NGOs. In later years ETWAVE was supported from profits generated by 
the restaurant operated by its founder. 
 
Fundacao Haburas 
 
This NGO was formed in 1998 by people who had been members of the student 
resistance movement, RENETIL. They were invited to Finland by the Finnish 
Government, and based on what they saw there realised the need to take good care of 
the environment. They were concerned that the Indonesian occupation had caused 
considerable damage to East Timor’s natural resources. They were barely active in 
1999, but regrouped in 2000 and began to research the issues and work with 
community groups in a number of districts (e.g. Aileu, Los Palos, Maubisse). They 
worked on reforestation and watershed rehabilitation, as well as broader environmental 
education. Initially they found it hard to get donors and others to recognise the 
environment as a key issue in the rehabilitation phase. They developed international 
links with Australian, Indonesian and other environmental groups and decided to focus 
on advocacy towards reviving customary law which protected the environment (“Tara 
Bandu”). They became active with the media and worked with other groups on things 
like a conference on sustainability and the development of HASATIL and the annual 
sustainable development ‘Expos’ that network organised. HASATIL successfully 
advocated for a clause relating to the environment to be incorporated into Timor-
Leste’s Constitution. In 2003 Haburas had 13 staff, and was supported by AusAID 
(through the NGO, Australian Conservation Foundation), USAID, JICA and CIDA.  
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Grupo Feto Foinsa’e Timor-Lorosa’e (GFFTL) 
 
GFFTL is a young women’s group which began in October 1998, and initially worked 
within the East Timor Students Solidarity Council to promote independence through 
organising ‘dialogues’ in the districts. It also participated in voter education and 
demonstrations in the lead up to the ballot. After 1999 it re-formed and began to focus 
on non-formal education and women’s rights. It was involved in training on gender, 
literacy programs, and civic education. In 2001 the group organised a conference in 
which some 50 or more women participated, and they decided to separate from ETSSC 
and form an independent organisation, to better promote women’s rights and to enable 
GFFTL to become better known. By 2004 GFFTL comprised nine staff and four 
volunteers, but salaries depended on availability of project funding. Most of the 
members were still university students, and needed funds for transport out to districts 
to provide training. At that time they had two projects running, one supported by an 
Australian NGO on women’s literacy, and the other by UNDP on civic education. 
While earlier civic education work supported by The Asia Foundation had enabled 
them to work in 10 districts, in 2004 they were working only in two districts—Los 
Palos and Baucau. They were also developing a sewing program with another 
Australian NGO. They were active in Dai Popular and REDE Feto. 
 
Naroman Yasona 
 
Yasona began in 1983 as an NGO of the Indonesian Protestant church, to provide 
assistance to communities displaced from the mountains by war. It initially focussed on 
welfare, then shifted to community development. Its main areas of work were in Dili, 
Liquica and Manututo. Its first Timorese employee was appointed in 1990. It had links 
with Indonesian NGOs, e.g. Bina Swadaya, for training. In the initial weeks after the 
1999 emergency it ran a ‘crisis centre’ to provide emergency assistance and was soon 
assisted by the Joint Church Emergency Group (with food clothing, medicines, 
household kits etc.) and USAID (who gave computers, motor bike, car, mini tractor). 
They assisted with reconstruction (e.g. schools, health clinics, water/sanitation, homes 
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etc) and opened three community health clinics (Same, Dili, Los Palos), plus mobile 
clinics and village medical outposts, assisted by an Indonesian NGO—Bethesda. They 
also assisted returning refugees. By early 2000 Yasona had ongoing church support, 
and recommenced community development work—agriculture, livestock and fishing, 
small business (kiosks etc), and small industry (sewing, cement blocks, tais weaving). 
They ran English and computing courses in Dili and Baucau, and supported a 
traditional culture group (with materials for costumes, transport etc.). By late 2003 they 
had a longer term strategic plan consistent with the National Development Plan and 
good relations with the Government at national and local levels. Their main focus in 
2004 was self-reliance through community development. Their programs focused on: 
food security; education; health care; small business and industry (i.e. very much same 
focus as pre-1999); they had six regional coordinators for their agriculture program in 
the Eastern and Central regions, and a technical trainer. They had a strong focus on 
bottom up planning, and self-reliance at community level. In 2004 they had four staff 
in central office and others specific to programs. Donors in 2004 were from a range of 
churches, especially from Australia and Europe.  
 
Pronto Atu Serbis (PAS) 
 
PAS was founded in June 1996 to provide medical and support services to the 
underground movement of student activists, FALINTIL soldiers, and rape victims. It is 
now a medical NGO providing a wide range of medical services (including dental) 
from a clinic in Becora, Dili. In addition to those services they also established three 
women’s groups in Dili, Los Palos and Atauro Island. The focus of their work with 
these groups has been on basic health information for mothers, human rights, and 
children’s health, especially nutrition. In Los Palos, the group has also started sewing, 
making clothes and tais making. In the Suco where the clinic is, they have a group for 
mothers and another for young women. They have a range of links with international 
health and church-related organisations, from whom they obtain support and some 
volunteer expertise. 
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Yayasan Halarae (means ‘Land Care’ in Kemak language) 
 
Halarae was established in 1992 to work on conservation, upland agriculture and agro-
forestry. Staff at Halarae had previously worked with CRS and then ETADEP and had 
undertaken a study tour within Indonesia in the 1980s, which inspired them to establish 
Halarae. Their initial small funding was from the Indonesian Government, and they 
have always worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Forests 
(MAFF), and gain technical expertise through this association. They also received early 
support from CIDA, and later AusAID, through their Jakarta offices. They started with 
just two staff, working in Bobonaro District, but now they also work in Manututo, in 
response to an initiative by Austcare, an Australian NGO. By 1999 they had grown to 
five staff and by 2004 had grown further employing 20 people. In 2004, they had major 
projects funded by Austcare (with AusAID support), UNOPS (seed multiplication 
trial), and were developing a proposal with JICA. Halarae was also involved with the 
Farmer Field School along with ETADEP and MAFF. In many respects Halarae 
functions as an agricultural extension organisation. 
 
2.Organisations established after September 1999 
 
Alola Foundation 
The Alola Foundation was established in 2001 under the leadership of then First Lady 
of East Timor, Kirsty Sword Gusmao, to raise awareness of and campaign against the 
sexual and gender-based violence experienced by women and young girls in Timor-
Leste. It has grown to provide services and programs in areas such as advocacy, 
employment, education, maternal and child health and humanitarian assistance. It has 
five program areas: Maternal and Child Health, Education, Economic Development, 
Advocacy and Management; its slogan ‘Strong Women, Strong Nation’ sums up its 
underlying approach. It works across all areas to increase the status of women, promote 
human rights, strengthen community participation in development and create 
employment opportunities, and its office in Dili acts as a marketing outlet for tais 
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products made by the women it supports. The programs are funded by a diverse range 
of supporters from all over the world, both individuals and institutions.  
 
Centro do Desimvolvimento do Economica Popular (CDEP) 
 
Centro do Desimvolvimento do Economica Popular was set up after 1999 to assist in 
marketing, particularly of rice and other agricultural produce. It had eight staff in 2003 
and was supported by the Bishop’s Conference of Japan, the Finnish Government and 
CAFOD, a UK Catholic NGO. Earlier it had received support from CIDA and one 
other NGO donor. It had networks of suppliers across Timor-Leste and assisted farmers 
to get their produce to major markets in places such as Dili, Hatolia, Liquica and 
Ainaro. 
 
Justice System Monitoring Project (JSMP) 
 
JSMP was founded in April 2001 by two international lawyers who worked voluntarily 
at the outset. Within two months it had a Timorese staff member, who was the Director 
in 2003. Its role is to monitor the Timor-Leste legal system and the Ad Hoc Tribunal 
which was taking place in Jakarta, and to comment on draft legislation before the 
Parliament. In 2003, as well as the Director, JSMP had  seven legal staff, three more 
involved in outreach and four others involved in administration and security. It had 
funding support from USAID, AusAID, The Asia Foundation and Finnish 
Government, as well the Jurists Association of Australia. It was well networked with 
other NGOs working in the legal area, such as HAK, FOKUPERS, and various legal 
aid NGOs then operating in Dili. This included running workshops together in the 
districts to inform the community about legal matters. It had limited contact with the 
Justice Ministry, but knew that Ministry used its website. It also had links with the 
President and the Parliament, each of whom read and used its reports. It was also 
working with the East Timor Students Solidarity Council to develop their knowledge 
about legal matters. 
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Roman Luan 
 
Roman Luan is a local NGO located on Atauro, an island off Dili, which started 
operating in February 2000. It grew out of a community development project 
sponsored by an Indonesian university. Initially it was supported by a British NGO, but 
difficulties in that relationship caused Roman Luan to end that partnership, and the 
New Zealand Government became its main supporter. Its office is solar powered, 
thanks to the efforts of UN troops from Pakistan who set up the system. The main 
activity is an ecotourism venture, the profits from which support community projects 
such as school facilities. There had been some difficulties between the NGO and the 
Government related to the requirements for the school, to which the Government 
barely contributed, but at the same time the Government (and others) were keen to 
learn about the success of the ecotourism venture as a possible model for other places. 
Roman Luan is fortunate to be supported by a long term expatriate staff member who 
was with the original community development project. The NGO had also made 
arrangements with dive boats to pay for access to beach camping, and to pay for water 
and toilet facilities there. 
 
La’o Hamutuk (‘Walking Together’) 
 
This organisation describes itself as a hybrid East Timorese-international organisation, 
that ‘monitors, analyses, and reports on the principal international institutions in East 
Timor’. It began in mid-2000 in response to the need of Timorese activists to 
understand the plethora of international organisations that had arrived in the country, 
and was jointly established by Timorese and international solidarity activists. In 2003 it 
had six East Timorese and three international staff, with a board of three East Timorese 
and one international member. It is primarily a research, information and advocacy 
NGO, helping Timorese understand the work of international organisations in their 
country, but equally helping those organisations hear Timorese perspectives about their 
work. It publishes a bulletin, a ‘Surat Popular’ (‘popular letter’) explaining things very 
simply in Tetum, has a multi-lingual website, runs a radio program and hosts public 
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meetings. A number of La’o Hamutuk’s staff have represented East Timor NGOs at 
major international meetings and participated in international exchanges. 
 
3.Selected NGO Networks 
 
Dai Popular 
The network of popular education organisations, Dai Popular, was set up in 2001 and 
officially  established in January 2002, with a priority to work among the illiterate, 
rural poor to try to ensure that they were included, not marginalised, by development. It 
grew out of an exchange program organised by local NGO La’o Hamutuk, The 
program began in 2000 with a visit to East Timor of two Brazilian  popular educators 
to East Timor;  the following year eleven East Timorese community educators  went to 
Brazil where they saw ‘literacy programs, popular health methods, women’s 
empowerment, community radio, popular theatre, cooperatives and alternative banking, 
bee/honey cultivation, ecotourism and environmentalism, water conservation and 
liberation-based theology and ministry work’ (La’o Hamutuk 2001). On their return the 
Dai Popular national network was formed to promote popular education as a tool for 
democratisation and social transformation. SAHE coordinated this network, which by 
2004 had some 36 organisations involved. Most of the members were community 
organisations, seeking to learn from each others’ experiences, and relate together with 
international organisations in areas of education, community education and community 
organising. These NGOs used ‘popular education’ methodologies as an approach for 
work in other sectors, such as agriculture, human rights and health. Dai Popular also 
advocated for a National Literacy Campaign, which was subsequently established. 
 
HASATIL 
 
HASATIL is a network promoting sustainable agriculture in Timor-Leste. It was 
established in March 2002 in response to an unsustainable situation. Agriculture in the 
Indonesian period had depended heavily on high levels of external inputs such as 
fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds, the prices of which were extremely high. This problem 
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had been very evident after the Asian crisis of 1997, but when international donors 
came to Timor in 1999 they perpetuated the same agricultural model. The network 
began from a workshop on sustainable agriculture, after which fifteen organisations set 
up a five-member steering committee. The first activity was an ‘Expo’ in May 2000 
about sustainable agriculture, which generated a high level of interest, and led to an 
increase to 31 organisational members, including international NGOs, farmers groups 
and local organisations. The main objective is to enable farmers to become independent 
of costly external inputs and able to farm sustainably using local seeds, natural pest-
control and organic fertilizers. In this sense the organisation is trying to transform 
agriculture and persuade government to promote this approach. The network had only 
four staff members in 2004, one of whom had developed an interest in permaculture 
through a connection with an Australian volunteer in Timor-Leste, and subsequently 
studied permaculture in Australia. He indeed, had been a driving force for HASATIL’s 
establishment. The network had three working groups focussed on advocacy and 
campaigning; research and development; and training and education. Clearly 
HASATIL was challenging both the Government of Timor-Leste and international 
organisations such as the World Bank, each of which were promoting increased rice 
production. HASATIL was encouraging a much wider range of crops for food 
consumption. Three international NGO donors supported the organisation, which had 
rejected offers of funding from governments of US and Japan, as it wanted to work 
with like-minded groups. HASATIL published a monthly bulletin and was trying to 
work with the Agriculture Department of the University to promote its ideas. 
 
REDE Feto 
 
REDE began on 10 March 2000. A group of women and women’s organisations came 
together to organise the first ever East Timor Women’s Congress in June 2000. While 
women had played a critical role in the struggle for independence, through the 
diplomatic, clandestine, and armed aspects of the struggle, the CNRT had no women’s 
section. The Coordinator of FOKUPERS was trusted by CNRT to establish REDE, 
bringing together 15 organisations. REDE’s policies were set by the Year 2000 
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Women’s Congress which was attended by over 500 women from all over East Timor. 
The national Congress was preceded by a series of district women’s meetings. The 
Congress agreed a ‘Platform for Action for the Advancement of Women of Timor 
Lorosae’. It identified the following issues as critical areas of concern: poverty, law 
and order, reconciliation and justice, culture of violence, and decision making and 
institution building. For a period REDE Feto  languished somewhat, but was revived 
again in July 2004, with a second successful national Congress which focussed on 
assessing progress since 2000 and setting new priorities for the following four years. 
UNIFEM provided early institutional support and training to REDE, and the 
organisation worked closely with the UN Gender Unit, and later the Office for the 
Promotion of Equality in the Timor-Leste Government. It had a number of UN agency 
donors in 2004 (e.g. UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNDP), as well as support from the 
Government of Timor-Leste. 
 
East Timor NGO Forum 
 
The NGO Forum was formed by 14 NGOs in 1998 to coordinate NGO responses to the 
drought then affecting East Timor. Due to the security situation it had been unable to 
meet or develop much before the emergency in 1999. The Forum was reestablished in 
late 1999-early 2000 with support from the UN OCHA and the Australian NGO 
coordinating body ACFOA. From mid-2000 the Forum began to grow rapidly and by 
2001 it was responsible for NGO registration in Timor-Leste, with some 200 Timorese 
and 112 international NGOs registered. It had 36 staff at the height of the rehabilitation 
phase and transition to independence and had numerous active working groups, 
undertook advocacy with international donors, and ran a district outreach program to 
build the capacity of district-level NGOs. A change of director in early 2002, when the 
international presence was scaling down, led to the Forum taking on a stronger 
advocacy role with less focus on its umbrella and training role of the earlier period. As 
a result, the support of the established Dili-based NGOs fell away during 2002-03, as 
they saw it becoming like another NGO, not an umbrella body. From late 2003 to mid-
2005 the Forum focussed on restructuring and revising its Constitution and under a 
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new director again in mid-2005 it started to regain support. The Forum was supported 
by numerous official and NGO donors, but it had difficulty meeting its financial 
accountability and reporting requirements to a number of them. Its relationship with the 
Timor-Leste Government was not always easy, particularly in the 2002-03 period, 
although in the early years it had good relationships with the UN administration and 
ETTA. 
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Appendix C Questions which guided the Case Study Research 
 
For every interviewee:  
• Explain details of the research (Plain Language Statement)  
• Confidentiality statement 
• Name/position of interviewee 
Then select appropriate questions for each interviewee: 
 
Clarify roles over the period before 1999-2004 with NGO 
 
Pre 1999 
1. How did the organisation begin and what was its original vision? 
2. Who was involved in its early period? Where were they from? What was their 
background? 
3. How did it pursue that vision before September 1999? 
4. What sorts of programs did it run? 
5. Where did it get funds to do the work? 
6. How was it structured/how did it function? (Internal and board?) 
7. What relationship (if any) did the NGO have to the independence movement before 
September 1999?  
8. How did it relate to, negotiate space with, the Indonesian authorities? 
9. What relations did it have with other NGOs/CBOs? How did it relate to 
communities? 
10. What relations did it have with international organisations? 
11. What role was it playing in lead up to ballot? (i.e. from about April/May 1999 or 
whenever it stopped its ‘normal’ programming?) 
 
1999-2004: How has the whole transition process affected what the NGO 
did/does? 
 
12. What happened to the NGO? Staff, facilities? 
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13. How did the organisation get reestablished? (factors/donor support?) 
14. Did it reestablish in same form, with same people, or was it different? 
15. Has its vision changed since before 1999? If so how—what was the process and 
why? 
16. How has it realised its vision since 1999? (this may need to be divided into several 
different periods according to the NGO’s own definition of the change-points). Explore 
the kinds of programs/activities it has developed over different phases since before 
September 1999.  
17. What was it doing in the immediate period of the emergency (say to end 2000?)  
(i.e. roles/program) Why? 
18. What about during the period of nation-forming? Constitution, formation of new 
government structures, development of National Development Plan? Why? 
19. Now since independence? What has been focus of its work? Why? 
20. What sorts of things caused it to change its approach (and perhaps its vision too)? 
(tease out factors external and internal which may have contributed) Why did it select 
the things it chose to work on/not work on? 
21. How did it change internally (organisational structure and relationships) to 
implement new approach(es)? (explore who/what drove that, how etc.) 
22. What difficulties, challenges has it had to face through all this? 
23. What funding and capacity building support (of all types) has it received, from 
where, and how useful has this been to the NGO? Has this varied much over the 
period? 
24. Are there any suggestions for how capacity building support could be made more 
effective (in a similar situation) in future? 
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More detailed questions re how the NGO has tried to contribute to/shape the new 
nation post 1999. 
 
Up to May 2002 
 
25. What influence did NGO try to have on the international community (UN, 
bilaterals, multilaterals and INGOs) and its approach between (pre) September 1999 
and May 2002? What were the key issues? How did you approach them? 
26. What contacts did NGO have with East Timorese political players (if any) and 
other civil society groups and the community level throughout this period? Did you try 
to influence political parties or the Constituent Assembly on particular issues?  
27. What sort of development or key issues has NGO tried to influence in the new 
nation?  
28. Where did the NGO get its ideas about these issues from? 
29. How has it gone about demonstrating, promoting or advocating that approach? 
Does the NGO work with other NGOs (local, international) to do this? If so how are 
they collaborating?  
30. What support does it feel it has from communities for such an approach? (how does 
it assess that?) How does NGO relate to traditional structures in the community? How 
does it deal with questions of legitimacy and accountability to the people? 
31. Did NGO have input to the processes which led to the national development plan? 
(what does it think about that?)  
32. How effectively did you feel you influenced the response of those you sought to 
influence? (to what does NGO attribute its success or lack of success?). 
33. What evidence does it have that its ideas were taken up at all? (If not, why does it 
think it did not succeed?) If so, what factors contributed to this success? 
34. What donor support did you have for this work in this period? Were there things 
you wanted to do that they wouldn’t support? 
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Since May 2002 
35. What changes in the NGOs’ work have occurred in this period and why? Where is 
its emphasis now?  
36. What sorts of relationships has it developed with the new government? (which 
departments? types of relationship and levels—national, district, local?  policy/program 
links? personal links?)  How does it assess government view of it as an NGO? 
37. How does it assess government-NGO relationships overall? What about NGO 
legislation? High Level Mechanism? 
38. How does it assess the current approach to nation building and development which 
the East Timor Government is pursuing? (strengths/weaknesses it sees?) 
What does it see as the key issues in Timor-Leste development now and what is it 
trying to do about them? 
39. How is it working now with other NGOs, communities etc. on these issues? 
40. How have its relations with donors changed since May 2002 (if at all)? 
41. How does it assess the impact of the international community on East Timor’s 
development approach now? Does it seek to influence that in any way? Of so, how and 
with what success? (factors in success or failure?). 
 
Now and future 
 
42. What are the challenges the NGO is facing now? (internal and external) 
43. Are these challenges specific to this NGO, or are they challenges facing NGOs as a 
group? 
44. How has  any of the recent capacity building support it received assisted it with its 
efforts to influence development  approach, or key issues it has been working on, or in 
other ways? (elaborate if affirmative). 
45. Looking back, what have you learned? What do you wish you had done differently 
if you’d had the chance? How will what you’ve learned shape what you do now? 
46. Others I should talk to (time permitting?). 
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Appendix D  Persons interviewed for this research 
 
 
All interviews were conducted in Dili, unless otherwise indicated. Some people were 
interviewed on more than one occasion. 
 
Visits to Dili during which interviews were conducted: 22 September-3 October 2003 
(scoping); 13 June-10 July 2004; 26 September-7 October 2004; 26 June-4 July 2005. 
 
One final visit to Dili took place from 1-6 October 2007 to confirm authority to use 
each of the case studies. No further data for use in the thesis was collected at that time.  
 
Timorese  NGOs 
 
Alola Foundation 
Kirsty Sword Gusmao 24 June 2004 
 
Bia Hula 
Aleixo da Cruz 26 June and 6 October 2004 
 
Caritas Dili 
Rogerio dos Santos 7 July and 30 September 2004 
Sister Idalia Taveras  28 September 2004 and 30 June 2005 
Pedro Amaral 1 July and 4 October 2004 
Basil Rolandsen 1 July 2004 
Dr Jamie Da Costa Sarmento 29 June 2004 and 1 July 2004 
Mariano Carmo 24 June and 4 October2004 
 
CDEP 
Agusto Guterres 29 September 2003 
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Christian Children’s Fund 
Lola dos Reis   29 June 2004 
 
ETADEP 
Gilman A. E. Santos 22 June 2004 
Jocelyn Mendez 29 September 2003 and 30 June 2004 
Carlos Alberto Barros Florindo 25 June and 1 October 2004 
Victor Carvalho  25 June 2004 
Norberto Goncalves dos Santos 23 June 2004 
Francisco Marcal Siquiera da Silva 30 June 2004 
 
ETDA 
Palmira Pires 29 June 2004 
 
FOKUPERS 
Manuela Pereira 21 June & 5 July 2004 
Laura Abrantes 30 September 2004 
Natalia de Jesus Cesaltino 29 September 2004 
Rosa da Souza 29 September 2004 and 1 July 2005 
Ubalda Maria Filipi Alves 5 October 2004 
Eliza da Silva dos Santos 6 October 2004 
 
GFFTL 
Marquita Soares  26 September 2003 and 7 July 2004 
 
Haburas 
Demetrio Amaral 29 September 2003 
Elias Vieira 29 September 2003 
 
HAK 
Aniceto Guterres Lopes  8 July 2004 
 319
Jose Luis de Oliviera 19 June 2004 and 1 July 2005 
Celastino Marques 22 June 2004 
Kerry Brogan 6 July 2004 
Joachim Fonseca 2 July 2004 
Octavia do Carmo 23 June 2004 
Silverio Pinto Baptista 4 October 2004 
Rui Viana 2 July 2004 
Amado Hei 21 June 2004 
Leon dos Santos 28 June 2004 
Edio Saldanha Borges 28 June 2004 
Vitor Lopes 29 June 2005 
Aniceto Neves 21 June 2004 
 
Halarae 
Paulo da Costa Amaral 8 July 2004 
 
HASATIL 
Ego Lemus 6 July 2004 
 
REDE 
Laura Menezes Lopes 6 October 2004 
Emily Royenstad  1 October 2004 
 
JSMP 
Nelson Belo 30 September 2003 
 
NGO Forum 
Antero Bendito da Silva 24 September 2003 and 24 June 2004 
Micel Soares  25 September 2003, 15 June and 1  
  October 2004 
 320
Joachim da Costa 15 June and 1 October 2004 and 30 June 
2005 
 
La’o Hamutuk 
Tomas Freitas 25 September 2003 
Adriano Nasciemento 25 September 2003 
Selma Hayati 26 June 2004 
Charlie Scheiner 4 July 2005 
 
Roman Luan 
Gabrielle Sampson 1 October 2004 
 
SAHE 
Aderito de Jesus Soares 2 July, 4 October 2004 and 29 June 2005 
Nuno Rodrigues 5 October 2004 
 
Timor Aid 
Maria do Ceu Lopes da Silva Federer   6 October 2004 
Alex Gusmao   30 June 2004 
 
Yasona 
Constantino Pinto (17 May in Melbourne)  17 May and 22 June 2004 
 
 
East Timor Government 
 
Ministry of External Affairs 
Emilia Pires  (in Melbourne)  17 September 2005  
Josephine  Dongail, NGO Unit 25 September and 21 June 2004 
Domingos Marques. NGO Unit 25 September 2003 and 25 June 2004 
Ben Moxham (NDPEAC) 18 June 2004 
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Ministry of Labour and Solidarity 
Arsenio Bano (in Darwin) 13 June 2004 
Secretary of State (and former Executive Director of NGO Forum) 
 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries 
Arkanju Araujo 
Dept Policy Planning & Program Services  2 July 2004 
 
Prime Minister’s Department 
Isabel Perreira   
Adviser on Human Rights  8 July 2004 
 
Maria Domingos Alves (Mikato)  
Adviser on Promotion of Equality 30 September 2004 
 
Parliament 
Aziza Magno MP 8 July 2004 
 
CAVR 
Kieran Dwyer 25 June 2004 
Galuh Wandita 6 July 2004 
 
International Donors 
 
AusAID 
Helio Talvares 23 September 2003 
Carmen Branco  23 September 2003 
Cynthia Burton 26 September 2003 
Alan Smith (CWSSP)  6 October 2004 
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CIDA 
Afonso Aleixo 5 July 2004 
Afonso de Oliviera (and formerly ETADEP)  1 July 2004 
Fransisco Marcal Siquiera da Silva   5 July 2004 
 
UNDP 
Jose (Aze) Marcelino Cabral Belo 6 July 2004 
Jennifer Worthington 24 September 2003 and 6 July 2004 
 
USAID 
Joao Noronha 23 September 2003 
Expedito Belo  23 September 2003 
Nicholas Hobgood 26 September 2003 
Nicole  Seibel 23 September 2003 
 
International NGOs  
 
Oxfam Australia 
Keryn Clarke  24 September 2003, 17 June  
and 1 October 2004 
AFAP 
Christine Carberry  (by phone, from Sydney) 6 May 2005 
 
Oxfam UK 
Wayne Gum 28 June 2004 
 
CRS 
Jamie Davies 25 September 2003 
Richard Holloway  24 June 2004 
Catharina Maria  25 June 2004 
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Caritas Australia 
Sieneke Martin  25 September 2003 
Bu Wilson  23 June 2004 
 
Catholic Institute of International Relations 
Tonette Velasco    25 September 2003 
 
CARE 
Jill Umbach 26 September 2003 
 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Lee Tan (in Melbourne)  3 June 2004 
 
Columbia University 
Rebecca Engel  29 September 2003 and 1 July 2004 
 
The Asia Foundation 
Dionisio Babo Soares   8 July 2004 
 
APHEDA 
Angela Soares 29 September 2003 
 
CAFOD/Trocaire 
Estanislau Martins 7 July 2004 
 
 
Other individuals or organisations that provided documents or information for 
which I am grateful: 
 
Domingos Soares Oxfam Australia 
Catherine Chalk  Austcare 
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Peter Zwart                   Caritas NZ 
Clare Danby  CAFOD 
J. Rennison  Trocaire  
HIVOS Netherlands 
Kirsten S. Natvig Caritas Norway 
 
Interpreters 
 
Elsa Ximenes assisted by Eugenia Lopes 
 
Translation 
 
East Timor Development Agency 
Fernando da Costa   
FOKUPERS (for material specific to FOKUPERS) 
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Appendix E Additional documents and other sources used in  
compiling NGO case studies. 
 
 
Caritas Dili 
• Report on Visit to Timor Lorosae 25 February-March 2000 Peter Zwart 
• Visit to Caritas Dili 18-23 July 2000 Peter Zwart 
• Report on Monitoring Visit to Timor Lorosae 17-27 July 2001 Peter Zwart 
• Visit Report East Timor 15-28 February 2003 Peter Zwart 
• Visit Report East Timor 17-30 August 2003 Peter Zwart 
 
ETADEP 
• Profil Fundacao ETADEP (brochure) 
• Proposal: Basic Needs Empowerment Program for Farmer Community 
Yayasan Ema Mata Dalan Ba Progressu (ETADEP) (undated) 
• Visit to Farmer Field School, Aileu, 9 July 2004 
 
HAK 
• Observation of Mid-Year Review Meeting 3 July 2004  
• Land Investment for HAK Office Building (one-page flier) 
• Timor-Leste National Alliance for an International Tribunal. Letter to Secretary 
General of the United Nations 17 September 2004 
• Issues of Direito (Nos 21-27) 
• Issues of Newsletter HAK, 2003, 2004 
• Suara NC, Edisi 06 April 2001 
• The HAK Association Brochure 
• Divisional Reports to the Board for the Period January-June 2004 
• Laporan Assessment (Assessment Report) Yayasan HAK Dili Timor Lorosae 
by M. Kusumahadi and F. Tugimin, USC-Satunama, Yogyakarta (undated) 
• Report of Consultative Workshop on the Development of a National Human 
Rights Actions Plan, 11-12 December 2003, Dili, USAID and RDTL 
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• HAK Foundation: HIVOS Counterparts Database, http://www. 
Hivos.nl/nederlands/partners/zoeken/partner/index.php?org_nummer=TL001 
 
FOKUPERS 
• Menilam Kemerau: upaya perempuan Timor Lorosae menyudahi kekerasan 
sebuah awal. (Make the Dry Season Lighter: First steps to stop violence against 
women in Timor Loro Sa’e) in Indonesian. Extracts translated into English by 
FOKUPERS 
• Issues of Babadok (FOKUPERS’ newsletter) 
• TA’ES Lia-Los ba Igualidadi. No4/Abril-Junio 2004 (Bulletin from the Office 
for the Promotion of Equality No 4 April-June 2004) 
• Movimento Nasional Kontra Violensia (National Movement Against Violence) 
Brochure 
• HIVOS Counterparts database: FOKUPERS, Women’s Communication Forum 
Timor Lorosae. 
Hivos.nl/nederlands/partners/zoeken/partner/index.php?org_nummer=TL003 
 
SAHE 
• CD Roms produced by SAHE:  e.g. Liquisi Ami Nia Rai (about the coffee 
monopoly); Situasaun Tribunal Iha Timor-Leste (about the International 
Tribunal). 
  
Timor Aid  
• Timor Aid brochure. 
• Participation in Timor Aid Open Day, 5 October 2004 
• Timor Aid: Edukasaun Sivika: Saida Maka: Demokrasia? Konstitusaun? 
Partidu Politiku? Direitus Humanus? (Civic Education Booklet in Tetum) 
• Tais Timor: Traditional weaving cataloguing Activity Funded by USAID. 
Timor Aid and USAID (brochure) 
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• Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific website: 
http://www.fpsi.orgfj/affiliates/timor.htm[viewed 19 April 2005] 
• Information about Timor Aid projects on website of Just World Partners: 
http://www.justworld.org.uk[viewed 19 April 2005] 
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Appendix F Some Examples of Official Donor Support to Civil 
Society in East Timor 1999 to 2004-05. 
 
 
Listed below are the major programs of selected major donors to Timorese civil society 
in East Timor from late 1999 to the FY 2004-05. The focus below is on programs 
which were designed to strengthen East Timor civil society (and often as a corollary, to 
provide support for community development work through NGOs and community 
groups). This summary may exclude support provided to local community groups or 
NGOs through major bilateral programs where such information is not publicly 
available. Other donors such as DFID (UK), Japan and Ireland provided support to 
local NGOs, but this was generally to achieve other program objectives (e.g. to 
promote agriculture or other sectoral goals). Some donors provided support to 
international NGOs which may have worked with Timorese partners, but these are only 
included where adequate information was available. The first three donors were the 
major donors with programs expressly identified to build civil society capacity, and 
which worked directly with Timorese local NGOs. 
 
USAID 
Following the 1999 emergency USAID set up the Office of Transition Initiatives 
(OTI), that led USAID’s response from November 1999 to October 2002. A key 
objective of OTI’s program was to ‘encourage citizen participation in public life, 
bolster civil society’ and promote the rule of law (2003 Final Evaluation OTI: 25) and 
this was to be achieved particularly through strengthening the NGO and media sectors.  
 
By early 2000 OTI was providing short term (three month) funding for office 
rehabilitation and salaries to get NGOs running again. The 23 initial grants were for 
office equipment and supplies, transport (vehicles and motor bikes) computers and 
other materials. Twenty three grants ranging from US$8,000-$25,000 were disbursed. 
OTI saw NGOs as a vehicle to quickly provide some social services to the people, but 
its main objective was to help establish and build civil society in East Timor. In August 
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2000 a second round of funding and in-kind support was provided, this time to 80 
NGOs. These covered activities such as community based literacy campaigns, media 
development, support for Yayasan HAK and other human rights groups for public 
radio communication about the draft Constitution, and some 50 groups were supported 
in civic education activities around the Constituent Assembly and Presidential elections 
in 2001 and 2002.  
 
USAID also established other programs which included grants to NGOs and civil 
society organisations as well as local governments and others. These were TEP—the 
Transitional Employment Program to August 2000; followed by TEP II (Transition 
Engagement for Population Support (61 projects); and BELE (Building Empowerment 
Leadership and Engagement) (88 projects) to February 2002. The goals of these 
programs were explicitly related to economic recovery and democratic development. 
Among the Projects to promote economic growth, 10 of the 11 projects under the 
heading ‘Financial services increased’, were through international and local non-
government organisations, or credit cooperatives. A smaller proportion of those under 
the heading ‘Markets improved and production of selected products increased’ were 
also through NGOs, although the amounts for local NGOs were very small. Two 
projects under the ‘Market linkages strengthened’ category were through local NGOs. 
More local NGOs were significantly supported under the ‘Democracy and Governance 
small grants’ program for election monitoring, civic education, women’s education, 
organisational development, conflict resolution, human rights  and justice monitoring, 
media, and campaigning against gender violence. Eleven local NGO projects were 
classified as ‘Increasing public participation in governance’, most of the ‘improving 
citizens’ access to justice’ projects, and two projects under the ‘strengthened 
independent and government institutions’ categories were through local NGOs. These 
programs indicate an emphasis on NGOs providing services to the population, and 
holding the government to account, promoting formal democracy and politically 
empowering the community.  
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AusAID 
In March 2001 AusAID began the East Timor NGO Capacity Building (ETCBS), a 
three-year program costing AUD$4.5 million. Its goal was to reduce poverty through 
building capacity of local NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs) and by 
supporting activities for community development and civil society strengthening. This 
Program supported 18 East Timorese NGOs through partnerships with seven 
Australian NGOs. Activities they undertook included employment and vocational 
training, civil society strengthening, sustainable livelihoods, environmental protection, 
human rights, peace and reconciliation, women’s empowerment and work with 
vulnerable groups. A review was conducted in 2003 (AusAID 2004). While the 
program was seen as flexible and responsive, and the activities were generally viewed 
positively by communities, the review questioned the capacity of small short-term 
projects to address poverty reduction. Even to achieve the projects’ own modest goals 
the timeframes were too short and there was too much focus on service delivery and 
insufficient attention to capacity building of the NGOs. What institutional development 
there was tended to focus on project management, including financial management, 
strategic planning, English language, computer skills, human resource management 
and gender analysis; many of these related to the need to interact with the donor 
system. Gaps identified by local NGOs focussed more on program implementation and 
development, ‘gender analysis, institutional development, participatory development, 
campaign planning, resource mobilisations, community education, environmental 
issues and sustainable livelihoods analysis’ (AusAID  2004:7). The Review notes the 
relatively positive experience of partnership which NGOs reported, but highlights the 
issue of sustainability, which was a critical issue facing the local NGOs. When this 
program ended in late 2003/early 2004 AusAID did not continue any specific civil 
society capacity development programs.  
 
East Timor Community Assistance Program 
This Program is not a civil society capacity building program, but it supports local 
community projects. It has been operating since 2001 and a total of AUD$5 million has 
been spent on it. This small grants scheme supports community initiatives throughout 
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East Timor through non-government organisations, community based organisations 
and religious groups with the aim of achieving better living conditions for East 
Timorese people. The Program has supported hundreds of community level and small 
scale activities, including building irrigation canals, schools and health facilities, 
providing education for women, and promoting peacebuilding and free media 
activities. It also supports district governments to directly address community needs.  
NGOs in bilateral projects. 
AusAID incorporated working with selected NGOs into two major bilateral projects in 
agriculture/rural development and water and sanitation.  
 
UNDP and related UN agencies 
UNDP first began NGO capacity assistance in early 2000 with support for an East 
Timor NGO Capacity Building Project. This project provided three blocks of training 
to NGOs to deepen their understanding of development issues and strengthen the 
managerial and organisational capacity of local NGOs. The blocks were: Development 
Concepts (March 2000), Organisational Management, Project Management and 
Proposal Writing (April 2000 and a repeat block in May 2000). A total of 60 NGOs 
availed themselves of the opportunities for training that the Project provided. The 
Project was also designed to assist in strengthening the national NGO Forum, so as to 
enhance cooperation and avoid duplication, and it worked with the Forum’s board to 
relocate it from the UN-NGO Information Centre to an independent building, hire an 
Executive Director, and develop a discussion paper about the role of the NGO Forum. 
 
In February 2001 UNDP began a second Project which ran until August 2002 called 
‘Enhancing the Capacities of East Timorese Civil Society Organisations’. This Project, 
with a total budget of US$486,000, had three components: 
1) Supporting capacity development within the NGO Forum 
2) Supporting a training program for civil society organisations, subcontracted to 
and run by Oxfam Australia 
3) A small grants program which provided 15 grants to local NGOs and CBOs. 
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A mid-term review of that Program in November 2001 recommended  a longer 
timeframe, development of some thematic priorities with possibility for NGOs to  
propose activities within those, ‘layered’ capacity building and support for governance, 
self assessment and evaluation, and a focus on the relationships between government 
and CSOs. More focus on capacity development and learning within any future small 
grants program was also recommended. The review also recommended a situation 
analysis of civil society in East Timor, a task that began in late February 2002.  
 
From May 2003 UNDP began a new Project, ‘Strengthening the Capacity of Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) in local and national development processes for the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in Timor-Leste’. This ran until 
March 2006. The overall UNDP Project was undertaken in collaboration with United 
Nations Volunteers (UNV). Its objective was to enhance the capacity of CSOs in 
project monitoring and advocacy in relation to the MDGs; this included training of 
NGOs in Dili and Baucau, developing civil society-government dialogue around the 
MDGs and strengthening the advocacy capacity of NGO networks and umbrella 
organisations. The Project provided grants to 21 CSOs (13 district-based) for 
organisational capacity development activities like strategic planning, financial 
management training and learning resources (such as books/documentation). It also 
supported capacity development of 11 community radio stations through the Timorese 
Media Development Centre. In collaboration with the NGO Forum, the main Timorese 
umbrella organisation, a mapping exercise of civil society (Civil Society Index) was 
also undertaken. The Program initially established Civil Society Support Centres in 
three districts, Baucau, Ainaro and Oecusse. However, only the Baucau Centre seems 
to have remained open by 2006 and, in preparation for the closure of the Program, had 
formed itself into a local NGO to focus on civic education and training based on the 
skills the staff had developed during the Project. 
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UNICEF and UNIFEM also provided small grants to women’s NGOs, such as 
FOKUPERS, and REDE Feto. UNICEF in 2000 also undertook a survey of training 
needs for NGOs in East Timor regions. 
 
In 2001 UNIFEM supported the establishment and operation of the REDE secretariat 
for its first year, as well as provided training and other support to strengthen the 
capacity of the network to promote and support women’s leadership in East Timor, and 
to implement the recommendations of the National Women's Congress. UNIFEM 
supported a Coordinator, Administrative/Finance Officer and Secretary, as well as 
operating expenses for the office, for one year, to enable the Secretariat to develop the 
capacity to raise further funding. UNIFEM and UNICEF support to REDE FETO has 
continued, for example, through support for their 2004 Congress. 
 
UNIFEM also assisted the NGO Timor Aid to upgrade the production of traditional 
textiles. UNIFEM worked with Timor Aid to support quality control and marketing in 
six districts, to upgrade weaving technology and the quality of the product in order to 
access niche markets offering higher prices to the women for their labour. UNIFEM 
funded a team from Thailand to train Timorese men from the districts of Suai, Same 
and Oecussi to build Thai-style upright looms with a flying shuttle. Women weavers 
from Thailand trained Timorese women in the use of these new looms. 
 
UNIFEM training on women’s political participation in August 2001 led to the 
establishment of a new NGO, the Timor Loro Sa'e Women's Political Caucus. This 
non-partisan group is drawing upon the experiences of similar organisations in the 
Pacific, and the Indonesian Women's Political Caucus. The Caucus actively supports 
all women candidates for elected office, regardless of party affiliation and promotes 
women’s participation in leadership and decision making.  
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CIDA, CANADA  
Canada Fund for Local Initiatives 
This program began in 2001-02 to the value of C$800,000, with $600,000 estimated 
annually in future years. It was a fund entirely for local NGO and community 
organisations, and involved some specific capacity building projects, including through 
support for Canadian co-operants (volunteers), for civic education through UNDP, and 
support through the NGO Forum to strengthen coordination and advocacy. Other 
projects were for women, agriculture, livestock and livelihood, human rights, gender 
and environmental issues. 
 
Sources  
 
USAID 
• Clark, J., von Briesen Lewis, A., Juiliani, L. 2003, Final Evaluation: The OTI 
Program in East Timor, submitted to USAID by Development Associates Inc. 
Washington. 
• USAID Office of Transition Initiatives East Timor Report.htm 
• Democracy and Governance Small Grants by Intermediate Result December 
2001-August 2003, unpublished paper. 
• Economic Growth Small Grants by Intermediate Result December 2001-August 
2003, unpublished paper. 
 
AusAID 
• AusAID. 2001, The Australian Aid Program in East Timor, June 2001, 
Canberra. 
• AusAID. 2004, East Timor NGO Capacity Building Scheme: Summary Report, 
March 2004, Dili. 
 
CANADA  
• Canadian International Development Agency. East Timor Programme 
Summary, June 2001. 
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UNDP and related UN agencies 
• UNDP. 1999, Capacity Building for National NGOs: Project Document, Project 
Code: ET/99/002, UNDP, Dili. 
• Walsh, P. 2000, All the King’s Horses and all the King’s Men…. Report on 
East Timor NGO Capacity Building Project, Dili, 14 June. 
• UNDP. 2000, Strengthening East Timorese Civil Society, UNDP Project 
Document, final draft, 9 October 2000. 
• UNDP. Strengthening the role of Civil Society Organisations in East Timor, 
Project Concept Paper, Draft, May 2002, unpublished paper. 
• UNDP and UN Volunteers. 2006, Vacancy Announcement: Project Evaluation 
Mission. Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in 
local and national development processes for achievement of the MDGs in 
Timor-Leste (The CSO Support Project).  
• Project Fact Sheet Civil Society (CSO) Support Project, UNDP, Timor-Leste. 
• UNIFEM in East Timor, http://www.unifem-eseasia.org/country/timor.htm. 
• Shires, D. and Crawford, J., 2000, Report and recommendations arising from 
field trip to assess training needs for NGOs in East Timor regions 12-17 July 
2000, UNICEF and Capacity International. 
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